Deep seabed regime : Africa's contribution to its evolution and system of mining by Egede, Edwin
THE DEEP SEABED REGIME: AFRICA’S 
CONTRIBUTION TO ITS EVOLUTION AND 
SYSTEM OF MINING.
EDWIN EGEDE
A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF WALES IN FULFILMENT 
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY. 
MAY 2005
i
UMI Number: U584744
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U584744
Published by ProQuest LLC 2013. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
DECLARATION
This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not 
being concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree.
(candidate)Signed
Date
STATEMENT 1
This thesis is the result of my own investigations, except where otherwise stated.
Other Sources are acknowledged by footnotes giving explicit references. A 
bibliography is appended.
Signed (candidate)
oDate
STATEMENT 2
I hereby give consent for my thesis, if accepted, to be available for photocopying and 
for inter-library loan, and for the title and summary to be made available to outside 
organisations.
Signed (candidate)
Date
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Robin Churchill for his constructive 
and helpful supervision. I particularly appreciate his valuable criticism and 
suggestions during the preparation and completion of this thesis.
I received much support and assistance from various sources including my immediate 
family. First, I would like to thank my wife, Hephzibah for her unflinching support 
and love. Special thanks to my mother, Mrs. Julie Egede, my parents-in-law, 
Professor and Professor (Mrs.) J.P Clark- Bekederemo, my grandmother, Mama 
Leticia Ogunbanjo (of blessed memory) and to my siblings, Kenneth, Evelyn and 
Rita. I am also grateful to my father, Mr. Charles Egede (of blessed memory) who 
always encouraged me to attain my dreams and aspirations.
I will like to acknowledge the financial assistance provided towards my initial travel 
and living expenses. I am particularly grateful to Mr. Jim Ovia (CEO of Zenith Bank 
Pic), Pastor Ben Akabueze, Pastor Sola Balogun and Mr. Gbenga Biobaku. I also 
thank Professor Yemi Osibajo (the Attorney General of Lagos State) for his support 
and encouragement.
Finally, I thank my Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ for His constant love and care. 1 am 
eternally indebted to Him and dedicate this thesis to His glory and praise.
SUMMARY OF THESIS
This thesis seeks to add to the existing literature by specifically attempting to examine 
from an African perspective, the regime of the Area, having regard to the changes 
introduced by the 1994 Agreement. It seeks to explore what Africa’s contribution to 
the evolution and development of the regime was and to place this contribution in the 
context of certain historical, social, political and economic factors not only before and 
during Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), but 
also after the coming into force of Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC) 1982, as well 
as the 1994 New York Implementation Agreement. Further, the thesis seeks to 
suggest that for African states the regime went beyond a mere set of legal rules, but 
rather had undertones that epitomise the recurring antagonism in international law and 
politics between the African states, as part of the developing states of the south, and 
the developed industrialised states of the north. In addition, the thesis considers the 
degree of African participation in the regime, and the possible hindrances to the actual 
participation of African states in deep seabed mining activities and the prospects of 
such participation in the near future.
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INTRODUCTION
Africa.
Africa is the second largest of the seven continents on earth.1 For the purposes of this 
thesis it includes not only the continental African states, but also the fringe island states 
of Cape Verde, Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Sao Tome and Principe and 
Seychelles.2 There are 54 states in the continent, of which 39 are coastal states with 
coastlines of varying lengths,3 while 15 are landlocked developing countries (LLDCs).4 
The state with the longest coastline is Madagascar (4,828km), while the Democratic 
Republic of Congo has the shortest (37km). Of the states in the continent 34 are classified 
as least developed countries (LDCs),5 while 6 are small island developing states (SIDs).6 
Although Africa consists of different states at varying stages of development, both 
coastal and landlocked, sometimes distinguished as Africa north and south of the Sahara,
1 Asia is the largest Continent.
2 See Art. 1(2) of the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity, 479 UNTS 39; 2 ILM (1963)766. 53 of 
the states were members of OAU. Morocco, the only state that was not a member o f OAU, withdrew in 
1985 following the admittance into OAU of Western Sahara (now the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic) 
in 1984. The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic is not listed in the table of the United Nations Ocean 
Affairs Division on the status of the LOSC and the 1994 Agreement because it is not a member of the 
United Nations. The O.A.U has since 2001 been replaced by the African Union (AU) established by the 
Constitutive Act of the African Union, which was adopted 11 July 2000 and came into force on 26 May 
2001. See http://w w w. afric a- uni on. org/home/W el come .htm [Accessed on 7 September 2004].
Presently, like the OAU, there are 53 member states of the AU. (Morocco is not a member).
3 Algeria (998); Angola (1600); Benin (121); Cameroon (402); Cape Verde (965); Comoros (340); 
Democratic Republic o f Congo (37); Republic of Congo (169); Cote d’Ivoire (515); Djibouti (314); Egypt 
(2450); Equatorial Guinea (296); Eritrea (2,234 total- mainland on Red Sea, 1151 and Islands on Red Sea, 
1083); Gabon (885); Gambia (80); Ghana (539); Guinea (320);Guinea-Bissau (350);Kenya (536);Liberia 
(579);Libya (1770);Madagascar (4828);Mauritania (754);Mauritius (177);Morocco (1835);Mozambique 
(2470);Namibia (1572);Nigeria (853);Sao Tome & Principe (209); Senegal (531); Seychelles (491); Sierra 
Leone (402); Somalia (3025); South Africa (2798); Sudan (853); Tanzania (1424); Togo (56); Tunisia
(1148) and Western Sahara (1110). All the lengths are calculated in Kilometres (Km). Figures from C.I.A -  
The World Factbook 2004. See http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html [Accessed 26 
August 2004].
4 Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, 
Niger, Rwanda, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. See list o f Landlocked Developing Countries. 
http://www.un.org/special-rep/ohrlls/lldc/list.htm [Accessed on 29 September 2004].
5 Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, 
Democratic Republic o f Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea- 
Bissau, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome 
and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Uganda, Tanzania and Zambia. See list o f 
Least Developed Countries http://www.un.org/special-rep/ohrlls/ldc/list.htm [Accessed on 29 September 
2004].
6 Cape Verde, Comoros, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritius, Sao Tome and Principe and Seychelles. See list of 
Small Island Developing States http://www.un.org/special-rep/ohrlls/sid/list.htm [Accessed on 29 
September 2004].
1
these states located in the continent, along with the fringe island states mentioned above, 
regard themselves as a bloc, especially under the auspices of the Organisation of African 
Unity (O.A.U), now replaced by the African Union (AU).7 Over the years these states
o
have become recognised at various international forums as the African grouping.
Africa is bounded on the north by the Mediterranean Sea, the Atlantic Ocean on the west,
the Red Sea on the north-east and the Indian Ocean on the south-east.9 The sea, with its
multifunctional use, is therefore of great significance to the continent. It provides a link
for transportation and trade between various coastal states, both within and outside
Africa.10 Also through fishing it serves as a source of food, contributing greatly to the
protein content of the diet of the various indigenous peoples of Africa.11 Further, the
tremendous offshore mineral resources of certain African coastal states provide much-
12needed income for the development of these states.
7 See Moneim Hefhy, A., “A regional perspective: Africa and the Law of the Sea Convention” in Vidas, D., 
& Ostreng, W., (eds.), Order fo r the Oceans at the Turn o f the Century, (The Hague/London/Boston, 
Kluwer Law International, 1999) p.365 at 366. See also Doombos, M., “The African State in Academic 
Debate: Retrospect and Prospect”, (1990) 28(2) The Journal o f Modern African Studies, p. 179 at 180-183, 
where the author points out that, despite the demographic and socio-economic differences, as well as 
variations in political and ideological orientation in different states in Africa, there are significant common 
characteristics justifying the examination of these various states as one whole. For an analysis of the 
common interests that acted as a unifying force for the African bloc at the Third United Nations Conference 
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), see section 2.1.6 of chapter two of this thesis.
8 For example, see the United Nations Organisation and the International Seabed Authority.
9 Rembe, N, Africa and the International Law o f the Sea, (Alphen aan den Rijn, the Netherlands, Sijthoff & 
Noordhoff, 1980), p.3.
10 Recently archaeologists from UCLA and the University o f Delaware have uncovered evidence indicating 
sea trade involving spices and other exotic cargo between India and Egypt during the Roman Empire. See 
http://www.popiilar-science.net/historv/india egvpt trade route.html/ [Accessed 26 August 2004].
11 Akintoba, T.O., African States and Contemporary International Law: A Case Study o f the 1982 Law o f  
the Sea Convention and the Exclusive Economic Zone (The Hague/Boston/London, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1997), pp. 106-125.
12See Rona P.A., “Resources of the Sea Floor”, Science Magazine, vol.299, issue 5607, 31 January 2003, 
pp.673-674 http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/reprint/299/5607/673.pdf [Accessed on 28 September 2004]; 
West Africa Offshore, http://wn.eom/s/westafricaoffshore/ [Accessed on 28 September 2004]. For instance 
it is estimated that the recoverable oil reserves in the Nigerian deepwater area range from eight to nearly 20 
billion barrels. See http://www.mbendi.co.za/indv/oilg/ogus/af/ng/pQ005.htmfAccessed 26 August 2004]. 
Also see Rao, P.S., “Offshore Natural Resources: an Evaluation of African Interests”, (1972) 12 Indian 
Journal o f International Law, pp.345-367 and on the West African coast see generally Underwood, P.O., 
“Ocean Boundaries and Resource Development in West Africa” in Johnston, D.M., & Saunders, P.M., 
(eds.), Ocean Boundary Making: Regional Issues and Developments (London/New York/Sydney, Croom 
Helm 1988), pp.229-267.
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In terms of adverse memories, the sea also plays a role in two landmark events in African 
history - the slave trade and colonialism. The sea served as a slave trade route by which 
many Africans were carted off as slaves to other continents. It was also through the sea 
that the colonisers came to colonise and subjugate the continent. These twin events of the 
slave trade and colonialism have radically affected the African continent and the effects 
are still being felt presently.13
In the context of international law, the issues concerning the sea provided one of the 
avenues for newly emergent African states to challenge the existing status quo of 
international law and relations.14
Literature Review
African states made significant contributions to the evolution and development of the 
regime of the deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction (the Area), the subject matter of 
this thesis. This innovative regime was one of the main reasons for the convening of the 
Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III). The deep seabed 
regime, as contained in Part XI of the Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC) 1982 15 and the 
New York Implementation Agreement 1994,16 introduced rather intricate rules to regulate 
the Area.
There has been extensive literature on the LOSC, including a number analysing the deep 
seabed regime. 17 The challenge in writing this thesis, therefore, was not a dearth of 
materials, but rather the task of sifting through a vast number of materials with a view to 
deducing those especially relevant to the topic of the thesis, which is specifically to 
examine the role of African states in the evolution and development of the regime. Such 
literature include materials focused on a general study of this regime, an example being
13 On the effect of colonialism on African boundaries see generally Brownlie, I., African Boundaries: A 
Legal and Diplomatic Encyclopaedia (London, C.Hurst and Co.Publishers Ltd, 1979).
14 See Miles, E., “The Structure and Effects of the Decision Process in the Seabed Committee and the Third 
United Nations Conference on the Law o f the Sea”(1977) 31(2) International Organization, pi 59 at 162 
and generally, Friedheim, R.L., Negotiating the New Ocean Regime (South Carolina, University of South 
Carolina Press, 1993), pp.220-263.
15 21 ILM 1245(1982).
16 33 ILM 1309(1994).
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E.D. Brown’s book, Sea-Bed Energy and Minerals: The International Legal Regime, 
Volume 2, Sea-Bed Mining (2001/ This book appears to be the most recent extensive and 
detailed study of the regime. It examines the background leading to the regime, the whole 
concept of the common heritage of mankind, the specific provisions of the regime 
contained in Part XI of LOSC as modified by the 1994 Agreement and the work of the 
Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) and the institutional framework and activities of the 
International Seabed Authority (ISA) as at 2001 when the book was written. Though this 
book served as a very important resource material, the present thesis differs from 
Brown’s book to the extent that it seeks to examine this regime not from a general 
perspective, but rather a regional perspective. The thesis specifically seeks to examine the 
regime from the perspective of African states. In so doing, the thesis seeks to pinpoint the 
underlying factors that influenced and possibly still influence the attitude of African 
states towards this regime, as well as certain peculiar problems or limitations faced by 
these states in actual participation in this regime. Inevitably this thesis, in looking at this 
regime from an African perspective, considering that the whole approach of African 
states to the evolution of the regime was to challenge the status quo, also differs from 
Brown’s study which, in many respects, examines the regime from the standpoint of 
developed industrialised states. This can particularly be discerned from his stance on 
whether seabed mining of the Area was one of the freedoms of the high seas, and whether 
the common heritage of mankind principle, in view of the various resolutions supporting 
it in the 1960s and 1970s, assumed the status of customary international law. As far as 
Brown is concerned, until the 1994 Agreement that ended the conflict between the 
principle of freedom of the high seas and the principle of the common heritage of 
mankind, seabed mining amounted to one of the freedoms of the high seas. He is also of 
the view that prior to the 1994 Agreement the principle of the common heritage of 
mankind incorporated in its original form in Part XI did not amount to customary 
international law binding on non-parties.18 Earlier works in support of the developed, 
industrialised states’ viewpoint include Kronmiller, Theodore G., The Lawfulness o f 
Deep Seabed Mining, Volumes 1 and 2 (1980) and Schmidt, Markus G, Common
17 See Bibliography.
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Heritage or Common Burden? The United States Position on the Development o f a 
Regime for Deep sea-bed Mining in the Law o f the Sea Convention (1989), both books 
concentrating on the position of the United States of America towards this regime. These 
books can be contrasted with two studies, namely, Said Mahmoudi, The Law o f the Deep 
Sea-Bed Mining: A Study o f the Progressive Development o f International Law 
Concerning the Management o f the Polymetallic Nodules o f the Deep Sea-Bed (1987) 
and Yuwen Li, Transfer o f Technology for the Deep Sea-Bed Mining: The 1982 Law o f 
the Sea Convention and Beyond (1994). The latter books take the view that seabed 
mining did not fall under the freedom of the high seas and that the common heritage of 
mankind was a new creation to govern a part of the sea not regulated by the traditional 
international law. Both Mahmoudi and Yuwen Li were also of the view that the common 
heritage of mankind principle assumed the status of customary international law as a 
result of the overwhelming support of the various United Nations General Assembly 
Resolutions, especially the Declaration of Principles Resolution 2749(XXV) of 1970.19 
These books, though having an emphasis, in the case of Mahmoudi, on polymettalic 
nodules and that of Yuwen Li on transfer of technology, are both general studies of the 
regime. Mahmoudi’s book, written in 1987, when the LOSC had been adopted but had 
not yet come into force, is limited to materials before the 1994 Agreement. Yuwen Li’s 
book, written in 1994, when the 1994 Agreement was adopted but yet to come into force, 
includes materials covering also the Agreement. The present thesis, written at a time 
when the Agreement has come into force and there is a near universal ratification of the 
LOSC, differs from these studies in not being a general study, but rather a region specific 
one, looking at the peculiar position of African states in relation to the regime.
There is also literature looking at the regime from the perspective of developing states. 
For example, R.P. Anand’s The Legal Regime o f the Sea-Bed and the Developing
18 Brown, E.D., Sea-Bed Energy and Minerals: The International Legal Regime, Volume 2, Sea-Bed 
Mining (The Hague/Boston/London, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2001), pp. 14-46.
19 Mahmoudi, S., The Law o f the Deep Sea-Bed Mining: A Study o f the Progressive Development o f  
International Law Concerning the Management o f the Polymetallic Nodules o f the Deep Sea-Bed 
("Stockholm, Sweden, Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1987),pp.85-168 and Yuwen,Li, Transfer o f  
Technology fo r the Deep Sea-Bed Mining: The 1982 Law o f the Sea Convention and Beyond 
(Dordrecht/Boston/London, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994),pp. 11-60.
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Countries (1976) examines the deep seabed regime from the point of view of developing 
states, of which African states are a part, but is limited to the position before and during 
UNCLOS III up to the time that the book was written. Since it was written prior to the 
adoption and coming into force of both the LOSC and the 1994 Agreement, the book is 
limited to an examination of the factors that led to the UNCLOS III and the negotiations 
at this Conference up to the time of the author’s writings. Further, though developing 
states do have certain common interests, as reflected in the unity of purpose of the Group 
of 77 on the regime of the Area at the UNCLOS III, the current situation, revealing an 
active participation of certain Asian developing states in deep seabed mining activities in 
contrast with the non-participation of developing African states, discloses that the 
challenges confronting the latter states are not exactly synonymous with those facing the 
former states. For instance, the recent article by Keyuan Zou, “China’s Efforts in Deep 
Sea-Bed Mining: Law and Practice”(2003),20 reveals that China, a developing Asian state 
and a pioneer investor in seabed mining activities, is at present not only actively engaged 
in seabed mining activities but is taking steps to consolidate and build upon its present 
position. Though African states can clearly learn from the experiences and expertise of 
Asian seabed mining developing states, there is a clear difference in status as regards the 
regime. This therefore points to a need for a separate work, like this thesis, specifically 
directed towards examining the regime from the viewpoint of African states.
There are also materials that generally examine African states’ contributions to the law of 
the sea, and look cursorily at the issue of the deep seabed. Such literature includes 
Penelope Simoes Ferreira’s article, “The Role of African States in the development of the 
Law of the Sea at the Third United Nations Conference”(1979);21 Nasila Rembe’s book, 
Africa and the International Law o f the Sea: A Study o f the Contribution o f the African 
States to the Third United Nations Conference on the Law o f the Sea (1980) and Barbara 
Kwiatkowska, “Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea in Africa: Towards the 21st 
Century” (1993).22 This literature, in its examination of the deep seabed is not sufficiently 
detailed and is written before the Part XI provisions, and the momentous 1994 Agreement
20 (2003)18(4), The International Journal o f Marine and Coastal Law, pp.481-508.
21 (1979) 7(1-2) Ocean Development and International Law, pp.89-129.
22 (1993) 17(1) Marine Policy, pp.l 1-43.
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modifying the original Part XI provisions, came into force. Also there is the article of 
Richard Payne, “African Economic Problems and the African Position on the Law of the 
Sea in Relation to Manganese Nodules” (1980).23 The article analyses certain political, 
ideological and economic factors that influenced Africa’s position on manganese nodules 
in the Area, but again this article, written in the 1980s, is limited to materials before the 
adoption of the LOSC in 1982 and also the 1994 Agreement that introduced fundamental 
changes to the regime. A more recent book on the law of the sea and African states, 
namely Tayo Akintoba, African States and Contemporary International Law: A Case 
Study o f the 1982 Law o f the Sea Convention and the Exclusive Economic Zone (1997), 
though having a very useful chapter examining the history of the law of the sea from an 
African point of view, deals with a different regime, the Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ).24 The EEZ, falling within national jurisdiction and not the common heritage of 
mankind, is subject to a totally different set of rules from the Area.
Aim o f thesis
This thesis seeks to add to the existing literature by specifically attempting to look at the 
regime of the Area, having regard to the changes introduced by the 1994 Agreement, 
from an African perspective. As a result of certain similar interests of developing states, 
of which Africa is part, in the law of the sea generally and the regime of the Area, the 
discussion will in some regards reflect the position of not only African states but also 
other developing states,25 but for the most part the thesis is intended to particularly focus 
on the position of Africa in relation to this regime. A position, which reveals that Africa, 
after a very enthusiastic support of the whole idea of the regime at the UNCLOS III, is 
not presently participating in actual deep seabed mining activities. This thesis therefore 
seeks to examine why this is so. In so doing the thesis will seek to examine what Africa’s
23 (1980) 15 The Journal o f Developing Areas, pp.21-42.
24 See Chapter V of LOSC.
25 See the Group of 77(G-77). This group was established on 15th June 1964 and is the largest Third World 
Coalition in the United Nations. Anand has described it as “.... a consortium of developing countries...”
See Anand, R.P., International Law and the Developing Countries: Confrontation or Co-operation? 
(Dordrecht/Lancaster, Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), p.l 11. It is currently made up of 133 members but the 
original name was retained because of its historic significance. Out of the 133 members about 51 are 
African nations, http://www.g77.org/main/gen info 1 .htm[Accessed 26 August 2004].
See Elias, T., New Horizons in International Law (2nd revised edition), (Dordrecht/Boston/London, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992,), pp.65-88.
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contribution to the evolution and development of the regime was and to place this 
contribution in the context of certain historical, social, political and economic factors not 
only before and during UNCLOS III but also after the coming into force of LOSC 1982, 
as well as the 1994 Agreement. Further, the thesis also seeks to suggest that for African 
states the regime went beyond a mere set of legal rules, but rather had undertones that 
epitomise the recurring antagonism in international law and politics between the African 
states, as part of the developing states of the south, and the developed industrialised states 
of the north.26 This point is reflected in the statement of Bamela Engo, an African and 
chairman of the first committee of the UNCLOS III, mandated to examine the deep 
seabed issues:27
"...we are not here merely to write a business arrangement to facilitate 
exploitation o f the sea-bed resources by the industrially rich and powerful 
nations. We are here to design a new relationship among states and between 
them and the International Sea-Bed Authority we seek to establish to ensure 
that the declared common heritage benefits all o f mankind. ”
The thesis considers whether these aspirations of African states were met. Finally, the 
thesis considers the degree of African participation in the regime, and the possible 
hindrances to the actual participation of African states in deep seabed mining activities 
and the prospects of such participation in the near future.
Structure of thesis
The thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter one seeks to analyse the role of African 
states in delimiting the Area and examines the mineral potential of the Area. Chapter two 
examines historically the contribution of African states to the development and evolution 
of the regime of the Area. It also examines whether the bedrock of the regime, the 
common heritage of mankind principle, as contained in the LOSC and 1994 Agreement, 
has become part of customary international law. Chapter three then proceeds to examine
26 See Barile, G., “The Way of Negotiating At The Third United Nations Conference On The Law O f The 
Sea”, in Rozakis, C & Stephanou C (eds.), The New Law O f The Sea, (Amsterdam, Netherlands Elsevier 
Science Publishing Company B.V, 1983), pp. 21-31; Koskenniemi, M., and Lehto M., “The Privilege of 
Universality- International Law, Economic Ideology and Seabed Resources,” (1996) 65 Nordic Journal of  
International Law, pp.533-555.
27 See Report to the Plenary by the Chairman o f the First Committee, Mr Paul Bamela Engo (United 
Republic of Cameroon), UNCLOS III, Official Record Vol. X,p.l8
the provisions of the LOSC retained by the 1994 Agreement and those provisions 
changed by the Agreement with a view to pinpointing how they affect African states. 
Chapter four examines the institutions of the regime as established by Part XI of the 
LOSC and the 1994 Agreement and seeks to identify the influence of African states in 
terms of membership, decision-making and financing. Chapter five examines the system 
of mining in the Area under the LOSC, 1994 Agreement and the Mining Code 2000, as 
well as certain relevant provisions of the Mining Code and the proposed rules on the 
system of mining polymetallic sulphides and cobalt crusts, vis-a-vis African states. As a 
result of the distributive role of the ISA under Article 82, the chapter also has a section on 
the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles and the system of exploitation in relation 
to African states. Chapter six thereafter proceeds to examine the problems hindering the 
participation of African states in seabed mining activities and prospects for overcoming 
such hindrances. Finally chapter seven, the conclusion, summarises the prior six chapters, 
identifying certain findings, and also volunteers certain recommendations which, in the 
view of the writer, would encourage the participation of African states in deep seabed 
mining activities.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE SCOPE OF THE REGIME OF THE AREA AND AFRICAN STATES.
The determination of the limits of the Area, as distinct from the seabed and subsoil within 
national jurisdiction, is crucial for the purposes of determining where the regime applies. 
African coastal states, 39 in number, have a role to play in determining the limits of the 
Area by ascertaining the outer limits of their continental shelves as required by the 
provisions of LOSC. This chapter starts off by examining what part of the seabed 
constitutes- the Area and then proceeds to examine the geographical scope of the Area and 
the role of African states in demarcating the Area. Thereafter it examines the possible 
economic significance of the Area.
1.1. The Area.
The “Area” means “the sea-bed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof beyond the limits o f 
national jurisdiction. ” 1 This is distinguished from the seabed and subsoil within national 
jurisdiction consisting of the territorial sea, exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and 
continental shelf.2 The Area commences beyond the continental shelf and consists of the 
generally flat areas of the deep ocean floor, mountain ranges, ridges and deep trenches 
that usually start at the 3000 to 5000 metre depth.3
In the tradition of trade-offs, which characterised the whole of UNCLOS III, resulting in 
the LOSC 82, states were allowed a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles in certain 
instances. This, along with the new concept of the EEZ, had the effect of incorporating 
into national jurisdiction what would otherwise have been part of the Area and thereby 
reducing the resources, which would have been the common heritage of mankind.4
1 See Art.l (1) of LOSC 82. For further reading on the Area , see Ogley, R., Internationalizing the Seabed, 
(Aldershot, England, Gower Publishing Company Limited, 1984),pp.4-30; Mahmoudi,S., The Law o f Deep 
Sea-Bed Mining -  A Study o f the Progressive Development o f  International Law Concerning Management 
o f the Polymetallic Nodules o f  the Deep sea-bed,( Stockholm, Sweden , Almqvist & Wilksell 
International, 1987), pp.26-36.
2 See Arts 2(1) and (2) (territorial sea); 55, 56(1) and 57(EEZ); and 76(1) (continental shelf) of LOSC 82.
3 Ogley, op.cit.pp.4-5 and Mahmoudi, op.cit.p.27.
4 See Arts.76 (4)-(6) and Part V of LOSC.
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1.2. Geographical scope o f the Area.
The definition of the Area in itself incorporates the idea of the outer limit of the 
continental shelf since the area beyond the limits of national jurisdiction will only be 
known if the outer limit of the continental shelf is identified.5 For the regime of the Area 
to be effective, there has to be clear indications of where national jurisdiction ends and 
where the Area commences.6 The continental shelf begins beyond the territorial sea and 
extends throughout the natural prolongation of the coastal state’s land territory to the 
outer edge of the continental margin or to a distance of 200 nautical miles if the outer 
edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance.7 According to Judge 
Shigeru Oda in the Case concerning the Continental Shelf (Libya/Malta): 8 “...the 
concept o f natural prolongation for the continental shelf was suggested with a view to 
defining the International Sea-bed area. ”
Under Article 76 of the LOSC the continental shelf of a coastal state could either extend 
to a distance of 200 nautical miles or beyond 200 nautical miles up to a maximum limit 
as provided in Convention.9 The continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles is governed 
by certain rather technical rules contained in the LOSC. Further, the baselines of the
5 See Arts. 1(1) and 134(3) and (4) of the LOSC. Section 1.2 of this thesis is an updated version of an 
earlier work of the author of this thesis. See Egede E., “The Outer Limits o f the Continental Shelf: African 
States and the 1982 Law o f the Sea Convention” (2004) 35 Ocean Development and International Law, 
pp. 157-178. Also on outer limits of the continental shelf, see generally Brown, E.D., Sea-Bed Energy and 
Minerals: The International Legal Regime, Vol. I (The Continental Shelf) (Dordrecht/Boston/London, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992), pp. 18-45. It must, however, be pointed out that the outer limit of the 
continental shelf may not be a border to the Area in the case of neighbouring states with opposite coasts, 
especially when the distance is less than 400 nautical miles.
6 For a historical perspective on the issue of the outer limit o f the continental shelf, see Ogley, op. cit. 
pp.98-133. Also see Judge Shigeru Oda’s dissenting opinions in Case concerning the Continental Shelf 
(Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) ICJ. Rep. 1982, p. 18 at pp. 173-197 and Case concerning the 
Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta) ICJ Rep.1985, p .13 at pp.151-156.
7 Art. 76(1). On UNCLOS III negotiations on Article 76, see generally Nordquist M., (ed.), United Nations 
Convention on the Law o f the Sea, 1982 - A Commentary, Vol.II (Dordrecht/Boston/London, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1993), pp.837-890.
8 Supra at p.l 54, para.55.
9 Art.76 (1) and (5) of LOSC. See Judge Shigeru Oda’s dissenting judgement in the Case concerning the 
Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya Arab Jamahiriya) I.C.J, supra, at pp.212-213, para. 101, where, 
commenting on the then draft Convention, he points out that the continental shelf is divided into two areas- 
that within 200 nautical miles and that beyond 200 nautical miles, and that for the latter some of the profits 
are dedicated to the international community, especially developing states.
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territorial sea play a very significant role in determining the outer limit of the continental 
shelf, not only to the distance of 200 nautical miles, but also in cases where the 
continental shelf extends beyond 200 nautical miles up to a maximum limit of 350 
nautical miles.
1.2.1. The Continental Shelf Beyond 200 nautical miles
The original position of African states was in favour of an Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ) which would totally subsume the whole idea of a continental shelf.10 However, at 
the end of the Conference, while the EEZ was incorporated into the LOSC,11 the 
continental shelf was also included.12 This situation therefore brings about an overlap 
between the EEZ and the continental shelf, where the latter does not extend beyond 200
1 3nautical miles.
Further, during the negotiations on the outer limit of the continental shelf at UNCLOS III,
African states were generally opposed to the extension of the outer limit beyond 200
nautical miles because of its reduction of the international area and resources therein that
would be subject to the common heritage of mankind.14 The Kenyan delegate criticised
the attempt to extend the outer limit beyond 200 nautical miles by observing:
"One o f the major weaknesses o f the concept o f the [continental] margin as 
the outer edge o f the area o f national jurisdiction was that neither the 
scientists nor its proponents were in a position to state with any degree o f 
certainty where the margin ended. It would be a tragedy i f  States were 
allowed to determine for themselves how fa r the natural prolongation o f their 
land territory extended, because they would then be tempted to claim areas in 
which there were valuable deposits, particularly hydrocarbons, and the 
International Sea-Bed Authority would be deprived o f all but the sea-bed
10 See paragraphs 6-10 of the 1974 Declaration of the Organisation of African Unity on the Issues of the 
Law of the Sea, Doc.A/CONF.62/33, UNCLOS III, Official Record Vol. Ill, pp.63-65 and Ferreira, P.S., 
“The Role of African States in the Development o f the Law o f the Sea at the Third United Nations 
Conference,” (1979) 7(1-2) Ocean Development and International Law, p.89 at 101-107.
11 Part V, Arts.55-75 of LOSC.
12 Part VI, Arts.76-85 of LOSC.
13 The ICJ in the Libya/Malta Case, Supra at p.33, para.33-34 points out “...the two institutions-continental 
shelf and exclusive economic zone -  are linked together in modem law.... [a]lthough there can be 
continental shelf where there is no exclusive economic zone, there cannot be an exclusive economic zone 
without a corresponding continental shelf.”
14 Nordquist, M., (ed.), United Nations Convention on the Law o f  the Sea, 1982 - A Commentary, vol. II, 
op.cit. pp. 845-847.
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minerals. I f  that happened, the Authority would not be able to generate 
sufficient revenues to assist developing countries. ” 15
Eventually at UNCLOS III African states conceded that broad-shelf states could extend
their continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. This concession was based on the
understanding that such states would make contributions or payments to the International
Seabed Authority (ISA) from mineral resource production in the shelf area beyond 200
nautical miles, to be used for the benefit of mankind, with special consideration to be
given to developing states.16 The statement of the Ghanaian representative at the
Conference, Mr Vanderpuye, captured the African compromise position:
"...international law could only impel, and since there was no means o f 
compelling those States to relinquish their hold on those areas o f the 
continental shelf outside the proposed 200-mile limit, [my] delegation would 
support any proposal aimed at the establishment o f an equitable system o f 
revenue sharing to ensure that the international community obtained some 
benefit from the exploitation o f what would otherwise have fallen within the 
international zone. ” 17
The idea of payments or contributions from production in this extended part of the 
continental shelf is to offer something in return for the concession to such extension, a 
kind of quid pro quo.li This was incorporated into the LOSC in Article 82 -  broad-shelf 
states are to make annual payments or contributions in kind at a specified rate from 
production in the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. The specified rate takes 
effect only after the first five years of exploitation.19 Developing states, which are net 
importers of a mineral resource produced from their continental shelf, are, however,
15 UNCLOS III, Official Records, Vol. II, p. 161, para. 17.
16 The original position of most African states at the Conference was based on the 1974 Declaration of the 
O.A.U which was that the EEZ of 200 nautical miles should replace the continental shelf concept and 
therefore national jurisdiction should be limited to 200 nautical miles. See UNCLOS III, Official Records, 
Vol. II, p. 160, paras. 1-2 (Gambia); ibid. p. 161, paras. 12-19 (Kenya); ibid. p. 163, paras. 32-36 (Tunisia); 
and ibid. p. 165, paras. 62-65 (Ghana). However, see Mauritius which appeared to have accepted that the 
EEZ should be without prejudice to the continental shelf, ibid. p. 163, para. 39.
17 UNCLOS III, Official Records, Vol. II, p.165, para. 65. See also the statement of the Mauritius 
representative, ibid. p. 163, para. 42.
18 Tonga described the payments or contributions as indicating a “guilty conscience” on the part of broad 
margin States. See UN press Release SEA/425, 4th March, 1981 cited in Brown, E.D., The International 
Law o f  the Sea (Aldershot, Dartmouth Publishing, 1994), at 146.
19 From the sixth year the rate of payment or contribution shall be 1 per cent and this progressively 
increases by an additional 1 per cent for each subsequent year until it stabilises at 7 per cent in the twelfth 
year. Production does not include resources used in connection with exploitation. Art. 82(2) of the LOSC.
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exempt from making such payments or contributions.20 These payments or contributions 
are to be made to the ISA, which is required to distribute them to states parties on the 
basis of an equitable sharing formula. In doing so, the ISA is required to take into account 
the interests and needs of developing states, particularly the least developed and the 
landlocked ones.21 Under the list of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) of the UN office 
of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing 
Countries and Small Island Developing States, 50 states are listed, of which 34 are 
African states.22 It is therefore expected that African states will particularly benefit in the 
event of any such distribution under Article 82.
The LOSC permits broad-shelf states to have a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical
miles up to a maximum limit of 350 nautical miles from their baselines or 100 nautical
miles from the 2,500-metre isobath with very technical details set out on how to establish
the outer limit.24 Article 76 provides:
“4(a) For the purposes o f this Convention, the coastal State shall establish 
the outer edge o f the continental margin wherever the margin extends beyond 
200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth o f the 
territorial sea is measured, by either:
(i) a line delineated in accordance with paragraph 7 by reference to the 
outermost fixed points at each o f which the thickness o f sedimentary rocks 
is at least 1 per cent o f the shortest distance from such point to the foot o f 
the continental slope; or
20 Art. 82(3) of the LOSC.
21 Art. 82(4) of the LOSC.
22 Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, 
Democratic Republic o f Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea 
Bissau, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome 
and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania and 
Zambia. See www.un. org/speci al-rep/ohrl ls/ldc/li st. htm [Accessed on 29 September 2004].
23 For more on Art. 82 of LOSC and African states, see section 5.1 of chapter five of this thesis.
24 See Art. 76 (5) and (6) of the LOSC. At UNCLOS III over 30 States were identified as potentially being 
able to extend their continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles and thereby utilise Article 76. These States 
are Angola, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Ecuador, Fiji, France, Guinea, Guyana,
Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Japan, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia, Myanmar, Namibia, 
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, the Russian Federation, Seychelles, South Africa, Spain, Suriname, 
United Kingdom, United States and Uruguay. See McDorman,T.L., “The Entry into Force of the 1982 LOS 
Convention and the Article 76 Outer Continental Shelf Regime”, (1995)10 The International Journal of 
Marine and Coastal Law(IJMCL), pp. 165-187 and “The Role of the Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf: A Technical Body in a Political World”, (2002)17 IJMCL, pp. 301-324 and 
Kwiatkowska, B.,“Creeping Jurisdiction beyond 200 miles in the Light of the 1982 Law o f the Sea 
Convention and State Practice,” (1991)22 Ocean Development and International Law, pp.153-187.
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(ii) a line delineated in accordance with paragraph 7 by reference to fixed 
points not more than 60 nautical miles from the foot o f the continental 
slope.
(b) In the absence o f evidence to the contrary, the foot o f the continental 
slope shall be determined as the point o f maximum change in the gradient at 
its base.
7. The coastal State shall delineate the outer limits o f its continental shelf 
where that shelf extends beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from 
which the breadth o f the territorial sea is measured, by straight lines not 
exceeding 60 nautical miles in length, connecting fixed points, defined by co­
ordinates o f latitude and longitude. ”
This wording reflects complicated methods of delineation known as the “Irish formula”25 
and the “Hedberg formula”26 to calculate the outer limits beyond 200 nautical miles.27 
Authors such as Professor Brown have criticised these highly technical methods. In his 
criticism Brown attacked the practicality of applying the Irish formula - Article 76(4) (a) 
(i). Relying on the criticism first noted by Professor Hedberg, he pointed out that the 
“thickness o f sediment” option is undesirable for, amongst other reasons, the fact that 
such thickness could not generally be determined with sufficient accuracy to meet the 
needs of a clear demarcation of national/international boundaries. This, he suggested, 
would lead to confusion and highly controversial outer limit situations. In further 
support of his criticisms he refers to a Secretariat study prepared for the UNCLOS III in 
1979, which indicated the considerable difficulties and costs involved in establishing the
29foot of the continental slope. There are unquestionably complexities involved in
25 Article76 (4) (a) (i) o f the LOSC. This was based on a complicated “informal suggestion” by Ireland in 
1978. See Ogley, op.cit. at p.l 19. Also see the exception to the Irish formula contained in the Statement of 
Understanding, adopted by UNCLOS III on 29th August, 1980, in favour of States like Sri Lanka with 
peculiar continental shelves.
26 Article76 (4) (a) (ii) o f the LOSC. This formula was named after Hollis Hedberg, an American geologist. 
See Smith,R.W. and Taft, G.,“Legal Aspects o f the Continental Shelf’, in Cook,P.J. and Carleton, C.M. 
(eds.), Continental Shelf Limits - The Scientific and Legal Interface, (New York, Oxford University Press, 
Inc., 2000), pp. 17 at 19.
27 On the possible implications of the two formulas, see “Study of the implications of preparing large-scale 
maps for the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea", Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.99, in 
Nordquist (ed.), United Nations Convention on the Law o f  the Sea, 1982- A Commentary, Vol.II, op.cit. at 
pp.887-889.
28 Brown, The International Law o f the Sea, op.cit. at p.143. Also, see generally Francalanci, G.P., 
“Technical Problems for the Commission on the Limits o f the Continental Shelf’, in Vidas, D and Ostreng, 
W.(eds.), Order for the Oceans at the Turn o f the Century,(The Hague/London/Boston, Kluwer Law 
International, 1999), pp.123-132.
29 Brown, ibid. at p. 143.
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30determining the exact limit of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, and 
whatever the apparent detail in the LOSC, the criteria and methods have been criticised 
as being imprecise.31
Studies have identified seven African states - Angola, Guinea, Madagascar, Mauritius, 
Namibia, Seychelles and South Africa - as being amongst those states with the potential
32to utilise extended continental shelf provisions under Article 76. Prescott has identified 
29 areas with potential claims to extended continental margin beyond 200 nautical miles, 
excluding Antarctica, which appears to include more African states.33 Kwiatkowska also 
names Ghana as being a state with a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. She 
points out that though Ghana has the potential to extend its continental shelf beyond 200 
miles; its 1986 Maritime Zones (Delimitation) Law claims a continental shelf only up to a 
maximum limit of 200 nautical miles.34 More recently, the report of the United Nations 
Secretary General to the fifty-ninth Session of the General Assembly indicates that 
Nigeria is also a broad-shelf state since it is reported that it would make its submissions 
before August 2005.35 The exact number of African broad-shelf states does not appear to
30 Article76 (5) of the LOSC.
31 See Mahmoudi, S., The Law o f Deep Sea-Bed Mining: A Study o f the Progressive Development o f 
International Law Concerning the Management of the Polymetallic Nodules o f  the Deep Sea-Bed, 
(Stockholm, Sweden: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1987), atpp.73-79.
32 See McDorman, “The Entry into Force of the 1982 LOS Convention and the Article 76 Outer 
Continental Shelf Regime,” op.cit at p. 167 and “The Role of the Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf: A Technical Body in a Political World”, op.cit at p. 323.
33 Prescott, V, “Resources of the Continental Margin and International Law”, in Cook and Carleton, (eds.) 
Continental Shelf Limits - The Scientific and Legal Interface, op.cit. at pp. 64 at 66-71, especially Figure 
5.3 and Table 5.1 therein. African states included in the areas identified by Prescott to have potential claims 
to continental margins beyond 200 nautical miles are Angola, Cape Verde, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, 
Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, 
Republic of Benin, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, 
Tanzania, Togo and Zaire. A 2004 United Nations press release estimates that there are between 30 and 60 
states that may qualify as broad-margin states, though it admitted that the actual number would only be 
determined as the CLCS examines the submissions o f coastal state. United Nations Press Release, 
SEA/1800 of 27 May 2004.
34 Kwiatkowska, B., “Commentary: Some Remarks on Africa, With Particular Reference to the State 
Practice of Ghana”, in T. Mensah, (ed.), Ocean Governance: Strategies and Approaches for the 21st 
Century, (Honolulu, Hawaii: The Law of the Sea Institute, University of Hawaii, 1996), pp. 511 at 520.
35 Para. 20 of the Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on Oceans and the Law of the Sea 
to the fifty-ninth session of the General Assembly-Addendum, A/59/62/Add. 1 of 18 August 2004. There is 
no legislative framework under Nigerian law defining the Nigerian continental shelf in line with Article 76 
of LOSC since the existing legislation , S. 14(1) of the Petroleum Act Cap.350, Laws of the Federation of 
Nigeria 1990, still defines the Nigerian continental shelf in terms of the 200 metres or depth of 
exploitability criteria under the 1958 Geneva Convention. However the depth of exploitability criterion
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be clear. The onus, therefore, is on any African state, which seeks to claim an extended 
continental shelf, to demonstrate to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental
36Shelf (CLCS) that its continental margin extends beyond the 200 nautical miles limit. 
All the African states parties to the LOSC with such an extended continental shelf are 
bound by the provisions of Article 76 paragraphs 4 to 8.
Those African states with a continental shelf exceeding 200 nautical miles are, as a first
step, to submit the particulars of their extended continental margin, along with supporting
scientific and technical data, to the CLCS. The CLCS then makes recommendations
based on these submissions to the submitting state. Article 76(8) indicates that the outer
limit of the continental shelf determined by a state “based on” the recommendation of the
CLCS “shall be final and binding.” In the 1992 Case concerning Delimitation o f
Maritime Areas between Canada and the French Republic (St. Pierre and Miquelon)
(Award),3* the arbitrators emphasised that it is the CLCS which has the exclusive
jurisdiction to consider and make recommendations on the continental shelf beyond 200
nautical. In the Award the tribunal said:
This court is not competent to carry out a delimitation which affects the 
rights o f a Party which is not before it. In this connection the court notes that 
in accordance with Article 76, paragraph 8 and Annex II o f the 1982 
Convention on the Law o f the Sea, a Commission is to be set up, under the 
title o f ’Commission on the Limits o f the Continental Shelf, to consider the 
claims and data submitted by coastal States and issue recommendations to 
them. In conformity with this provision, only ‘the limits o f the shelf 
established by a coastal State on the basis o f these recommendations shall be 
final and binding’.39
could be interpreted to encompass the continental margin. Other African states believed to be broad margin 
states are Cape Verde, Mozambique and Senegal. See the Workshop Report of the UNEP/GRID-Arendal 
International Workshop on Continental Shelf Delineation, March 30-April 2, 2003 held in Arendal,
Norway, http://www.continentalshelf.org/ documents/workshop%20report%20final.doc [Accessed on 20 
December 2004]
36 Para.2.2.3 of the Scientific and Technical Guidelines of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental 
Shelf, Doc.CLCS/11 of 13 May 1999.
37 Article76 (8) of the LOSC. See McDorman, "The Role of the Commission etc.”, op.cit at pp. 313-317.
38 95 International Law Reports, p. 645. For critical comments on this decision, see Boyle, A.E., “Dispute 
Settlement and the Law of the Sea Convention: Problems of Fragmentation and Jurisdiction”, (1997) 46 
ICLQ, p. 37 at 45-46.
39 International Law Reports, ibid. at p.674, paragraph 79.
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The CLCS is made up of technocrats representing various geographical regions and 
scientific disciplines, with powers under the Convention to make recommendations upon 
submissions made by broad-shelf states.40 However, this in itself raises some issues that 
are not clearly answered by the Convention. For example, it is difficult to determine the 
exact scope of the power of the CLCS vis-a-vis the submitting state. While the LOSC 
clearly acknowledges the sovereign power of a coastal state to determine the limits of its 
boundary lines,41 it goes on to say that such determination is to be the basis o f  the 
recommendations of the CLCS 42 It is not clear what will happen if the CLCS makes a 
recommendation unacceptable to the coastal state. Is the coastal state allowed to reject 
such recommendation? What is the effect of such a rejection? Will it mean that the 
submission of the coastal state would be invalid and not recognised under international 
law? In cases of a disagreement between the coastal state and the CLCS, what is the 
machinery for settling such a dispute? Is it the procedure under Part XV of the LOSC?43 
In the event of such dispute, can the ISA, as the custodian of the Area, indicate an 
intention to join as a party to any settlement procedure as an interested party?
Mahmoudi suggests, and rightly in this writer’s view, that any unilateral act of a coastal 
state which is not on the basis of the recommendation of the CLCS may not gain 
international recognition and would not be considered as final.44 This is in line with 
Article 76(8), as a contrary view would reduce the CLCS to a powerless and toothless
40 Article 2 of Annex II of the LOSC states that the Commission is to consist of 21 experts in the field of 
geology, geophysics or hydrography appointed for five years in their personal capacities from nationals of 
State Parties with such appointment reflecting geographical representation. On 23 April 2002, the twelfth 
meeting of the State Parties to the Law of the Sea Convention elected 21 members of the Commission for a 
term of five years commencing from 16th June 2002. Three of the members are from Africa -  Awosika, 
Lawrence Folajimi (Nigeria); Betah, Samuel Sona (Cameroon) and Fagoonee, Indurlall (Mauritius). See 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs new/commission members.htm#Members [Accessed 17 December 
2004]. It is interesting that there is no provision for lawyers to be members of the Commission considering 
that they have to apply the LOSC, a treaty. Also it is interesting that the ISA is not in anyway represented 
in the Commission though they remain a very interested party in the determination of the outer limits for 
the purpose of determining the scope of the Area.
41 Article76 (8) of the LOSC.
42 On the possible implications of coastal States establishing the limits of their shelf “on the basis” of the 
Commission’s recommendations, see Brown, E.D., Seabed Energy and Minerals: The International Legal 
Regime, Vol.l: The Continental Shelf (Dordrecht/Boston/London, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992), 
pp.29-31 and McDorman, “The Role of the Commission etc”, op.cit. at pp. 313-317.
43 See Brown, The International Law o f  the Sea, op.cit. pp.144-145 and Mahmoudi, op.cit.,pp. 76-77. See 
also McDorman, ibid. at pp. 301-324.
44 Mahmoudi, ibid. p. 78.
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body, which would defeat the clear intention of the Convention in trying to attain 
certainty of such outer limits. It has been suggested that, in the light of Article 8 of Annex 
II, when there is a disagreement between the coastal state and the CLCS, a “ping-pong” 
procedure is created, whereby when the CLCS rejects an unacceptable submission, the 
coastal state has to go back and make a revised or new submission until there is a 
convergence.45 However, this raises the issue of whether this “ping-pong” can go on ad 
infinitum, or whether there is a definite end point considering that the LOSC, by making 
provision for submissions to be made within 10 years of the entry of the Convention for 
the submitting state, shows a clear intention for such issues of the outer limit to be 
resolved within a reasonable time frame 46
Where there is no convergence between the CLCS and the submitting state, can there be 
recourse to the compulsory settlement of dispute mechanism in Part XV?47 It is doubtful 
that the Part XV dispute settlement mechanism would normally be available, in the event 
of a disagreement between the CLCS and the submitting state, since the way and manner 
Part XV is couched gives the impression that generally the dispute settlement procedures, 
except in certain exceptional cases, apply as between states parties. The CLCS, 
obviously, not being a state party, would not as a general rule be in a position to avail 
itself of or be a party under the dispute settlement mechanism of Part XV. However, 
there are certain exceptions; for example, the International Tribunal for the Law of the 
Sea (ITLOS) can hear disputes involving entities other than states. Article 20 of Annex 
VI, after stating in paragraph 1 that the Tribunal is open to states parties, goes on in 
paragraph 2 to provide:
45 See McDoman, “The Entry into Force etc.”, op.cit. at p. 178.
46 See Article 4 of Annex II of the LOSC.
47 See generally Oude Elferink, A.G., “The Continental Shelf beyond 200 nautical miles: The Relationship 
between the CLCS and Third Party Dispute Settlement,” in Oude Elferink, A.G. and Rothwell, D.R. (eds.), 
Ocean Management in the 21st Century: Institutional Frameworks and Responses, (The Netherlands, 
Koninklijke Brill NV, 2004), pp. 107-124.
48 See International Law Association, New Delhi Conference (2002), and Berlin Conference (2004) Reports 
of the Committee on Legal Issues of the Outer Continental Shelf, at p. 6 and pp.7-12 respectively, available 
at http://www.ila-hq.org/html/lavout committee.htm [Accessed 23 June 2003 and 18 January 2005 
respectively] and McDorman, "The Role of the Commission etc", op.cit. at pp. 317-319.
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“The Tribunal shall be open to entities other than States Parties in any case 
expressly provided for in Part X I or in any case submitted pursuant to any 
other a2reement conferring jurisdiction on the Tribunal which is accepted by 
all the parties to that case. ”(Emphasis added)
In the light of this provision it is arguable that the ITLOS would have jurisdiction if the 
CLCS and the coastal state were to agree. Although the ITLOS might be utilised in the 
event of a protracted disagreement between the CLCS and a submitting state, the 
significance of the role of the CLCS, which would assume more prominence as more 
states make submissions, should have led to the inclusion in the Convention of explicit 
provisions- on dispute settlement to deal with sustained disagreement between the CLCS 
and a submitting state if the “ping-pong” procedure fails to bring about a convergence.
States parties, including African states, were originally required by LOSC to make 
submissions on their extended continental shelf within 10 years of the entry into force of 
the Convention for that state.49 However, at the Eleventh Meeting of the states parties to 
the Convention (SPLOS) in 2001, a decision was taken that the commencement period 
for calculating the 10-year period for states, which became parties to the Convention 
before 13 May 1999 (when the Commission adopted its scientific and technical 
guidelines), would be 13 May 1999.50 Broad-shelf African states that became states 
parties to LOSC before 13 May 1999 are therefore required to make submissions within 
10 years from that date, while those that became parties to the Convention after this date 
would be required to make submissions 10 years from the date they became parties.
Thus far, no African state has made a submission to the CLCS. The complicated 
procedure for determining the outer limit beyond 200 nautical miles, which requires
49 Article 4 of Annex II of the LOSC.
50 See Para. 81 of the Report of the Eleventh Meeting o f the States Parties to the Law of the Sea Convention 
(SPLOS), SPLOS/73 of 14 June 2001. Recently, however, Law Ministers of Small Commonwealth 
Jurisdictions, concerned about the impending deadline of 2009 for a number of Small Commonwealth 
Jurisdictions, and noting the expense and expertise required to make the submissions within the time limit, 
have recommended that all Commonwealth member states be encouraged to lobby the General Assembly 
and the SPLOS for an extension of the 2009 deadline. See Meeting of Law Ministers of Small 
Commonwealth Jurisdictions- Final Communique, 22 October 2004
http://www.thecommonwealth.org/Templates/Intemal.asp?Nodef D=141082&PrintFriendly=True 
[Accessed on 20 December 2004].
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advanced marine technology, will certainly be a challenge to broad-shelf African states.51 
Fortunately a trust fund has been established to provide assistance for states, especially 
the least developed and small island developing states, so they can meet their obligations
52under Article 76, and also to provide training for preparing submissions to the CLCS. It 
is hoped that African states will take advantage of such assistance and training, which 
will not only help as regards submissions but also in marine scientific and technological 
capacity building within these states. Also they can take advantage of the provisions of 
the Convention to obtain scientific and technical advice from the CLCS, especially from 
African representatives who may be more acquainted with the African situation. However 
this can only be done if an African state, in the course of preparations for a submission,
• 53specifically requests such advice.
Five of the African states acknowledged to have the potential to extend their continental 
shelf beyond 200 nautical miles,54 have domestic legislation that acknowledge the 
possibility of having a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. Under the South 
African Maritime Zones Act, No. 15 of 1994, the South African continental shelf is as
51 On the technology required, see Verlaan, P., “New seafloor mapping technology and Article 76 of the 
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea”,(1997) 21 Marine Policy, pp. 425-434. So far 
three states have made submissions - the Russian Federation, Brazil and Australia. See CLCS website 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs new/clcs home.htm [Accessed 17 December 2004].
52 See General Assembly Resolution A/RES/55/7 of 30 October 2000, Para. 18, which mandated the United 
Nations Secretary-General to establish this trust fund.
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs new/commission trust funds.htm [Accessed 25 June 2003].
As at 31 December 2003 the Fund had a balance of $1,137,053. From this Fund candidates from six 
developing states have been sent on a training course designed by the CLCS. Also seven developing states 
have requested assistance from the fund to send their nationals to a similar training course offered by the 
Southampton University Oceanography Centre, United Kingdom. See Paras. 105-107 and 129 of the 
Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on Oceans and the Law of the Sea to the fifty-ninth 
Session of the General Assembly, A/59/62 of 4 March 2004.
53 Article 3(1) (b) of Annex II of the LOSC. There is a Standing Committee of the CLCS on the provision 
of scientific and technical advice to coastal states currently composed of the following CLCS members: 
Lawrence Folajimi Awosika(Rapporteur); Noel Newton St Claver Francis; Philip Alexander 
Symonds(Chairman) and Kensaku Tamaki(Vice-Chairman). As at the end of April 2004 there had been no 
formal request for advice by the CLCS by any state. See Para.25 of the Statement by the Chairman of the 
CLCS on the progress of work in the Commission, CLCS/39 of 30 April 2004.
54 Madagascar, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles and South Africa. See McDorman, “The Entry into Force of 
the 1982 LOS Convention and the Article 76 Outer Continental Shelf Regime”, and “The Role of the 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf: A Technical Body in a Political World,” op. cit. and 
Kwiatkowska, “Creeping Jurisdiction beyond 200 Miles in the Light of the 1982 Law of the Sea 
Convention and State Practice,” op.cit.
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“defined in Article 76 o f the United Nations Convention on the Law o f the Sea”55 This
definition and the lists of coordinates in schedule 3 of the Act incorporate the provisions
of Article 76, including those dealing with the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical
miles. On 27 October 1995, the South African government published charts indicating the
maritime zones claimed by South Africa, which portrayed the continental shdf area
beyond 200 nautical miles. Prescott, in his analysis of these charts, suggests that South
Africa must have relied upon the thickness of sedimentary rock formula.56 He goes on to
point out certain difficulties South Africa may face when it eventually submits its
information to the CLCS, especially as regards the claim of more than 200 nautical miles
from Marion and Prince Edwards Islands. Prescott states:
“I f  the South African claim to the continental shelf more than 200 nautical 
miles from Marion and Prince Edward Islands is submitted to the 
Commission on the Limits o f the Continental Shelf particular attention will 
need to be paid to the nature o f the ridge on which the two islands stand. 
Marion and Prince Edward islands are twin peaks o f a submerged volcano. I f  
they are standing on either the Atlantic-Indian Oceanic Ridge or the 
Southwestern Indian Oceanic Ridge the claim will probably have to be 
modified. This view is held because o f the stipulations in Article 76. ” 51
South Africa will have to show that such ridges are not part of the “deep ocean floor with
c o
its oceanic ridges or subsoil thereof’. Also it has to show that the outer limits do not 
exceed 350 nautical miles or that it falls under the exception of “submarine elevations 
that are natural components o f the continental margin, such as its plateaux, rises, caps, 
banks and spurs.”59 South Africa is in the process of carrying out the preparatory work 
needed to prepare its submission to the CLCS.60 It became a party to the Convention on 
23 December 1997 and therefore should make its submissions to the CLCS by 13 May 
2009.
55 Section 8(1) of the South Africa Maritime Zones Act, No. 15 of 1994.
56 See Prescott, V., “South Africa: Publication of a Chart Showing the Limits of South Africa’s Maritime 
Claims,” (1999) 14IJMCL, p. 557 at 560-565.
57 Ibid. at p. 565.
58 Article 76(3) of the LOSC. Note that Section 11(3) o f the Seychelles Maritime Zones Act No. 2, 1999 
says that the Seychelles continental margin does not include “the deep ocean floor with its oceanic ridges or 
the subsoil thereof.”
59 Article 76(6) of the LOSC.
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The Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone Act No. 3 of 1990 of Namibia says the 
continental shelf of Namibia shall be “as defined in the Convention [LOSC 1982], or as it 
may from time to time be defined by international Convention and binding on 
Namibia.”61 This legislation, in essence, incorporates the definition of the continental 
shelf in Article 76, including the provisions dealing with the extended continental shelf 
beyond 200 nautical miles, into the domestic law of Namibia. Hamman, in his criticism 
of this provision, argues that the Act does not determine the outer limits of the shelf and 
therefore creates uncertainty as regards the limits beyond 200 nautical miles.62 However, 
it would appear that by incorporating the definition in LOSC Namibia would be 
precluded' from claiming, in respect of its continental shelf beyond 200 miles, a 
maximum limit beyond that stated in the Article 76 provision of LOSC. The Namibian 
government has recently asserted that it has a legitimate claim to a continental shelf 
beyond 200 nautical miles up to 350 nautical miles in some parts of its continental shelf 
margin.63 It also contends, as regards Walvis Ridge, which continues beyond 350 nautical 
miles, that a political decision is needed to determine whether the claim should be limited 
to 350 miles or if it should go beyond.64 While it lies within the sovereign right of any 
state to make unilateral claims as regards its maritime boundaries, a claim to the 
continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles will be deemed problematic by the CLCS if it 
is not in line with the wording of the Convention. Under the Convention, the outer limit 
of the shelf may exceed 350 nautical miles if such extension is as a result of submarine 
elevations such as plateaux, rises, caps, banks and spurs that are natural components of 
the margin.65 To succeed in such claim beyond 350 nautical miles, the onus will be on 
Namibia to inform and satisfy the Commission that Walvis Ridge falls within the
60 See the comments of the South African representative, Mr Hoffmann, at the fifty-eighth session, 64th 
plenary meeting of the General Assembly. A/58/PV.64, Official Records, 24 November 2003.
61 Section 6(1) of the Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone Act, No. 3 of 1990.
62 Hamman, D.B, “The Single Maritime Boundary -  A Solution for Maritime Delimitation between 
Namibia and South Affica?”(1995) 10IJMCL, p 369 at 377.
63 See Media Release from the Namibian government cabinet chambers in respect of the decisions of the 
cabinet at its 28th meeting held on 5 November 2002,
http://www.gmnet.gov.na/News/Archive/2002/November/Week... and “Quest for more Sea Territory”, The 
Namibia Economist, 15 November 2002 http://www.economist.com.na/2002/1 5nov/l 1 -15-02.htm [Both 
sites accessed on 23 July 2003]. See also Moller, L.E., “The Outstanding Namibian Maritime Boundaries 
with Angola and South Africa”, (2003)18 IJMCL, p. 241 at 248.
64 See Media Release from cabinet chambers, ibid.
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exception. Namibia became a party to the Convention on 18 April 1983 and is therefore 
required to make a submission to the CLCS by 13 May 2009.66
Madagascar in its legislation claims a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles up to a
limit of 100 nautical miles from the 2500-metre isobath. Article 7 of its Ordinance
determining the limits of the Maritime Zones (Territorial Sea, Continental Shelf and
Exclusive Economic Zone) states:
"The continental shelf o f the Democratic Republic o f Madagascar shall 
comprise the sea-bed and its subsoil beyond the territorial sea to a distance 
o f 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth o f the 
territorial sea is measured, or to the limit determined by agreement with the
67adjacent states or else to 100 nautical miles from the 2.500 metre isobath 
(Emphasis added)
This wording does not appear to be compatible with Article 76 in that it fails to refer, in 
any way, to the foot of the continental slope formula of either paragraph 4(a) (i) or (ii). 
Although, Madagascar is reported to have done little work in establishing a potential 
claim to an extended continental shelf, especially because of funding constraints, the 
issue of the extended shelf has been discussed at various relevant governmental bodies.68 
Madagascar became a party to the LOSC on 22 August 2001, and is therefore required to 
make submissions to the Commission by 22 August 2011.
In the case of the Seychelles, its Maritime Zones Act 1977 defines the continental shelf as 
comprised of:
65 Art.76 (6) of the LOSC. This is however still subject to the 100 mile from the 2,500 metre isobath 
criterion. See Art.76 (5) of LOSC.
66 Namibia, with the assistance of Brazilian consultants, is taking steps to prepare its submission to the 
CLCS. According to the Report of the United Nations Secretary-General to the fifty-ninth session of the 
General Assembly it has indicated that it would make its submission in 2007. See Para. 20 of the Report of 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations on Oceans and the Law of the Sea to the fifty-ninth session of 
the General Assembly-Addendum, A/59/62/Add.l o f 18 August 2004.
67 Ordinance No. 85-013 of 16 September 1985, as amended and ratified by Law No. 85-013 of 11th 
December 1985.
68 This information was given as at 2 April 2003. See the Workshop Report of the UNEP/GRID-Arendal 
International Workshop on Continental Shelf Delineation, March 30-April 2, 2003 held in Arendal, 
Norway, http://www.continentalshelf.org/ documents/workshop%20report%20final.doc [Accessed on 20 
December 2004].
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“the seabed and subsoil o f the submarine areas that extend beyond the limit o f the 
territorial waters throughout the natural prolongation o f the land territory o f 
Seychelles (a) to the outer edge o f the continental shelf; or (b) to a distance o f  two 
hundred nautical miles from the baseline where the outer edge o f the continental 
shelf does not extend up to that distance. ” 69
Ian Kawaley argues that this definition, by extending the continental shelf to the outer 
margin without stating any limits, confers on the Seychelles a continental shelf more 
extensive than that envisaged by the Article 76 limit of a maximum of 350 nautical mile 
or 100 nautical miles from the 2,500 metre isobath.70 The subsequent Seychelles 
Maritime Zones Act No. 2 of 1999, however, by implication appears to correct this 
anomaly by stating that “wherever the continental margin extends beyond 200 nautical 
miles ... the outer limits o f the continental shelf shall be established and delineated with 
due regard to the requirements and limitations o f international law. ”71 This, in essence, 
incorporates the requirements and limitations of Article 76. Seychelles became party to 
the LOSC on the 16 September 1991 and is therefore required to make submissions to the 
Commission by 13 May 2009.
Finally, Mauritius, another African state with the potential for an extended continental 
shelf, by its Maritime Zones Act 1977 adopts an identical definition of its continental 
shelf as the 1977 Seychelles Act. It does not appear that this legislation has been 
amended to make it subject to international law. To this extent, the criticism of Kawaley, 
noted above, is relevant to this legislation. Mauritius, which became a party to LOSC on 
4 November 1994, would have to make a submission by 13 May 2009.
Seychelles and Mauritius are reported to be in the process of preparing their submissions. 
In the case of Seychelles, the government has commissioned various consultancy reports 
to establish its entitlement to an extended continental shelf, and has also embarked on 
preliminary desktop studies. However, there are constraints in terms of obtaining the
69 Section 5( 1) of the Maritime Zones Act 1977.
70 Kawaley, I., “Implications of the Exclusive Economic Zone and EEZ Management o f Seychelles, A 
Small Midocean Island Commonwealth Territory,” (1998) 26 Ocean Development and International Law , 
p.225 at 244-245.
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relevant data and competent human resources.72 Mauritius, on the other hand, through its 
Mauritius Oceanography Institute (MOI), has since June 2002 completed survey work on 
the extended continental shelf. It is reported to have contracted out through international 
tender the acquisition of bathymetry and geophysical data necessary to substantiate the
73claim to an extended continental shelf.
1.2.2. Baselines.
The baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured is relevant in 
determining the outer limit of the continental shelf, particularly in cases of the 200 mile 
outer limit' and where the outer limit extends beyond 200 nautical miles to a maximum 
limit of 350 nautical miles.74
Mahmoudi rightly points out that while the LOSC provides definite methods for
• • 75  • •constructing baselines just like the 1958 Convention, there is still a lot of imprecision in 
the application of these methods which may result in coastal states creatively determining 
their baselines and thereby extending the outer limits of their continental shelf.76 For 
example, the charts published by South Africa on 27 October 1995, which drew straight
71 Section 11(2) of the Maritime Zones Act No. 2 of 1999. For similar formulations, see Section 1 of the 
Federal Law on the Continental Shelf of the Russian Federation adopted by the State Duma on 25 October 
1995 and Section 17(1) (a) o f the Canadian Oceans Act of 18 December 1996.
72 See Country Presentation - “Delimitation of the Extended Continental Shelf-The Seychelles Experience” 
by Raymond F. ChangTave, Technical Adviser, Ministry of Land Use and Habitat, Mahe, Seychelles at the 
UNEP/GRID-Arendal International Workshop on Continental Shelf Delineation, March 30-April 2, 2003 
held in Arendal, Norway http://www.continentalshelf.org/resources.cfm?pageID=l and the Workshop 
Report of the UNEP/GRID-Arendal International Workshop
http://www.continentalshelf.org/ documents/workshop%20report%20final.doc [Both accessed on 20 
December 2004].
73The Mauritius Oceanography Institute (MOI), established in January 2000 by legislation (MOI Act No.24 
of 1999), which has as one of its functions the formulation of a claim to an extended continental shelf to the 
CLCS. http://moi.gov.mu/institute.htm [Accessed on 20 December 2004].
74 See Art.76 (1) and (5) of the LOSC. See Carleton, C.M., Shipman, S., Monahan, D., and Parson, L., “The 
Practical Realisation o f the Continental Shelf Limit,” in Cook and Carleton(eds.), Continental Shelf Limits 
-  The Scientific and Legal Interface, op.cit. p.268 at 278-281.
75 See Art. 5 and 7 of the LOSC and compare with Art. 3 and 4 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and 
the Contiguous Zone 1958.
76 Mahmoudi, op.cit. p. 73. However, see the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case (1951), International Law 
Reports, 86 at p. 95 where the I.C.J. pointed out that: “The delimitation of sea areas has always an 
international aspect: it cannot be dependent merely upon the will of the coastal state as expressed in its 
municipal law. Although it is true that the act o f delimitation is necessarily a unilateral act, because only 
the coastal state is competent to undertake it, the validity of the delimitation with regard to other states 
depends upon international law.”
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baselines along about 540 nautical miles of its Southern coast from Cape Deseada, north 
of Cape Town, to Cape Padrone, east of Port Elizabeth, have been criticised by Prescott 
as a contravention of the wording contained in Article 7 of the LOSC.77 He argued that 
apart from a short section of this coast that is deeply indented, the remaining coast is 
neither deeply indented nor fringed with islands as required by Article 7. He pointed out 
that certain other states, including the African states of Algeria, Kenya, Madagascar and 
Senegal, had earlier similarly drawn straight baselines contrary to Article 7.78
The LOSC requires that baselines be shown on charts of a scale or scales adequate for 
ascertaining their position or through a list of geographical co-ordinates of points 
specifying the geodetic datum.79 The coastal state is to give due publicity to such charts 
or lists of geographical co-ordinates and to deposit a copy of such charts or lists with the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations.80 Virtually all African coastal states have 
legislation designating the baselines of their territorial sea as either the low-water mark 
and/or straight baselines.81 Some of these legislation describe the baselines in detail, 
while others merely make a bald statement that such baselines are either the low-water 
mark or straight baselines without details.82 The intention usually, in the latter cases, is 
that such details would be contained in separate official government charts or list of co­
ordinates.
For example, the Tanzanian Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1989, after 
stating that the baseline of the territorial sea is the low-water line, goes on to require such 
to be marked on a large-scale chart or map officially recognised by the government.83 
Further, under the part of this legislation dealing with the EEZ, the relevant minister is 
required to cause the boundary lines of the zone to be marked on a sealed map or chart,
77 Prescott, “South Africa: Publication of a Chart Showing the Limits of South Africa’s Maritime Claims,” 
op.cit.at p. 559.
78 Ibid.
79 Article 16(1) of the LOSC.
80 Article 16 (2) of the LOSC.
81 See Table 1. Article 14 of the LOSC gives a coastal State the discretion to determine its baselines by any 
of the methods provided for in the LOSC.
82 See Table 1.
83 Section 5 of the Tanzanian Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone Act. See also section 11 of the 
Maritime Zones Act No. 13 1977 of Mauritius.
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which is to be judicially noticed and kept with the Director of Land Surveying in the 
ministry responsible for lands.84 In the case of Nigeria, it is not clear if such officially 
recognised charts are available. The Nigerian Territorial Waters Act,85 as amended in 
1998,86 states that the baseline of Nigeria’s territorial sea is the low-water mark, but, 
unlike the Tanzanian Act, it does not specifically contain provisions requiring the 
baseline to be marked on an officially recognised chart or map. Recently a dispute arose 
before the Supreme Court between the Federal government (the central government) and 
certain State governments within the Federation of Nigeria as regards “ownership” as 
between themselves of the Nigerian offshore zones for the purposes of revenue 
allocation.87 This case was an opportunity for the Federal government to produce before 
the Court charts or maps marking Nigerian baselines and the various maritime zones 
within national jurisdiction. However, despite an objection filed by certain unit States on 
the failure on the part of the Federal government, as plaintiff, to put before the Court any 
evidence to show the exact offshore zones of Nigeria, the Federal government declined to 
tender any charts or co-ordinates preferring to argue its case on points of law.88 From the 
actions in this case it is not clear if the Nigerian government has large-scale charts 
indicating the low-water mark. Events subsequent to the decision of the Supreme Court, 
involving the establishment of a task force by the Revenue Mobilisation and Fiscal 
Commission to determine the low-water mark,89 appear to suggest that at the time of the 
decision of the Court,90 there were either no officially recognised charts, or whatever was 
available did not adequately delimit the low-water mark.
84 Section 8 of the Tanzanian Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone Act.
85 Chapter 428, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990.
86 Act No. 1 of 1998.
87 See Attorney-General o f Nigeria -v-Attorney-General o f  Abia State & 35 Ors. [2002] 6 N. W.L.R. (Part 
764) pp. 542-905.
88 See the lead judgement of Ogundare, JSC, ibid. at p. 644, which agreed with the Federal government that 
it was a point o f law before the court and therefore the Federal government did not need to tend any 
evidence. On this point also see the comments of the writer in Egede, E., “The Nigerian Territorial Waters 
Legislation and the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention,” (2004) 19(2), The International Journal o f Marine 
and Coastal Law, p. 151 at 156-161.
89 See Adeinokun, K. “Onshore/Offshore: Revenue Commission determines perimeters”, This Day 
(Nigerian Newspaper), 26 June 2002,
http://www.thisdavonline.com/archive/2002/06/26/2002Q626newsl2.html [Accessed 23 June 2003].
90 The decision of the Supreme Court of Nigeria in A.-G. Nigeria v. A.-G. Abia State, supra, was delivered 
on 5 April 2002.
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The precise determination of the baselines of the territorial sea of African coastal states 
is a prerequisite for the effective determination of the outer limit of their continental 
shelves. In spite of the various statutes enacted by African states regarding the baselines 
of their territorial sea, only a handful of these states have complied with the requirement 
of submission of charts or co-ordinates under Article 16(2).91 The convenient excuse of 
lack of technology and expertise cannot, in this writer’s view, be a justifiable reason for 
non-submission, especially in the light of the willingness of such United Nations bodies 
as the Division of Ocean Affairs to render the necessary assistance.92 The explanation for 
this failure by Africah states, like most other states including developed states, is 
sometimes'attributable to the manner in which Article 16(2) is worded. While clearly 
imposing an obligation on states parties by using the mandatory word “shall ”, Article 
16(2) is open-ended in that it specifies no time limit for states parties to comply with the 
obligation. However, in spite of this, it is only to be expected that a submission should be 
done within a reasonable period of the state becoming a party to LOSC. Unfortunately 
this has not been the situation as a number of states, including African states, have been 
parties to the LOSC for a long period and have yet to make such submissions.
1.2.3. Continental Shelf Legislation in Africa
Several African states have enacted legislation dealing with the outer limit of their 
continental shelf. While some in their legislation unequivocally declare the limit of their 
continental shelf to be 200 nautical miles,93 others have declared their outer limit to be 
the edge of the continental margin or 200 nautical miles where the outer edge does not 
extend to 200 nautical miles.94 Some, like South Africa and Namibia, as reviewed above,
91 Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Madagascar, Sao Tome and Principe and Tunisia are recorded as having 
submitted charts. See United Nations Website; See
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATlES/depositpublicitv.htm [Accessed 17 
December 2004]. These figures are as at 28 October 2004. The total number of states parties, including 
developed states, which have complied with the obligation under Article 16(2) is quite low considering the 
number of states which have become states parties to LOSC.
92 See United Nations, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/doalos activities/about doalos.htm#GlS [Accessed 23 
June 2003].
93 For example, see the legislation of Cape Verde, Ghana, Republic of Benin and Sierra Leone. See Table 1.
94 For example, see the legislation of Cameroon, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Senegal and 
Seychelles. See Table 1. If these states are able to establish their entitlement to extended continental shelf it 
is expected that if  they are parties to the LOSC the outer limit would be the maximum provided in Art.76 of 
LOSC.
29
provide that their continental shelf is to be as defined by the relevant Convention in force 
and binding on them, and thereby incorporate the Article 76 provisions.95 Other African 
states, in spite of being parties to the LOSC, still have in their national legislation the 
provisions in Article 1 of the 1958 Geneva Convention which uses the depth of 200 
metres or exploitability as the outer limit of the continental shelf.96
Table 1-Country Information (Africa)
Country Legislation on 
baselines/ Type
Deposit 
under 
Art. 16 
(2)
Y/N.
Legislative Claims of 
outer limits of C.S.
Claims of EEZ.
1 .Algeria* Straight baselines(d) 
(Arts 1-2 of Decree 
No.84-181 of 4 
August 1984)
N N/A
2. Angola* Low-water line and 
straight baselines 
(Arts.2-3 of Law No. 
21/92 of 28 August 
1992)
N N/A Art. 7 of Decree-Law 
No. 47,771 of 27 
June 1967
3. Republic o f Low-water mark and N 200 N.M. Decree No. 76-92
Benin* with respect to (Decree No. 76-92 of April
estuaries from the 1976)
first obstacle to 
maritime navigation 
as defined by 
maritime regulations 
in force.
(Art.l of Decree No.
76-92,1976)
95 See Table 1.
96 For example, see the legislation of Egypt, Nigeria and Sudan. See Table 1.
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4.Cameroon* Low-water mark and N CM/200(Legislation
for gulfs, bays and N/A)97
roadsteads decrees to
be made fixing the
lines.
(Art.l of Decree
No.71/DF/416 of 26
August 1971 and
Art.5 of Act No.
74/16 of 5 December
1974)
5.Cape Verde* Straight baselines(d) N 200 N.M. Art. 12 of Law No.
(Art.24 of Law (Art. 17 of Law 60/1V/92 of 21
No.60/IV/92 of 21 No.60/IV/92 of 21 December 1992
December 1992) December 1992)
6. Comoros* Low-water mark and 
straight baselines(d) 
(Art.3 ofLawNo.82- 
005 of 6 May 1982 
and Arts.2-3 of 
Ordinance No. 
049/77 of 20 
December 1997)
N N/A Art. 6 of Law No. 82- 
005 of 6 May 1982
7. Cote D’ Ivoire* Lowest water mark 
and straight baselines 
(Art.l o f Law No.77- 
926 of 17 November 
1977)
N 200 N.M.(Legislation 
N/A)98
Art.2 of Law No. 77- 
926 of 17 November 
1977
8. Congo Low-water line N N/A N/A
(Art.2 of Ordinance 
No. 049/77 of 20 
December amending 
article 2 of 
Ordinance 26/71 of 
18 October 1971)
9.Democratic N/A N N/A Art. 2 of Act
Republic o f proclaiming an EEZ
Congo of 4 November 1992
97 See Antunes, N.S.M., “The Pending Maritime Delimitation in Cameroon v. Nigeria Case: A Piece in the 
Jigsaw Puzzle of the Gulf o f Guinea”, (2000) 15 IJMCL,p. 163 at 171
98 See Nationmaster.com2003.http://www.nationamaster.com/countrv/lV/Geographv [Accessed on 8 
August 2003]
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10. Djibouti* Low-water mark and 
straight baselines(d) 
(Art. 4 of Law 
No.52/AN/78 1978 
and Arts. 1 and 2 o f  
Decree No. 85-048 
PR/PM of 5 May 
1985)
N N/A Art. 12 o f Law No.
52/AN/78
11. Egypt* Low water line and N 200 metres or depth of Declaration
straight baselines(d) exploitability. accompanying Law
(Art. 6 of Decree (Presidential Decision of the Sea
concerning No. 1051 of 1958 Convention
Territorial Waters of concerning the Continental ratification
Egypt 15 January 
1951, as amended by 
Presidential Decree 
of 17 February 1958 
and Arts. 1-3 of 
Decree of President 
No.27(1990))
Shelf)
12.Equatorial Low water line and Y N/A Art. 10 of Act No.
Guinea* straight baselines(d) 
(Art.3 of Act 
No. 15/1984 of 12 
November 1984 and 
Art.l o f Act 
No.1/1999 of 6 
March 1999)
15/1984 of 12 
November 1984.
13. Eritrea Extremity of sea­
board at maximum 
annual high tide of 
Eritrea’s continental 
coast(Maritime 
Proclamation No. 137 
of 1953 and 
Proclamation 7- 
Transitional 
Maritime Code of 
Eritrea, 15 
September 1991
N N/A
M.Gabon* Low-water line and 
straight baselines(d) 
(Art.2 of Act 
No.9/84 of 1984 and 
Arts 1-5 of Decree 
002066/PR/MHCUC 
DM of 4 December 
1992)
Y N/A Art.2 of Act No. 9/84
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15. Gambia* Low-water mark 
(S.2 of Territorial 
Sea and Contiguous 
Zone Act, 1968 as 
amended in 1969)
N Non-Specific.
(Continental Shelf Act No. 
25 of June 1965 as 
amended by Continental 
Shelf Act(Revised) of July 
1966
16. Ghana* Low-water line 
(S.l of Maritime 
Zones(Delimitation) 
Law 1986)
N 200 N.M.
(S.6(l) of Maritime 
Zones(Delimitation) Law 
1986)
S. 5 of the Maritime 
Zones (Delimitation) 
Law, 1986.
17. Guinea* Low-water line 
(Arts. 1 and 4 of 
Decree No.336/PRG 
of 30 July 1980)
N N/A Arts. 2-4 of Decree 
No. 336/PRG of 30 
July 1980
18.Guinea- 
Bissau*
Straight baselines 
(Art.l of Acts 
No.2/85 and Art.2 of 
Act No.3/85 both of 
17 May, 1985)
N N/A Art. 3 of Act No. 
3/85 of 17 May 1985
19. Kenya* Low water lines and 
straight baselines 
(S.2 of the Territorial 
Waters Act of 16 
May 1972 as revised 
in 1977 and S.l of 
Presidential 
Proclamation of 28 
February 1979)
N 200 metres or depth of 
exploitability(Legislation
N/A)99
Presidential 
Proclamation of 28 
February 1979
20. Liberia N/A N 200 metres or depth of 
exploitability.(Act to 
Establish Continental Shelf 
1969)
21. Libya N/A N N/A
See Nationmaster.com2003, Ibid.
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22. Madagascar* Low-water mark and 
straight baselines 
(Arts.2 -3  o f Decree 
No.63-131 of 27 
February 1963 and 
Art.8 of Ordinance 
No.85-013 of 16 
September 1985 as 
amended and ratified 
by Law No.85-013 
of 11 December 
1985)
Y 200 N.M. or by 
delimitation agreement or 
100 N.M. from the 2,500- 
metre isobath.
(Art.7 of Ordinance No.85- 
013 of 16 September 1985 
as amended and ratified by 
Law No.85-013 of 11 
December 1985)
Art.5 of Ordinance 
No.85-013 o f 16 
September 1985 as 
amended and ratified 
by Law No. 85-013 
of 11 December 
1985)
23. Mauritania* Low-water line and 
straight baseline 
(Art.l of Ordinance 
88-120 of 31 August 
1988)
N CM. /
200.
(Art.4 of Ordinance 88- 
120 of 31 August 1988)
Art.7 of Ordinance 
88-120 of 31 August 
1988
24.Mauritius* Straight baseline 
(S.2 of Maritime 
Zones Act No. 13 of 
3 June 1977)
N C.M./
200.
(S.5(l) of the Maritime 
Zones Act No. 13 of 3 June 
1977)
Art.6 of Act No. 13 of 
3 June 1977 and 
Maritime Zones 
(Exclusive Economic 
Zones) Regulations 
1984.
25. Morocco Low-water 
line/straight 
baselines 
(Art. 1 o f Act 
No.1.73.211 of 2 
March 1973 and 
Arts. 1-2 of Decree 
No.2.75.311 of 11 
Rajab 1395(21 
July, 1975)
N 200metres or depth of 
exploitability.
(Law No. 1.58.277 of July 
1958)
Act No. 1-81 of 18 
December 1980 
promulgated by Dahir 
No. 1-81-179 of 8 
April 1981.
26. Mozambique* Low-water 
line/straight 
baselines 
(Art.l of Decree 
No.47,771 of 27 
June 1967 and Art. 1 
of Decree Law No. 
31/76 of 19 August 
1976)
N CM/200
(Law No. 4/96 of April 
1996)
Art.2 of Decree Law 
No. 31/76 o f 19 
August 1976 and 
Law No. 4/96
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27.Namibia* Low-water line and 
any other rules 
recognised by LOSC 
82 or any other 
convention binding 
on Namibia or any 
other international 
rules.
(S.2 of Territorial 
Sea and EEZ Act 
No.3 1990 as 
amended in 1991)
N As defined in LOSC 82 or 
subsequent international 
convention binding on 
Namibia.
(S.6(l) of the Territorial 
Sea and Exclusive 
Economic Zone Act No.3 
of 30 June 1990)
Art.4 o f Act No.3 of  
30 June 1990
28. Nigeria* Low-water mark N 200 metres or depth of EEZ Act No. 28 o f 5
(S.1(1) of the exploitability. October 1978.
Territorial Waters (S. 14 (1) of the Petroleum
Act 1967 as Act, Cap.350 Laws of the
amended in 1971 and Federation of Nigeria
1998) 1990)
29. Sao Tome and Straight Y N/A Arts. 4-6 of Law No.
Principe* baselines/archipelagi 1/98 of 1998
c baselines 
(Art.2 of Law 
No. 1/98 of 1998)
30. Senegal* Low-water N C.M./ Law 87-27 of August
line/straight 200. 1987.
baselines (Art.6 of Act No.85-14 of
(Art.l ofActNo.85- 25 February 1985)
14 of 25 February
1985 and Arts. 1-2 of
Decree No.90-670 of
18 June 1990)
31. Seychelles* Low-water N C.M./ SS. 9-14 of Act No. 2
line/straight 200/ of 1999.
baselines (S.l 1 of Maritime Zones
(S.2 of Maritime Act No.2 of 1999)
Zones Act No. 15 
1977 and S.2,3 and 5 
o f Maritime Zones 
Act No.2 1999)
32. Sierra Leone* Low-water line N 200 N.M. SS. 8-10 of Maritime
(S.2 of the Maritime (S.l l  of the Maritime Zones Decree 1996
Zones Zones(Establishment)
(Establishment) Decree 1996
Decree 1996)
35
33.Somalia* Low-water line and 
straight baseline 
(Art.2 of Law No.37 
of 10 September 
1972)
N N/A
34. South Africa* Low-water line and 
straight baseline(d) 
(S.2 of the Maritime 
Zones Act No. 15 of 
1994)
N As defined in Art.76 of 
LOSC 1982.
(S.8 of Maritime Zones 
Act, No. 15 of 1994)
Art.7 of Act No. 15 of 
1994.
35. Sudan*
36. Tanzania*
Lowest water line N
and straight baselines 
(S.5-6 of Territorial 
Waters and 
Continental Shelf 
Act 1970)
Low-water line N
(S.5 of the Territorial 
Sea and EEZ Act 
1989)
200 metres or depth of 
exploitability.
(S.2(k) of Territorial 
Waters and Continental 
Shelf Act, 1970)
N/A SS.7-9 of the 
Territorial Sea and 
EEZ Act 1989.
37. Togo51 Low-water line( Art.l 
of Ordinance No.24 
Delimiting the 
Territorial Waters 
and creating a 
protected Economic 
Maritime Zone of 16 
August 1977)
N N/A Ordinance No. 24 of 
August 1977.
38. Tunisia* Low-water mark and 
straight baseline 
(Art.l of Act No.73- 
49 of 2 August 1973)
Y N/A
39. Western 
Sahara
N/A N N/A N/A
Key
Y-Yes
N-No
d- Detailed description o f co-ordinates o f  baselines in legislation.
N/A-Not available 
N.M.-Nautical Miles 
* Parties to LOSC100
1.2.4. Deposit o f Information on the Outer Limits o f the Continental Shelf with the United 
Nations Secretary-General.
Under the LOSC, coastal states are required to deposit with the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations charts and lists of geographical co-ordinates designating the outer limits
100 For more details on when the states became parties to LOSC, see Table 2 in chapter 2 of this thesis.
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of their continental shelf.101 With the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles this is 
done after such has been established by the coastal state on the basis of the 
recommendation of the CLCS. This information deposited is to be given due publicity by 
the Secretary-General and is to “permanently” describe the outer limits of such 
continental shelf.102 No state has so far made a deposit under Article 76(9), although six 
states, including an African state, have made such a deposit under Article 84(2) of 
LOSC.103 This requirement again has no set time limit for compliance although it is 
expected that states parties should endeavour be do this within a reasonable time.
1.3. Mineral Resources in the Area
The Area assumed great prominence in the UNCLOS III as a result of the discovery that 
certain minerals found in this zone during the 1873-6 Challenger expedition had 
economic value and the subsequent technological development which showed that the 
mining of such minerals could be accomplished.104 These minerals, known as 
polymetallic nodules, have been found to be scattered in all the oceans, though those of 
greatest economic interest are generally located in the centre of the north central Pacific 
Ocean, the Peru Basin in the south-east Pacific Ocean and the centre of the north Indian 
Ocean. These nodules, located at depths of 4000 to 5000 metres, contain certain strategic 
minerals, including manganese, nickel, copper and cobalt.105
Although the initial focus by potential miners of the seabed was on polymetallic nodules, 
recent scientific research has aroused interest in other mineral resources in the Area. Such 
minerals include polymetallic sulphide deposits and cobalt-rich ferromanganese crusts.106
101 Article 76(9) o f the LOSC.
102 Ibid.
103 Belgium, Chile, Finland, Italy, Norway and Seychelles. See United Nations, 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGlSLAT10NANDTREATIES/depositpublicitv.htm [Accessed 17 
December 2004]. In its Maritime Zones (Establishment) Decree 1996, Sierra Leone in Section 12(2) claims 
that, “Copies of the official charts and relevant information, including geodetic data, permanently 
describing the outer limits of the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf may be obtained from 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations with whom they have been deposited in compliance with the 
Convention.” There is no indication on the United Nations database that this has been done.
104 Ogley, op.cit.pp. 12-24 and Mahmoudi, op.cit.pp. 26-36
105 For recent data on polymetallic nodules, see http://www.isa.org.im/en/publications/lA ENGZENG7.pdf 
[Accessed 9 August 2004]
106 See ISA Press Releases, SEA/1720 of 6 July 2001 and SEA/1724 of 12 July 2001.
37
The polymetallic sulphides, located at water depths of up to 3700 metres as a result of 
volcanic activities, are found mainly in mid-ocean at the East Pacific Rise, the southeast 
Pacific Rise and the northeast Pacific Rise. Several deposits are also known to be located 
at the mid -Atlantic Ridge, but so far only one has been located at the ridge system of the 
Indian Ocean. These sulphides contain high concentration base metals such as zinc, lead 
and copper, as well as precious metals such as gold and silver.107 Cobalt-rich 
ferromanganese crusts are located at water depths of about 400 to 4000 metres. Based on 
grade, tonnage and oceanographic conditions, the central equatorial Pacific region 
appears to have the best potential for mining this resource. In addition to cobalt, it is said 
to be an important potential source of manganese, nickel, platinum, titanium, phosphorus, 
thallium, tellurium, zirconium, tungsten, bismuth and molybdenum.108 The polymetallic 
sulphides and cobalt crusts located in the Area, unlike the polymetallic nodules, would, 
however, have to compete with sulphides and crusts located within national jurisdiction 
as there is already evidence that certain states have the potential of recovering such 
within their national jurisdiction.109 There has also been a call for the ISA to give 
attention to methane (gas) hydrates.110 They are ice-like crystalline compounds consisting 
of gas (usually methane) and water molecules said to be widespread both on continental 
margins and in the Area. It is believed that the extraction of the hydrates could provide 
one of the most important energy sources for the future.111 Again it is expected that the
107 For recent data on polymetallic sulphides, see
http://www.isa.org.im/en/publications/IA ENGZENG8.pdf [Accessed 9 August 2004]
108 For recent data on cobalt-rich ferromanganese crusts, see
http://www.isa.org.im/en/publications/TA ENGZENG9.pdf respectively [Accessed 9 August 2004]
109 For example exploration licences have been issued to a company, Nautilus Minerals Co-operation Ltd., 
in respect of Manus Basin off the coast of Papua New Guinea for exploration and development of 
sulphides.
110 See ISA Press Release, SB/6/21 of 5 July 2000 where Indonesia, commenting on the ISA Secretary- 
General’s report, suggested that more attention be given to Methane Hydrates.
111 See Borgese, E.M., “Caird Medal address,” (2001) 25 Marine Policy, p.391at 394; Dr. William Dillon, 
US Geological Survey, Gas (Methane) Hydrates -  A New Frontier, http://marine.usgs.gov/fact-sheets/gas- 
hvdrates/title.html [Accessed 25 August 2004] ; Desa, E., “Submarine Methane Hydrates-Potential Fuel 
Resources of the 21st Century”, in Minerals other than Polymetallic Nodules o f the International Seabed 
Area, Proceedings o f the International Seabed Authority Workshop held on 26-30 June 2000 in Kingston, 
Jamaica^Kingston Jamaica, International Seabed Authority, 2004), pp.517-558 and the Statement by Paul 
L.Kelly, Senior Vice President, Rowan Companies, Inc. on behalf o f the American Petroleum Institute, the 
International Association of Drilling Contractors and the National Ocean Industries Association before the 
United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Hearing on the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea, Washington, D.C., October 21, 2003.
http://foreign.senate.gov/testimonv/2003/kellvTestimonv031021 .pdf [Accessed on 4 January 2005]
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methane hydrates located in the Area would have to compete with methane hydrates 
thought to be located within the continental shelves of certain states.112 Although the ISA 
has not done much work on this, there is ongoing research by certain states, including the 
United States of America, to identify, explore, assess and develop methane hydrates as an
113alternative source of energy.
The issues related to the regime of the deep seabed were the most heated in UNCLOS 
III. The intensity and passion surrounding issues of this regime were magnified by the 
reports available in the 60s and 70s that gave the impression of a colossal amount of 
mineral wealth in the deep seabed just waiting to be picked up by any state with the 
requisite technology.114 For the developed industrialised states there was an expectation 
that it would open up the possibility of access to a new source of strategic minerals for 
their industries, which was outside the monopoly of any particular state. On the other 
hand, for the developing states there was anticipation that it would provide access to 
additional revenue useful for achieving development and a more equitable world 
economic order. In addition, for developing land-based producer states the regime 
governing the Area was a particularly important issue because of their dependence on 
export revenue from land-based mineral resources, which would have to compete with 
those from the deep seabed if exploitation eventually commenced. These developing 
land-based producers included African states like Zambia, Botswana, Morocco, South 
Africa, Namibia, Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire) and Zimbabwe, which
112 For instance Chile and India have been identified as potentially having methane gas hydrates in their 
continental shelf margin. See Esteban Morales G., “Methane hydrates in the Chilean continental margin,” 
(2003)6(2) Electronic Journal o f Biotechnology,
http://www.eibiotechnology.info/content/vol6/issue2/issues/l and Gupta, H., “Gas Hydrates: A Potential 
Source of Energy from the Oceans,” Bruun Memorial Lecture 2003 on ‘Energy from the sea’, June 25, 
2003-Pans, Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission(IOC), http://dod.nic.in/secbraunnlect.pdf [Both 
accessed on 4 January 2005]
113 On 2 May 2000 the President of the United States enacted the Methane Hydrate Research and 
Development Act 2000, Law 106-193 requiring the Secretary of State to commence a Methane Hydrate 
research programme. This programme has since been commenced as the National Methane Hydrates R&D 
Program, http://www.netl.doe.gov/scng/h vdrate/ [Accessed 25 August 2004]. Others that have begun 
assessments and research on deep water methane hydrates are Canada, the European Union, Japan and 
India. See Desa, “Submarine Methane Hydrates-Potential Fuel Resources of the 21st Century,” 
op.cit.pp.549-550.
114 See for example Mero i.L.,The Mineral Resources o f the Sea, (Amsterdam, Elsevier, 1964,)
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are land-based producers of copper and cobalt. 115 For Morocco and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, cobalt can be mined independently and not as a by-product,116 while 
South Africa is also a land-based producer of manganese.117 At present, as a result of the 
indefinite postponement of commercial exploitation of polymetallic nodules, such 
mineral resources in the Area do not pose an immediate threat to the economy of these 
land-based producers. However, it is opined that it would be rather short-sighted for these 
states not to still maintain concern and interest in the regime governing the Area. Further, 
the discovery of other possible resources in the Area, such as sulphides, cobalt crusts and 
methane hydrates, though like polymetallic nodules not likely to be commercially 
exploitable' in the near future, should similarly raise concerns for African land-based 
producers of comparable resources. The cobalt crusts should still be of interest to African 
land-based producers of cobalt. Sulphides, which contain gold, should be of concern to 
African states, such as South Africa, which are significant producers of gold. For 
significant African producers of oil and gas, currently a major source of global energy, 
such as Nigeria, Angola and Gabon, the possibility of methane hydrates being a viable 
alternative to other sources of energy, such as oil and natural gas, should raise concerns 
for these states.
Beyond the economic perspective that contributed to the passion displayed in respect of 
the deep seabed issues at the UNCLOS III, it must be pointed out that the innovative 
regime also provided an avenue for African states to address a broader issue of changing 
the existing legal order of the sea in particular and international law in general, which in 
their view leaned more in favour of the northern industrialised states.118
115 Ogley, op.cit.pp. 19-25; Mahmoudi, op.cit.pp.30-31. For more recent data on land-based producers of 
mineral resources, see U.S. Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries, 2004 
http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/mcs/2004/mcs20Q4.pdf [Accessed 30 September 2004]
116 Mahmoudi, ibid.
117 Ibid.
118 Oxman B., “The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 1976 New York 
Sessions” (1977) 71 AJIL, 253; See also Miles, E., “The Structure and Effects of Decision Process in the
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1.4. Conclusion.
The proper delimitation of the outer limit of the continental shelf is a sine qua non for a 
determination of what part of the submarine zone falls within national jurisdiction and 
what part constitutes the Area. For the outer limit of the continental shelf, the 
determination of the baseline is significant. While the determination of the baselines of 
African states remain within their sovereign decision, the major challenge they appear to 
face is that of ensuring that their baselines are in line with the criteria set out in the 
LOSC, including giving such baselines appropriate publicity, and also making the 
required submissions under Article 16(2). Submissions under Article 16(2) provide a 
reliable means of achieving certainty as regards coastal states’ baselines, yet only a few 
African states have complied with Article 16(2). Also very few African states have 
deposited charts and other relevant information on the outer limits of the continental shelf 
with the United Nations Secretary-General as required by Articles 76(9) and 84(2) of 
LOSC. It must however be pointed out that African states are no worse than states in 
other geopolitical groupings since, generally, only a few states have made such deposit.
African states with the potential to claim a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles 
have to satisfy the highly complex demands of Article 76, along with the requirement of 
submission of information to the CLCS within the time limit. The preparation of a 
submission to the CLCS requires both sophisticated technology and expertise. This 
highlights the necessity for assistance by the relevant international organisations and 
bodies to broad-shelf African states to enable them comply with their international 
obligations under the Convention.
The domestic laws of African states, again like other states in other geopolitical 
groupings, are divergent on what constitutes the outer limits of the continental shelf, but 
it does appear that some African states have updated their legislation to claim a 
continental shelf in line with Article 76 of the LOSC, though there is a need for 
adjustments in some of the legislation. However, it is also noteworthy that some African
Seabed Committee and the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,”(1977) 31 
International Organization,p.\59 atl62. For more on this see chapter two of the thesis.
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states still adhere to the depth and exploitability test in their legislation, though they are 
parties to the LOSC. It is hoped that such states will be encouraged to amend their 
legislation and align it with the wording of Article 76.
Further, this chapter discusses the economic potential of the Area. It suggests that 
although commercial exploitation of the resources in the Area has been postponed 
indefinitely it would be in the interest of African states, especially land-based producers, 
which may upon commercial exploitation in the future have to compete with resources in 
the Area, to maintain concern and interest in the regime and activities in the Area.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE EVOLUTION OF THE REGIME OF THE AREA AND AFRICAN STATES.
In order to appreciate the intricacies of the regime and institutions of the deep seabed and 
what at one stage was quite a serious conflict between the developed states and the 
developing states, including African states, it is helpful to have an historical perspective 
of the law of the sea. This chapter therefore examines the historical development of the 
regime from an African perspective.
2.1. Historical Development o f the Regime o f the Area: An African Perspective 1
2.1.1. The euro-centric nature o f the traditional law o f the sea.
Historically, though this is sometimes blurred by first the Arab and subsequently the 
European influence on the African continent, there is some evidence of the involvement 
of certain African ethnic groups in maritime activities long before the slave trade and 
colonialism. For instance, there is evidence to suggest the presence of “vessels of black 
men” (kun-lun bo - a description by Chinese authors writing between the third and the 
ninth century) sailing in the Indian Ocean and manned by crew suspected to have come 
from modem Madagascar at a period before and after the seventh century.3 These vessels 
are described as ships with woven sails averaging 50m in length, and able to transport 
between 500 and 1000 people as well as cargo of between 250 and 1000 tons. Also there 
is evidence that between the seventh and the eleventh century there were some ship
1 For readings generally on the historical development o f the Law of the Sea see O’Connell, D., 
International Law o f the Sea, Vol.l (edited by I. A. Shearer)(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1982) pp. 1-28; 
Anand, R., International Law and Developing Countries: Confrontation or Co-operation} 
(Dordrecht/Lancaster, Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), pp. 1-71; Anand, R., Origin and Development o f the Law o f  
the Sea, (History o f International Law Revisited), (The Hague/London, Martinus Nijhoff, 1982); J.H.W. 
Verzijl, International Law in Historical Perspective, Vol. I, (Sijhoff, Leyden, 1968).
2 Eurocentrism has been defined as “settled habits o f thought which have led to the acceptance, mostly 
uncritical, of European [and Western] intellectual and social cultural traditions as the invariable if not 
superior framework of inquiry.” See Rembe, N.S., Africa and the International Law of the Sea, (Alphen 
aan den Rijn, The Netherlands, Sijthoff & Noordhoff International Publishers B.V., 1980), p.30. According 
to Okoye: “It is suggested that the consequence o f the Eurocentric origins of international law is that much 
of classical international law sought not only to regulate the balance of power between relatively powerful 
and modernised states, but also gave them special privileges and rights which frequently ran against the 
interest o f non-European colonised peoples, then regarded as objects rather than subjects of the law.” See 
Okoye, F., International Law and the New African States, (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1972), p. 176.
3 Domenichini-Ramiaramanana, B., “Madagascar,” in El Fasi, M., and Hrbek, I. (eds.), UNESCO General 
History o f Africa Vol. Ill: Africa from the Seventh to the Eleventh Century, (Berkeley, California, 
UNESCO/University o f California Press, 1988), p. 681 at 696-703.
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captains on the Indian Ocean who were Negroid and Bantu-speaking (described as Zandj 
by Arabic authors), suspected to be indigenes of the ethnic groups located on the East 
African coast and the Comoro Islands.4 Amongst the boats said to have been used by 
these African seafarers were the mtepe (a sewn boat) and ngalawa (a rather narrow 
dugout boat). The latter would have been unstable and dangerous in open sea but an 
outrigger-balancing device overcame the lack of stability.5 Similar evidence appears to 
abound amongst different ethnic groups located along the west coast of Africa.6 
However, since for a long time these ethnic groups were regarded more as objects rather 
than subjects of international law, they were not consulted and had no input whatsoever 
in the origin of the law of the sea. R.P. Anand, affirming that Asian and African states 
had little or no contribution to the origin of the law of the sea, describes the modem law 
of the sea as not only th Q“product o f the European mind” and 'European beliefs, ” but 
also “based on European State practices which were developed and consolidated during 
the last three centuries”.7 This much was admitted by Professor Verzijl who pointed out 
that the whole gamut of international law, of which the law of the sea is a part, was “the 
product o f the conscious activity o f the European mind, but has drawn its vital essence 
from a common source o f European beliefs and in both these aspects it is mainly o f
t* 8Western European origin ”.
Professor Umozurike, an African international law jurist, putting this rather forcefully 
and without mincing his words, states:
4 Masao, F.T., and Mutoro, H.W., “The East African Coast and the Comoro Islands,” in El Fasi and Hrbek 
(eds), ibid. atpp.586 at 600-602 and 609-610.
5 Ibid. at 609-610.
6 For instance the Aworis, Efiks and the Ijaws (Izon), ethnic groups located along the west coast of Africa 
in modem day Nigeria, have oral tradition o f extensive maritime activities, especially fishing, deep in the 
Atlantic Ocean even before the “white man” came to their land. Affidavit evidence to this effect in respect 
of the Aworis and Efiks were deposed to by His Royal Highness, the Oba of Lagos state, Oba Adeyinka 
Oyekan, and the Obong of Calabar, Edidem Professor Nta Elijah Henshaw VI, respectively, in the Nigerian 
Supreme Court case of Attorney-General o f the Federation v. Attorney-General o f Abia State & 35 
ors.[20Q2\ 6 N.W.L.R (Part 764), 542 at 722-723. Also the writer has been told by his father-in-law, 
Professor J.P. Clark-Bekederemo, a renowned Nigerian playwright and authority on Ijaw (Izon) tradition, 
that there is oral tradition of extensive maritime activities by the Ijaw people in the Atlantic Ocean even 
before the Europeans came to Ijaw land.
7 Anand, R., Origin and Development o f the Law o f  the Sea (History of International Law Revisited), 
op.cit.l.
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"... international law developed by western powers before the 2(fh century 
served as a buttress for the colonisation o f African peoples. It connived at the 
subordination o f African dignity to western economic interests. It was 
essentially racialist and therefore contrary to the basic norms o f the law 
applicable to all mankind. In creating the relevant rules o f international law, 
Africans were not consulted for the law was specifically directed against 
them. The colonisers agreed among themselves that African communities 
were ‘objects ’ o f the law unprotected by it. The law applied to the Africans by 
the Europeans may indeed, be properly called European colonial law, for 
international law by its very nature should and does protect all peoples 
regardless o f race, creed, religion or colour... ” 9
This perception, as will be pointed out later in this thesis, accounts for the eagerness by 
African states for the convening of UNCLOS III, as well as the general attitude of these 
states during the conference to the existing law of the sea in general and to the issue of 
the deep seabed regime and its institutions in particular.10 Another African international 
law jurist, Professor Ajomo, captures the attitude of African states to the existing law of 
the sea prior to and during UNCLOS III, by explaining as follows:
"... it must be realised that existing norms governing rights on the sea, like 
most norms o f customary international law, were formed from practice 
among Western European States before the accession o f the new African and 
Asian States to independence. Many countries o f the Third World were not 
parties to the development o f these norms. Further some o f these norms have 
been considered as unfavourable to many countries o f Africa and Asia and 
their aspirations. ” 11
2.1.2. Traditional Law o f the Sea.
By the 15th century certain European states had by virtue of their dominance over the seas 
assumed the position of originators of the rules governing the sea. In 1494 by the papal 
bull of Pope Alexander VI, which was given legal effect through the Treaty of 
Tordesillas, a line was drawn down a meridian of longitude through Brazil dividing the 
sea between Portugal and Spain. The area east of the line was to be the Portuguese sphere
8 Verzijl, International law in Historical Perspective, op.cit. pp.435-436.
9 Umozurike, O, “International Law and Colonialism in Africa: A Critique”, (April 1970) 3 (1) Eastern 
Africa Law Review, pp.47 at 81-82 quoted in Rembe, op. cit. at p. 9.
10 See section 2.1.4 below.
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of expansion while that to the west of the line was the Spanish area of expansion. This
1 9treaty is one of the earliest attempts to codify the law concerning the sea. This, of 
course, led others like the Dutch, with a concern for freedom of communication as a 
result of their trading interests, to advocate the doctrine of the freedom of the high seas. 
The Dutch state practice was reflected through the writings of the famous Dutch writer, 
Hugo Grotius, who in his book, Mare Liberum (1609), advocated the freedom of the high 
seas.13 It has been said that this book is “the first and classic exposition o f the doctrine o f 
the freedom o f the seas”.14 Grotius published this book to defend the right of the Dutch, 
through the Dutch East India Company, to navigate in the Indian Ocean and other Eastern 
seas in order to trade with India and the East Indies over which Spain and Portugal 
claimed a commercial monopoly and political domination.15 This was therefore a 
situation where the Portuguese and Spanish desired closed seas (mare clausum), while 
others like the Dutch desired open seas (mare liberum).
The English also challenged the claim by Spain and Portugal to sovereignty over the seas.
In reply to Spanish protest over Sir Francis Drake’s violation of its alleged sovereignty
over the Pacific and Indian Oceans, Queen Elizabeth of England is reported to have said:
“Neither nature nor public interest permit the exclusive possession o f the sea 
by a single nation or private individual, the ocean is free to everybody; no 
legal titles exist whatever that would grant its possession to anyone in 
particular; neither nature nor usage permit its seizure; the domains o f the sea 
and o f the air are common property o f all men”.16
However it is interesting to note a change of policy by the English from the open sea 
policy of Queen Elizabeth to a closed sea policy by her successor, King James. For as
"Ajomo, M., “Third World Expectations”, in Churchill, Simmonds & Welch (eds.), New Directions in the 
Law o f the Sea -  Collected Papers, Vol. Ill, (New York, Dobbs Ferry, Oceana Publications Inc, 1973), 
p.302.
12 O’Connell, The International Law o f the Sea, Vol.I, op.cit.p.2.
13 Brown, The International Law o f the Sea, Vol.I, (Aldershot, Darmouth, 1994), p.7.
14 See W.S.M. Knight, Seraphin de Freitas: Critic o f Mare Liberum, Transactions of Grotius Society, vol. 
II p. 1(1926) quoted in Anand, International Law and Developing Countries: Confrontation or Co­
operation? op. cit. p.53.
15 Anand, ibid.pp.53-56.
16 Queen Elizabeth’s reply to the Spanish envoy Menedoza in 1580 in Christian Meurer, The Program of  
the Freedom o f the Sea, (Translated from German by Leo J. Frachtenberg) p. 11 (1919) quoted in Anand, 
Anand, R., Origin and Development o f the Law o f  the Sea, (History of International Law Revisited), op. 
cit.p.95.
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long as the English, under Queen Elizabeth, were interested in having a share in the East 
India trade like the Dutch, as against the Spanish and the Portuguese, they supported the 
mare liberum policy. However by the reign of King James, when England was more 
interested in curtailing the benefits accruing to the Dutch, who had powerful merchant 
and fishing fleets, they started to pursue the policy of mare clausum. The Crown 
commissioned an English man, John Selden, to make a strong case against mare liberum. 
In reply to Grotius’s Mare Liberum, Selden wrote his treatise, Mare Clausum, seu de 
Dominio Maris Libri Duo (The closed sea or two books concerning the Rule over the 
sea). This book was published in 1635 by the express command of the King “for the 
manifesting o f the right and dominion o f us and our royal progenitors in the seas which 
encompasses these our realms and Dominions o f Great Britain and Ireland. ”17 However, 
by the 19th century, when Britain had strengthened its maritime capability, thereby 
becoming a leading maritime power, it reverted again to mare liberum, and has thereafter, 
along with other leading maritime powers, consistently “pursued and consolidated a 
policy o f freedom o f the seas.”18
This lesson from history gives an idea of the constant conflict between advocates of mare 
liberum and those of mare clausum that to this day permeates the law of the sea. This 
conflict was clearly reflected in the UNCLOS III in the antagonism between the 
developed (advocating freedom of the seas) and developing states (advocating closed 
seas) in various areas of the law of the sea, including the issue of what type of regime and 
institutions should apply to the Area. It points to the underlying political and economic 
self-interest of states that determines the policy they adopt on the law of the sea generally 
and the deep seabed regime in particular.
According to Brown:
"... many o f the principal features o f the international law o f the sea have 
been formed by the interplay between two opposing fundamental principles o f 
International law: the principle o f sovereignty and the principle o f the 
freedom o f the high seas. The ascendancy o f one over the other during any
17 Anand, ibid.p. 105.
18 Brown International Law o f the Sea, op. cit.p.7.
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particular historical period has tended to reflect the interests o f the 
predominant powers o f the day. ” 19
It must also be pointed out that while the whole history of the law of the sea is about the 
conflict between mare liberum and mare clausum, the negotiations of the regime of the 
deep seabed, as will be seen later, introduced a new variant to the conflict. Rather than 
the usual situation of a state claiming sovereignty over a belt of the sea, we see, in the 
deep seabed regime, a situation where the international community jointly appears to be 
claiming a type of communal sovereignty over the deep seabed.
2.1.3. UNCLOS I  and II
In 1930, the League of Nations convened the Hague codification conference. However 
one of the critical points on which the participating states failed to reach an agreement 
was on the breadth of the territorial sea.
In 1957 the General Assembly of the United Nations, by Resolution 1105(XI) of 21 
February, convened the first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS I). This Resolution required the UNCLOS I to examine the law of the sea 
taking into account the legal, technical, biological, economic and political aspects and to 
embody the results of its work in one or more international Conventions or other 
instrument. The conference was also required to study the question of free access to the 
sea of land-locked states as “established by international practice or treaties”.20 The 
General Assembly Resolution also referred to UNCLOS I the report of the International
th • • •Law Commission (ILC) covering the work of its 8 session, which in essence formed the 
basis for the various 1958 Conventions. Other materials referred to the conference were 
the verbatim records of the relevant debates in the General Assembly; comments by 
governments on the draft articles on the law of the sea prepared by the ILC; the 
memorandum submitted by the preliminary conference on land-locked states held in 
Geneva from the 10 to 14 February 1958; and preparatory documents prepared by the 
United Nations secretariat, along with certain specialised agencies and independent
19 Brown, Sea-Bed Energy and Minerals: The International Legal Regime, Vol.2 (The 
Hague/Boston/London, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2001), p. 14.
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experts.21 UNCLOS I was held at the United Nations office at Geneva from 24 February 
to 27 April 1958, with eighty-six states participating, out of which only six states were 
from Africa, namely Ghana, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, South Africa and Tunisia. The 
gross under-representation of Africa can be explained by the fact that most African states 
were still under the subjugation of foreign colonial “masters”. Also involved in the 
Conference were seven specialised agencies22 and nine inter-governmental 
organisations23 invited by the General Assembly as observers.
The four 1958 Conventions on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone24, the High 
Seas,25 the Continental Shelf26 and Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of 
the High Seas,27 products of the UNCLOS I, have been described as “the first completed 
attempt o f the International Law Commission to place a large segment o f international
20(1958) 52 AJ.I.L. p.830.
21 Ibid. p.832.
22 Ibid.pp.830-831.
23 Ibid. p. 831.
24 The Territorial Sea Convention, made up of 32 articles, was adopted on 27 April 1958 and entered into 
force on 10 September 1964. See (1958) 52 A.J.I.L. pp. 834- 842. As at 7 March, 2002 there were 41 
signatories and 51parties, including Kenya (20/6/1969), Lesotho (23/10/1973), Madagascar (31/7/1962), 
Malawi (3/11/1965), Mauritius (5/10/1970), Nigeria (26/6/1961), Senegal (25/4/1961), Sierra Leone 
(13/3/1962), South Africa(9/4/1963), Swaziland (16/10/1970) and Uganda (14/9/1964). See 
http://untreatv.un.org/ENGLISH/bib1e/englishintemetbible/partl/chapterXXI/treatvl .asp [Accessed 7 
March 2002].
25 The High Seas Convention, made up of 37 articles, was adopted on 27 April 1958 and entered into force 
on 20 September 1962,ibid. pp.842-851. As at 7 March 2002 there were 46 signatories and 62 parties, 
including Burkina Faso (4/10/1965), Central African Republic (15/10/1962), Kenya (20/6/1969), Lesotho 
(23/10/1973), Madagascar ( 31/7/1962), Malawi (3/11/1965), Mauritius (5/10/1970), Nigeria (26/6/1961), 
Senegal (25/4/1961), Sierra Leone (13/3/1962), South Africa (9/4/1963), Swaziland (16/10/1970) and 
Uganda (14/9/1964). See
http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinteraetbible/partI/chapterXXI/treatv2.asp [Accessed 7 
March 2002].
26 The Continental Shelf Convention, made up o f 15 articles, was adopted on 26 April 1958 and entered 
into force on 11 June 1964, ibid. pp. 858-862. As at 7 March 2002 there were 43 signatories and 57 parties, 
including Kenya (20/6/1969), Lesotho (23/10/1973), Madagascar (31/7/1962), Malawi (3/11/1965), 
Mauritius (5/10/1970), Nigeria (26/6/1961), Senegal (25/4/1961), Sierra Leone (25/11/1966), South Africa 
(9/4/1963), Swaziland (16/10/1970) and Uganda (14/9/1964). See
http://untreatv.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterXXI/treatv4.asp [Accessed 7 
March 2002].
27The Fisheries Convention, made up of 22 articles, was adopted on 26 April 1958 and entered into force on 
20 March 1966, ibid. pp.851-858. As at 7 March 2002 there were 35 signatories and 37 parties, including 
Burkina Faso (4/10/1965), Kenya (20/6/1969), Lesotho (23/10/1973), Madagascar (31/7/1962), Malawi 
(3/11/1965), Mauritius (5/10/1970), Nigeria (26/6/1961) Senegal (25/4/1961), Sierra Leone (13/3/1962), 
South Africa (9/4/1963) and Uganda (14/9/1964).
See http://untreatv.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishintemetbible/partI/chapterXXI/treatv3.asp [Accessed 7 
March 2002],
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law on a multilateral treaty basis ” 28 African states became parties to these Conventions 
by succession or accession,29 with some incorporating into their domestic legislation 
certain provisions of these Conventions. 30There was also an optional protocol on dispute 
settlement.31
Despite the success of the 1958 conference, which led to four major Conventions on the 
law of the sea, the parties failed to reach any agreement on two fundamental issues, 
namely the breadth of the territorial sea and fishery limits. As a result of this, a second 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS II) was convened in 1960 at 
Geneva. The conference, with 88 states in attendance, including 10 African states, was 
held for ten days from 17 to 27 March 1960 and had as its agenda the examination of the 
question concerning the breadth of the territorial sea and the delimitation of a fisheries 
zone.32 This conference, unlike its predecessor, failed to produce any new Conventions, 
and in particular failed to agree on the issue of the breadth of the territorial sea and 
fishery limits.
28 Harris, D., Cases and Materials on International Law, 5th edition (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1998), 
p.368.
29 See generally the Convention on Succession o f States in respect of Treaties of 23 August 1978, 17 I.L.M. 
(1978), 1488 and Art. 15 of the Vienna Convention on the Law o f Treaties of 23 May 1969, 8 I.L.M 
(1969), 679.
30 For example, the Nigerian Petroleum Act, enacted as far back as 1969, vests ownership and control of 
petroleum located in the continental shelf in the Federal government of Nigeria and defines the continental 
shelf as “the seabed and subsoil of those submarine areas adjacent to the coast of Nigeria the surface of 
which lies at a depth no greater than two hundred metres (or, where its natural resources are capable of 
exploitation, depth) below the surface of the sea, excluding so much of those areas as lies below the 
territorial waters of Nigeria”. See SS. 1(1) and 14(1) o f Petroleum Act Cap.350, Laws of The Federation of 
Nigeria, 1990. The definition of the Nigerian continental shelf in this Act, which came into force on 27 
November 1969, is in line with the Continental Shelf Convention 1958. See also Art.2 (k) of the Sudanese 
Territorial Waters and Continental Shelf Act 1970 and Egyptian Presidential Decision No. 1051 of 1958 
defining their continental shelf in line with the 1958 Convention.
31 The Optional Protocol, made up of only seven articles, was adopted on 29 April 1958 and came into 
force 30 September 1963 (1958) 52 A.J.I.L. pp. 862-864. As at 7 March 2002 there were 14 signatories and 
37 parties, including Ghana(29/4/1958), Liberia (27/5/1958), Madagascar (10/8/1962), Malawi 
(17/12/1965), Mauritius (5/10/1970), Sierra Leone (14/2/1963) and Uganda (15/9/1964). See
http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishintemetbible/partI/chapterXXI/treatv5.asp [Accessed on 7 
March 2002].
32 The African states in attendance were Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, 
Sudan, Tunisia and South Africa. See UNCLOS II Official Records,pp.xiii-xxiv
33 For more on UNCLOS II see Dean, A., “The Second Geneva conference on the Law of the Sea: The 
Fight for Freedom of the seas” (1960) 54 AJIL. pp. 751-789 and Jessup, P., “The Law of the Sea Around 
Us” (1961) 55 AJIL.pp. 104-109.
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At the 1958 and 1960 Geneva conferences, as at the time of the 1930 Hague conference, 
the deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction (the Area) was not regarded as an issue of 
note because of the limited technology at that time. In its preparatory work on the 1958 
conference the ILC commented that it had not put forward any proposals on the 
exploration and exploitation of the bed of the high seas because it did not consider the 
question to be of practical significance.34
2.1.4. Prelude to UNCLOS III.
By the 1960s a growing number of African states had begun to emerge as independent 
states.35 These states became members of the General Assembly of the United Nations 
and, along with Asian and Latin American developing states, by sheer numbers, if
* • 36nothing else, became extremely influential in the Assembly. Most of these African
states, which were still under colonial rule during UNCLOS I, did not have an
opportunity of a direct input into the formulation of the 1958 Conventions. Consequently
these states were dissatisfied with the existing law of the sea and viewed it as being tilted
in favour of the western industrialised developed states. This perception, common to most
developing states that did not participate as independent states in UNCLOS I as a result
of colonialism, is well expressed by one commentator when he pointed out that:
“Most o f the impetus for dramatic departures from the law as expressed in 
the Geneva Conventions has come from developing countries and, in 
particular, developing coastal countries. Many o f these nations had no part 
in the formulation o f the existing codified law, regard the customs on which it 
was based as closely identified with the colonial regime, and feel that its legal 
arrangements often work to their economic disadvantage ” 37
Another commentator, talking specifically about Nigeria, explained that: “Like many 
other Third World States, Nigeria happens to be one o f the post-colonial states which 
never had any say in the drafting o f the Geneva Conventions o f1958. ” 38
34 Churchill, R. & Lowe, A., The Law o f the Sea, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1999) p. 225.
35 For example, by 1960 Nigeria, Senegal, Niger, Togo, Republic of Benin, Gabon, Chad, Mali, Cote d’ 
Ivoire and Central African Republic had emerged as independent states.
36 See Arts. 7, 9-22 of the United Nations Charter, http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/index.html [Accessed 
5 January 2005]
37 Brantley, T., “Law of the Sea”, (1973) 14 Harvard International Law Journal, p. 555 at 556.
38 Okeke, C., The Theory And Practice o f  International Law In Nigeria, (Enugu, Nigeria, Fourth Dimension 
Publishers, 1986), pp. 227-228.
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2.1.4.1. Organisation o f African Unity/African Union.
With independence, a number of African states felt a need for a common forum, amongst 
other things, to voice their views in the international community. This led to the 
establishment of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) on 25 May 1963 at Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia by 32 independent states.39 Its purpose was to promote the unity and 
solidarity of the African states; to defend the sovereignty of its members; to eradicate all 
forms of colonialism; to promote international co-operation having due regard for the 
Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; and to co­
ordinate arid harmonise member states’ economic, diplomatic, educational, health, 
welfare, scientific and defence policies.40 This Organisation was open to all independent 
sovereign African states and the neighbouring island Malagasy states 41
This organisation, working along with other developing states from Asia and Latin 
America in forums such as the Group of 77, exerted a great influence in the development 
of a new law of the sea that culminated in the LOSC 1982.42
The expressed intention by African states to promote international co-operation having 
due regard to the United Nations Charter, a product of the existing international law, was 
an indication that they were ready to be part of that law. Their determination was to work 
within the existing framework of international law to bring about a change, in what they 
perceived was the euro-centric nature of the existing international law, in order to 
incorporate the interest of African states.
392 ILM (1963) 766. See Elias, T.O., “The Charter of the Organisation of African Unity” (1965) 59 AJIL. 
pp.243-267. Prior to the establishment of the OAU there was a conference of Heads of African and 
Malagasy states in Lagos, Nigeria from January 25 to 30, 1962 in which resolutions were adopted to the 
effect that African States should constitute themselves as a definite group in the United Nations in dealing 
with problems peculiar to Africa and the Malagasy States and also to “strive continuously” to ensure a fair 
and equitable representation of the group in organs o f the United Nations. See also Okeke, C.N., 
“International Law”, in Okonkwo, C.O. (ed.), Introduction to Nigerian Law, (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 
1980), pp. 318-319.
40 See Art. I and II of the Charter of the OAU.
41 See Arts. I and V of the Charter.
42 See the 1974 Declaration of the Organisation o f African Unity on the Issues of the Law of the Sea, Doc. 
A/CONF.62/33 of 19 July 1974. See UNCLOS III, Official Records, Vol.HI, pp.63-65.
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Georges Abi- Saab pointed out, concerning African states, that:
" While adhering to the existing system o f international law, they started to 
contest it “from within ” striving for its development with their participation -  
particularly within the UN and its ILC - to make it more responsive to the 
new needs, and more “universal” or “oeumenical” in its approach as well as 
the values and interests it purports to protect and promote”.43
Another commentator noted:
“.... It is the view o f the newly-independent states that, since they were under 
the rule o f foreign powers during the formative era o f international law, it 
was clear that their interests could not have been taken into account. 
Consequently, they insist on reviewing and reshaping those laws that are 
clearly anti-African. 44
On 2 March 2001 the African Heads of State at an Extraordinary OAU Summit in Sirte, 
Libya declared the establishment of the African Union (AU) to succeed the OAU. Under 
the Constitutive Act of the AU, adopted by the thirty-sixth ordinary session of the Heads 
of State of the OAU on 11 July 2000 in Lome, Togo, it was specified that the AU would 
come into force thirty days after the ratification by two-thirds of the member states of the 
OAU.45 On 26 April 2001, Nigeria became the 36th member state to deposit its instrument 
of ratification and the Constitutive Act came into force on 26 May 2001 46 The Act has 
since been ratified by all the member states of the OAU and the AU has replaced the 
OAU. The objectives of the Union includes achieving greater unity and solidarity 
between the African states and peoples; to promote and defend an African common 
position on issues of interest to the continent and its peoples; and to establish the 
necessary conditions which would enable the continent to play its rightful role in the 
global economy and in international negotiations.47 So far there is no indication that the 
AU has any significant interest in promoting a unity and common position in law of the
43 Abi-Saab, G., “International Law and the International Community, The Long Road to Universality”, in 
Macdonald, R. (ed.), Essays in Honour o f Wang Tieya, (Dordrecht, Netherlands, Martinus Nijhoff, 1994), 
p. 41; See also Henkin, L., How Nations Behave - Law and Foreign Policy, 2nd edition, (New York, 
Columbia University Press, 1979), pp.l 19-134.
44 Okeke, C.N., “International Law”, in Okonkwo, C.O. (ed.), op.cit.p.321.
45 See Arts. 27 and 28 of the Constitutive Act o f the African Union. http://www.africa- 
union.org/home/Welcome.htm [Accessed on 7 September 2004] and Packer, C.A.A. and Rukare, D., “The 
New African Union and its Constitutive Act”, (2002) 96(2) AJIL, pp.365-379.
46 By 9 July 2001 the Constitutive Act had been signed by all OAU Member States and has since been 
ratified by all 53 member states of the O.A.U.
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sea matters, including the seabed regime and its institutions, in a manner similar to the 
position of the OAU during the UNCLOS III.48 In the vision of the African Union and the 
mission of the African Union Commission, the 2004-2007 Strategic Framework of the 
African Union Commission and the Action Plans of the various Departments of the 
Commission, three documents intended to map out a programme for the period 2004- 
2007, there is no evidence of an articulated position by the AU on law of the sea issues.49 
However, recently there appears to be an indication of some interest by the AU in the 
regime of the Area as it put forward a candidate, Ambassador Charles Manyang D’Awol 
(Sudan), for the position of Secretary-General of the ISA.50
2.1.4.2. Africa’s dissatisfaction with the traditional law o f the sea.
African states were clearly dissatisfied with the traditional law of the sea, which in their 
view, was tilted in favour of the technologically developed maritime states. This 
dissatisfaction came to a fore when Senegal denounced the Geneva Conventions on the 
Territorial Sea and Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of the High Seas.51 
This denunciation was brought to the notice of the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations by a formal notification from Senegal on 9 June 1971 and was to take effect on 8 
July 1971. According to Rembe, one of the major reasons for the denunciation was 
because Senegal felt there was a “technological gap between her and the treaty 
partners.”52 The Secretary-General, upon receipt of the denunciation, took the view that 
he was not authorised to receive such denunciation since there were no specific clauses 
authorising denunciations in the Conventions, neither was there any specific instruction 
in that regard by the parties to the Conventions. He therefore referred the issue to the 
parties to the Conventions. Only one party, the United Kingdom, replied. It took the view
47 Art. 3 of the Constitutive Act.
48 See, for example, the 1974 Declaration of the Organisation of African Unity on the Issues of the Law of 
the Sea. UNCLOS III Official Records, Vol.III, pp.63-65.
49 See http: // w w w. aff ica- uni on. org/home/ W elcome. htm [Accessed on 7 September 2004]. There are, 
however, moves by the International Ocean Institute (IOI), South Africa, a non-governmental organisation, 
to develop an African Implementation Action Plan for Oceans and Coast. Nothing concrete has come of 
this because of lack of funds. [Personal Communication o f Dr. Kim Prochazka, Director, International 
Ocean Institute (IOI), South Africa -  on file with the author].
50 See International Seabed Authority Press Release, SB/10/16 of 2 June 2004.
51 United Nations Treaty Series (UNTS) vol. 781 nos. 7477 and 8164.
52 Rembe, op. cit. p. 167.
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that the Geneva Conventions were not susceptible to unilateral denunciation by any of the 
parties and therefore rejected the validity and effectiveness of this denunciation and
53regarded Senegal as still being bound by the Conventions.
All this merely strengthened the resolve of African states to press for a new law of the 
sea. With the improvement of technology and the possibility of mining the seabed 
beneath the high seas, it became necessary to look at the issue of a regime to regulate any 
eventual mining in this part of the sea. This led the international community to give 
attention to this part of the sea and its resources. Developed, technologically endowed, 
states started to take an interest in the possibility of mining the seabed under the high 
seas. African states, fresh from colonial domination resulting from the scramble for and 
the partition of Africa by western developed states, were averse to another land grab of 
the seabed of the high seas by these same states. Interestingly, the American president, 
Lyndon Johnson, was able to identify with this fear of African states when in 1966 he 
warned that:
“Under no circumstances, we believe, must we allow the prospects o f a rich 
harvest o f mineral wealth to create a new form o f colonial competition among 
the maritime nations. We must be careful to avoid a race to grab and hold the 
lands under the high seas. We must ensure that the deep seas and the ocean 
bottom are, and remain, the legacy o f all human beings” 54
2.1.4.3. Arvid Pardo’s Proposal and United Nations Common Heritage Resolutions.
The stage was therefore set for the speech of Dr. Arvid Pardo, Maltese ambassador to the 
United Nations, in 1967.This speech proposed that the deep seabed beyond national 
jurisdiction and the resources thereof should be declared as the common heritage of 
mankind and used for only peaceful purposes.55 This brought to the fore the need to have 
a legal regime for the seabed beyond national jurisdiction.56 The speech appears to have 
acted as a clarion call for developing states, including African states, within the General
53 U.N.T.S., vol.781, nos. 7477 and 8164.
54 “Remarks at the Commissioning o f the Research Ship Oceanographer, 13 July, 1966”, quoted in Payoyo, 
P.B, Cries o f the Sea: World Inequality, Sustainable Development and the Common Heritage o f Humanity 
(The Hague/London/Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997), pp.176-177 and Rembe, op. cit. atp.38.
55 See Maltese Note Verbale of 17 August 1967 to the U.N. Secretary-General (A/6695, 18th August, 1967; 
vol. II, Doc. 12.1) and Dr. Pardo’s speech to the General Assembly’s first Committee on 1st November 
1967. (A/C.1/PV.1515, 1 November 1967).
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Assembly. Thereafter a number of General Assembly Resolutions concerning the deep 
seabed beyond national jurisdiction were adopted, including the Resolution on the 
importance of preserving the seabed beyond national jurisdiction from actions and uses
cn
which might be detrimental to the common interests of mankind; a Resolution that the 
exploitation of the resources in the seabed be carried for the benefit of mankind as a 
whole with special consideration for developing nations;58 the Moratorium Resolution;59 
the Resolution on the Declaration of Principles governing the seabed and ocean floor, and
• Anthe subsoil thereof beyond the limits of national jurisdiction; and the Resolution for
exclusively using the seabed beyond national jurisdiction for peaceful purposes.61 The
Moratorium Resolution, which clearly revealed the divide between the developed and the
developing states, declared as follows:
“Pending the establishment o f [an international regime including appropriate 
machinery]
(a) States and persons, physical or juridical, are bound to refrain from all 
activities o f exploitation o f the resources o f the area o f the sea-bed and ocean 
floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits o f national jurisdiction;
(b) No claim to any part o f that area or its resources shall be recognised. ”
Whilst it is almost impossible to say that the Moratorium Resolution established 
customary international law,63 considering the level of objections64 and abstentions65 
even from certain African states, there is no doubt that this Resolution served as the 
launch pad for subsequent Resolutions, including the Resolution on the Declaration of
56 It has been said that the proposal for a legal regime for the deep seabed was already in place before Arvid 
Pardo’s speech. See Rembe, op. cit. p.36.
57 General Assembly Resolution 2340 (XXII) of 18 December, 1967
58 General Assembly Resolution 2467A (XXIII) o f 21 December 1968.
59 General Assembly Resolution 2754 (XXIV) o f 15 December 1969.
60 General Assembly Resolution 2749(XXV) o f the 17 o f December, 1970
61 General Assembly Resolutions 3029 (XXVII) o f 18 December 1972 and 3067 (XXVIII) of 16 November 
1973.
62 See Gerstle, M., The Politics o f U.N. Voting: A view o f the Seabed from the Glass Palace, (Occasional 
paper No. 7, 1970,Law of the Sea Institute University o f Rhode Island); Henkin, L., “Old Politics and New 
Directions,” in Churchill, Simmonds & Welch (eds.), New Directions in the Law of the Sea, Vol. Ill, op. 
cit. 8-10.
63 62 states voted in favour of this resolution including African States such as Mauritius, Tunisia, Ethiopia, 
Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Lesotho, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zambia.
64 28 states objected, including such African states as Ghana and South Africa.
65 28 states abstained, including such African States as Cote d’ Ivoire (then Ivory Coast), Liberia, Libya, 
Madagascar, Sierra Leone, Togo, Sudan, Malawi, Swaziland, Burkina Faso (then Upper Volta) and even 
Nigeria.
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Principles of this regime that was adopted without any objections. 66 All these 
Resolutions eventually culminated in the entrenchment of the principle of the common 
heritage of mankind, along with the regime of the deep seabed beyond national 
jurisdiction, in the LOSC, as modified by the 1994 Implementation Agreement. Despite 
the watering down of the principle of the common heritage of mankind by the 
Agreement, there is no doubt that the principle, which requires that special consideration 
should be given to developing states, is an accomplishment for developing states, 
including African states.
2.1.4.3 (I). Legal Status o f the Area
For a long while there was confusion as to the legal status of the Area - whether it was res
nullius, an extension of the continental shelf or res communis, or whether it enjoyed a
• • 68totally different status as the common heritage of mankind. The argument that the Area 
was res nullius, and therefore susceptible to appropriation by anyone who asserted legal 
control and effective occupation, did not seem to gain much support in the international 
community.69 In 1974 an American company, Deep Sea Ventures Inc., filed a ‘Notice o f 
Discovery and Claim o f Exclusive Mining Rights, and Request for Diplomatic Protection 
and Protection o f Investment’, in respect of a specified nodule site in the Clarion fracture 
zone, with the US State Department. The State Department was, however, not prepared to 
grant or recognise an exclusive claim to the site, which fell outside national jurisdiction.70
66 Adopted by 108 votes for the Resolution, none against, with 18 abstentions. On views in respect of the 
legal effect o f this Resolution, see Rembe, op.cit. at pp.49-57 and compare with Churchill & Lowe, op. cit. 
at pp. 227-228 and Brown, E., Sea-Bed Energy and Minerals: The International Legal Regime, Vol.2, 
Seabed Mining(The Hague/Boston/London, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2001), pp.23-44.
67 See Anand, R.P, “Common Heritage of Mankind: Mutilation of an Ideal,” (1997) 37 Indian Journal of 
International Law, pp. 1-18. Here the author expresses disappointment that the common heritage principle 
had been deprived of its original meaning and substance by the 1994 Agreement.
68 See Mahmoudi, S.,The Law o f Deep Sea-Bed Mining: A Study o f the Progressive Development of 
International Law Concerning the Management o f the Polymetallic Nodules o f the Deep Sea-Bed 
(Stockholm, Sweden,Almqvist &Wiksell International, 1987), pp.85-168.
69 On res nullius see generally the Island o f  Palmas (United States v. Netherlands) Case, printed in (1928) 
22 AJIL. pp.867-912; Clipperton Island (France v. Mexico) Case (1932) 6 R.G.D.I.P, pp. 129-132; Legal 
Status o f Eastern Greenland (Denmark v. Norway) Case P.C.I.J. Series A/B., No.53, 1933 and Western 
Sahara Case, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J.Rep. 1975, p. 12. See also Mahmoudi, Ibid. pp.87-103; Dyke, J. V. & 
Yuen, C., “Common Heritage v. Freedom o f the High Seas: Which Governs the Seabed?” (1982) 19 San 
Diego Law Review, p. 493 at.514-519.
70 See 14 ILM 51 (1975). See Burton S.J., “Freedom o f the Seas: International Law Applicable to Deep 
Seabed Mining Claims,” (1977) 29 Stanford Law Review.pA 135 at 1140-1159. However see the British 
Foreign Office instructions to the British Embassy in Venezuela on the bed and subsoil of the Gulf o f Paria
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There was also the argument that in view of the rather vague “exploitability ” test 
enunciated in Article 1 of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, each state 
could extend its continental shelf to include the deep seabed area. This argument was also 
not popular since it was felt that the “exploitability” test was qualified by the requirement 
that the seabed and subsoil of the submarine area exploitable by the coastal state should 
be adjacent to the coast.71
For some time the main issue therefore was whether the Area and its resources were res 
communis or the common heritage of mankind, two concepts with distinct legal effect. A 
territory that is deemed to be res communis is not subject to the exclusive appropriation 
by any one and therefore not subject to any sovereign claims or any national 
jurisdiction,72 it is therefore available to any entity willing and able to exploit the 
resources therein. This therefore permits a situation whereby whoever has the available 
resources for exploitation in terms of finance and technology can unilaterally exploit the 
resources therein.
On the other hand, the principle of the common heritage of mankind as Joyner points out 
consists of five principal elements.73 First, it deals with territories that are not subject to 
appropriation of any kind, public or private, national or corporate, and though no one 
owns it, everyone manages it. Second, in the view of Joyner, all peoples, with states 
acting in a representative capacity, are expected to share in the management of the 
territory and therefore are to be represented in any international institution set up in this
where they wrote: “...in international law the bed o f  the sea beneath territorial waters and the subsoil 
beneath that bed are already considered as being in possession o f  the territorial State. The bed of the sea 
and accompanying subsoil beneath the high seas on the other hand is res nullius, but is capable o f  
acquisition by effective occupation in the same manner as any unoccupied territory above the level o f the 
sea. ” Public Record office reference F.O. 371/19847, folio 429 quoted in Marston G., “The Evolution of 
the Concept of Sovereignty over the Bed and Subsoil o f the Territorial Sea,” (1976-77) 48 B. Y.I.L.pp.329- 
330. This was, o f course, before the development o f the concept of the continental shelf.
71 See Young, R., “The Legal Regime of the Deep-Sea Floor” (1968) 62 A//L.pp.641-653; Finlay L., The 
Outer Limit of the Continental Shelf: A Rejoinder to Professor Louis Henkin (1970) 64 A//Z,.pp.42-61; 
Henkin, L., A Reply to Mr Finlay (1970) 64 AJIL. pp. 62; Ogley, Internationalizing the Seabed, (England, 
Gower Publishing Company Limited, 1984), pp. 104-106 and Payoyo, op.cit.pp. 180-226.
72 Joyner, C., “Legal Implications o f the Concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind”, (1986) 35 ICLQ, 
pp. 190 at 193-194; For a detailed study o f the Common Heritage see Baslar, K., The Concept o f the 
Common Heritage o f Mankind in International Law, (The Hague/Boston/London, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1998).
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regard. Third, any natural resources exploited from the territory and any economic 
benefits are to be shared amongst all peoples. Fourth, the territory is to be used 
exclusively for peaceful purposes. Fifth, it should be open to scientific research by any 
particular state, provided that such research does not adversely affect the environment 
and the results of that research are made available as soon as possible to other states 
which request for it.
He goes on to suggest out that there is a New International Economic Order (NIEO) 
variant of the common heritage of mankind principle requiring full legal ownership of the 
Area by the international community and that developing states should be given 
preferential rights in the distribution of the revenue accruing from the Area. In addition, 
this NIEO variant, in the view of Joyner, requires the setting up of international 
machinery with immense powers to serve as trustee for the Area.74
The present writer is of the opinion that the so-called NIEO variant of the common 
heritage of mankind represents the essence of the principle since ownership of the 
territory, albeit a communal not individual ownership is a crucial attribute of the common 
heritage of mankind principle. Therefore though ownership cannot vest in any individual 
state, it is vested in the international community as a whole.
The implication of communal ownership of the Area by the international community 
appears to be inherent in the use of the word “heritage” to describe the principle of the 
common heritage of mankind. This word “h e r i ta g e which it is suggested was used 
deliberately, connotes, in itself, something that allows for ownership and capable of being 
inherited by future generations. The Somali delegate, suggesting communal ownership 
under the common heritage of mankind principle, pointed out at UNCLOS III that:
“The aim o f the General Assembly in using the expression “common 
heritage o f mankind” was clear and embodied the notion that the resources 
o f the seabed and ocean floor beyond the limits o f national jurisdiction 
belonged to all peoples and should be used for the benefit o f all. ” 5
73 Joyner, ibid. pp. 191-192.
74 Ibid.pp.192-193.
75 See UNCLOS III, Official Records, Vol.I, p. 186 para.52.
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Also the Tanzanian representative at the UNCLOS III was emphatic about the Area being
t t  76“jointly owned by all mankind. ”
Communal ownership by the international community of the Area and its resources, in 
the view of the present writer, is the legal basis upon which the international community 
is able to set up international machinery to administer this part of the sea in a role akin to 
that of a trustee for mankind. This communal ownership of the Area is implicit in Article 
137(2) of the LOSC, which says, “All rights in the resources o f the Area are vested in 
mankind as a whole, on whose behalf the Authority shall act. ”
Communal ownership of property, implicit in the common heritage of mankind, is a 
familiar concept to African states. There are examples of African states where under 
native law and customs land is not subject to individual ownership, but rather communal 
ownership by the family, village or community. Individual ownership appears to have
77been introduced as a result of the contact with Europeans. According to a chief in 
Ghana, the late Nana Sir Ofori Atta, “I  conceive that land belongs to a vast family o f 
whom many are dead, a few  are living and countless hosts are still unborn. ” 78
The communal nature of land ownership in West Africa has received judicial support in 
the case of Amodu Tijani v. Secretary, Government o f Southern Nigeria™ In this case
76 See UNCLOS III, Official Records, Vol. II, p.33, para.33. See also the view of the representative of 
Madagascar that the Area belongs to the international community as a whole. UNCLOS III, Official 
Records, Vol.II, p.59, para.78. Contrast, however, with the view o f the Libyan representative who appeared 
to be more focused on joint management rather than joint ownership and advocated that the Authority 
should exercise jurisdiction and not sovereignty over the Area and its resources. UNCLOS III, Official 
Records, Vol.II, p.43, para.79.
77 See, for example, Gluckman, M., “Property Rights and Status in African Traditional Law”, in Gluckman, 
M.(ed.), Ideas and Procedures in African Customary Law (London, Oxford University Press, 1969), 
pp.252-265; Rubin, N., & Cotran, E.,(eds.), Readings in African Law, Vol.I, (London, Frank Cass & Co. 
Ltd, 1970), pp. 236-409; Ollennu, N. A., & Woodman, G. R., Ollennu’s Principles o f Customary Land Law 
in Ghana, (Birmingham, CAL Press, 1985), pp.4 -7 and Olawoye C. O., Title to Land in Nigeria, (London, 
University of Lagos, Nigeria & Evans Brothers Limited, 1974), pp.22-34.
78 Ollennu, ibid. p.7.
79 [1921] 2 A.C. 399. This case was cited with approval again by the Privy Council in Sunmonu v. Disu 
Raphel [1927] A.C. 881.
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Lord Haldane of the Privy Council quoted, with approval, Rayner C.J.’s Report on Land
Tenure in West Africa, as follows:
“The next fact which it is important to bear in mind in order to understand 
the native land law is that the notion o f individual ownership is quite foreign 
to native ideas. Land belongs to the community, the village or the family, 
never to the individual All the members o f the community, village, or head o f 
the family have an equal right to the land, but in every case the chief or 
headman o f the community or village or head o f the family, has charge o f the 
land, and in loose mode o f speech is sometimes called the owner. He is to 
some extent in the position o f a trustee, and as such holds the land for the use 
o f the community or family. He has control o f it, and any member who wants 
a piece o f it to cultivate or build a house upon, goes to him for it. But the land 
so given still remains the property o f the community or family. He cannot 
make any important disposition o f the land without consulting the elders o f 
the community or the family, and their consent must in all cases be given 
before a grant can be made to a stranger. ” 80
There is an interesting parallel between the communal ownership of land in Africa and
• • 8 1  •the common heritage of mankind principle. The community under native law and
custom jointly owns the property. Any person who wants to use the communal land 
applies to the head for use and not ownership. The ownership is, however, always, at 
every point, vested in the community with the head of the community or family acting as 
a type of trustee for this communal land. This can be equated with the situation where the 
International Seabed Authority (ISA) acts as trustee of the Area and its resources for the 
benefit of mankind under the common heritage of mankind. It is not out of place to say 
that even before the famous speech of Arvid Pardo, African indigenous communities had 
a form of common heritage in respect of community or family land. Therefore it was not 
surprising that the African states could identify with the speech of Pardo and were willing 
to embrace the concept of the common heritage of mankind in respect of the Area, a 
concept in many ways similar to African cultural values in respect of ownership of land.
80 Supra at pp. 404-5.
81 Rembe, op.cit.p.53.
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2.1.4.3(H). Res Communis vs. Common Heritage o f Mankind
The General Assembly Resolutions on the matter declared the Area and the resources 
therein as the common heritage of mankind. However, despite these Resolutions, 
certain developed states still argued that the Area and its resources were res communis 
and that the resources were exploitable as one of the freedoms of the high seas. As far as 
they were concerned, while no state could exercise sovereignty over any part of the Area, 
they were entitled to free use of the Area and the exploitation of the resources therein. 
Their arguments have been put forward by jurists such as Kronmiller, Murphy, Burton
and Brown.83 They based their arguments mainly on Article 2 of the 1958 High Seas
84Convention that says:
“The high seas being open to all nations, no State may validly purport to 
subject any part o f them to its sovereignty. Freedom o f the high seas is 
exercised under the conditions laid down by these articles and by the other 
rules o f international law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and non­
coastal States:
(1) Freedom o f navigation:
(2) Freedom o f fishing;
(3) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;
(4) Freedom to fly  over the high seas.
These freedoms, and others which are recognised by the general principles o f 
international law, shall be exercised by all states with reasonable regard to 
the interests o f other States in their exercise o f the freedom o f the high seas ”
As far as these jurists were concerned, the provisions of the 1958 Convention, by using 
the phrases “inter alia” and “others which are recognised by the general principles of 
international law”, made room for additional freedoms of the high seas recognised by 
international law. In their view these additional freedoms include freedom of deep seabed 
exploitation. They also rely on the travaux preparatoires of the ILC in support of this
82 See for example, General Assembly Resolution 2340 (XXII) of 18 December 1967; General Assembly 
Resolution 2467A (XXIII) o f 21 December 1968; General Assembly Resolution 2754 (XXIV) of 15 
December 1969; General Assembly Resolution 2749(XXV) of 17 of December 1970; General Assembly 
Resolutions 3029 (XXVII) of 18 December 1972 and 3067 (XXVIII) of 16 November 1973. 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/gares 1 .htm [Accessed on 20 January 2005].
83 Kromiller T.G., The Lawfulness o f  Deep Seabed Mining, Vol. I (London/Rome/New York, Oceana 
Publications, 1980), pp.369-418; Murphy, J., “The Politics of Manganese Nodules: International 
Considerations and Domestic Legislation,” (1979) 16 San Diego Law Review, p.531 at 536-538; Burton, 
“Freedom of the Seas: International Law Applicable to Deep Seabed Mining Claims,” op.cit. pp. 1169-1180 
and Brown, Sea-Bed Energy and Minerals: The International Legal Regime, Vol.2, op. cit.pp. 14-22.
84 (1958) 52 AJIL, pp.842-851.
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view.85 However, Van Dyke and Yuen raise very lucid and cogent arguments against the
o / r
view that deep seabed mining was a freedom of the high seas. One of their most cogent
arguments is to the effect that there is no evidence in terms of state practice to show that
deep seabed mining had been established as a freedom of the high seas under customary
international law.87 Ambassador Elliot Richardson, the United States Ambassador to the
UNCLOS III, in a statement to Congress explained the rather limited acceptance of deep
seabed mining as a freedom of the high seas by states. He said:
“We [the United States] insist that there is a right under international law to 
engage in seabed mining as a high seas freedom, but there are only a dozen 
or 15 countries that take that position.... ” 88
The representative of Canada at the Sea-Bed Committee had earlier on in 1972 also
pointed out that the attempt to classify deep seabed mining as one of the freedoms of the
high seas was a minority position. He said:
“While there were those who lament the death o f the traditional unrestricted 
freedom o f the high seas, there are many more who rejoice that the 
traditional concept o f freedom o f the high seas can no longer be interpreted 
as.... a legal pretext for the unilateral appropriation o f sea-bed resources 
beyond national jurisdiction ”. (Emphasis addedf9
It is difficult to see how the position of only “a dozen or 15 countries” in the 
international community can be sufficient to make deep seabed mining a freedom of the 
high seas under customary international law. Mahmoudi, for his part, also agrees that the 
omnibus phrase of “other freedoms which are recognised by the general principles o f 
international law” in the High Seas Convention, does not include deep seabed mining
85 The ILC in its commentary on Art.2 of the High Seas Convention said: “The list of freedoms of the high 
seas contained in this article is not restrictive; the Commission has merely specified four of the main 
freedoms. It is aware that there are other freedoms, such as freedom to explore or exploit the subsoil of the 
high seas and freedom to engage in scientific research therein.” See (1955) 2 Year Book of the International 
Law Commission, p.21. Brown, for example, alluded to the ILC travaux preparatoires in his contention that 
seabed mining in the Area at one time was one of the freedoms of the high seas. See Brown, Sea-Bed 
Energy and Minerals, Vol.2, op.cit.pp.21-22.
86 Van Dyke and Yuen, “Common Heritage v. Freedom o f the High Seas: Which Governs the Seabed?,” 
op.cit. pp. 501-514.
87 Ibid atpp.512-513.
88 Briefing on the 8th Session of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: Hearing 
before the Subcomm. on International Policy and Trade and the Subcomm. on Foreign Affairs, 96th Cong., 
1st Sess. 13(1979), quoted in Van Dyke & Yuen, Ibid. p.498.
89 U.N. Doc. A/C. 1/PV. 1906, of 1972, para.42.
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because there is no evidence that this was generally accepted by state practice.90 He 
points out that the other freedoms in Article 2 that the ILC must have had in mind were 
the freedom of scientific research and freedom of undertaking nuclear tests on the high 
seas for which there was sufficient state practice.91 On the question of whether the 
freedom of the high seas could be extended to deep seabed mining because it was not 
expressly prohibited,92 Mahmoudi was of the view that for an act to be valid under 
international law it must not only satisfy the status of non-prohibition but must also be 
generally accepted by state practice.93 His position is premised on the point that though 
the travaux preparatoires of a treaty play a role in the interpretation of the treaty, 94 they 
cannot replace the requisite state practice in determining whether a principle is one of 
customary international law.95 The idea that deep seabed mining was one of the freedoms 
of the high seas, as pointed above, was rejected by a majority of states and therefore 
could not be validly said to be a freedom “recognised by the general principles o f 
international law”96
The view of the developed states, surprisingly, seemed to have been endorsed by
Professor Ajomo, a Nigerian jurist, when he said:
“The legal status o f the seabed should not present any difficulty as there is 
general agreement that the ocean floor beyond national jurisdiction is 
governed by the same regime as the high seas. As a result it is subject to 
Article 2 o f the Convention on the High Seas, by which no State may assert its 
sovereignty over any part o f the high seas. The ocean floor and subsoil may 
therefore not be occupied by a state or otherwise subjected to national 
jurisdiction either temporarily or permanently. It is res communis. A fortiori 
the natural resources o f the ocean floor and the subsoil are the common07heritage o f mankind.”
90 Mahmoudi, op. cit. pp.103-115.
91 Ibid. p. 109.
92 Brown, Sea-Bed Energy and Minerals, op. cit. pp. 19-22.
93 Mahmoudi, op. cit. pp. 112-115.
94 Art.32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law o f Treaties. 8 I.L.M (1969) 679.
95 See Asylum CasefColumbia v. Peru) I.C.J. Rep., 1950, p.266; North Sea Continental Sh elf Cases (Federal 
Republic o f Germany v. Denmark; Federal Republic o f Germany v. Netherlands) I.C.J. Rep., 1969, p.3 and 
Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United 
States), I.C.J. Rep.,1986,p.l4.
96 Art.2 of the High Seas Convention 1958.
97 Ajomo, op. cit. p.307.
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The position of the learned jurist appears to mix up the two concepts of res communis 
and the common heritage of mankind and does not adequately represent the position of 
developing states, including those in the African continent. The position of developing 
states, as posited by the Group of 77, was that the existing international law of the sea, 
including the High Seas Convention 1958, did not cover the regime of the seabed beyond 
national jurisdiction. In the view of the Group of 77, the regime was an innovative one 
based on the common heritage of mankind, which had been developed and become part 
of customary international law through the various Resolutions in the sixties and the
98seventies, including the Moratorium Resolution. The statement of the learned jurist
appears to be based on a misunderstanding of the difference between res communis and
the common heritage of mankind." Res communis, while preventing states from
appropriating a region as part of their national jurisdiction, does not prevent a free for all
exploration and exploitation of the resources by any state that has the capacity to do so.100
It was exactly this situation that the developing states desired to guard against with the
common heritage of mankind concept. Under the common heritage of mankind states are
not only disallowed from appropriating the region but also precluded from unilaterally
mining it. Rather the mining is to be a collective and regulated one.101 The Nigerian
position, which was in line with that of the O.A.U. and the Group of 77, was put by the
Nigerian delegation at the 22nd session of the General Assembly in the following words:
"... it is our view that the known resources o f the seabed and ocean floor, 
which are vast, should, as far as they lie outside the limits o f present national 
jurisdiction, be exploited collectively for the sole benefit o f the world 
community. As a developing country Nigeria’s renewed fear is o f the 
incalculable dangers for mankind as a whole i f  the seabed and the ocean
98 See Letter dated 29 August 1980 from the Chairman of the Group of 77, E.K. Wapenyi of Uganda, to the 
President of the Conference, UNCLOS III, Official Record, vol.XIV, pp. 111-114. This letter was in 
response to the unilateral legislation by certain developed industrialised states and it articulated the Group 
of 77 position on the regime applicable to the deep seabed Area.
99 On the doctrinal basis for the common heritage for mankind in the seabed , see Dupuy, R., “The Notion 
of Common Heritage of Mankind Applied to the Seabed”, in Rozakis, C & Stephanou C (eds.), The New 
Law o f the Sea: Selected and Edited Papers o f the Athens Colloquium on the Law o f the Sea, September 
7952(Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1983), pp. 199-208. Also see Wolfrum, R., “The Principle of the 
Common Heritage of Mankind”, (1983) 43 Zeitschrift Fur Auslandisches Offentliches Recht Und 
Volkerrecht, p.312 at 315-324.
100 See Churchill & Lowe, op.cit. pp. 143 and 225.
101 See Mwenda, K.K., “Deep Sea-Bed Mining Under Customary International Law”, (June 2000) 7(2), E 
Law -  Murdoch University Electronic Journal o f  Law,
http.V/www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v7n2/mwenda72.htmirAccessed 14 September 2004] explaining 
the position of the Group of 77. See also Churchill & Lowe, Ibid.p.228.
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floor beyond present national jurisdiction were progressively and 
competitively appropriated, exploited and even used for military purposes by 
those countries which possess the necessary technology. ” 102
These varying interpretations of the legal status of the Area by developed and the 
developing states explain their diverse positions at the UNCLOS III on various issues 
concerning this regime.103
2.1.4.4. Seabed Committee.
After the speech of Arvid Pardo, various African bodies started to issue statements on 
various issues of the law of the sea, including the regime of the Area. Such statements 
included the O.A.U Declaration,104 the Resolutions of the third conference o f heads of 
state and government of non-aligned countries held at Lusaka, Zambia from the 8 to 10 
September 1970,105 the Report of the sub-committee on the law of the sea of the Asian- 
African Legal Consultative Committee, 1971;106 the Conclusions in the General Report of 
the African states regional seminar on the law of the sea held in Yaounde, Cameroon 
from 20 to 30 June 1972,107and the Kampala Declaration, 1974.108
Upon a draft Resolution sponsored by ten African states, namely Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, 
Libya, Madagascar, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan and Tunisia, an ad hoc committee 
was established to study the peaceful uses of the seabed and ocean floor. The General 
Assembly subsequently reconstituted this committee as a standing committee named 
“The Committee on the Peaceful Uses o f the Seabed beyond the Limits o f National
102 See Division of Ocean Affairs and the Law o f the Sea Office(DOALOS), Concept o f  the Common 
Heritage o f Mankind, Legislative History o f  Articles 133 to 150 and 311(6) o f the United Nations 
Convention on the Law o f  the Sea, (New York, United Nations, 1996), p. 14.
103 See Dupuy, “The Notion of Common Heritage o f Mankind applied to the Seabed”, in Rozakis, & 
Stephanou (eds.), op.cit.pp. 199-208. Also see Elias, T., New Horizons in International Law, (2nd revised 
and edited by Ssekandi, F.), (Dordrecht/London, Martinus Nijhoff, 1992) pp.70-72.
104 UNCLOS III Official Records, Vol.III, pp.63-64.
105 A/AC. 138/34, text in DOALOS, United Nations Legislative Series, National Legislation and Treaties 
Relating to the Law o f the Sea, (New York, United Nations, 1974), pp.593-594. See also 10 ILM 215(1971)
106 DOALOS, ibid. pp.594-598.
107 A/AC. 138/79, ibid. pp.601-604. See also 12 ILM 210(1973).
108 Doc. A/CONF.62/631. UNCLOS III, Official Records, Vol.III, p.3. This was a declaration by 
developing landlocked and other geographically disadvantaged States who meet in Kampala, Uganda.
109 See General Assembly Resolution 2340 (XXII) of 18 December 1967. See Rembe, Africa and the 
International Law o f the Sea, op.cit. pp.40-41.
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Jurisdiction”. The committee was originally made up of thirty-five members out of which 
seven, namely Egypt, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Senegal, Somalia and Tanzania, were 
African states. The committee was later enlarged to forty-two and the African 
representation was increased to thirteen with the addition of Cameroon, Madagascar, 
Mauritania, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Sudan. Subsequently the committee was enlarged 
first to eighty-six then to ninety-one members. By this time the African states in the 
committee had increased to twenty-six namely Algeria, Cameroon, Congo, Egypt, 
Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, 
Tanzania, Tunisia, Zambia and Zaire. All of them were coastal states except for the 
landlocked states of Mali and Zambia.110
2.1.5. UNCLOS III
The speech by Arvid Pardo set the stage for the calling of a Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III).111 UNCLOS III was made necessary 
not only to deal with the issue of the deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction, which had 
assumed prominence with the speech of Arvid Pardo and the improvement of technology 
that opened up the possibility of mining this part of the sea, but also to deal with the 
unresolved issues from UNCLOS I and II, such as the breadth of the territorial sea and 
fishery zones. In addition, the fragmentation of the 1958 law of the sea Conventions 
resulted in an uncoordinated law of the sea policy whereby states had the latitude to 
choose to sign one Convention and reject another. As a result it was felt that, since the 
problems of the sea are closely interrelated and needed to be considered as a whole, there
110 See Rembe, ibid. pp.36-80.
111 On UNCLOS III see generally Sebenius, J.K., Negotiating the Law o f the Sea, (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts/London, England, Harvard University Press, 1984), Oxman, B., & Stevenson, J., “The 
Preparations for the Law of the Sea Conference”, (1974) 68 AJIL.pp. 1-32; Oxman & Stevenson, “The 
Third United Nations Conference on the Law o f the Sea: The 1974 Caracas Session” (1975) 69 AJIL.pp. 1- 
30; Oxman & Stevenson, “The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 1975 Geneva 
Session”, (1975) 69 AJIL. pp. 763-797; Oxman, “The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the 
Sea: The 1976 New York Sessions”, (1977) 71 AJIL.pp.241-269; Oxman, “The Third United Nation’s 
Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 1977 New York Session”, (1978) 12 AJIL. pp. 57-83; Oxman, “The 
Third United Nations Conference on the Law o f the Sea: The Eighth Session”, (1979) 74 AJIL. pp. 1-47; 
Oxman, “The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Ninth Session”, (1980) 75 
AJIL.pp. 211-256 and Oxman, “The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Tenth 
Session”, (1981) 76 AJIL.pp. 1-23.
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112was a need for a single Convention covering the various aspects of the law of the sea. 
Further, the UNCLOS III was a response to the need to accommodate the developing 
states, a large number of which were from Africa, which were under colonial domination 
at the time of UNCLOS I and II, and felt that the Geneva Conventions did not cater for 
their interests. The dissatisfaction of African states, along with other developing states, 
the bulk of which had become members of the United Nations, gained ground, and as a 
result of their numerical strength they succeeded in passing various Resolutions in the 
General Assembly, which culminated in UNCLOS III.113
The General Assembly by several Resolutions requested the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations to convene the UNCLOS III.114 This Conference, involving diverse states 
from various parts of the globe, including African states, lasted for nine years (1973- 
1982). The first session of the Conference met at the United Nations Headquarters in 
New York from 3 to 15 December 1973.115 This session approved the rule of consensus 
for the Conference, which was later inserted in its Rules of Procedure of 27 June 1974. 
By this rule the Conference was required to “make every effort to reach agreement on 
substantive matters by way o f consensus; there should be no voting on such matters until 
all efforts at consensus have been exhausted. ” 116
The Conference worked through four main Committees - the First Committee (dealing 
with the regime of the seabed and ocean floor beyond national jurisdiction); the Second 
Committee (dealing with the general regime of the law of the sea and related topics); the
112 See the preamble of the LOSC 82 which says the states parties were inter alia: “Prompted by the desire 
to settle, in a spirit o f mutual understanding and co-operation, all issues relating to the law of the sea and 
aware of the historic significance of this Convention as an important contribution to the maintenance of 
peace, justice and progress for all peoples of the world ... Conscious that the problems of ocean space are 
closely interrelated and need to be considered as a whole...”
113 See Stavropoulous, C., “The Third Conference on the Law of The Sea in a Historical Perspective”, in 
Rozakis C. & Stephanou C. (eds.), op.cit. pp. 11-20.
114 See for example General Assembly Resolutions 2749(XXV) of 17 December 1970; 3029 (XXVII) of 18 
December 1972 and 3067 (XXVIII) of 16 November, 1973.
115 There were ten other sessions. See the Final Act of UNCLOS III.
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention agreements/texts/final act ene.pdf [Accessed on 16 September 
2004]. For more details on the sessions see Bemaerts, A., Bernaerts ’ Guide to the Law o f the Sea, The 1982 
United Nations Convention, (Coulsdon, Fairplay Publications Ltd, 1988). pp.311-312.
116 See generally Buzan B., “Negotiating by Consensus: Developments in Technique at the United Nations 
Conference on the Law o f the Sea”, (1981) 75 AJIL. pp.324-348.
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Third Committee (dealing with the marine environment, scientific research and the 
development and transfer of technology) and the General Committee (acting as a clearing 
house involved inter alia in preparing the draft documents for the Conference and giving 
advice on these drafts). An African, P.B. Engo (Cameroon), headed the First 
Committee.117
By the third session the chairmen of the First, Second and Third Committees had each 
produced a single document on the subject matter of their Committee. These documents 
were merged together as a single document called the Single Negotiating Text (SNT). By 
1976 this document had evolved into what was known as the Informal Composite 
Negotiating Text (ICNT). This text, after further negotiations and revisions by 1980, was 
produced as an Informal Draft Convention and in 1981 became the Draft Convention.118
At the eleventh session the United States of America demanded a vote on the Draft
Convention. The vote resulted in 130 votes in favour, 4 against, including the United
States, and 17 abstentions, including 7 Western European states. 119 No African state
120voted against the Convention or abstained from voting. The Final Act, together with 
four Resolutions of the UNCLOS III, was finally adopted on 10 December 1982 in 
Montego Bay, Jamaica.121 This brought to an end the UNCLOS III.
117 Bemaerts, op.cit. pp.8-9.
118 Ibid.
119 Ibid.pp.16-19. Israel, Turkey, United States of America and Venezuela voted against the Convention, 
while Belgium, Bulgaria, Byelorussia, Czechslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Mongolia, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Thailand, 
the Ukraine, the USSR and the United Kingdom abstained. See United Nations Press Release SEA/493 of 
30 April 1982.
120 For African states that voted to adopt the Convention, see UNCLOS III Official Records, Vol.XVI, at 
pp. 152-167.
121 Resolution I attached to the Final Act of the UNCLOS deals with the establishment of a Preparatory
Commission for the International Sea-Bed Authority and for the International Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea, while Resolution II deals with the Preparatory Investment in Pioneer Activities relating to Polymetallic 
Nodules. Resolution III, on the other hand, deals with territories whose people have not attained full 
independence or self-governing status and Resolution IV deals with Liberation movements and their
signing status of the Final Act.
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1222.1.6. Factors influencing the attitude o f African States in UNCLOS III.
Magdy Abdel Moneim Heftry123 argues that Africa, when viewed from geographical, 
historical and cultural criteria, is a continental whole that defies any division arbitrarily 
made. He opposes the division of Africa into ‘white’ and ‘black’, or Africa north and 
south of the Sahara. He then went on to allude to an African personality.124 This rather 
sweeping contention may tend to suggest something of a “United States o f Africa” having 
an African personality, with a common cultural affinity and completely devoid of any 
division. Consequently, one might be tempted to use this as a basis to justify the 
relatively united stance of African states at the UNCLOS III. However the reality on 
ground does not entirely reflect this position. Whilst there are pockets of ethnic groups 
sharing a common cultural affinity who were arbitrarily divided into different nation 
states by artificial boundaries created by the partition of Africa, there also exist in the 
continent certain ethnic groups having no cultural affinity whatsoever with each other and 
having different languages and way of life. This diversity amongst ethnic groups in 
Africa sometimes constitutes a strain in the attempt at unity not only as between states in 
their interaction with each other, but also within the domestic setting of the different 
states where different ethnic groups were arbitrarily lumped together by colonising states.
Even in the sphere of marine matters this diversity is reflected in that some are coastal 
states while others are landlocked states with different interests to protect.125 Further, as
122 See generally Rembe, op. cit. 36-85.
123 At the time of writing the article in note 124 below, he was Ambassador Extraordinary and 
Plenipotentiary of Egypt in Norway.
124 Moneim Hefny, A., “A regional perspective: Africa and the Law of the Sea Convention” in Vidas, D., & 
Ostreng, W., (eds.), Order fo r the Oceans at the Turn o f the Century, (The Hague/London/Boston, Kluwer 
Law International, 1999) p.365 at 366.
125 In the 1973 session of the Sea-Bed Committee two landlocked states, Uganda and Zambia, openly took 
a contrary position to the OAU on the Economic Zone by proposing the creation of regional economic 
zones where fisheries would be reserved for the exclusive use not of only the coastal state but all states in 
the region, including landlocked states, and mineral resources would be exploited and managed exclusively 
by a regional authority on behalf of all the states in the region. This proposal was eventually withdrawn as a 
result of pressure from the OAU at the instance of African coastal states. See Akintoba, T.O., African 
States and Contemporary International Law: A Case Study o f the 1982 Law o f the Sea Convention and the 
Exclusive Economic Zone, (The Hague/Boston/London, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997), p.74. Also see 
the Kampala Declaration, Document A/CONF.62/63 of March 1974, UNCLOS III, Official Records, 
Vol.III, p.3, where the landlocked states of Africa joined forces with other landlocked and geographically 
disadvantaged developing states to emphasise the need for a special consideration to be given to the 
peculiar interests of landlocked and geographically disadvantaged developing states vis-a-vis the issues of 
the law of the sea.
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regards deep seabed mining, some are land-based producers while others are not. Also 
the fact that African states are at different stages of development, with some being more 
developed than others, affects their ability to engage in marine activities. As Gonidec 
posited:
“ ...can one ignore the fact that the history o f African societies resulted in 
creating contemporary States that are basically unequal as far as their power 
is concerned, with the consequence, among other aspects, that there have 
appeared in Africa poles o f power, as has been demonstrated....Taking into 
account this phenomenon may help in understanding the difficulties 
encountered to achieve the ideal o f African unity”. 126
Views such as that of Magdy Hefny, with an emphasis on one Africa, can be traced back
to the call for “Pan-Africanism” by Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana in the I960’s.127 Pan-
Africanism leading to an African unity, though a worthwhile aspiration remains a goal
towards which African states aspire. Regional organisations, such as the now defunct
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the present African Union (AU), have been
established to promote this aspiration of African unity. The preamble of the Constitutive
Act of the African Union (AU) declares as follows:
“Inspired by the noble ideals, which guided the founding fathers o f our 
Continental Organisation and generations o f Pan-Africanists in their 
determination to promote unity, solidarity, cohesion and co-operation among 
the peoples o f Africa and African States.” 128
The question then arises as to what accounted for the relative unity of African states on 
the deep seabed and other issues at the UNCLOS III despite the occasional divergent 
interests of these states. This writer would prefer to attribute this to certain common 
interests amongst African states derived from historical, economic and political factors 
rather than a unity arising out of an African personality. The writer agrees with Rembe 
when he pointed out in respect of developing states generally that:
126 Gonidec, P.F., “Towards a ‘Treatise of African International Law,” (1997) 9(4) African Journal of 
International and Comparative Law, p. 807 at 811.
127 Sanders, A. J.G.M., International Jurisprudence in African Context, (Durban, South Africa, 
Butterworths, 1979), pp. 96-120.
128 Adopted on 11 July 2000. See http://www.africa-union.org/home/Welcome.htm [Accessed on 20 
September 2004].
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“The common heritage o f mankind received a welcome support from the 
developing countries because it is attuned to their desires and modern 
conditions; it appeals directly to their basic problems and needs, as it has as 
its emphasis development, peace, and equality o f treatment o f all State. ”
It must be pointed out that an examination of some factors would be better appreciated 
within the background that at the time of the UNCLOS III negotiations African states
130were of the view that commercial exploitation of the seabed mining was imminent.
• Historical.
The generally common historical experience of colonialism greatly influenced the 
attitude of the African states to the regime of the Area. 131 The attempt to put forward 
seabed mining in the Area as a freedom of the high seas by developed industrialised 
states was, in the view of African states, a prelude to these developed states partitioning 
the Area and the resources therein amongst themselves as a result of their superior 
technology. The previous experience of the partitioning of the African continent by these 
industrialised states was still fresh in the memory of African states. After the era of the 
slave trade the African continent had been partitioned by these industrialised states at the 
Berlin conference of 1884-5, leading to a long period of colonialism of the continent. 
This experience of the slave trade and colonialism is virtually the same in most African 
states and has left a deep-rooted wound in the psyche of African states. The attendant 
effect of this is that any action perceived by African states as being akin to oppression or 
colonialism serves as a unifying force for these states.
Judge Ajibola aptly explained these historical unhealed wounds in his separate opinion in
the Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad) case, when he said:
"For about a century, perhaps since 1885 when it was partitioned, Africa has 
been ruefully nursing the wounds inflicted on it by its colonial past. Remnants 
o f this unenviable colonial heritage intermittently erupt into discordant
129 Rembe, op. cit.p.52.
130 See generally Ferreira, P.S., “The Role of African States in the Development of the Law of the Sea at 
the Third United Nations Conference,”(1979) 7(1-2) Ocean Development and International Law,pp.89-129
131 On the influence of the slave trade and colonial experience on African jurisprudence see Sanders, op. cit. 
pp.49-135.
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social, political and even economic upheavals, which some may say, are 
better forgotten than remembered. But this “heritage ” is difficult, i f  not 
impossible to forget; aspects o f it continue, like apparitions, to rear their 
heads, and haunt the entire continent in various jarring and sterile 
manifestations: how do you forget unhealed wounds? ” 13
The memory of these events led African states to have a common desire to change the
existing international law, which not only supported but actively encouraged the slave
trade and colonialism.133 It was therefore not surprising that African states together
resisted the attempt to promote deep seabed mining as a freedom of the high seas since
they perceived it would lead to a modem day partition, similar to the partition of Africa,
by the western developed states, with the aim of monopolising the resources of the Area
to the detriment of African states and other developing states. The representative of
Ghana at UNCLOS III pointed this out when he said:
“[h]is delegation supported the establishment o f an autonomous regime with 
legal bodies o f its own and in effective control o f all activities in the area o f 
the seabed and ocean floor beyond the limits o f national jurisdiction. That 
position stemmed from memories o f the 18th and 19th centuries when, in the 
scramble for overseas territories, the colonialists had parcelled out African 
lands which it had taken over a century to recover from them. " 134
Also Bamela Engo, the chair of the First Committee, said: “The race for the resources o f 
the deep sea-beds was seen as a maritime repeat o f the despicable scramble for Africa 
and, as such, provocative o f contemporary economic and social misgivings.”135
This common historical experience, leading to a common determination to challenge the 
“oppressors” and “colonisers”, served as a shared point for African states to support 
wholeheartedly the declaration of the Area and its resources as the common heritage of 
mankind, thereby precluding any unilateral exploitation by the technologically superior 
industrialised states.
132 Separate Opinion of Judge Ajibola delivered on 13 February 1994. (1994) I.C.J Reports 6; 49 at 50.
133 See Umozurike and Ajomo in notes 9 and 11 above.
134See UNCLOS III, Official Records, Vol.l, p. 86 at 87, para.92. Also quoted in Rembe, op.cit. p.58.
135 Engo, B.P., “Issues of the First Committee at UNCLOS III”, in Koers, A.W. and Oxman B.H.(eds.), The 
1982 Convention on the Law o f the Sea: Proceedings o f the Law o f the Sea Institute, Seventeenth Annual 
Conference, July 13-16, 1983, Oslo, Norway, (Honolulu, Law of the Sea Institute, University o f Hawaii, 
1984), p.33 at 35.
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• Economic.
The emergent African states, upon independence from their colonisers, were still 
economically dependent on the former colonial and other western industrialised states. It 
became clear to the African states that political independence without economic 
independence amounted to an inchoate independence. The resources of the Area, the 
commercial exploitation of which was erroneously believed at the time of UNCLOS III 
to be imminent, raised the possibility of additional revenue that these states felt would 
enable them to achieve economic independence, resulting in full political independence.
With the widening economic and technological gap between developed and developing 
states, the latter, including African states, were determined to make a concerted effort in 
international fora to push for measures that would reduce this gap.136 The common factor 
of under-development therefore acted as a unifying force for African states, together with 
other developing states. In 1974 three Resolutions were passed by the General Assembly 
calling for a “New International Economic Order (NIEO)” to address the economic
1 T7imbalance between the north and south. These Resolutions, which were 
overwhelmingly supported by developing states, influenced the position of African states 
at international fora, including the UNCLOS III.138
As far as the African states, affected similarly by economic under-development, were 
concerned, the resources of the Area provided a means to obtain additional resources to 
effect the NIEO. The idea of the Area and its resources being the common heritage of 
mankind, coupled with the requirement that special consideration should be given to the 
interests of developing states, was therefore widely canvassed and supported by the
136 See the comments of the representative of Morocco at UNCLOS III that the concept of the common 
heritage of mankind was intended to help under-developed states and to breach the gap between developing 
and developed states. UNCLOS III Official Records, Vol.IV, p.58, para.40.
137 The Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, GA Res. 3201, May 1, 
1974 (S-VI) GAOR, Supp. (No.l) 3, UN Doc. S/9559, 13 ILM 715(1974); Program of Action on the 
Establishment of a New International Economic Order, GA Res.3202, May 1, 1974 (S-VI) GAOR, Supp. 
(No.l) 5, UN Doc. A/9559 (1974); 13 ILM 720 (1974); Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, 
Art. 13 GA Res. 3281, Dec.12, 1974 GAOR, Supp. (No.30) 50, UN Doc. 9631 (1974), 14 ILM 251 (1975).
138 See generally Pinto, M., “The Developing Countries and the Exploitation of the Deep Seabed”, 
(1980)15(4) Columbia Journal o f World Business, pp.30-41.
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African states, all in need of extra income for development. The desire to correct the 
economic imbalance between the developed states of the north and the under-developed 
states of the south clearly influenced the arguments of the African states on the nature of 
the regime of the Area, and was evinced by their stance on issues such as financing the
139mining activities of the Enterprise and the transfer of technology.
Further, a number of Africa states were heavily reliant as land-based producers on certain 
minerals located in the Area. Naturally these states were concerned about the adverse 
effect seabed mining would have on their economy. Consequently they were united in the 
common agenda of ensuring that seabed mining would be regulated in such a way as to 
protect land-based producers against competition from resources to be derived from the 
Area.140 Other African states’ solidarity with the land-based producers is explicable on 
the ground, not only of their sympathy with the land-based producers’ cause, but also 
their own interest to protect the ability of developing states, vis-a-vis developed states 
and their multinational corporations, to effectively exploit and develop mineral and other 
natural resources located within their jurisdiction.141
• Political.
The UNCLOS III provided an opportunity for the newly emergent African states to 
exercise their sovereign rights of legal equality as stated by the U.N Charter and to seek 
to establish themselves as a regional force to be reckoned with in the international 
community. This is reflected in their insistence on the principle of one vote per state in 
the institutions of the regime of the seabed. This in itself gave them the opportunity to 
manifest their sovereignty and equality with already existing members of the 
international community. As new participants in the international community, they 
discovered that the existing international institutions were under the control and 
dominance of existing members of the international community, especially the developed
139 See Nelson, L., “The functions of Regionalism in the emerging Law o f the Sea as Reflected in the 
Informal Composite Negotiating Text”, in Johnston, D. (ed.), Regionalization o f the law o f the sea: 
Proceedings Law o f the sea institute, Eleventh annual Conference, November 14-17, 1977, University o f  
Hawaii, Honolulu, Hawaii, (Cambridge, Massachusetts,, Barlinger Publishing company, 1978),p.l8 and 
Engo, “Issues of First Committee at UNCLOS III,” op. cit. p.38.
140 See Rembe, op. cit. pp. 68-73.
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states. They were therefore interested in achieving, together with other developing states, 
a shift in control from developed states to developing states in the various international 
regimes and institutions, including that of the Area. Oxman rightly identified this when 
he said:
“...for many countries the Committee I  negotiations are not about the deep 
sea beds or the minerals involved. They are about the future structure o f the 
United Nations, totally unrelated commodities, and the role o f multinational 
corporations in the development o f national and off-shore resources ... The 
stated objective is “control”. This emphasis on abstraction hides three 
underlying objectives o f far broader scope: first, greater “control ” o f  
international organisations by developing countries; second, greater 
“control” o f raw materials by producers; and third, greater “control” o f 
natural resource development projects by the state. " 142
With the large number of developing states, including African states, in attendance at 
UNCLOS III they were able to effect, though not to the full extent intended, certain 
changes in the traditional law of the sea.143 The negotiations and the success in pushing 
through a distinct regime for the deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction at the 
conference demonstrates that African states, teaming up with other developing states, 
were able to exert a significant influence on the UNCLOS III negotiations generally, as 
well as that in respect of the regime of the Area in particular.
2.2. Part XI o f the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) 1982.
The Convention was the result of a package deal involving trade-offs and compromise.144 
As a single comprehensive document, the 1982 Convention was designed to offer in one 
single package all aspects of the law of the sea arrived at through compromise by the 
various parties.
141 Ibid.pp.69-70.
142 Oxman B., “The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 1976 New York 
Sessions,”op. cit.p.253.
143 Johnson, B., “Regionalism and the Law of the Sea: New Aspects of Dominance and Dependency”, in 
Johnston, D. (ed.), Regionalization of the law o f the sea, op.cit. pp. 103-127.
144 See Brown, The International Law o f the Sea, op. cit.pp. 10-11 and 95 and on the package deal see 
Caminos, H., and Molitor, M.R., “Progressive Development of International Law and the Package Deal,” 
(1985)79 AJIL,pp.S71-890.
76
Part XI, which turned out to be the most controversial aspect of the Convention, 
establishes a regime for the seabed and subsoil outside national jurisdiction (the Area).145 
The Area and its resources, the common heritage of mankind, are to be used only for 
peaceful purposes.146 Part XI, consisting of five sections, details this extremely 
complicated but unique regime and its institutional framework. The Area and its 
resources are declared to be the common heritage of mankind and therefore not subject to 
claims of sovereignty by any state nor subject to appropriation by any state or natural or 
juridical person.147 All rights in the resources are vested in mankind as a whole with the 
International Seabed Authority (ISA) acting on behalf of “mankind” as a type of 
trustee.148 Activities in the Area are to be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a 
whole represented by states, irrespective of such states’ geographical location or whether 
they are coastal or landlocked.149 The Convention, however, gives special consideration 
to the interests and needs of developing states and of peoples who have not attained 
independence or self-governing status.150 This provision appears to have a discriminatory 
bias in favour of developing states though the same provision goes on to say that the ISA 
shall provide for the equitable sharing of financial and other economic benefits derived 
from the Area on a non-discriminatory basis.151 The apparent contradiction of this 
provision is reconcilable on the grounds that it would be discriminatory to treat unlike 
situations in the same way. Therefore, in this particular case, since developed and 
developing states are not alike they should not be treated in the same way. Wolfrum
1 Odepicts this as, “a legal form o f discrimination. ” The only difficulty with this is that 
even among the broad category of developing states there are some that are more 
developed than others. For instance, it is difficult to classify developing states actively 
engaged in seabed mining activities in the same category as others that are not due to a
145 See Arts. 133-191 of LOSC. For more reading on this see Churchill & Lowe, op. cit. pp. 223-254; 
Brown, Sea-Bed Energy and Minerals: The International Legal Regime, Vol.2, op. cit.pp.49-151 and 
Mahmoudi, The Law o f Deep Sea-Bed Mining, op.cit.pp. 169-305.
146 Arts. 136 and 141 of LOSC.
147 See Arts. 136 and 137 of LOSC.
148 Art. 137 (2) of LOSC.
149 Art. 140 ('1) of LOSC.
150 Ibid.
151 Art. 140(2) of LOSC.
152 Wolfrum, R., “The Principle of the Common Heritage of Mankind,” op.cit. p.327; See also Bulajic, M., 
“Commercial Relations” in Bedjaoui, M., (ed.), International Law: Achievements and Prospects, 
(Paris/Dordrecht/Boston/London, UNESCO/Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1991), p.633 at 641.
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lack of the wherewithal to do so. Even in the African continent there is a disparity in 
development between states. Some, like Nigeria and South Africa, are more developed, 
while others, like Sudan and Somalia, ravaged by internal conflicts and natural disasters, 
are less developed. The issue therefore arises whether extremely poor developing states, 
especially landlocked states and geographically disadvantaged states, should not be given 
an extra advantage over and above more “developed” developing states in enjoying the 
benefits derived from the Area. The African continent is replete with such extremely poor 
states as up to thirty-four African states are classified as highly indebted poor countries 
(HIPCs).153 The need to distinguish between the special consideration given to extremely 
poor developing states, in contrast with other developing states, in respect of the benefits 
of the Area appears to be useful since such distinction is implicit in the provisions of the 
LOSC on the effective participation of developing states.154 This provision requires that 
in promoting effective participation of developing states in activities of the Area due 
regard should especially be given to landlocked and geographically disadvantaged states. 
Though the emphasis of this provision is on geographical disadvantage, in reality quite a 
number of these landlocked and geographically disadvantaged states, especially those in 
Africa, are amongst the poorest developing states.
The Convention also created the International Seabed Authority (ISA) with a mining arm, 
the Enterprise, to organise, carry out and control activities in the Area on behalf of 
mankind, and a judicial arm, the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal 
for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) to determine disputes in respect of the Area.155
Mining in the Area is by a rather complicated process known as the “parallel system” or 
“site-banking.”156 Under this system a state party or its entities or nationals, both natural 
and juridical(hereinafter called “the applicant”), seeking the approval of the ISA to carry
153 See http://www.worldbank.org/hipc/about/map/map.htm1 [Accessed on 16 January 2004].
154 Art. 148 of LOSC.
155 Arts. 153 and 186 ofLOSC. See section 4.1.3.2 of chapter4 of this thesis on institutions for the 
settlement of disputes under the deep seabed regime.
156 Art. 153 (2) ofLOSC. The United States proposed this system in April 1976. See Anand, R., “Odd Man 
Out: The United States and the U.N Convention on the Law of the Sea”, in Van Dyke J. (ed.), Consensus 
and Confrontation: The United States and the Law of the Sea Convention, a workshop o f the Law o f the Sea
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out mining operations is required to make an application in respect of two sites of equal 
commercial value. Upon approval of such application by the ISA, the applicant is 
authorised, based on the terms of the contract, to mine one site, while the other site is 
"banked” for mining by the ISA through the Enterprise or in association with developing 
states. This process anticipates mining by the applicant and the ISA working side by 
side.157 Therefore the Convention made provisions for the mandatory transfer of 
technology to the ISA and developing states interested in deep seabed mining and access 
to finance on very liberal terms to the Enterprise, provisions that have been significantly
158modified by the 1994 Agreement. The ISA is empowered under the Convention to 
acquire for itself and to promote and encourage the transfer to developing states of the 
requisite marine technology from the technologically developed states parties.159
Further, the LOSC made provision for the adoption of production policies by the ISA, in 
respect of mining of the seabed, to protect developing states that are land-based producers 
of these minerals.160 This provision has also been modified by the Agreement.161 Also, 
subject to the retention of certain fundamental principles of the regime, such as the 
common heritage of mankind principle, there are provisions for review by the Assembly 
of the system of mining after five years from the entry into force of the Convention, and 
by a Review Conference after 15 years from 1 January of the year that the earliest 
commercial production commences in the Area.162 Amendments by the Review 
Conference were to be by consensus. However, in the event of a failure to reach a 
consensus, the amendment could be adopted by a three-fourths majority of the states 
parties and such amendment would come into force 12 months after three-fourths of the
Institute, Honolulu, Hawaii, January 9-13, 1984, (Honolulu, Hawaii, the Law of the Sea Institute, 
University of Hawaii, 1985), pp. 82-83.
157 Art 153 ofLOSC.
158 Annex III ofLOSC and Section 5 of the Annex to the 1994 Agreement. See section 3.2 of chapter 3 of 
this thesis on the modifications introduced by the Agreement to the LOSC.
159 Art. 144 ofLOSC and Section 5 para.l of the Annex to the 1994 Agreement.
160 Arts 150 and 151 ofLOSC.
161 Section 6 of the Agreement.
162 Arts. 154 and 155 ofLOSC.
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state parties had deposited their instrument of ratification or accession.163 Again these 
provisions have been modified by the Agreement.164
In addition, the LOSC has eight annexes attached to it, of which annex III (Basic 
Conditions of Prospecting, Exploration and Exploitation), annex IV (Statute of the 
Enterprise) and annex VI (Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 
especially the part on the Seabed Disputes Chamber) are particularly significant to the 
regime. Annex II (Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf) also has some 
incidental significance since the Commission, as has been discussed in chapter one, is 
charged with receiving submissions from states with extended continental shelves which 
is relevant in determining the scope of the Area.
Further, the LOSC is accompanied by four Resolutions with two, Resolutions I 
(Establishment of the Preparatory Commission [PrepCom] for the ISA and the ITLOS) 
and II (Preparatory Investment in Pioneer Activities relating to Polymetallic Nodules), 
being particularly significant to the regime.165 Resolution II established and introduced 
the Pioneer Investor Protection (P.I.P.) scheme to give preferential treatment to certain 
pioneer investors, especially from the developed industrial states that had invested 
substantial amounts in seabed mining.166 The idea of this P.I.P. scheme was to give an 
incentive to these developed industrialised states to become parties to the Convention. 
These concessions, however, failed to achieve their desired objective of achieving 
universal participation, as states such as the United States of America, the United 
Kingdom and Germany still refused to ratify or even sign the Convention. These 
industrialised states then proceeded to enact similar national legislation providing for 
comprehensive regulation of seabed mining by their nationals and thereby established the
1 fil“Reciprocating States Regime.” This unilateral regime by these industrialised states
163 Art. 155 (2) and (3) ofLOSC.
164 Section 4 of the Annex to the Agreement.
165 See the Final Act of UNCLOS III.
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention agreements/texts/final act ene.pdf [Accessed on 16 September 
2004].
166 See Brown, International Law o f the Sea, op.cit pp. 448-456; Churchill & Lowe, op. cit. pp. 230-238.
167 The legislation included the United States Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act 1980,19 ILM 1003 
(1980); Federal Republic of Germany’s Act on the Interim Regulation of Deep Seabed Mining 1980, 20
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threatened to bring about a dual regime on seabed mining that would have undermined
168the entire work of UNCLOS III and the resultant Convention.
2.2.1. Prep Com.
The Preparatory Commission for the International Seabed Authority (ISA) and for the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) (PrepCom), established under 
Resolution I of the Final Act, headed at various times by two Africans - Joseph Warioba 
(Tanzania) and Jose Luis Jesus (Cape Verde) - commenced in 1983 the drafting of rules 
to bring the ISA and ITLOS into operation.169 It was also mandated to implement 
Resolution II.170 The PrepCom at its first session established four special Commissions, 
one of which was Special Commission 3(SCN.3) charged with the responsibility of
171preparing the rules and regulations for the mining of polymetallic nodules in the Area. 
Despite the amount of work put in by the PrepCom resulting in Draft Regulations on 
Prospecting, Exploration and Exploitation of Polymetallic Nodules in the Area, the 
informal consultations of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to meet the 
objections of the developed states to Part XI, which took place simultaneously but 
independently of the PrepCom, appears to have taken the wind off the efforts of 
PrepCom.172
ILM 393 (1981) and 21 ILM 832 (1982); Britain’s Deep Sea Mining(Temporary Provisions) Act 1981, 20 
ILM 1219 (1981); France’s Law on the Exploration and Exploitation of the Mineral Resources of the Deep 
Seabed, 21 ILM 808 (1982); Japan’s Law on Interim Measures for Deep Seabed Mining, 22 ILM 102 
(1983) and Italy’s Law No.41 of 20 February 1985, 24 ILM 983 (1985) . See Churchill & Lowe, Ibid. pp. 
232-235. However see the Letter dated 29 August 1980 from the Chairman of the Group of 77 (E.K. 
Wapenyi of Uganda) to the President of the Conference, which took the position that this unilateral 
legislation was contrary to international law, UNCLOS III, Official Record, vol.XIV,pp.l 11-114.
168 Churchill & Lowe, Ibid.
169 For Reports of the various sessions of the PrepCom see Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the 
Sea (DOALOS), The Law o f the Sea Bulletin Nos. 3, 4,6,8,10,12,14,17,20 and 23. 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/doalos publications/los bult.htm [Accessed 7 January 2004]. The PrepCom 
held meetings from 1983 to 1994. See Nandan, S.N, Lodge, M.W. and Rosenne, S., The Development of  
the Regime for Deep Seabed Mining (The Hague, Netherlands, Kluwer Law International, 2002), pp.56-59 
and Churchill & Lowe, ibid.p. 19.
170 Art.5 (h) of Resolution I.
171 See DOALOS, The Law o f the Sea Bulletin No. 3, pp.28-35.
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2.3. The New York Implementation Agreement
With the end of the UNCLOS III and the adoption of LOSC, the issue of ensuring the 
universal application of this new constitution of the sea became the focus of attention. 
The United States of America and certain major Western European maritime powers 
made it clear that they were not going to ratify the Convention as it then stood because of 
the provisions of Part XI.173 On 16 November 1993 Guyana deposited the sixtieth 
ratification with the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Convention came 
into force on 16 November 1994. 174 However despite this, the reality of the “America- 
Euro” centric nature of the present international law came to the fore. It was realised that 
the Convention despite the overwhelming support of states, especially of the developing 
states, including African states, was not workable without the support of the United 
States of America and other western industrialised states. Apart from a desire for 
universal participation, the more pragmatic consideration was that these states, together 
the major contributors to international institutions, were needed to fund the institutions of 
the new regime.175 This points to the fact that as long as the western developed states 
continue to provide the bulk of the contributions to the United Nations system176 and 
other international institutions, they will continue, to a large extent, to dictate the nature 
and content of international law. The African states, together with other developing 
states, though having the numerical strength to bring the Convention into force, were not
172 See Brown, Sea-Bed Energy and Minerals, etc, Vol. 2,(2001), op. cit. pp.96-100 and Nandan, Lodge and 
Rosenne, The Development o f the Regime for Deep Seabed Mining ,op.cit.p.58.
173 In 1982 President Ronald Reagan made it clear that the United States was not going to sign the 1982 
Convention. See Nelson, L., “The New Deep Sea-Bed Mining Regime”, (1995) 10(2) The International 
Journal o f Marine & Coastal Law, p. 191; Hayashi, M., “The 1994 Agreement for the Universalization of 
the Law of the Sea Convention”, (1996) 27 Ocean Development and International Law, pp. 31-39; Oxman 
B., “The 1994 Agreement and the Convention”, (1994) 88 AJIL. pp.687-695; Joyner, C., “The United 
States and the New Law of the Sea”, (1996) 27 Ocean Development and International Law, pp.41-58; 
Anderson, D.H., “Universal Participation in UNCLOS” and “Further Efforts to Ensure Universal 
Participation in the UNCLOS” in (1993) 4 2 1.C.L.Q., pp.654-664 and (1994) 43 I.C.L.Q., pp.886-893 
respectively.
174 See Art. 308 of LOSC.
175 See Churchill & Lowe, op. cit. p. 19.
176 The top six contributors to the United Nations for 2000-2001 are the USA (25%); Japan (20.573%); 
Germany (9.857%); France (6.545%); Italy (5.437%) and the United Kingdom (5.092%). Together they 
account for over 72% of the regular U.N budget while the rest o f the world, including African states, 
accounts for less than 28% of the U.N budget. See
http://ceb.unsvstem.org/documents/FB.reports/ACC55.525/2000TAB3.pdf [Accessed on 20 September 
2004]
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able to proceed without the industrialised states because of the lack of financial and
177technological wherewithal.
In July 1990 the erstwhile Secretary-General of the United Nations, Javier Perez de
Cuellar, embarked on informal consultations with a view to ensuring that there was
universal participation in LOSC 1982.178 One of the major reasons identified by the
Secretary-General for the need to re-evaluate the regime of the seabed was the
transformation of the general political and economic climate in favour of free market
principles.179 In addition Nelson identifies the shortcomings of the PrepCom in dealing
with the seabed mining provisions in the Convention and the absence of the United States
of America from participation in the PrepCom.180 The importance of the United States of
America to the regime can be traced to the fact that U.S companies were one of the major
custodians of seabed mining technology and also because the U.S had, with the collapse
of the former Soviet Union, become the only authentic “super power” in the world.
Annick de Marffy-Mantuano also points out that the developing states, which included
African states, co-operated in the 1994 consultations because of the loss of influence by
these states due to their “tragically depressed” financial situation, which reduced their
181ability or desire to fight the developed states.
The Secretary-General commenced these consultations after he had bilateral exchanges 
with the key non-signatory states. These consultations, continued by Mr. Perez de 
Cuellar’s successor, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, an African from the coastal state of Egypt, 
led to fifteen rounds of consultations from July 1990 to June 1994. The consultations 
identified certain issues including Costs to states parties; the Enterprise; Decision­
177 Marffy-Mantuano, A., “The Procedural Framework of the Agreement Implementing the 1982 United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea”, (1995) 89 AJIL. pp. 814 at 815.
178 See generally Secretary-General’s Informal Consultations on Outstanding Issues Relating to the Deep 
Seabed Mining Provisions o f the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: Collected Documents 
(Jamaica, International Seabed Authority, 2002) and also the Report of the Secretary-General:
Consultations of the Secretary-General on outstanding issues related to the deep seabed mining provisions 
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Law o f the Sea Bulletin, Special Issue IV of 16 
November 1994, pp. 1-6.
179 See Report of the Secretary-General etc., ibid.p.l.
180 Nelson, “The New Deep Sea-Bed Mining Regime”, op. cit. p. 190.
181 Marffy-Mantuano, “The Procedural Framework of the Agreement Implementing the 1982 United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea”, op.cit. at p.815.
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making; the Review Conference; Transfer of technology; Production limitation;
182Compensation fund; Financial terms of contracts and Environmental considerations. 
During the round of negotiations from 2 to 6 August 1993, a paper dated 3 August 1993 
was prepared by representatives of several developed and developing states and was 
distributed amongst the delegations to assist with the process of consultations. This paper, 
known as “boat paper, ” 183 did not necessarily reflect the position of those that prepared 
it but was used as a basis for negotiation in the subsequent consultations. By the end of 
the last round of consultations from 31 May to 3 June 1994, a draft General Assembly 
Resolution and draft Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the 1982 
Convention were ready. At the resumed forty-eighth session of the General Assembly the 
Agreement was adopted by 121 votes in favour, none against, with only 7 states 
abstaining.184 Interestingly, no African state voted against or abstained from the adoption 
of the Agreement, though twenty-three African states did not participate in the voting.185 
Thirty African states, however, voted for the adoption of the Agreement. 186 As at 1 
February 2005, 26 African states had become parties to the Agreement.187 Unlike the 
UNCLOS III leading to LOSC 1982 that had the benefit of a statement of common 
purpose by the OAU in the form of the 1974 Declaration, there is no evidence of any 
such common purpose as regards the consultations that led to the 1994 Agreement. This
182 See “Information Note concerning the Secretary-General’s informal consultation on outstanding issues 
relating to the deep seabed mining provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, New York, 25 
March 1991” in Secretary-General’s Informal Consultations on Outstanding Issues Relating to the Deep 
Seabed Mining Provisions o f the United Nations Convention on the Law o f the Sea: Collected Documents 
(Jamaica, International Seabed Authority, 2002), pp. 13-20. Also see Nelson, “The New Deep Sea-Bed 
Mining Regime”, op. cit.pp.189-192; Churchill & Lowe, op. Cit. 236-238; Brown, International Law of  
the Sea, op. cit. 458-477; Oxman, B., “The 1994 Agreement and the Convention”, op.cit. pp. 687-696.
183 The paper was an anonymous paper, which was called the boat paper for the simple reason that it had a 
picture of a boat on the cover. For the boat paper see Secretary-General’s Informal Consultations on 
Outstanding Issues Relating to the Deep Seabed Mining Provisions of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law o f the Sea: Collected Documents, ibid. pp. 167-191.
184 The states that abstained were Colombia, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Russian Federation, Thailand and 
Venezuela.
185 Angola, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome and 
Principe, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Swaziland, Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo) and Zambia. See 
DOALOS, Law o f the Sea Bulletin, special issue IV, of 16 November, 1994, p.7.
186 Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Congo, Cote D ’Ivoire, Egypt, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Tanzania and Zimbabwe.
187 See Table 2 below.
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may account for what appears to be a lack of evident cohesiveness, in contrast with
188UNCLOS III, on the part of African states during the consultations.
The 1994 Agreement provides different procedures by which a state or entity can signify 
its consent to be bound, provided such state or entity has previously or at the same time 
established its consent to be bound by the LOSC 1982.189 Consent to be bound by the 
Agreement can be through:
• Deposit of an instrument of ratification, formal confirmation or accession to the 
LOSC after the adoption of the Agreement;190
• Signature without the need of ratification, formal confirmation or the procedure set 
out in Article 5 of the Agreement(Simplified procedure);191
• Signature subject to ratification or formal confirmation which is thereafter followed
192by such ratification or formal confirmation;
1 01• Signature by simplified procedure under Article 5;
• Accession.194
The procedures of: signature without the need of ratification or formal confirmation, if so 
intended by the parties;195 signature subject to ratification or formal confirmation;196 and 
accession,197 are relatively familiar procedures under the Vienna Convention on the Law
188 See section 3.3 of chapter 3 of the thesis.
189 Art.4 (2) of the Agreement.
190 Art.4 (1).
191 Art.4 (3) (a). Whilst there is no specific requirement under this head for the state to declare its signature 
as definitive, the practice of the United Nations Secretariat requires a formal written indication of this by 
the state. See Brown, E.D., “The 1994 Agreement on the Implementation of Part XI of the UN Convention 
on the Law of the Sea: Breakthrough to Universality?” (1995) 19(1) Marine Policy pp.5 at 6-7.
192 Art.4 (3) (b).
193 Art.4 (3) (c).
194 Art, 4(3) (d).
195 See Kenya’s notification consenting to be bound by signature not subject to ratification, formal 
confirmation or Art.5 (1) procedure. DOALOS, The Law o f the Sea Declarations and Statements with 
respect to the United Nations Convention on the Law o f the Sea and to the Agreement relating to the 
Implementation o f Part XI o f the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea o f 10 December 
7952(New York, United Nations, 1997), p. 109.
196 See notifications consenting to be bound by signature subject to ratification of Sudan and United 
Republic of Tanzania, Ibid.p.l 11. Also Cameroon, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa and Tunisia have 
consented to the Agreement by ratification. Sudan is yet to consent to the Agreement. See 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference files/status2005.pdf [Accessed on 6 May 2005].
197 Botswana and Mozambique consented by accession.
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of Treaties (VCLT), commonly utilised by states to indicate consent to treaties.198 The 
other procedures are, however, rather unusual and adopted because of the peculiar 
circumstances surrounding the Agreement. However, it is must be pointed out that the 
VCLT also gives states the leeway to agree on other means outside the usual 
procedures.199
Article 4 paragraph 1 procedure says:
“After the adoption o f this A2reement. any instrument o f ratification or 
formal confirmation o f or accession to the Convention shall also represent 
consent to be bound by this Agreement. ” (Emphasis added)
This provision appears to suggest that a state would be deemed to have consented to the
Agreement, which in reality is an amending instrument,200 when it deposited its
instrument of ratification or formal confirmation or accession to the LOSC, after the
adoption of the Agreement even before it came into force.201 This would seem to be at
variance with Article 40(5) (a) of the VCLT that states:
“Any State which becomes a party to the treaty after the entry into force o f 
the amending agreement shall, failing an expression o f a different intention 
by that State:
(a) be considered as a party to the treaty as amended;
(b) ... ’’(Emphasis added)
First, the provision of Article 40(5) (a) of the VCLT makes it clear a state is only bound 
by an amending agreement if it became a party to the principal treaty after the entry into 
force of the amending instrument. Second, Article 40(5) (a) gives such a state the 
opportunity to choose not to be bound by the amending instrument through “an 
expression o f a different intention”, unlike the 1994 Agreement that gives no such 
opportunity under Article 4(1). Since the adoption of the Agreement the following 
African states have become parties to Agreement through the Article 4(1) procedure: 
Algeria, Benin, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Madagascar, Mauritania, Mauritius and Sierra
198 See Arts. 12, 14 and 15 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties(VCLT) 1969 which entered 
into force on 27 January 1980, 8 ILM 679(1969); 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
199 Art. 11 of VCLT.
200 See section 2.4 below.
201 The Agreement was adopted on 28 July 1994 and came into force 28 July 1996.
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Leone.202 Of these Algeria, Mauritania, Mauritius and Sierra Leone became parties 
through this procedure after the adoption of the Agreement but before it came into force.
The other procedure, Article 5(1) of the Agreement, provides:
“A State or entity which has deposited before the date o f the adoption o f this 
Agreement an instrument o f ratification or formal confirmation o f or 
accession to the Convention and which has signed this Agreement in 
accordance with article 4, paragraph 3(c), shall be considered to have 
established its consent to be bound by this Agreement 12 months after the 
date o f its adoption, unless that State or entity notifies the depositary in 
writing before that date that it is not availing itself o f the simplified 
procedure set out in this article”.
By this provision a state, which before the Agreement was adopted had become a party to 
the LOSC, automatically became a party if it had signed the Agreement and did not 
within 12 months of the adoption of the Agreement notify the depositary in writing of its 
intention not to avail itself of this procedure. This automatic consent by signature through 
omission is also not a normal procedure utilised by states to indicate their consent to 
treaties, though there are instances when a state may be a party to a treaty by just the 
signature of its representative. Under the Article 5(1) procedure the intention to be 
bound by a mere signature is implied, rather than express, since all that is required is for a 
state party to LOSC to sign the Agreement during the adoption stage, do nothing at all 
for 12 months and thereafter be deemed to have consented. Brown explained that this 
procedure of states becoming parties by implied or tacit consent was inserted to avoid the 
need for such states to revert to their legislatures before becoming parties to the 
Agreement.204
The Article 5(1) procedure has been utilised by the following African states: Cote 
d’Ivoire, Guinea, Namibia, Nigeria, Togo, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.205 However 
certain African states such as Cape Verde, Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia and United Republic of
202 See relevant United Nations website in note 196 above..
203 See Art. 12 of VCLT.
204 Brown, “The 1994 Agreement on the Implementation of Part XI of the UN Convention on the Law of 
the Sea: Breakthrough to Universality?” op.cit. p.7.
205 See note 196 above.
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Tanzania have specifically notified the depositary in writing of their intention not to avail
themselves of this simplified procedure.206 As at 1 February 2005 Cape Verde had yet to
become a party to the Agreement. In its notification, as required by Article 5(1), Cape
Verde declared that:
“The Government o f the Republic o f Cape Verde, having signed the 
Agreement adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 48/263 o f 28 
July 1994, is not availing itself o f the simplified procedure set out in article 5, 
paragraph 1, o f the Agreement, and will establish its consent to be bound by 
the Agreement after fulfilling the requirements set forward by its national 
laws and regulations, in accordance with article 5, paragraph 2, and article 
4, paragraph 3(b) o f the Agreement. ” 207
In the event of a state declining to utilise the procedure under Article 5 paragraph 1, its 
consent would be required to be by signature subject to ratification or formal 
confirmation and thereafter followed by the said ratification or formal confirmation.208
The Agreement eventually came into force on 28 July 1996, 30 days after the consent of
the fortieth state, including at least seven states which were pioneer investors,209 of which
five were developed states. 210 Thereafter every state or entity establishing its consent to
be bound shall have the Agreement come into force for it on the thirtieth day after the
211date it established its consent.
206 See DOALOS, The Law o f  the Sea Declarations and Statements with respect to the United Nations 
Convention on the Law o f the Sea and to the Agreement relating to the Implementation o f Part XI o f the 
United Nations Convention on the Law o f  the Sea o f 10 December 1982, op.cit. , pp. 110-111. The 
depositary is the Secretary-General of the United Nations. See Art.9 of the Agreement.
207 See Law o f the Sea Bulletin Special Issue IV, op. cit. p.47. Egypt and Sudan are also yet to become 
parties to the Agreement.
208 Art. 5 (2) of the Agreement.
209 Belgium, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the Republic of Korea, 
the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. See Brown, “The 1994 
Agreement on the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: 
Breakthrough to Universality?”op.cit. p.6. No African State is a pioneer investor in deep seabed mining. 
See Kwiatkowska, B., “Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea in Africa: Towards the 21st Century,” (1993) 
17 Marine Policy, p. 11 at 29.
210 See Art.6 (1) of the Agreement.
211 Art.6 (2) of the Agreement.
2.4. The Status of the Convention and Implementation Agreement and African
. , 212  states.
The Agreement, though called an Implementation Agreement, is actually an amending 
instrument. The decision to tag the Agreement as an “implementing” rather than an 
“amending” one has been attributed to the political reason of avoiding the need for states, 
which had already ratified the Convention, to go back to their legislatures for a 
subsequent approval of the Agreement. A fresh approval of the legislature would 
necessarily be required if such instrument was an amendment but would not be obligatory 
if it were merely an implementation instrument.213 However, as Brown rightly pointed 
out, this was merely a play with words as in substance the Agreement was actually an 
amending instrument.214 The Agreement made certain fundamental changes to the regime 
as enunciated in the LOSC.215 It amended the provisions of the LOSC on the
i  /  ___  \ H i o
Enterprise, Transfer of technology, Economic assistance, Decision making in the
1Q iinstitutions, Production policy, Financial terms of contracts and the Review 
conference.222 It also amended the institutional framework by merging some
O'! “X  OOAinstitutions and including new institutions such as the Finance Committee. The 
amending nature of the Agreement is also confirmed by it declaring that certain 
provisions of the LOSC “shall not apply.”225 As an amending document, the Agreement
212 See generally Brown, E., “The 1994 Agreement on the Implementation of Part XI of the UN Convention 
on the Law of the Sea: breakthrough to universality?” op. cit.pp.5-20; Chamey, J., “Entry into Force of the 
1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea”, (1995) 35(2) Virginia Journal o f International Law, pp.381-404; 
Oxman, B., “The 1994 Agreement and the Convention”, op.cit. pp. 687-696 and Sohn L., “International 
Law Implications of the 1994 Agreement,” (1994) 88 AJIL.pp.696-705.
213 See Art. 2(1) of Agreement: Brown, ibid. pp.9-10 and Nelson, “The New Deep Sea-Bed Mining 
Regime,” op. cit. 192-195.
214 Brown, Ibid. p. 10.
215 For a full analysis of the provisions of the 1994 Agreement vis-a-vis African states see chapters 3 and 4 
of this thesis.
216 Section 2 of the Annex to the Agreement.
217 Section 5 of the Annex to the Agreement.
218 Section 7 of the Annex to the Agreement.
2,9 Section 3 of the Annex to the Agreement.
220 Section 6 of the Annex to the Agreement.
221 Section 8 of the Annex to the Agreement.
222 Section 4 of the Annex to the Agreement.
223 Section 1 paragraph 4 and Section 2 paragraph 1 of the Annex to the Agreement.
224 Section 9 of the Annex to the Agreement. This was, however, anticipated by the LOSC in Art. 162 (2)
(y)-
225 See, for example, Section 3 paragraphs 8, 11(b) and 16; Section 5 paragraph 2; Section 6 paragraph 7 
and Section 8 paragraph 2 of the Annex to the Agreement.
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fundamentally transformed the earlier regime contained in Part XI of LOSC.226 The 
whole process therefore of hiding under the mask of calling the Agreement an 
Implementation Agreement could also be attributed to a desire not to formally 
acknowledge that the Convention had been amended, since the amendment procedures 
under the LOSC were not followed.227
Article 2 of the Agreement, dealing with the relationship between the Agreement and 
Part XI of LOSC, declares the superiority of the former over the latter by providing in 
paragraph 1 as follows, ‘‘The provisions o f this Agreement and Part XI shall be 
interpreted and applied together as a single instrument. In the event o f any inconsistency 
between this Agreement and Part XI, the provisions o f this Agreement shall prevail. ”
The 1994 Agreement, in trying to encourage the participation of states in LOSC, as well 
as ensure the immediate application of the Agreement vis-a-vis the LOSC, made 
provision not only for the provisional application of the Agreement but also for 
provisional participation in the regime by non-states parties to the LOSC.228 Four 
categories of states were allowed to apply the Agreement provisionally before it came 
into force:
• states which had consented to the adoption of the Agreement unless they had notified 
the depositary in writing before 16 November 1994 that they would not so apply the 
Agreement or that they would consent to such application upon subsequent signature
229or notification in writing;
226 See section 3.2 of chapter 3 for further discussion o f the changes introduced by the Agreement.
227 See Arts. 314, 315 and 316 of LOSC. See also Freestone, D. and Oude Elferink, A.G., “Flexibility and 
Innovation in the Law of the Sea - Will the LOSC Amendment Procedures ever be used?” A paper 
presented at the third Verzijl Symposium- Stability and Change in the Law of the Sea: Selected Issues, 
Utrecht University, The Netherlands, 3 December 2004, pp. 13-18.
228 Art.7 of the 1994 Agreement.
229 Cameroon by notification chose that the provisional application of the Agreement would only apply to it 
upon subsequent signature or notification in writing. See Law o f the Sea Bulletin, Special Issue IV of 16 
November, 1994, p.45.
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• states and entities which signed the Agreement unless they notified the depositary in
230writing at the time of signature that they would not so apply the Agreement;
• states and entities which consented to its provisional application by so 
notifying the depositary in writing; and
231• states which acceded to the Agreement.
A state which applied the Agreement provisionally also automatically became a 
provisional member of the International Seabed Authority (ISA). Upon the entry into 
force of the Agreement on 28 July 1996, the provisional application of the Agreement 
terminated. This also meant that the provisional membership of states, which had not at 
that time become parties, terminated on that date. However, the Council of the ISA was 
empowered to extend the provisional membership of a state, if it so requested in writing 
and the ISA was satisfied that the state concerned had been making efforts in good faith 
to become a party to LOSC 82 and the Agreement. The latest date for such extension was 
16 November 1998 and thereafter all provisional application lapsed, and all provisional 
membership ceased.233 Such provisional members had participated on the same basis as 
the states parties to the Agreement. For example, they had voting rights, contributed to 
the administrative budget and had a right to sponsor an application by their citizens for 
approval of a plan of work. The aim was to encourage the participation by the major 
industrialised states at whose behest the Agreement was formulated, while they took 
steps to become parties to the treaties. As at 16 November 1998 the United States of 
America, the major objector to the original Convention, had not become a Party to the 
Convention and the Agreement and therefore its provisional membership and
230 Morocco by notification chose not to apply the Agreement provisionally. See Law o f the Sea Bulletin, 
Ibid.p.46.
231 Art.7 (1) of Agreement.
232 Art. 7(3). See Chamey, J., “U.S. Provisional Application of the 1994 Deep Sea Bed Agreement”, (1994) 
88A//L.pp.705-714.
233 The provisional members were Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Canada, Chile, European Community, 
Gabon, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Mozambique, Nepal, Poland, Qatar, Russian Federation, 
Solomon Islands, South Africa, Switzerland, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United 
States of America. All the African States which were provisional members have since become parties to 
both the LOSC and the Agreement. See Marffy-Mantuano, “The Procedural Framework o f the Agreement 
Implementing the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea”, op. cit. 821-824.
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participation lapsed.234 On the other hand, two African states, Gabon and South Africa, 
which extended their provisional membership, became parties to both the LOSC and the 
Agreement before the deadline.235
Anderson has described the provisional application of treaties as a fairly recent
development in international practice, where there is an urgent need for the application of
a treaty in order to avoid delays that necessarily arise in securing the various states’
ratifications.236 Whilst provisional application of treaties is not a common practice, it has,
however, always been recognised under the law of treaties as codified in the VCLT.
Article 25 of the VCLT says:
“I. A treaty or a part o f a treaty is applied provisionally pending its entry 
into force if:
(a) the treaty itself so provides; or
(b) the negotiating States have in some other manner so agreed.
2. Unless the treaty otherwise provides or the negotiating States have 
otherwise agreed, the provisional application o f a treaty or a part o f a treaty 
with respect to a State shall be terminated i f  that State notifies the other 
States between which the treaty is being applied provisionally o f its intention 
not to become a party to the treaty.”237
234 Presently the United States of America, along with forty-six states, including fourteen African states, 
has since assumed the status of observer to the ISA. See 
http://www.isa.org.im/en/members/default.aspfAccessed on 23 September 2004]
235For Gabon and South Africa’s statement applying to extend their provisional membership, see The Law 
o f the Sea Declarations and Statements with respect to the United Nations Convention on the Law o f the 
Sea and to the Agreement relating to the Implementation o f Part XI o f the United Nations Convention on 
the Law o f the Sea o f 10 December 79&2,op.cit.pp. 118 and 120.
236 Nelson, “The New Deep Sea-Bed Mining Regime”, op.cit. p. 194.
237 See Elias, T., Modern Law o f Treaties, (Netherlands, A.W. Sijthoff International Publishing B.V., 
1974), pp.37-39 and Sohn L., “International Law Implications of the 1994 Agreement”, op.cit.p.703.
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Table 2
238African Group  -  Status o f  the Convention and the Agreement.
State United Nations 
Convention on the Law of 
the Sea
(in force as from 16 
November 1994)
Agreement Relating to the 
Implementation of Part 
XI of the Convention.
(in force as from 28 July 
1996)
1. Algeria Y- 11 June 1996 Y - l l  June 1996(p)
2. Angola Y-5 December 1990 N
3. Benin Y -16 October 1997 Y-16 October 1997(p)
4.Botwana(L) Y -2 M ayl990 Y- 31 January 2005
5.Burkina Faso(L) Y- 25 January 2005 Y -  25 January 2005
6.Burundi(L) N N
7.Cameroon Y -19 November 1985 Y- 28 August 2002
8.Cape Verde Y -10 August 1987 N
9.Central African Republic 
(L)
N N
10. Chad(L) N N
11. Comoros Y- 21 June 1994 N
12.Congo N N
13.Cote d ’Ivoire Y- 26 March 1984 Y- 28 July 1995(sp)
14.Democratic Republic of 
Congo
Y -17 February 1989 N
15.Djibouti Y- 8 October 1991 N
16.Egypt Y- 26 August 1983 N
17.Equitorial Guinea Y- 21 July 1997 Y -21 July 1997(p)
18.Eritrea N N
238 See note 196 above. Western Sahara is not included in the United Nations list o f  states and therefore it is 
not included in Table 2 and the consideration o f the number o f states in the African grouping in this and 
subsequent chapters..
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19.Ethiopia(L) N N
20.Gabon Y - l l  March 1998 Y - l l  March 1998(p)
21.Gambia Y- 22 May 1984 N
22. Ghana Y- 7 June 1983 N
23. Guinea Y- 6 September 1985 Y- 28 July 1995(sp)
24. Guinea-Bissau Y- 25 August 1986 N
2 5. Kenya Y- 2 March 1989 Y- 29 July 1994(ds)
26.Lesotho(L) N N
27.Liberia N N
28.Libya Arab Jamahiriya N N
29.Madagascar Y- 22 August 2001 Y -22 August 2001 (p)
30.Malawi(L) N N
31 .Mali(L) Y -16 July 1985 N
32.Mauritania Y -17 July 1996 Y -17 July 1996(p)
3 3.Mauritius Y- 4 November 1994 Y- 4 November 1994(p)
34.Morocco N N
3 5.Mozambique Y -13 March 1997 Y -13 March 1997(a)
36.Namibia Y -18 April 1983 Y- 28 July 1995(sp)
37.Niger(L) N N
38.Nigeria Y -14 August 1986 Y -28 July 1995(sp)
39.Rwanda(L) N N
40.Senegal Y- 25 October 1984 Y- 25 July 1995
41.Seychelles Y- 16 September 1991 Y -15 December 1994
42.Sierra Leone Y -12 December 1994 Y- 12 December 1994(p)
43.Somalia Y- 24 July 1989 N
44.South Africa Y- 23 December 1997 Y- 23 December 1997
45.Sudan Y- 23 January 1985 N
46.Swaziland(L) N N
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47.Togo Y -16 April 1985 Y- 28 July 1995(sp)
48. Tunisia Y- 24 April 1985 Y- 24 M ay 2002
49.Uganda(L) Y -9 November 1990 Y-28  July 1995(sp)
50. United Republic of 
Tanzania
Y -30 September 1985 Y- 25 June 1998
51 .Zambia(L) Y -7 March 1983 Y- 28 July 1995(sp)
52. Zimbabwe(L) Y- 24 February 1993 Y- 28 July 1995(sp)
53.Sao Tome & Principe Y- 3 November 1987 N
Key.
1. Y -  P arty to the treaty and the date the State became a party
2. N -  Not a party;
3. L - Landlocked State;
4. p  - States bound by having ratified, acceded or succeeded to the Convention under Article 4 paragraph 1 o f  
the Agreement;
5. sp -  States bound by the Agreement under the simplified procedure set out in A rticle 5 o f  the Agreement;
6. ds -  definitive signature;
7. a -  accession.
Table 3
United Nations Regional Groupings -  A Comparative Tabular Analysis o f  Parties to 
LOSC 82 and the 1994 Agreem ent239
Regional grouping/total 
number of States in group
United Nations 
Convention on Law of the 
Sea 1982 (number of 
States Parties)
1994 Agreement Relating 
to the Implementation of 
Part XI (number of State 
Parties)
African -  53 States. 39 26
Asian -  54 States.240 41 36
Latin American and 
Caribbean (LAC) -  33 
States.
27 19
Western European and 
others (WEOG) -  29 
States.241
22 22
Eastern European (EE) -22  
States.242
18 17
239 There is an unofficial United Nations General Assembly list dividing United Nations member States into 
regional groupings for General Assembly election purposes. The author was unable to get access to this 
unofficial list which is not available for distribution to the public. However, a break down o f the United 
Nations regional groups was obtained from the United States o f America, Department o f State 2003 Report 
on Voting Practices in the United Nations (Report to Congress submitted on March 31, 2004 pursuant to 
U.S. Public Law, 101-246),pp. 95-1 OO.http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/31561 .pdf [Accessed 
24 August 2004], The breakdown in table 3 above on regional groupings o f course does not include the 
European Community which is also a Party to both the LOSC 82 and the 1994 Agreement. See also 
“ Indicative List o f States Members o f the International Seabed Authority which would fulfil the criteria for 
Membership in the Various Groups o f States in the Council in Accordance with Paragraph 15 o f Section 3 
o f the Annex to the Agreement Relating to the Implementation o f Part XI o f the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea o f 10 December 1982,” Prepared by the ISA Secretariat, ISBA/10/A/CRP.2 o f 5 
March 2004, p. 15 and International Seabed Authority Handbook 2004 (Jamaica, International Seabed 
Authority, 2004), pp.8-9, breaking down into regional groupings the members o f the ISA.
240 The International Seabed Authority Handbook 2004 includes the Cook Islands under the Asian Group. 
Therefore the Cook Islands, an entity with a special status under international law, is also included in table 
3 above under the Asian Group.
241 Israel was admitted as a member o f WEOG in 2000 for a renewable period o f 4 years because the Arab 
members in the Asian group, to which it normally should belong, blocked its membership. The Department 
of State Report o f course did not include the USA in the WEOG group but this was included in the total 
number in Table 3 above.
242 The United States Department o f State 2003 Report, op.cit. did not include Estonia but this was included 
in the total number for Eastern European (EE) group.
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As at 1 February 2005, 148 entities had become parties to the LOSC, including 39 
African states, 243 six of which are landlocked.244 In the case of the Agreement, as at the 
same date 121 entities have become parties, 245including 26 African states, five of which 
are landlocked.246
It can only be speculated why certain African states have failed to become parties to these 
treaties.247 For some, pressing domestic issues have perhaps engaged their focus and 
therefore the ratification of these treaties is not a priority.248 Also quite a number of 
African states are going through economic crisis and a number are having difficulties 
meeting their financial obligations to international organisations such as the United 
Nations. It is probable that a number of them are yet to be parties to the treaties because it 
would involve additional financial obligations to the institutions of the regime, which in 
their view will not yield any immediate economic returns. With the indefinite 
postponement of commercial exploitation of minerals in the Area, contrary to the 
assumption during UNCLOS III of its imminence, the need to ratify the LOSC, a large 
part of which has become customary law, acceptance of Part XI, as well as the 
Agreement, has perhaps lost its economic and strategic relevance for these states. Also, 
there is little in the LOSC for landlocked states, which comprise 8 of the 14 African non­
243 See note 196 above. Denmark , Latvia and Burkina Faso are the latest parties to the LOSC having 
become parties on 16 November 2004, 23 December 2004 and 25 January 2005 respectively.
244 These States are Botswana, Burkina Faso, Mali, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
245 See note 196 above.
246 These States are Botswana, Burkina Faso, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
247 Although Tunisia in its declaration when ratifying the LOSC declared that it would not be a party to any 
Agreement which derogated from the principles of the common heritage, it actually became a party to the
1994 Agreement on 24 May 2002 though the latter watered down and in some regards derogated from the 
common heritage principle as enunciated in Part XI. See
http://untreatv.un.org/ENGLlSH/bible/englishintemetbible/partI/chapterXXl/treatv6.asp . [Accessed 7 
March 2002].
248 For example, Rwanda is not yet a party to the LOSC and Agreement has recently been embroiled with 
the genocide which led to the setting up of the ICTR. With some other African states that are non-parties 
perhaps dealing with the critical problem of internal conflicts, poverty and under-development within their 
borders has made the need to ratify the LOSC and Agreement less of a priority.
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parties. In addition, certain African states have, perhaps, failed to become parties to these 
treaties simply because of bureaucratic inertia.
2.5. The Common Heritage o f Mankind: Treaty Provisions or Part o f Customary 
International Law?
The deep seabed regime is founded upon the principle of the common heritage of 
mankind. This section seeks to examine whether the common heritage of mankind 
contained in Part XI, as modified by the 1994 Agreement, is merely a concept limited to 
treaty provisions or whether it has crystallised into customary international law. This 
section shall not dwell on the issue of whether such principle emerged as a rule of 
customary international law prior to the LOSC and 1994 Agreement as a result of various 
General Assembly Resolutions. Much has been written for and against whether this 
principle crystallised into customary international law as a result of the various General 
Assembly Resolutions.249 This writer would restrict this discourse to whether or not the 
common heritage of mankind, as stated in the LOSC and 1994 Agreement, has 
crystallised into customary international law since 1982. It must, however, be pointed 
out that those provisions of the LOSC and the 1994 Agreement setting up institutions 
under the regime of the Area cannot become customary international law. The 
establishment of institutions and membership by a state of such institutions can only be 
through treaty-based obligations; therefore the analysis as to whether the common 
heritage of mankind principle is part of customary international law would not include 
the institutional framework of the regime of the treaties.251
The relevance of the question raised by this section is pertinent as regards the legal effect 
of Part XI of LOSC, as modified by the 1994 Agreement, vis-a-vis states that are not
249 See for e.g. Brown, Sea -Bed Energy and Minerals: The International Legal Regime, op. cit. pp. 22-45 
and compare with Rembe, Africa and the International Law o f the Sea, op.cit. pp .46-57; Mahmoudi, The 
Law o f Deep Sea-Bed Mining, op. cit.pp.124-149 and Wolfrum, “The Principle of the Common Heritage of 
Mankind,” op. cit.pp.333-337.
250 For a general reading on the generation of customary international law from treaty provisions, see 
Villiger M.E, Customary International Law and Treaties,( Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1985), pp. 183-205.
251 Treves, T., “The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea as a non-universally accepted instrument:
Notes on the Convention and Customary law,” in Koers, & Oxman, (eds), The 1982 Convention on the Law 
of the Sea, op.cit. p.685 at 685-686.
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parties to these treaties. Ordinarily by reason of res inter alios acta, non-parties to a treaty 
are not bound by it.252 Therefore if the principle of the common heritage of mankind as 
enunciated in Part XI, as modified by the 1994 Agreement, is merely a treaty provision 
that has not crystallised into customary international law, non-state parties will not be 
bound by the obligations therein, neither can they share in the distribution by the ISA of 
the benefits of deep seabed activities.
As a result of the present lack of the requisite marine technology and finance, any access 
by African states to the resources of the Area is totally dependent on other states having 
the necessary technology and finance. It is therefore in the interest of African states for 
all states, including developed industrialised states, to be bound by the legal regime of the 
seabed that emphasises a community-based, rather than an individual, approach to mining 
the Area. Also it is in the interest of African states that this community-based approach, 
as captured by the common heritage of mankind, is regarded as part of customary 
international law binding on all states, including non-states parties. This is particularly 
germane since the United States of America, with a tremendous marine technological 
capability and the ability to embark on unilateral mining of the Area, is not yet a party to 
LOSC and the Agreement.254 Further, the provisions of LOSC allow a state party to 
denounce the Convention upon written notification addressed to the Secretary-General. 
This denunciation takes effect on the expiry of one year after the receipt of the instrument 
of denunciation by the Secretary-General or at a later date if the instrument so 
specifies. Once the denunciation comes into effect, the provisions of the treaty cease to 
bind the denouncing state, unless it can be shown that such provision was not merely
252 Art. 34 of the VCLT.
253 See generally Boczek, B. A., The Transfer o f Marine Technology to Developing Nations in International 
Law, (Occasional Paper No.32) ( Honolulu, Hawaii, Law of the Sea Institute, University of Hawaii, 1982), 
pp.34-44; Lenoble,J., “Technological Aspects o f the Operation of Transport Vessels and Mining Ships,” in 
Koers, A.W., & Oxman, B.H (eds), op.cit., pp. 375-427 and Chamey, J., “Technology and International 
Negotiations,” (1982) 76 AJIL, pp.82-90.
254 The Senate of the United States of America is presently deliberating on whether to give its consent to 
United States accession to the LOSC and the Agreement. See Duff, J., “A Note on the United States and the 
Law of the Sea: Looking Back and Moving Forward,” (2004) 35(3) Ocean Development and International 
Law, pp. 195-219.
255 Art.317 (1) of LOSC.
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treaty-based but has become part of customary international law. As Article 317(3) of the 
LOSC says:
“The denunciation shall not in any way affect the duty o f any State Party to 
fulfil any obligation embodied in this Convention to which it would be subject 
under international law independently o f this Convention ’’
The possibility of a unilateral action by states contrary to the LOSC and 1994 Agreement 
and denunciation would appear not to be a figment of imagination, in view of 
contemporary situations where there are examples of unilateral action by states and also 
examples of states withdrawing from negotiated treaties or denouncing treaties to which 
they are parties, in what can be regarded as a move towards unilateralism rather than 
communalism.256
Further, the issue of whether the provisions of the deep seabed regime are treaty or part 
of customary international law would also be relevant in determining whether African 
non-states parties can enjoy the benefits of the activities on the ground that the regime is 
part of customary international law.
The generation of customary international law from treaties is, of course, not new. It is 
endorsed by Article 38 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 and also 
has judicial backing, notably in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases?51 In this case it 
was pointed out that for a treaty provision to generate customary international law it must
9 SRsatisfy the following conditions:
• It must have a fundamentally norm-creating character such as could be regarded as 
forming the basis of a general rule of law;
256 See for e.g. the United States of America’s indication that it would not ratify the Kyoto Protocol on 
Climate Change in favour of “a national energy policy”. See the Text of President George W. Bush’s letter 
to Senators Hagel, Helms, Craig, and Roberts in this regard.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/03/2Q010314.html [Accessed on 27 September 2004]. 
Also the United States of America withdrawal from the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty with the 
former Soviet Union. See Kirgis L. F., “Proposed Missile Defenses and the ABM Treaty,” (2001) ASIL 
Insights, http://www.asi 1 .org/insights/insigh70.htm [Accessed on 27 September 2004].
257 1.C.J. Rep. 1969, p.3.
258 Ibid. atpp.41-44.
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• It must enjoy a very widespread and representative participation in the treaty, 
including that of states whose interests are specially affected;
• It must enjoy extensive and general uniformity of State practice evidencing a general 
recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation is involved ; and
• The passage of time, though on certain occasions it may be a short one.260
The common heritage of mankind principle as contained in the LOSC and 1994 
Agreement is a generalised norm imposing duties and conferring rights upon all states.261 
For example, it makes provisions imposing a duty upon all states to use the Area for only 
peaceful purposes262 and to refrain from claiming or exercising sovereignty over the Area 
or its resources.263 It also confers rights by declaring that the activities of the Area are for 
mankind as a whole (represented by their states), irrespective of the geographical location 
of states, with preferential treatment given to developing states.264 The combined effect of 
this, as well as the widespread participation in the LOSC and the 1994 Agreement by 
states from every regional grouping, coastal and landlocked, including big maritime 
states with the requisite marine technology, lends further credence to the fact that the 
principle of the common heritage of mankind in relation to the Area, if not a principle of 
customary international law by virtue of the various General Assembly Resolutions, has 
now become such and is binding on all states, including non-parties.
According to Joyner:
“The prime determinant o f how, when or whether that norm-creating process 
will happen rests in the conduct o f States. When sufficient State practice
259According to the ICJ in the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against 
Nicaragua (Nicaragua/United States),(Merits) ICJ Rep. 1986, p.14 at 98; 76 ILR, p.349 at 432:
“In order to deduce the existence of customary rules, the Court deems it sufficient that the conduct of states 
should, in general, be consistent with such rules, and that instances of state conduct inconsistent with a 
given rule should generally have been treated as breaches of that rule, not as indications of the recognition 
of a new rule.”
260 In the majority decision in the North Sea continental Shelf Cases, Supra at p.42, it was said that “the 
passage of only a short period of time is not necessarily, or o f itself a bar to the formation of a new rule of 
customary international law.”
261 D’Amato, A., “An Alternative to the Law o f the Sea Convention,” (1983) 77(2) AJIL, p.281at 282-283
262 Art. 141 of LOSC.
263 Art. 137 of LOSC.
264 Art. 140 of LOSC.
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indicates clear, widespread acceptance o f the CHM [common heritage of 
mankind], its legitimacy in international law will be fixed”.265
Also, Brown whilst arguing in his writing in 2001 against the norms of the LOSC on the 
common heritage of mankind being part of customary international law, however, 
acknowledged the possibility that such could be transformed into universal international 
customary law through developing state practice. 266
In this writer’s opinion it would be safe, as a result of the present widespread acceptance 
of the LOSC and 1994 Agreement, including virtually all developed states initially 
opposed to the LOSC, to conclude that there is sufficient state practice at this stage to 
transform the treaty provisions into universal customary international law binding on 
both states parties and non-states parties. Even the United States of America, a major 
maritime state that is yet to become a party to the treaties, appears to generally accept the 
common heritage of mankind as a principle of international law. The United States Deep 
Seabed Hard Minerals Resources Act 1980 alludes to a support of the common heritage 
of mankind vis-a-vis the Area subject to it being legally defined under the terms of a 
comprehensive law of the Sea treaty.267 Whilst the term “common heritage o f mankind” 
is not specifically defined in the Convention, the combined effect of the provisions in the 
LOSC and the Agreement explains the principal features of this principle in such a 
manner as to make sufficiently clear the obligations imposed and the rights conferred 
upon states. Moreover, even the United States of America is presently taking steps that 
indicate that they may in the near future become party to the LOSC and Agreement.268
265 Joyner, “Legal Implications of the Concept o f the Common Heritage of Mankind,” op. cit.p. 199; See 
also Wolfrum, op.cit.p.314; Van Dyke and Yuen, “Common Heritage v. Freedom of the High Seas which 
governs the sea bed?,” op. cit.p.537 and generally D ’Amato, A., “An Alternative to the Law of the Sea 
Convention,” (1983)77 AJIL, 281-285.
266 See Brown, Sea bed Mining, vol.2, op. cit. p. 59.
267 Section 2(7) of the Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Resources Act 1980. 19 ILM 1003 (1980). Also see 
Summary of Provisions of Draft Proposal by the United States for a United Nations Convention on the 
International Sea Bed Area, o f August 3rd, 1970 (1971) 65(1) TJ/L.pp. 179-186 and United States: 
President’s Transmittal of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Agreement 
relating to the Implementation of Part XI to the U.S. Senate with Commentary [October 1994], 34 I.L.M. 
1393(1995), pp. 1393 at 1438, plus the United States’ signature of the 1994 Implementation Agreement.
268 See Duff, “A Note on the United States and the Law o f the Sea: Looking Back and Moving Forward,” 
op.cit.
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Another author, Jennifer Frakes, argues that as a result of the varying interpretations by 
various states of the principle of the common heritage of mankind, it cannot be deemed to
9AQ • •be part of general customary international law. It is contended that this argument is not 
convincing. To accept the variance of interpretation by states as a pre-condition to 
determine whether the common heritage of mankind is part of customary international 
law would have far-reaching and rather unsafe effects. The result would be that certain 
clearly established principles of customary international law could be excluded. For 
instance, with the principle of self-defence, an established principle of customary 
international law,270 there are varying interpretations by states as to the scope of such 
principle, whether it is limited to a response to actual armed attack or whether it can be 
extended to include a pre-emptive strike in self-defence. This variance in interpretation 
does not make it any less a principle of customary international law; neither can it be a 
pre-condition to exclude the principle of the common heritage as a rule of customary 
international law. It is contended that variance of interpretation is not a precondition to 
determining whether a rule has emerged as a rule of customary international law: rather 
the issue centres on whether there is the requisite state practice and opinio juris 271 The 
widespread ratification of the LOSC and Agreement, it is contended, evinces the 
necessary state practice and opinio juris.
The common heritage of mankind provisions of LOSC and the 1994 Agreement, it is 
argued, are binding on all states, both states parties and non-states parties. Therefore it is 
suggested that no state can unilaterally embark on mining activities in the Area. Further, 
it is contended that all states, inclusive of non-states parties, are entitled to receive the 
benefits of activities in the Area.272 It therefore follows that African non-states parties are 
entitled to enjoy the benefits of seabed mining activities and are bound by the obligations
269 Frakes J., “The Common Heritage of Mankind Principle and the Deep Seabed, Outer Space and 
Antarctica: Will Developed and Developing Nations reach a Compromise?”(2003) 21 Wisconsin 
International Law Journal, pp.409 at 411.
270 See Nicaragua Case, Merits, Supra, para. 176.
271 See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases-, Supra, Nicaragua Case, Ibid.; and Thirlway, H., “The Sources 
of International Law,” in Evans, M.D., (ed.),International Law, (New York, United States, Oxford 
University Press, 2003),pp. 117 at 124-130.
272 See Art. 140 of LOSC. For African states that are non-states parties see table 2 above.
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set out in Part XI and the 1994 Agreement (except such obligations related to the 
institutional framework of the regime).
2.6. Conclusion.
The historical evolution of the deep seabed regime has indeed witnessed a great 
contribution to the development of the international law of the sea by African states 
working with other developing states. This evolution, as we have seen, reflects very 
vividly another arena for the “battle” at the international sphere between the rich 
technologically developed northern states and the generally poor less technologically 
developed southern states. The clash, which initially emerged as mainly an economic one 
when it was thought that seabed mining was imminent, spiralled into a political one with 
the two sides jousting for control of the regime and the institutions therein. The 
happenings in the seabed regime is only an aspect of a multifaceted conflict on different 
issues of international law, still ongoing and rehashed in various international fora such 
as the United Nations, World Trade Organisation (WTO), and the Commonwealth 
Organisation, between developing states, including African states, and developed states. 
On the part of the African states, working together with other developing states, it is a 
fight for global equity in an international community made up of rules and regulations 
leaning in favour of the more developed economies.
The 1994 Agreement has made certain fundamental changes to the regime vis-a-vis 
African states, as will be analysed in more detail in chapters 3 and 4. However, though 
the common heritage of mankind has been substantially watered down by the 1994 
Agreement, the retention of the common heritage of mankind of the Area and its 
resources, with an emphasis on a community-based approach to the regime, is a 
significant achievement for African states, to whom communal ownership of property is a 
familiar concept under native law and custom.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE REGIME OF THE AREA AND AFRICAN STATES.
This chapter seeks to examine the regime of the Area under Part XI, as modified by 
the 1994 Agreement, with the aim of pointing out its effect on African states. The 
aspect dealing with the institutions of the regime shall be examined in chapter four, 
whilst the system of mining would be dealt with in chapter five. This chapter starts 
off by examining the provisions of Part XI that have not been changed by the 
Agreement. Thereafter the chapter proceeds to examine specific aspects of the 
Agreement that have modified Part XI. There will be an attempt to contrast these 
provisions pf the Agreement with the original provision of Part XI with a view to 
pointing out the effects on African states. Finally, the chapter seeks to suggest why 
African states were prepared to go along with the 1994 Agreement, considering their 
original and unequivocal position on the issues changed by the Agreement during the 
UNCLOS III.
3.1. Unchanged Provisions o f Part X I
Despite the monumental changes introduced by the 1994 Agreement, which shall be 
discussed in section 3.2 of this chapter, there are certain parts of the regime under Part 
XI which remain intact. However, it must be pointed out that in relation to certain 
aspects of the regime, such as the legal status of the Area (section 3.1.1.) and the 
special regard for developing countries clause (section 3.1.2.), although formally there 
is no change, the practical effect of certain changes introduced by the 1994 
Agreement (for example, the downgrading of the role of the Enterprise and the 
alteration of certain other institutional features of the regime, changes relating to the 
transfer of technology and financial provisions) is to significantly reduce the impact 
some of the unchanged provisions on African states and other developing states.
3.1.1. The Legal Status o f the Area and Its Resources.
The declaration of the Area and its resources as the common heritage of mankind, and 
therefore not subject to the sovereignty of, or unilateral appropriation or exploitation 
by, any state, remains the focal point of the regime, though certain changes introduced
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by the Agreement have the effect of watering down the whole principle of the 
common heritage of mankind.1
Despite this, the significance of the retention of the principle of the common heritage 
of mankind can perhaps be better appreciated in the light of the initial position of 
developed states in favour of res communis, in contrast with that of developing states, 
including African states, insisting on the Area and its resources as being the common 
heritage of mankind.2 Whilst the principle of the common heritage of mankind has 
been criticised in certain quarters as not being a totally precise legal concept,3 and has 
indeed lost its original “lustre and soul” as a result of the 1994 Agreement, it 
certainly marked a shift by the developed states from their original position that 
mining in the Area was one of the freedoms of the high seas.4 The Netherlands, in a 
paper presented at the informal consultations of the United Nations Secretary- 
General, which led to the 1994 Agreement, captured the importance of the common 
heritage of mankind to the deep seabed regime when it said:5
1 See Arts. 136 and 137 o f LOSC and preamble 2 o f  the 1994 Agreement. However, see section 3.2 and 
chapter 4. Also see Anand, R.P., “Common Heritage o f Mankind: Mutilation of an Ideal” (1997) 37 (1) 
Indian Journal o f  International Law, p .l at p. 17 where the author said, “Although the area of the deep 
seabed beyond the limits o f national jurisdiction is still called and declared as the common heritage of 
mankind, the term has lost its original meaning and substance when it symbolised the interests, needs, 
hopes and aspirations o f a large number o f poor peoples. The principle has lost its lustre and soul.” 
Further, see the Asian African Legal Consultative Committee (AALCC) [now Asian African Legal 
Consultative Organisation (AALCO)] Secretariat Document, “Law o f the Sea”, 
AALCC/XLI/ABUJA/2002/S.2, para.79, p .l 1.
2 See Section 2.1.4.3 of Chapter 2.
3 See Brown, E.D., Sea-bed Energy and Minerals: The International Legal Regime, Vol.2 (The 
Hague/Boston/London, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2001), pp.72-73; Pinto, M.C.W., “Common 
Heritage o f Mankind: From Metaphor to Myth, And the Consequences o f Constructive Ambiguity” in 
Makarczyk, J., (ed.), Theory o f  International Law at the Threshold o f  the 21st Century (Essays in 
Honour o f  Krzysztof Skubiszewski) (The Hague/London/Boston, Kluwer Law International, 1996), 
pp.249-268 and Gorove, S., “The Concept o f Common Heritage o f Mankind: A Political, Moral or 
Legal Innovation?”(1972) 9 San Diego Law Review, pp.390-403.
4 See Mahmoudi, S., The Law o f  Deep Sea-Bed Mining: A Study o f  the Progressive Development o f  
International Law Concerning the Management o f  the Polymetallic Nodules o f the Deep Sea-
Bed,(Stockholm, Sweden, Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1987), pp. 164-168.
5 The Non-paper on the Enterprise prepared by the Netherlands delegation for Informal Consultations, 
New York, 6-7 August 1992. NILOS, International Organisations and the Law o f the Sea: 
Documentary Yearbook Vol.8 (1992) (London/Dordrecht/Boston, Graham & Trotman/Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1994), p.241. See also the statement o f the Secretary-General of the Asian-African Legal 
Consultative Committee, H.E. Mr Frank X. Njenga at the summer meeting of the Eighth session o f the 
Prepcom held at New York in August, 1990, NILOS, International Organisations & the Law o f  the 
Sea: Documentary Yearbook, Vol.6 (1990) ( London/Dordrecht/Boston, Graham & Trotman/Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1992), p.513
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“The concept o f  common heritage is central to the current provisions o f 
Part XI. Any generally acceptable and simplified deep seabed regime 
produced by these informal consultations must equally include the 
acceptance o f the common heritage principle, i.e., the regime must strike 
a balance between a deep seabed regime based on sound commercial 
principles and the interests o f  the international community. ”
The final outcome of the informal consultations was to produce a situation where the 
developed industrialised states, though accepting that the Area and its resources are 
the common heritage of mankind, have through the 1994 Agreement modified its 
contents and effectively altered the original meaning of the principle.6
3.1.2. Special Regard fo r  Developing Countries Clause.
Part XI in certain places requires that special regard be given to developing states,
which include African states, by providing that:
“Activities in the Area shall, as specifically provided fo r in this Part, be 
carried out fo r  the benefit o f  mankind as a whole, irrespective o f the 
geographical location o f states, whether coastal or land-locked, and 
taking into particular consideration the interests and needs o f developing 
States and o f peoples who have not attained fu ll independence or other 
self-governing status recognised by the United Nations in accordance 
with General Assembly resolution 1514(XV) and other relevant General 
Assembly resolutions. ” 7
“The effective participation o f developing States in activities in the Area 
shall be promoted as specifically provided fo r  in this Part, having due 
regard to their special interests and needs, and in particular to the special 
need o f the landlocked and geographically disadvantaged among them to 
overcome obstacles arising from their disadvantaged location, including 
remoteness from the Area and difficulty o f  access to and from it. ” 8
The activities of the Area are to be carried out for the benefit of all mankind but in 
distributing any benefit derived from such activities, special regard is to be given to 
developing states, over and above the developed states. Also the Convention requires 
that the effective participation of developing states in activities in the Area shall be
6 Preamble 2, G.A. Res. 48/263 o f 17 August 1994 and Preamble to the Regulations on Prospecting and 
Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules in the Area ISBA/6/A/18 o f 4 October 2000. See Resolution 
issued by the Asian African Legal Consultative Organisation at its fortieth session, RES/40/2 of 24 
June 2001, which states in para. 1 as follows: “Reaffirms that in accordance with Part XI o f the 
Convention and the preambular paragraphs o f  the Agreement relating to the Implementation o f Part XI 
and Regulations, the Area is the common heritage o f  mankind and should be used for the benefit o f the 
mankind as a whole.”
7 Arts. 140 (1). See also Arts. 160(f) (i) o f LOSC.
8 Art. 148 of LOSC.
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promoted. These concessions to the less economically endowed developing states 
were not modified by the 1994 Agreement. This legal discrimination in favour of 
developing states is an aspect of international development law and it recognises the 
reality of inequality amongst the states in the international polity.9
However, this “positive discrimination”10 loses its significance if the developing 
states do not have the wherewithal, especially in terms of technology, expertise and 
finance, to take advantage of this. Therefore while the “reasonable regard for  
developing states ” clause is not formally altered by the Agreement, the effect of the 
provisions of the Agreement withdrawing the advantage given by the LOSC to 
developing states as regard the mandatory transfer of the requisite technology and the 
downgrading of the role of the Enterprise appears to diminish the impact of this clause 
on African states and other developing states.11
3.1.3. The Use o f the Area fo r  Peaceful Purposes Only.
Part XI states that the Area shall be open to use exclusively for peaceful purposes by
all states.12 One of the fears of the developing states, including African states, was
that the developed states with their destructive military arsenal, including nuclear
weapons, would use the Area as a testing field. This fear was expressed by the
Nigerian delegation at the 22nd session of the General Assembly when it said:
“As a developing country Nigeria’s renewed fear is o f  the incalculable 
dangers fo r  mankind as a whole i f  the seabed and the ocean floor beyond 
present national jurisdiction were progressively and competitively 
appropriated, exploited and even used fo r  military purposes by those 
countries which possess the necessary technology ”.
9 See Para. 3(c) o f the Memorandum attached to the Maltese Note Verbale dated 17 August 
1967(A/6695, 18 August, 1967). See also Bulajic, M., “Commercial Relations” inBedjaoui, M., (ed.), 
International Law: Achievements and Prospects, (Paris/Dordrecht/Boston/London, UNESCO/Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1991), pp. 633 at 641. In the Report o f the President to the UNCLOS III, it was said 
that, “The principle of non-discrimination means in law, treating equals equally and giving differential 
treatment to those who are not equals.” Doc.A/CONF.62/L.141 and Add.l o f 29 April 1982, UNCLOS 
III, Official Record Vol. XVI, p.247 Para.9.
10 Bulajic, ibid.
11 See Sections 2 and 5 o f the Annex to the 1994 Agreement and section 3.2 below.
12 Art. 141. See Treves, T., “Military Installations, Structures, and Devices on the Seabed,” (1980) 74(4) 
A//L.pp.808 at 851-857.
13 See DOALOS, The Law o f  the Sea, Concept o f  the Common Heritage o f Mankind, Legislative 
History o f  Articles 133 to 150 and 311(6) o f  the United Nations Convention on the Law o f the Sea, 
(New York, United Nations Publications, 1996), p. 14. Also see Para.6 of the Resolution o f the Council 
of Ministers of the O.A.U on the international zone extending beyond national jurisdiction, 
Doc.A/CONF.62/50 o f 14 September 1976, stating that “The international zone, a common heritage of
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This fear was heightened by the cold war between the United States of America and 
the then USSR, and the growing acquisition of nuclear and other sophisticated 
armaments, especially by the developed states. Prior to the UNCLOS III, an attempt 
to allay this fear led to the 1971 Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of 
Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the 
Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil thereof, which was adopted by an overwhelming vote 
of 104 in favour, 2 against and 2 abstentions.14 The treaty entered into force on 18 
May 1972 and presently has 93 state parties, 22 of which are African states.15 The 
treaty, which is still in force, requires states parties to undertake not to emplant or 
emplace on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof beyond 12 miles 
from the baselines any nuclear weapons or any other type of weapons of mass 
destruction, as well as structures, launching installations or any other facilities 
specifically designed for storing, testing or using such weapons.16 However, the treaty 
makes provision for any state party to withdraw from the treaty based on the rather 
vague ground that it had decided “that extraordinary events related to the subject 
matter o f this Treaty have jeopardised the supreme interests o f its country”} 1 It is 
merely required to give three months notice of such withdrawal to all the other states 
parties and the United Nations Security Council. Such notice is to include a statement 
of the extraordinary events, which it considers to have jeopardised its supreme 
interests.18
Although the peaceful use provision of Part XI is basically similar to Article 88 of the 
LOSC dealing with the high seas, it is not superfluous since its inclusion in Part XI
mankind, should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. Any utilisation o f this zone for military 
purposes is strictly prohibited.” UNCLOS III, Official Records Vol. VI, p. 121.
14 See 10 ILM. 145(1971). 31 African states voted in favour o f  the treaty. No African state voted 
against it. On key legal issues affecting various programmes for eliminating nuclear weapons, see 
Crawford, J. and Sands, P., “Legal Aspects o f  a Nuclear Weapons Convention” in Yusuf A. A.,(ed.), 
African Yearbook o f  International Law, vol. 6, 1998,(The Hague/London/Boston, Kluwer Law 
International, 1999), pp.153-179.
15 The United States o f America, the United Kingdom o f Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
then USSR (now the Russian Federation) are designated as the depositary Governments. See Article X 
(2) o f the Treaty. For the list o f states parties, see United States Department o f State, 
http://www.state.gOv/t/ac/trt/5187.htm [Accessed on 29 September 2004]. African states parties are 
Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, 
Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Mauritius, Morocco, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, 
Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia and Zambia.
16 See Arts. I and II
17 See Art. VIII
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emphasises that peaceful use is not just confined to the waters of the high seas but
extends to the seabed, ocean floor and subsoil thereof According to the representative
of Madagascar at UNCLOS III, Mr. Rabetafika,
"... new concepts such as ‘the common heritage o f mankind’ and the 
‘exclusive economic zone ' gave a new dimension and importance to the 
Conference’s task o f  drafting a comprehensive, global Convention 
covering, inter alia, political issues relating to the peaceful use o f ocean 
space and the creation o f  zones ofpeace and security. ” 19
The LOSC, while emphasising that both the high seas and the Area are to be utilised
for “peaceful uses,” does not define the ambit of this phrase. Various states therefore
interpret it to suit their national interests. Some, including African states, have
interpreted fit to mean all military activities are prohibited. Others, especially the
developed states that are nuclear powers, have interpreted it as prohibiting only
military activities for an aggressive purpose, whilst other nuclear states take the view
that it only prohibits military activities that are inconsistent with the United Nations
20  •Charter and other obligations under international law. This highly political issue 
that the Area should be used for peaceful purposes was not altered by the 1994 
Agreement, nor did the Agreement in any way clarify the exact scope of the “peaceful 
uses ” of the Area.
3.1.4. Freedom o f Marine Research in the Area.
The regime gives all states and competent international organisations the right to 
conduct marine scientific research in the Area. This scientific research is to be carried 
out exclusively for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of mankind as a whole.21 
This is in line with the requirement that the Area should be used only for peaceful 
purposes, but again it raises the issue of the interpretation of the phrase “peaceful 
purposes.” This raises the issue: does this exclude scientific research with a military 
objective? Arguably, since the research in the Area is to be carried out exclusively for
18 Ibid. To the knowledge o f this writer, so far, none o f  the states parties have invoked this provision.
19 See UNCLOS III, Official Records Vol. V.p.57.
20 See Nordquist M., (ed.), UNCLOS 1982- A Commentary, Vol. Ill (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1995), pp.90-91.
21 Arts. 143 and 256 o f LOSC. See generally Part XIII. See also Brown, Sea-bed Energy and Minerals, 
op.cit.pp.79-81; Friedheim, Negotiating the New Ocean Regime, op.cit.pp.203-209 and Soons A.H.A., 
Marine Scientific Research and the Law o f  the Sea, (Deventer /Antwerp/Boston/London/Frankfurt, 
Kluwer and Taxation Publishers, 1982), pp.219-229.
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peaceful purposes, by implication this should exclude research with a military 
objective.
States parties are required to promote international co-operation in marine scientific 
research in the Area through participation in international programmes and 
encouraging co-operation in research by personnel of different states and the ISA.22 
The objective of such programmes, to be developed through the ISA or other relevant 
international organisations, is principally directed towards helping developing states 
and technologically less developed states to strengthen their research capabilities; to 
train their personnel in the techniques and applications of research, as well as to foster
• • O'Xthe employment of their qualified personnel in research in the Area. It also is to 
train personnel of the ISA on the techniques and applications of research, which 
would enable the Authority to carry out marine scientific research concerning the 
Area and its resources either directly or through contracts entered into for that 
purpose.24 The results of such scientific research and analysis are to be effectively 
disseminated through the ISA or other international channels. In the latter case the 
ISA is to co-ordinate such dissemination.25 The effect of these provisions on scientific 
research is to encourage the transfer of technical and scientific information to 
developing states, including Africa states.
The 1974 Declaration of the Organisation of African Unity on the Issues of the Law 
of the Sea, 26 had wholeheartedly advocated for international co-operation in marine 
scientific research in the areas beyond national jurisdiction. In Article 14 of the 
Declaration it was said:
22 Art. 143 (3) (a) o f LOSC.
23 Art. 143 (3) (b) of LOSC.
24 Art. 143 (2) and (3) (ii) o f LOSC.
25 Art. 143 (2) and (3) (c) o f LOSC. In promoting and encouraging marine scientific research the ISA
has organised several expert workshops, seminars and meetings. See Para. 123 of the Report o f the
Secretary-General o f the International Seabed Authority under article 166, paragraph 4, o f the United 
Nations Convention on the Law o f the Sea, ISBA/10/A/3 o f 31 March 2004. Also see the ISA Data 
Repository providing technical information on the resources of the Area obtained from marine 
scientific research activities.http://www.isa.org.im/en/default.htm [Accessed on 15 October 2004].
26 See Document A/CONF.62/33 o f 19 July 1974, UNCLOS III, Official Records Vol. Ill, pp.63-65.
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“States agree to promote international co-operation in marine scientific 
research in areas beyond limits o f national jurisdiction. Such scientific 
research shall be carried out in accordance with rules and procedures
>>27laid down by the international machinery. ”
Presently, the ISA is actively engaged in promoting collaboration in research on the 
environmental implications of mining activities in the Area. There is, however, no 
indication of the involvement of African states or their research institutions in such 
research activities neither is there any indication of any plan to specifically encourage 
the participation of African scientists and researchers in such research efforts.28 
Recently Kenya, on behalf of African states, appealed to the ISA to conduct some of 
its training seminars and technical workshops in Africa as a way of exposing African
29scientists and researchers to issues related to the deep seabed.
The provisions on marine scientific research within the Area were not affected by the 
1994 Agreement, rather they are endorsed by clear implication through the provisions 
of the Agreement requiring states parties, as a general rule, to promote international 
technical and scientific co-operation with regard to activities in the Area. However, 
as will be seen in the next part of this chapter, the provisions of Part XI relating to the 
transfer of the actual marine technology, which would have enabled the developing 
states, including African states, to effectively participate in deep seabed mining 
activities, were affected, to the detriment of developing states, by the 1994 
Agreement. The Tunisian representative at the tenth session of the Assembly 
emphasised the importance of making every effort to preserve the balance established 
under the LOSC by providing for the transfer of the requisite deep seabed mining 
technology to developing states.31
3.1.5 Protection o f the Marine Environment.
The protection of the environment has become a major issue because of its intrinsic 
link with human life and existence. The International Court of Justice rightly pointed 
out that “the environment is not an abstraction but represents the living space, the
27 In this same article the OAU also supported the right to carry out marine scientific research within 
national jurisdiction as long as it was done with the consent o f the coastal state concerned.
28 See Paras 127-136 o f ISBA/10/A/3 o f 31 March 2004.
29 See International Seabed Authority (ISA) Press Release, SB/10/16 of 2 June 2004.
30 Section 5, para. 1 (c) o f the Annex o f the Implementation Agreement.
31 See ISA Press Release, SB/10/16 o f 2 June 2004.
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quality o f life and the very health o f human beings, including generations unborn.” 
The protection of the environment has therefore become a major concern to virtually 
all states, though there may be some variance in the way and manner they advocate 
such protection. It is therefore not surprising that the Convention in Part XI includes 
provisions on the protection of the marine environment from harmful effects which 
may arise as a result of activities in the Area.33 The ISA is required to do this by 
adopting appropriate rules, regulations and procedures to, inter alia, prevent, reduce or 
control pollution and other hazards to the marine environment, including the 
coastline, and interference with the biodiversity of the marine environment through 
mining activities in the Area, as well as to protect and conserve the natural resources 
of the Area.34 States’ participation at the domestic level is also required through the 
adoption of municipal laws and regulations to prevent, reduce and control pollution of 
the marine environment from activities in the Area undertaken by vessels, 
installations, structures and other devices flying their flag, or of their registry or 
operating under their authority.35 The common interest of both developed and 
developing states, including African states, in protecting the marine environment, 
including that of the Area, was summed up by the then Secretary-General of the 
AALCC (now AALCO), H.E. Mr. Frank X. Njenga (Kenya), when he said: “.... such 
issues as the environment are a delicate balance which i f  upset could spell disaster o f
*9 36no mean dimension fo r  the future o f  mankind. ” In the OAU Declaration African
32 Legality o f  the Threat or Use o f  Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep. 1996,p. 226 at 241- 
242, para.26.
33 Brown, SeaBed Energy and Minerals vol.2, op.cit.pp.84-85.
34 Art. 145, Part XII- specifically in relation to the Area Art.209- and Art. 17(1) (b) (xii) of Annex III of 
LOSC.
35 Art.209 (2) of LOSC. See Art. 58 o f the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community 
(AEC), adopted on 3 June 1991 and came into force on 12 May 1994, which enjoins member states to 
adopt national, regional and continental policies, strategies and programmes to deal with environmental 
pollution. http://www.africa-union.org/home/Welcome.htm [Accessed 18 October 2004]. Also see the 
New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), Action Plan for the Environment Initiative, 
http://www.nepad.Org/reports/ACTIQN/l.pdf [Accessed 27 January 2005]. This Action Plan has a 
section on conservation and sustainable use o f marine, coastal and freshwater resources, though the 
focus is limited to areas within national jurisdiction o f  African states.
36 NILOS, International Organisations and the Law o f  the Sea: Documentary Yearbook, vol. 6 
(London/Dordrecht, Graham&Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, 1990). p. 512. At its 41st session the Asian 
African Consultative Committee pointed out that the implementation o f the plans of work o f pioneer 
investors for prospecting and exploration should follow a precautionary approach towards preservation 
and protection o f the marine environment in the Area. See the Asian African Legal Consultative 
Committee (AALCC) [now Asian African Legal Consultative Organisation (AALCO)] Secretariat 
Document, “Law o f the Sea,” AALCC/XLI/ABUJA/2002/S.2, Para. 81.
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states recognised that every state “has an obligation in the prevention and control o f
9*37pollution o f the marine environment.”
The provisions of the LOSC on the protection of the marine environment in the Area 
were not modified by the 1994 Agreement. Although environmental consideration 
was one of the issues initially identified as an area of difficulty during the 
consultations leading to the 1994 Agreement, it was subsequently agreed that it was 
not a controversial issue.38 Rather, the Agreement emphasises the importance of 
taking appropriate steps to protect the environment from activities in the Area, by 
requiring an application for approval of a plan of work to be accompanied by an 
assessment of the potential environmental impacts of the proposed activities and by a 
description of a programme for oceanographic and baseline environmental studies in 
accordance with the rules of the ISA.39 The Legal and Technical Commission 
Recommendations40 and the Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for 
Polymetallic Nodules in the Area (the Mining Code) have gone further to make 
provisions on the protection of the environment from activities in the Area.41 A large 
part of the work of the ISA is currently directed towards ascertaining the 
environmental implications of mining in the Area, especially the need to apply the 
precautionary principle.42
37 Art. 15 o f the OAU Declaration on the Issues o f the Law o f  the Sea, UNCLOS III, Official Records, 
Vol. Ill, pp.63-65. See also Arts.16 and 17 o f the Declaration. See Kenya’s Draft Articles for the 
preservation and the protection o f the marine environment for inclusion in the Convention on the Law 
of the Sea. (Especially Art.3), A/CONF.62/C.3/L.2 o f  23 July 1974.
38 See “Information Note concerning the Secretary-General’s informal consultation on outstanding 
issues relating to the deep seabed mining provisions o f  the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, New 
York, 25 March 1991” and “Summary o f Informal Consultations Conducted by the Secretary-General 
on the Law of the Sea during 1990 and 1991, 31 January 1992” in Secretary-General’s Informal 
Consultations on Outstanding Issues Relating to the Deep Seabed Mining Provisions o f  the United 
Nations Convention on the Law o f  the Sea: Collected Documents, (Jamaica, International Seabed 
Authority,2002), pp. 13 and 77 respectively.
39 Section 1, Para.7 o f the Annex to the Agreement. See Brown, E.D., “The 1994 Agreement on the 
Implementation o f Part XI o f the UN Convention on the Law o f the Sea: Breakthrough to 
Universality?”(1995) 19(1) Marine Policy, p.5 at 16.
40 See Recommendations o f the Legal and Technical Commission for Guidance of Contractors for the 
Assessment of the Possible Environmental Impacts Arising from Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules 
in the Area. ISBA/7/LTC/l/Rev.l.
41 See Regs. 1(3) (c) and (f), 7, 21(4) (b) and Part V o f  the Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration 
for Polymetallic Nodules in the Area (hereinafter called the Mining Code). ISBA/6/A/18
42 Reg.31 (2) of the Mining Code. See generally Lodge, M.W., “Environmental Regulation of Deep 
Seabed Mining,” in Kirchner, A. (ed.), International Marine Environmental Law: Institutions, 
Implementation and Innovations (The Hague/New York, Kluwer Law International, 2003), pp.49-59. 
See also the comments o f the South African representative, Mr. Hoffmann, to the 64th plenary meeting 
of the fifty-eighth session o f the General Assembly where he said that South Africa welcomes, “ .. .the 
steps the Authority has taken to develop a better understanding of the biodiversity o f the seabed and
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The whole mining process in the Area is expected to have a tremendous impact not 
only on the marine environment and biodiversity of the Area, but also, as a result of 
the nature of environmental pollution which is difficult to localise, it may spread to 
the marine environment within national jurisdiction.43 It is therefore in the common 
interest of states, including African states, to ensure that effective measures are taken 
by contractors in the Area to guard against damage to the marine environment. For 
example, African states bordering the Indian Ocean, where India as a pioneer investor 
has been allocated a pioneer site, are susceptible to the effects of possible 
environmental pollution emanating from seabed mining activities taking place in 
pioneer mine sites located therein. The Convention for the Protection, Management 
and Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the Eastern African 
Region (Nairobi Convention) provides that “The contracting parties shall take all 
appropriate measures to prevent, reduce and combat pollution o f the Convention area 
resulting directly or indirectly from exploration and exploitation o f the sea-bed and 
its subsoil.,AA Whilst this provision is more focused on the seabed and subsoil within 
the Convention area, arguably, it could be said, from the way and manner it is 
couched, that it is wide enough to permit the states parties to take appropriate 
measures to prevent, reduce and combat any pollution of the Convention area 
resulting from deep seabed mining activities.45
deep ocean so as to be able to take effective measures aimed at protecting the marine environment 
against harmful effects from activities relating to prospecting and exploration of mineral resources in 
the Area.” General Assembly, fifty-eighth session, official Records, A/58/P.V.64 of 24 November 
2003.
43 Reg.33 (2) o f the Mining Code provides that “Any coastal state which has grounds for believing that 
any activity in the Area by a contractor is likely to cause serious harm to the marine environment under 
its jurisdiction or sovereignty may notify the Secretary-General in writing o f the grounds upon which 
such belief is based.” Also see Art.209 o f LOSC
44 Art.8. (The Nairobi Convention came into force on 30 May 1996). Compare with Art.8 of the 
Convention for Co-operation in the Protection and Development o f the Marine and Coastal 
Environment of the West and Central African Region (The Abidjan Convention that entered into force 
on 5 August 1984) that states, “The contracting parties shall take all appropriate measures to prevent, 
reduce, combat and control pollution resulting from or in connection with activities relating to the 
exploration and exploitation o f the sea-bed and its subsoil subject to their jurisdiction and from 
artificial islands, installations and structures under their jurisdiction.” For Nairobi and Abidjan Treaties, 
see http://www.unep.Org/themes/marine/#seasregionsrAccessed on 18 October 2004].
45 Art.2 (a) defines the Convention area as comprising “the marine and coastal environment o f that part 
of the Indian Ocean situated within the Eastern African Region and falling within the jurisdiction of the 
contracting parties to this Convention.”
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3.1.6. Protection o f Human Life.
Under Part XI necessary measures are expected to be taken to ensure the effective 
protection of human life with respect to activities in the Area. The ISA is required in 
this regard to adopt appropriate rules, regulations and procedures. The provisions of 
the LOSC are not meant to be exhaustive, but merely to supplement the existing 
international law as embodied in relevant treaties.46 An example of such a treaty is the 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 1974,47 as amended 
by various protocols.48 In view of the importance attached to the right to life, this 
provision was, not surprisingly, in any way modified by the Agreement.
3.1.7. The “Reasonable Regard” Provision.
Part XI, while providing for seabed mining activities in the Area, recognises that 
reasonable regard should be given to other activities.49 Mining activities in the Area 
are required to be done with reasonable regard to the rights of other states to enjoy the 
freedom of the high seas, including freedom of navigation, freedom of over flight, 
freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, freedom to construct artificial islands 
and other installations, freedom of fishing and freedom of scientific research.50 The 
LOSC, under chapter VII dealing with the high seas makes it clear that the freedoms 
of the high seas should be exercised with due regard for the rights under Part XI with 
respect to activities in the Area.51 In the same vein activities under Part XI are 
required to be “carried out with reasonable regard fo r  other activities in the marine 
environment. ” 52 For instance, installations used for carrying out activities in the Area 
should be erected in accordance with regulations laid down by the ISA, and with a 
permanent warning and appropriate markings of their presence to other users.53 Also, 
they may not be established where they would interfere with the use of recognised
46 Art. 146 of LOSC. See Brown, SeaBed Energy and Minerals, Vol. 2, op.cit.pp. 85-86.
47 Adopted on 1 November 1974 and entered into force on 25 May 1980. This Convention has so far 
being ratified by 153 states, including African states. However certain African states, mainly 
landlocked states, have not become parties to this Convention, namely, Botswana, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Guinea Bissau, Lesotho, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Swaziland, 
Somalia, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. See
http://www.imo.org/Conventions/mainffame.asp7topic id=248 [Accessed on 18 October 2004].
48 SOLAS Protocols o f 1978 and 1988.
49 Brown, Sea-Bed Energy and Minerals, Vol.2, op.cit.pp.86-88.
50 Art. 147 of LOSC.
51 Art.87 (2) and Art. 147 (3) o f LOSC.
52 Art. 147(1) of LOSC.
53 Art. 147(1) (a) o f LOSC.
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sea-lanes essential to international navigation or areas of intense fishing activities.54 In 
addition, activities with respect to deposits in the Area that overlap into the limits of 
national jurisdiction of coastal states are to be conducted with due regard to the rights 
and legitimate interests of any such state across whose jurisdiction such deposits lie. 
This involves consultations with, including prior notification to, the state concerned. 
In cases where such activities in the Area may result in the exploitation of resources 
lying within national jurisdiction, the prior consent of the state concerned must be 
obtained. 55 The reasonable regard provision is also not modified by the 1994 
Agreement.
3.1.8. Archaeological and Historical Objects in the Area.
All archaeological and historical objects found in the Area are to be preserved or 
disposed of for the benefit of mankind as a whole, having particular regard to the 
preferential rights of the state or country of origin, or the state of cultural origin, or the 
state of archaeological or historical origin of such objects.56 A prospector or 
contractor is required to immediately notify the Secretary-General of the ISA in 
writing of any object of an archaeological or historical nature and its location. 
Thereafter the Secretary-General is to transmit such information to the Director- 
General of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation 
(UNESCO).57 Neither the LOSC nor the Mining Code defines what “archaeological 
and historical” objects are. However, the UNESCO Convention on the Protection of 
the Underwater Cultural Heritage,58 which at the draft stage played a part in the
54 Art.147 (1) (b) o f LOSC.
55 Art. 142 o f LOSC.
56 Arts. 149 and 303 o f LOSC.
57 Regs. 8 and 34 o f the Mining Code. See also Art. 11(2) o f the UNESCO Convention on the 
Protection o f the Underwater Cultural Heritage 2001 which requires states parties to notify both the 
Director-General o f UNESCO and the Secretary-General o f  the ISA o f such discoveries.
58 This Convention is not yet in force since only three states -Bulgaria, Panama and Nigeria - have 
ratified it. Art.27 o f the Convention says it shall enter into force three months after the date of the 
deposit o f the twentieth instrument o f consent. For Convention see 41 ILM 40(2002). Also available at 
http://www.unesco.org/culture/laws/underwater/html eng/convention.shtml. Nigeria ratified the 
Convention recently, on 4 February 2005. See Nigeria First, Official Website o f the Office of Public 
Communications, State House Abuja http://www.nigeriafirst.org/printer 3484.shtml [Accessed on 24 
February 2005], where the Federal Executive Council (FEC) o f the Federal Republic of Nigeria is 
reported to have ratified the UNESCO Convention on the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage.. 
For further reading on the UNESCO Convention, see Carducci G., “New Developments in the Law o f  
the Sea: The UNESCO Convention on the Protection o f Underwater Cultural Heritage”(2002) 96(2) 
AJIL,ppA 19-434; Murphy, S., “U.S. Concerns Regarding UNESCO Convention on Underwater 
Heritage”(2002)96(2) AJIL,pp.468-470 and Forrest, C., “A New International Regime for the 
Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage” (2002) 51(3) I.C.L.Q., pp.511-554.
117
inclusion of the provision on archaeological and historical objects in the Mining 
Code,59 defines “underwater cultural heritage,” as “all traces o f human existence 
having a cultural, historical or archaeological character which have been partially or 
totally under water periodically or continually fo r  at least 100 years”60 It includes 
sites, structures, buildings, artefacts and human remains, as well as vessels, aircraft, 
other vehicles or any part thereof, their cargo or other contents and other objects of 
prehistoric character. It, however, does not include pipelines and cables placed on the 
seabed that are still in use. The UNESCO Convention also deals with protection of the 
underwater cultural heritage in the Area.61 The Southern and Eastern Africa UNESCO 
Maputo Conference on the Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural 
Heritage held from 6 May to 9 May 2003, while encouraging states to become parties 
to the Convention, recommended that: “International, national and private assistance 
programs should facilitate the implementation o f  the Convention by States Parties, in
9 9 62particular by developing countries. ”
The provision dealing with archaeological and historical objects has not in any way 
been modified by the 1994 Agreement.
633.1.9. Parallel System or Site Banking.
Generally, the system of mining requiring a contractor to designate an area 
sufficiently large and of sufficient estimated value to allow two mining operations, 
with the ISA having the first option to pick one of these sites which is banked or 
reserved for mining by ISA either through the Enterprise or in association with 
developing states, remains unchanged by the Agreement though the provisions of the
59 See comments on Regulation 34 in Draft Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for 
Polymetallic Nodules in the Area (Annotated version o f ISBA/6/C/2*-Prepared by the Secretariat), 
ISBA/6/C/CRP.2 o f 21 June 2000 which says the “provision was added in the light o f the provisions of  
the draft UNESCO Convention on the protection o f  the underwater cultural heritage.” See however 
Art.3 of the UNESCO Convention on the relationship between the Convention and LOSC 82, requiring 
that the UNESCO Convention must be interpreted and applied in a manner consistent with 
international law, including the LOSC.
60 See Art.l (1) o f the UNESCO Convention.
61 See Art. 12 of the UNESCO Convention.
62 See Recommendations o f the Southern and Eastern Africa UNESCO Maputo Conference on the 
Convention on the Protection o f the Underwater Cultural Heritage,
http://www.unesco.org/culture/legalprotection/water/images/maputorec.pdf [Accessed 24 February 
2005]. See also the subsequent West and Central Regional Workshop for the Promotion o f the 
UNESCO 2001 Convention on the Protection o f the Underwater Cultural Heritage, Dakar, Senegal, 10 
June to 12 June 2004.
63 Art. 153 and Art. 8 of Annex III o f LOSC and Section 1, Para. 10 of the Annex to the Agreement.
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Agreement on transfer of technology and the downgrading of the role of the 
Enterprise have significantly watered down the practical effect of the system of
• • 64mining.
3.2. Provisions o f Part X I that have been modified by the 1994 Agreement.
As has been stated in Chapter 2 of this thesis the 1994 Agreement introduced some 
fundamental changes to the provisions of Part XI.65 This section will examine such 
changes (excluding those affecting institutions),66 as it affects African states.
3.2.1. Transfer o f Technology.
As a result of the distance of the Area from land and its rather difficult terrain, highly 
sophisticated technology is required for the prospecting, exploration, exploitation,
• 67transportation and processing of the resources therein. The development of the 
necessary technology in respect of seabed mining activities is still on going.68 
However, the capacity to develop the requisite technology lies with certain developed 
industrialised states,69 through government institutions and private entities.70 Presently 
African states do not possess such technology.71 It was therefore not surprising that at 
the UNCLOS III the issue of transfer of technology for seabed mining activities in the 
Area was a fundamental issue for African states and was also one of the major points
72highlighting the north/south conflict at the Conference. One of the objectives of the 
African states during the Conference was to achieve transfer of marine technology
64 See chapter 5 o f the thesis on system o f mining vis-a-vis African states.
65 See the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee, Law o f the Sea: Report of the Secretary 
General, Doc. No. AALCC\XXXIV\DOHA\95\5.
66 See chapter 4 of the thesis on Institutions o f the Regime.
67 See Yuwen Li, Transfer o f  Technology fo r  Deep Sea-Bed Mining- The 1982 Law o f  the Sea 
Convention and Beyond, (1994, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht/Boston/London), pp.142-145; 
Lenoble J., “Technological Aspects o f the Operation o f Transport Vessels and Mining Ships” in Koers 
A.W. and Oxman B.H. (eds.), The 1982 Convention on the Law o f  the Sea, (1984, Law of the Sea 
Institute, University o f Hawaii, Honolulu), pp.375-427.
68 See Seabed Technology. http://www.isa.org.im/en/seabedarea/TechBrochures/ENG10.pdf [Accessed 
on 18 October 2004].
69 Mainly the U.S.A, Japan, Russian Federation, France, Canada, Netherlands, Germany and United 
Kingdom. See Seabed Patents, Volumes l-10 .http://www.cdr.isa.org.im/doc/data-rep/cd1 .pdf and 
http://www.cdr.isa.org.im/doc/data-reo/cd2.pdf [Accessed on 18 October 2004]
70For a list o f various entities and institutions that have been involved in deep seabed mining activities 
see http://www.iffemer.fr/drogm/Realisation/Miner/Nod/texte/consortium.html. [Accessed on 18 
October 2004]
71 For the effect o f technology on the prospects o f African states’ participation in deep seabed mining, 
see section 6.2 o f chapter 6 o f this thesis.
72 On negotiations at the UNCLOS III on the transfer o f technology, see Ogley, Internationalizing the 
Seabed, op.cit.pp.148, 154, 156, 162-163, 171-175, 227 and 230.
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generally, inclusive of that relating to the Area, from the developed states to the
-70 #
developing states, including African states. The OAU Declaration on Issues of the
Law of the Sea clearly evinced the interest of African states in the transfer of marine
technology by stating in paragraph 13 that:
“ ... African States in order to benefit in exploration and exploitation o f 
the resources o f the seabed and subsoil thereof shall intensify national 
and regional efforts in the training and assistance o f their personnel in all 
aspects o f marine science and technology. Furthermore they shall urge 
the appropriate United Nations agencies and the technologically 
advanced countries to accelerate the process o f transfer o f marine science 
and technology, including the training o f  personnel. ” 74
This desire for the transfer of technology by African states was one of the means
towards attaining a New International Economic Order (NIEO);75 therefore they
advocated such transfer not only at UNCLOS III but also at various other
international forums.76 The representatives of African states at the Conference were
vocal about the issue of transfer of technology from developed to developing states.77
The statements of the representatives of Somalia and Guinea capture the general
attitude of African states. The Somalian representative said:
".... All delegations recognised the urgent need to bridge the ever- 
widening gap between developing and developed countries. The 
Conference would fa ll short o f  its objectives i f  it did not agree upon 
precise terms for the transfer o f  technology to the developing countries.
The General Assembly at the sixth special session had emphasised the 
need fo r  the transfer o f technology within a new international economic
73 See generally Boczek, B.A., The Transfer o f  Marine Technology to Developing Nations in 
International Law, The Law o f the Sea Institute Occasional Paper No.32, (1982, Law of the Sea 
Institute, University o f Hawaii, Honolulu, USA).
74 UNCLOS III Official Records, Vol. Ill, pp.63-65. See also para. 15 o f the Group of 77 Text on 
Conditions o f Exploration and Exploitation, 1974 Doc. A/CONF.62/C.1/L.7
75 See Para. 4 (p) o f the 1974 Declaration on the Establishment o f a New International Economic 
Order, G.A. Res. 3201(S-VI); Art. 13 o f the 1974 Charter o f Economic Rights and Duties of States,
G.A. Res.3281 (XXIX), in Yearbook o f the United Nations 1974,pp.324-326 and pp.403-407;, 13 ILM 
715(1974) and 14 I.L.M 251(1975) respectively. Also see Rembe, Africa and the International Law o f  
the Sea, op.cit.pp.183-187 and Rembe, “Prospects for the Realisation o f the New International 
Economic Order: an African Perspective” (1984) XVII Comparative and International Law Journal o f  
Southern Africa (CILSA), pp322-339.
76 Such international forum also includes UNCTAD, UNIDO, UNESCO and FAO conferences and 
meetings.
77 See Nigeria and Group o f 77 draft articles on the development and transfer of technology,
Documents A/CONF.62/C.3/L.8 o f 1st August 1974 and A/CONF.62/C.3/L.12 of 22nd August 1974 
respectively, UNCLOS III Official Records Vol. Ill, pp.251 and 253.See also the statements of the 
representatives of Nigeria, Libya and Congo in UNCLOS III Official Records vol. II at p. 348, 
paras. 14-15; p.353, paras. 68 and 69 respectively. Further the statements of the representatives o f the 
following African states: Somalia, Egypt, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Togo, Senegal and Gambia in 
UNCLOS III Official Records vol. IV at p.102, para. 7; p.103, paras.21; 33; 34-37; pp. 103-104, 
para.38; p. 104, paras.49-51 respectively.
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order: the basis could be laid only through international co-operation if  
all mankind was to share in the use o f  advanced technology. ”78
The Guinea representative adopted a more moral and ethical stance, stating that: “the 
transfer o f technology was a means o f  rectifying past injustices and bringing about a
j  >>79more equitable distribution o f  the world’s wealth. ”
Beyond the desire to rectify past injustices and to bring about more equitable 
distribution, the whole attitude of African states to transfer of technology during the 
UNCLOS III could, in the opinion of this writer, also be attributed to the communal 
outlook of many traditional African societies to knowledge and innovations. 
According to Lewanika and Echols, a number of African traditional societies believe 
that knowledge and innovations derived from traditional knowledge systems should 
not be credited to a single inventor but rather to the community as a whole. For these 
societies, unlike the developed industrialised societies, the motivation for such 
innovations should not be based on individual profit or gain, but rather the more 
altruistic purpose of the welfare and common good of the community as a whole,
• o pincluding future generations.
At the end of the Conference the developing states were able to wrest major 
concessions on the issue of transfer of technology and include them in the LOSC. 
This became one of the major grounds upon which certain developed industrialised 
states initially refused to ratify the Convention.81 The LOSC provisions on transfer of 
technology have been significantly altered by the 1994 Agreement.
78 UNCLOS III, Official Records, vol. IV, p. 102, para7.
79 Ibid. p. 103, para.33.
80 See Lewanika, M., “Traditional Knowledge: Recognition and Protection”, A paper presented in 
Nairobi, Kenya, 30-31 July 2001, http://www.mindfullv.org/GE/African-Traditiona1- 
Knowledge30iul01 .htm [Accessed 16 March 2004] and Echols, M., “Geographical Indications for 
Foods, Trips and the Doha Development Agenda”, (2003) 47(2) Journal o f  African Law, p.199 at 201.
81 See “Information Note concerning the Secretary-General’s informal consultation on outstanding 
issues relating to the deep seabed mining provisions o f  the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, New  
York, 25 March 1991” in Secretary-General’s Informal Consultations on Outstanding Issues Relating 
to the Deep Seabed Mining Provisions o f  the United Nations Convention on the Law o f the Sea: 
Collected Documents, (Jamaica, International Seabed Authority, 2002), pp. 13.
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I. The Position under Part XI. 82
The original provisions of Part XI actively promoted the transfer of seabed mining 
technology and even leaned in favour of the developing states, including those from 
the African continent, by making such transfer mandatory. Article 144 of LOSC, 
emphasising co-operation in the transfer o f technology, states:
“1. The Authority shall take measures in accordance with this 
Convention:
(a) to acquire technology and scientific knowledge relating to activities in the 
Area; and
(b) to promote and encourage the transfer to developing States o f such 
technology and scientific knowledge so that all States Parties benefit 
therefrom.
2. To. this end the Authority and State Parties shall co-operate in 
promoting the transfer o f  technology and scientific knowledge relating to 
activities in the Area so that the Enterprise and all State Parties may 
benefit therefrom. In particular they shall initiate and promote:
(a) programmes fo r  the transfer o f  technology to the Enterprise and to 
developing States with regard to activities in the Area, including, inter 
alia, facilitating the access o f  the Enterprise and o f  developing States to 
the relevant technology, under fa ir  and reasonable terms and conditions;
(b) measures directed towards the advancement o f  the technology o f the 
Enterprise and the domestic technology o f  developing States, particularly 
by providing opportunities to personnel from the Enterprise and from  
developing States fo r  training in marine science and technology and for  
their fu ll participation in activities in the Area. ”.
Although Article 144 emphasises co-operation, Article 5 of Annex III imposed a 
mandatory obligation to transfer technology upon applicants who desired to be 
involved in deep seabed mining activities. The applicant was required to give an 
undertaking “to comply with the provisions on the transfer o f technology set forth in 
article 5, ” 84 the term “technology” being defined as meaning “the specialised 
equipment and technical know-how, including manuals, designs, operating 
instructions, training and technical advice and assistance, necessary to assemble, 
maintain and operate a viable system and the legal right to use these items for that 
purpose on a non-exclusive basis. ” 85
82 See generally Yuwen Li, op.cit. pp. 141-205; Brown, SeaBed Energy and Mineral Resources and the 
Law o f  the Sea, (London, Graham & Trotman Limited, 1986) pp.42-52, section II.3.
83 See Art. 5 o f Annex III o f LOSC.
84 See Art. 4, para. 6(d) o f Annex III.
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Under Article 5 of Annex III the following obligations, which were to be included in
o r
contracts until 10 years after the Enterprise had begun commercial production, were
imposed on applicants:
• The applicant when submitting its proposed work plan was required to make 
available to the ISA a general description of the equipment and methods to be 
used by it in seabed mining, as well as other relevant non-proprietary information 
about the characteristics of the technology and where such technology was 
available. The applicant was also to inform the ISA of any revisions in such 
description and whenever there was a substantial technological change or
87innovation.
• The seabed mining contract was to contain undertakings by the contractor that it 
would: -
■ Make available to the Enterprise, at the request of the ISA, the technology that it 
used for seabed mining activities and which it was legally entitled to transfer. This 
was to be done on fair and reasonable commercial terms and conditions. This 
commitment could only be invoked by the ISA if the Enterprise was unable to 
obtain the same or equally efficient technology on the open market on fair and 
reasonable commercial terms and conditions. Such transfer was to be done by way 
of licences or any other appropriate arrangement negotiated between the
contractor and the Enterprise which was to be set forth in a special agreement
88supplementary to the main seabed mining contract.
■ Obtain a written assurance from the owner of any technology not covered by that 
mentioned in the first undertaking above, which was not generally available on the 
open market, that such owner would, at the request of the ISA, make the 
technology available to the Enterprise to the same extent as it was made available 
to the contractor. The technology was to be made available to the Enterprise on 
fair and reasonable commercial terms and conditions under a licence or other 
appropriate arrangement. In the event of the failure of the contractor to obtain 
such assurance, the contractor in seabed mining was to be precluded from using 
such technology.89
85 See Art.5, para. 8 of Annex III.
86 Art.5, para.7 of Annex III.
87 See Art.5 paras. 1 and 2 o f Annex III.
88 Art. 5, para. 3(a) of Annex III.
89 Art.5, para. 3(b) of Annex III
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■ Acquire at the request of the Enterprise, whenever it was possible to do so without 
substantial cost to the contractor, a legally binding and enforceable right to 
transfer to the Enterprise any third party technology used by the contractor in its 
seabed mining operations that it was not legally entitled to transfer and which was 
not generally available on the open market. In cases where there was a substantial 
corporate relationship between the contractor and the owner of the technology, 
such closeness in relationship, degree of control or influence was to be relevant in 
determining whether all feasible measures to obtain such legally binding right to 
the transfer had been taken by the contractor. Where the contractor exercised 
effective control over the owner of the technology, the failure to acquire the legal 
rights from such owner should be considered relevant to the contractor's 
qualifications for any subsequent proposed plan of work. This was to discourage 
contractors whose subsidiary company owned the technology from using the 
excuse of corporate separateness from the owner of the technology as a reason for 
not obtaining the legal rights in favour of the Enterprise.90
■ Facilitate the acquisition by the Enterprise under licence or other appropriate 
arrangements, on fair and reasonable commercial terms and conditions, any 
technology covered by the second undertaking mentioned above, if the Enterprise 
decided to negotiate directly with the owner of the technology and requested such 
facilitation.91
■ Take the same measures as those described in the first, second, third and fourth 
undertakings mentioned above for the benefit of a developing state or group of 
developing states that applied for a seabed mining contract. However, such 
measures were to be limited to the area reserved for the developing state(s) under 
the site-banking method in article 8 of annex III. Also such a developing state was 
restrained from transferring such technology to a third state or its nationals. This 
obligation only applied to the contractor when such technology had not already
92been requested by, and transferred to, the Enterprise.
• If the Enterprise was unable to obtain the appropriate technology, on fair and 
reasonable commercial terms and conditions, to commence in a timely manner the 
recovery and processing of minerals from the Area, the Council or the Assembly
90 Art.5, para. 3(c) o f Annex III
91 Art. 5, para. 3(d) o f Annex III
92 Art.5, para. 3(e) o f Annex III.
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of the ISA was empowered to convene a group of states parties composed of those 
engaged in activities in the Area, those who had sponsored entities engaged in 
such activities and those having access to such technology. This group was to 
consult together and take effective measures to ensure that such technology was 
made available to the Enterprise on fair and reasonable commercial terms and 
conditions. Such states parties were to take all feasible measures within their own
93legal system to ensure such transfer.
• In the case of joint ventures between a contractor and the Enterprise, such transfer 
of technology was to be in accordance with the terms of the joint venture
94agreement.
Article 5 further provided that the compulsory dispute settlement mechanism provided 
in Part XI was to be utilised for settlement of disputes in respect of the above- 
mentioned undertakings of the contractor and other terms of the contract.95 However, 
disputes as to what constitutes “fa ir  and reasonable commercial terms and 
conditions”, could be submitted by either party to binding commercial arbitration in 
accordance with the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules or such other arbitration rules as 
might be prescribed under the rules, regulations and procedures of the ISA. In the 
event of a negative finding against the contractor by the arbitration panel, it was given 
a period of 45 days to revise the offer in order to make such offer fall within “fair and 
reasonable terms and conditions Failure to do so would result in the ISA making a 
determination as to whether or not to impose penalties for such a violation of the
96contract.
The mandatory provisions of Part XI on the transfer of technology contrast with the 
“best efforts” commitments on the part of possessors of technology, based on 
international co-operation, to transfer technology to developing states, commonly 
found in .treaties.97 The effectiveness of such mandatory provisions in a treaty is
93 Art. 5 para.5, o f Annex III.
94 Art.5 para. 6, o f Annex III.
95 See section 4.1.3.2 o f chapter 4 o f this thesis on dispute settlement procedures under Part XI.
96 Art.5 para. 4 o f Annex III.
97 The provisions o f Art. 144 on the transfer o f deep seabed technology and Part XIV of LOSC, dealing 
generally with the transfer o f marine technology, appear to emphasise “best efforts” international co­
operation in the transfer o f technology rather than making it mandatory. See UNCTAD Issues Note by 
the Secretariat, International Arrangements for Transfer o f Technology: Best Practices for Access to 
and Measures to Encourage Transfer o f Technology with a View to Capacity Building in Developing
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doubtful. Such provision is confronted with the issue of protection of the intellectual 
property of the possessor of the technology. This in turn raises the extreme difficulty 
of attaining a balance between encouraging innovations by individual inventors 
through the protection of intellectual property, on the one hand, and meeting the 
communal interest of the international community through transfer of technology to 
developing states, constituting a large chunk of the international community, on the 
other hand.98 The tilting in favour of the encouragement of innovation through 
intellectual property protection in respect of deep seabed mining led to the 1994 
Agreement provisions on transfer of technology.99
Another pertinent issue that arises about the feasibility of such mandatory transfer of 
technology jn  relation to African states concerns the capacity of these states, to utilise 
such technology. It is not enough for recipients of technology to merely receive the 
technology, in terms of the hardware (in the form of machinery) and the licence to use 
it. For the recipients to make effective use of the technology they must also acquire 
the skills and technical know-how concerning the technology.100
Countries, Especially in Least Developed Countries, TD/B/COM.2/EM.9/2 o f 1 June, 2001, pp.5-6 that 
examines various treaties on ‘‘best efforts” international co-operation. Examples o f such treaty 
provisions include Arts. 9 and 10A o f the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone 
Layer, 26 ILM 1550(1987); Art. 16 o f the Biodiversity Convention, 31 ILM 818(1992); Art.66 (2) of 
the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects o f  Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), 33 ILM 1197(1994) 
and Art. 10(c) o f the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
37 ILM 22 (1998)
98 Li Yuwen, op.cit.pp. 128-130; Yusuf A. A., “Transfer o f Technology”, in Bedjaoui, M., (ed.), 
International Law: Achievements and Prospects, (Paris/Dordrecht/Boston/London, UNESCO/Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1991), p.691 at 695 and Weidner, H.E., “The United States and North-South 
Technology Transfer: Some Practical and Legal Obstacles”, (1983) Wisconsin International Law 
Journal, pp.205-228.
99 See below the section dealing with the position on the transfer o f technology under the 1994 
Agreement.
100 See the example o f South Korea, which embarked on the practice o f importing technology and then 
acquiring the know-how o f these technologies. See generally Enos, J.L. and Park, W.H., The Adoption 
and Diffusion o f Imported Technology-The Case o f  Korea (London/New York/Sydney, Croom Helm, 
1987). The Report o f the World Summit on Sustainable Development, (WSSD) Johannesburg, South 
Africa, 26 August -  4 September 2002, as one o f the means of achieving sustainable development in 
Africa states, in para.62(c) points out that action must be taken at all levels to, “Promote technology 
development, transfer and diffusion to Africa and further develop technology and knowledge available 
in Africa centres o f excellence.” See also para. 62(d)-(f) o f the Report. 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NQ2/636/93/PDF/N0263693 .ndf?OpenElement 
[Accessed on 10 February 2005] Also see “An Outline on the Implementation o f Strategy and 
Programme of Action Adopted by Regional Leadership Seminar on Marine/Ocean Affairs in Africa -  
Addis Ababa 28 March-2 April 1994” in Mensah, T. (ed.), Ocean Governance: Strategies and 
Approaches fo r the 21st Century: Proceedings, the Law o f  the Sea Institute, Twenty-Eight Annual 
Conference, Honolulu, Hawaii, July 11-14,1994(Honolulu, University o f Hawaii, the Law o f  the Sea 
Institute, 1996), pp.540-549. Paragraph 3 o f  the outline points out that for there to be marine/ocean 
development in Africa,amongst other things, the following is needed:
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A mandatory transfer of technology provision in a treaty without a corresponding 
capacity by the recipient to make effective use of such technology is, in the opinion of 
this writer, meaningless. It is therefore necessary for the recipient states to 
consciously develop an environment in their domestic setting to promote and 
encourage the development o f skills and technical know-how that would encourage 
the effective use of such technology. Most African states at present do not have the 
right environment for the promotion of the development of the requisite skills and 
technical know-how by their nationals due to a complexity of factors.101 These 
factors include the non-existence o f the necessary institutional framework for the 
promotion of science and technology, as well as under-funding and lack of 
encouragement and incentives to trained personnel to achieve any significant 
technological feats. 102 For the transfer of marine technology, inclusive of deep seabed 
mining technology, to be effective there should be a complementary effort on the part 
of African states to provide the right environment within their domestic settings that 
would encourage and promote the effective use o f marine technology.
The LOSC has rather ambitious provisions for the ISA to establish national and 
regional centres to promote and enhance skills and technological capabilities of 
developing states, including African states, in respect of marine technology.103 These 
centres would require large scale and consistent funding.104 However, the provisions
“(iii) a well thought out technology acquisition policy within a reasonable period o f time leading to 
national or regional self-reliance;
(iv) a human resources development policy which leads to the creation o f critical masses of skills at 
national, subregional and regional levels.”
101 See for example on Nigeria, Omorogbe, Y., “The Legal Framework and Policy for Technology 
Development in Nigeria”(1991) 3 African Journal o f  International and Comparative Law, pp. 15 7-171
102 Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, B., “Africans are shaping World Technologies.”
http://www.africanfront.com/technologv.php [Accessed on 21 October 2004]. See also Kanaan, A,
“The New Transfer o f Technology Rules in Egypt”(2000) 32(5) International Review o f  Industrial 
Property and Copyright Law, pp. 519-531; Omorogbe, “The Legal Framework and Policy for 
Technology Development in Nigeria”, Ibid. and AremuJ.A, “Technology Transfer through 
Transnational Corporations (TNCS) : A Reality or a Reverie for the Less Developed Countries” in 
Omorogbe, Y.,(ed.), International Law and Development: Strategies at the Threshold o f  the Twenty- 
First Century (Lagos, Nigeria, Nigerian Society o f  International Law, 1998), pp.127-170.
103 Arts. 275-277. Also see the Final Act o f UNCLOS III, Annex VI, The Resolution on Development 
of National Marine Science, Technology and Ocean Service Infrastructures. For efforts by various 
international organisations as regards the development and transfer of marine science and technology to 
the African continent, see Kwiatkowska, B., “Ocean Affairs and the Law o f the Sea in Africa: Towards 
the 21st Century” (1993) 17 Marine Policy, pp.l 1 at pp. 34-41.
104 See Borgese, E. M., The Oceanic Circle: Governing the Seas as a Global Resource, (Tokyo/New 
York/Paris, United Nations University Press, 1998) pp. 148-151.
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on funding of these centres are rather vague. Although the LOSC provides that states, 
especially developing states, which need and request technical assistance, will be 
assisted in the acquisition of the necessary equipment, processes, plant and other 
technical know-how “through any financial arrangements provided in this 
Convention, ” 105 the provisions are not too clear as to how such funds will be 
raised.106 This can be contrasted with the situation in certain environmental treaties 
where there are clear and specific provisions on the provision of funding for 
developing states as regards acquisition of the requisite technology.107 Perhaps it 
would not be far from the truth to say that in environmental matters the provision of a 
clear funding mechanism for developing states is based on the integrated nature of 
environmental issues that necessarily requires both developed and developing states to 
work together to protect the global environment. Unfortunately this is not the same in 
respect of deep seabed mining activities.108
II. The Position under 1994 Agreement.
Some developed states that declined to ratify the LOSC as a result of the original Part 
XI provisions expressed certain concerns at the Secretary-General’s informal 
consultations on outstanding issues relating to Part XI about the mandatory 
requirement for the transfer of technology. One of such concerns related to the 
practical difficulties, including the issue of the protection of intellectual property 
rights, which this mandatory transfer of technology would raise for commercial
105 Art.274 (d). See Arts 171-175 on the financial arrangements o f the ISA.
106 See Art. 3(d) o f the Proposal o f the Group o f  77, A/CONF.62/C.3/L.12, UNCLOS III Official 
Records, Vol.III, p.253 which proposed the establishing o f a special fund to assist developing states 
with the acquisition o f the necessary equipment and know-how for the exploration and exploitation of 
marine resources. This proposal was not incorporated into the LOSC provisions. See ,however, Art.4 of 
the Resolution on the Development o f National Marine Science, Technology and Ocean Service 
Infrastructures adopted by the UNCLOS III at the 182nd meeting on 30 April 1982, Document 
A/CONF.62/120 o f 7 May 1982, UNCLOS III Official Records Vol. XVI, pp.176-177. This resolution 
recommends the participation o f the World Bank, the Regional Banks, the United Nations 
Development Programme, the United Nations Financing System for Science and Technology and other 
Multilateral Funding Agencies in the funding o f  marine technology development of developing states. 
See also Yuwen, Li, op.cit.pp.156-162.
107For example the Global Environment Facility (GEF). http://www.gefweb.org/GEF Instrument3.pdf 
[Accessed on 22 October 2004]. See Boisson de Chazoumes, L., “The Global Environment Facility 
Galaxy: On Linkages among Institutions” (1999) 3 Max Planck Yearbook o f  United Nations Law, 
pp.243-285. See also Arts. 16, 20 and 21 o f the Biodiversity Convention, 31 ILM 818(1992) and Arts.5 
and 10 o f the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 26 ILM 1541(1987). On 
Africa and the Biodiversity Convention, see Juma, C., “Science, Technology and Economic Growth: 
Africa’s Biopolicy Agenda in the 21st Century,” UNU/INRA Annual Lectures, 1999. 
http://www.unu.edu/inra/pub/iuma/AL99.html [Accessed on 18 February 2004].
108 See Borgese, the Oceanic Circle, op.cit.pp. 145-149
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operators, especially those who were not owners of the technology in question.109 The 
1994 Agreement sought to address the concerns of these developed states. Although 
the provisions of the Agreement retained Article 144 of LOSC, with its focus on co­
operation, it declares that the mandatory provisions on transfer of technology under 
Article 5, Annex III, “shall not apply.5,110 The Agreement says that transfer of 
technology shall be governed by the following principles:111
(a) The Enterprise, and developing States wishing to obtain deep seabed
mining technology, shall seek to obtain such technology on fair and 
reasonable commercial terms on the open market, or through joint- 
venture arrangements;
(b) I f  the Enterprise or developing States are unable to obtain such
technology, the Authority may request all or any o f  the contractors and 
their respective sponsoring States or States to co-operate with it in 
facilitating the acquisition o f deep seabed mining technology by the 
Enterprise or its joint venture, or by a developing State or States seeking 
to acquire the technology on fa ir and reasonable commercial terms and 
conditions, consistent with the effective protection o f  intellectual property 
rights. State Parties undertake to cooperate fully and effectively with the 
Authority for this purpose and to ensure that contractors sponsored by 
them also cooperate fully with the Authority;
(c) As a general rule, States Parties shall promote international technical and 
scientific co-operation with regard to activities in the Area either between 
the parties concerned or by developing training, technical assistance and 
scientific co-operation programmes in marine science and technology and 
the protection and preservation o f the marine environment.
The 1994 Agreement witnessed a swing from the position of mandatory transfer of 
technology to a position that merely required “best efforts” co-operation. This can be 
deduced from the fact that the Agreement did not in any way alter the provisions of 
the LOSC encouraging the transfer of technology by way of international co­
operation.112
The Agreement, in dealing with the transfer of technology, emphasises the issue of
113“effective protection o f intellectual property rights.” The Agreement on Trade-
109 See “Information Note concerning the Secretary-General’s informal consultation on outstanding 
issues relating to the deep seabed mining provisions o f the UN Convention on the Law o f the Sea, New  
York, 25 March 1991” in Secretary-General's Informal Consultations on Outstanding Issues Relating 
to the Deep Seabed Mining Provisions o f  the United Nations Convention on the Law o f  the Sea: 
Collected Documents, op.cit. at p. 15.
110 Section 5 paras 1 and 2 of the Annex to the Agreement.
111 Section 5 para 1 o f the Annex to the Agreement.
112 See Art. 144 and Part XIV o f LOSC.
113 Section 5, para. 1(b) o f the Annex to the Agreement.
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Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), the World Trade
Organisation (WTO)) Agreement dealing with intellectual property rights, provides as
one of its objectives that the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights
should contribute to “the transfer and dissemination o f  technology. ” 114 However, as
pointed out in the previous section dealing with the position of transfer of technology
under Part XI, the difficulty is in achieving a balance between this and the objective
also mentioned in TRIPS of promoting technological innovation.115 The whole gamut
of the TRIPS leans more in favour of the promotion of technological innovation, with
rather stringent protection in favour of the possessors of the technology, the bulk of
who are in the developed states. According to Carlos M. Correa:
“The Agreement [TRIPS] was also regarded as a component o f a policy 
o f ‘technological protectionism ’ aimed at consolidating an international 
division o f labour whereunder Northern Countries generate innovations 
and Southern Countries constitute the market fo r  the resulting products 
and services.”116
Correa further points out that the TRIPS, which strengthens intellectual property 
rights protection, does not exactly favour the transfer of technology to developing 
states. He gives certain reasons for this proposition. He points out that the TRIPS 
results in the increase of royalty and other payments required by the technology 
holders for the use of their technology, thereby reducing the resources available to 
receivers, mostly developing states, to apply towards promoting local research and 
development (R&D).117 He also opined that it may result in technology holders 
refusing to transfer their technology because in their opinion an effective system of 
compulsory licences has not been put in place by the receiving developing states, 
thereby blocking industrial initiatives by such developing states.118 Further he was of 
the view that it restricts reverse engineering and other methods of imitative innovation 
by the receiving developing states, thereby making it more difficult for such states to 
catch up technologically.119 The exceptions to the stringent provisions on intellectual 
property rights protection provided by the TRIPS in respect of developing states, such
1,4 Art.7 of the TRIPS Agreement. 33 ILM 1197(1994). See also Art.8 (2).
115 See again Art.7 of the TRIPS Agreement incorporating these two almost opposing objectives- 
transfer of technology and promotion o f  intellectual innovation - in the same article.
116 Correa, M. C., Intellectual Property Rights, the WTO and Developing Countries: The TRIPS 
Agreement and Policy Options (London/New York, Zeb Books Ltd, 2000), p.5.
117 Ibid. pp. 19 and 31.
1,8 Ibid. p. 19.
119 Ibid. See, for example, Art.26 o f TRIPS.
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as the need to promote public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio­
economic and technological development120 and the transitional arrangements
• • 1") 1granting exemptions to developing states for determined penods, would have been 
a way out if such states had the capability and the finance required for the extensive 
R&D necessary to acquire technology. Unfortunately most African states do not have 
such capability or finance to acquire technology. They therefore survive on the 
largesse of the technologically developed states, which insist on a strict application of 
TRIPS under the domestic laws of such African recipient states, usually to the
advantage of the technology holder and to the detriment of local interests of the
. . 122recipient states.
The 1994 Agreement, by deleting the mandatory provisions on transfer of technology 
in LOSC and placing an emphasis on protection of intellectual property rights, has 
eroded any perceived leverage that developing states, including African states, would 
have derived from the provisions of Part XI on the transfer of technology.
3.2.2. Production Policy.
Economic considerations based on a belief in the imminence of commercial 
exploitation of the deep seabed Area, were the main reasons why there was 
enthusiasm during the UNCLOS III for the establishment of a legal regime for the 
Area. One of the concerns of African states was that such commercial exploitation in 
the Area would affect the price of similar minerals, and therefore the earnings of land- 
based African producer states.123 This, of course, was at variance with the stance of 
most developed states, mainly consumer states, interested in access to alternative 
sources of such minerals, with a view to driving down the prices of such minerals and 
also to obtaining security of supply of these minerals.124 During the Conference the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations was asked to prepare a preliminary study on 
the possible impact of the Convention on developing states that were producers and
120 Art.8 (1) o f TRIPS.
121 Part VI, Arts 65-66 of TRIPS.
122 See generally Correa, op.cit.pp.30-31
123 See para. 5 of the 1970 Lusaka Statement on the Seabed by Non-Aligned Countries, Doc. 
NAC/CONF.3/Res. 11, which required the regime to, “ ... make adequate provisions to minimise 
fluctuation o f prices o f land minerals and raw materials that may result from such activities [production 
activities in the Area].”
124 Mahmoudi, op.cit.pp. 30-31; Ogley, op.cit.pp.180-193; Friedheim, op.cit.pp.248-255.
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1 2 sexporters of the minerals to be extracted from the Area. Although this report
expressed doubt about the viability of commercial exploitation of nodules in the Area
in the near future, it pointed out that such exploitation would have an impact on the
earnings and income of certain developing states, including certain African states,
which depended mainly on the exportation of such minerals as the mainstay of their
economy.126 The following extracts from the report point to the highly dependent
position of certain African states on the export of land-based minerals, similar to those
contained in the Area:
“The economy o f Zaire is highly dependent on the export o f a diversity o f 
minerals (copper, cobalt, diamond, tin, zinc, gold and others), but, o f  
these, the most important are copper and cobalt, which account for  
approximately 70 per cent o f  the total value o f  exports, though in 1979 the 
high price o f cobalt raised it to over 80 per c e n tf127
“Minerals are the most important exports o f Zambia and have 
consistently been responsible fo r  about 98 per cent o f the total export 
earnings. Copper usually represents 93 per cent o f  export earnings, with 
other metals such as lead and zinc representing about 3 per cent to 4 per 
cent and cobalt about 1 per cent. However, since 1976 there has been an 
increasing trend in cobalt prices, with quite a dramatic rise in 1978-1979, 
and at the same time copper and other base metal have remained static or 
even been recessional. The result o f  these changes is that in 1979 copper 
represented 85.1 per cent o f total export earnings and cobalt represented
7 7  j  *> 12811 per cent .
“Gabon is dependent fo r  its foreign exchange to a large extent on the 
export o f mineral products. This is mainly in the form o f petroleum 
products, but manganese ore also plays an important part. In 1977, the 
total value o f exports was $1,218 million, o f which $988 million (81 per 
cent) was from petroleum products and SI 09 million (9 per cent) was
s  >> 129jrom manganese.
Certain African states still remain amongst the major land-based producers of certain 
minerals located in the Area.130 The major producers include Botswana (nickel);
125 Report of the Secretary-General on the Possible Impact o f the Convention, with special reference to 
article 151, on developing countries which are producers and exporters of minerals to be extracted from 
the Area, Documents A/CONF.6/L.84 and A D D .l o f 2 March, 1982; UNCLOS Official Records Vol. 
XVI, pp. 177-196.
126 Ogley, op.cit.pp. 180-181 and 190.
127 UNCLOS III, Official Records, Vol. XVI.p.189.
128 Ibid. p. 190.
129 Ibid. p. 190.
130 In 1997, at a meeting o f copper industry experts in Africa held in Durban, South Africa, it was 
pointed out that Africa contains 17.6 per cent o f world copper reserves, a cmcial mineral located in the 
Area. See the “Report o f the Copper Industry Experts Meeting on the Prospects for Increased
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Democratic Republic of Congo (cobalt); Gabon (manganese); Mauritania (iron ore); 
Morocco (cobalt); South Africa (aluminium, gold, manganese, iron ore, titanium 
mineral concentrates and nickel); Zambia (copper and cobalt) and Zimbabwe 
(nickel).131
It was not surprising that land-based African producer states at the UNCLOS III were 
interested in the issue of production control.132 The issue of production control and the 
protection of land-based producers also came up during the PrepCom as a thorny 
issue and it was assigned to the PrepCom’s Special Commission l(SCN.l).133 
Although substantial progress was made by SCN.l, there were still areas of 
fundamental disagreement between the developing land-based producer states and the 
developed, mainly consumer, states. The production control provision in the LOSC 
was one of the reasons for the refusal of certain developed states to ratify the 
Convention.134
I. The Position under Part XI.
The Convention in Part XI contained highly technical rules on production policies.135 
These rules can, however, be classified under three heads -  commodity arrangements,
136 •production controls, and a compensation system. The aim of the production policies 
is clearly stated as the protection of developing land-based producer states from 
adverse effects to either their economies or their export earnings, resulting from a
Production and Intra-African Trade in Copper Metal and Copper-based Products”, adopted as part of 
the Report of the Second Regional Conference o f  African Ministers Responsible for the Development 
and Utilisation o f Mineral and Energy Resources, Durban, South Africa, 21-22 November 1997. 
http://www.uneca.org/eca resources/Publications/RCID/old/97 conf ministers mineral.htm [Accessed 
on 2 April 2004].
131 See United States Department o f the Interior and Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity 
Summaries 2004.http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/mcs/2004/mcs2004.pdf [Accessed on 22 
October 2004].
132 See, for example, statements in UNCLOS III, Official Records, Vol. XVI, p. 169 by representatives 
of the following African states: Zambia, paras. 5,11 and 14; Zaire, para.6, and Zimbabwe, para.6. Also 
in UNCLOS III Official Records, Vol. XIII: Zaire, pp.37-38, paras. 77 and 78 and Kenya, p.44,
para. 164.
33 See, for example, DOALOS, Law o f  the Sea Bulletin No. 8 at p.45. For more on the work of the 
PrepCom in this regard, see Mahmoudi, op.cit.pp.324-326.
134 See Brown, Sea-Bed Energy and Minerals, Vol.2, op.cit.pp. 123-131.
l35For more details see Brown, Sea-Bed Energy and Mineral Resources and the Law o f the Sea, Vol.2 
(1986), op.cit.pp. II.4 21-33 and Jagota, S.P., “The Seabed Outside the Limits o f National Jurisdiction” 
in Bedjaoui (ed.), International Law: Achievements and Prospects, op.cit.p.915 at pp.926-927.
136 This classification was used by Professor E.D. Brown. See Brown, ibid. p. 124.
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reduction in the price or the volume of exports of the affected mineral due to seabed
137mining activities in the Area.
(a) Commodity Arrangements.
The ISA was empowered to enter into commodity arrangements, whether through
existing forums or new arrangements or agreements, involving all interested parties,
1 ^ 8including both producers and consumers. The essence of these arrangements was to 
take necessary measures to promote the growth, efficiency and stability of markets for 
those commodities produced from the minerals derived from the Area, in a bid to 
arrive at prices remunerative to producers and fair to consumers. All states parties
139were required to co-operate in these arrangements. The ISA had the right to 
participate jn any commodity conferences involving those commodities, along with 
all other interested parties, including both producers and consumers. In this regard it 
had the right to become a party to any arrangement or agreement resulting from such 
conferences. However, it was emphasised that such participation of the ISA was not 
general but limited to arrangements or agreements in respect of production in the Area 
and in accordance with the relevant rules o f those organs.140 In carrying out its 
obligations under such commodity arrangements or agreements, the ISA was required 
to do so in a manner which assured a uniform and non-discriminatory implementation
137 Art. 150(h) o f LOSC. See Brown, ibid.,pp.l24-125
138 In UN General Assembly Resolution entitled, “Strengthening and Development o f the World 
Market and Improvement o f the Trade Conditions o f the Economically Less Developed Countries”, 
G.A. Res. 1421/XIV o f 5 December 1959, it was said that “it would be desirable to work out, within 
the United Nations and other appropriate forums, measures to promote the stabilisation o f the 
commodity markets and the development o f trade between the highly developed and the less developed 
countries on a reciprocally beneficial and non-discriminatory basis, including, where appropriate, short, 
medium or long-term trade international commodity agreements and the establishment o f international 
study groups”
http://ods-dds-nv.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NRO/142/44/IMG/NR014244.pdf/OpenElenient 
[Accessed on 25 October 2004]. Art.6 o f the Charter o f  Economic Rights and Duties o f States, G.A. 
Res. 3281/XXIX o f 12 December 1974 provided as follows: “It is the duty o f States to contribute to the 
development o f international trade o f goods, particularly by means o f arrangements and by the 
conclusion o f  long-term multilateral commodity agreements, where appropriate, and taking into 
account the interests o f producers and consumers. All States share the responsibility to promote the 
regular flow and access o f all commercial goods traded at stable, remunerative and equitable prices, 
thus contributing to the equitable development o f  the world economy taking into account, in particular, 
the interests o f  developing countries.”
http://ods-dds-nv.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NRO/738/83/IMG/NRQ73883.pdf/OpenElement 
[Accessed on 25 October 2004]. See generally on Commodity Agreements and Arrangements, Khan, 
K., The Law and Organisation o f  International Commodity Agreements, (The Hague/Boston/London, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1982) and Kohona, P.T.B., The Regulation o f  International Economic 
Relations through Law, (Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985), pp.61-66.
139 Art. 151 (1) (a) o f LOSC.
140 Art. 151(1) (b) o f LOSC.
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in respect of all production of the relevant minerals in the Area. It was required in this 
regard to act in a manner consistent with the terms of existing contracts and approved 
plans of work of the Enterprise.141
(b) Production Controls.
The Convention contained a highly technical and complicated method of production 
controls.142 With the production controls, it was not enough for an operator to have 
obtained an approved plan of work; it had to also obtain a production authorisation. 
This production authorisation was to be issued so that the amount of production of 
such operator, along with that authorised for other operators, fell within the limits 
determined by the ISA under Article 151. The Convention then proceeded to 
elaborate in some detail the methodology for arriving at the production ceiling level 
for nickel production with a requirement that a certain quantity of nickel be reserved 
to the Enterprise for its initial production.143 The level of production of other metals 
extracted from the polymetallic nodules, such as copper, cobalt and manganese, was 
required not to be higher than the maximum level of nickel that would have been 
produced by the operator. The ISA was to establish rules, regulations and procedures 
to implement these production controls.144 In respect o f minerals, other than minerals 
from polymetallic nodules, the ISA was simply given the power to limit the level of 
production by adopting regulations in this regard.145
(c) Compensation system
Under the LOSC, the Assembly, based upon the recommendation of the Council, 
which in turn was to act on the basis of advice from the Economic Planning 
Commission, was empowered to establish a compensation system. This mechanism 
was directed at assisting developing land-based producers of certain minerals 
produced in the Area that suffered serious adverse effects to their export earnings or 
economy resulting from either a reduction in the price or the export volume of such 
minerals due to seabed mining activities. The ISA was to initiate, on request, studies 
of the problems faced by such states likely to be most seriously affected by activities
141 Art. 151 (1) (c) o f LOSC.
142 Art. 151 (2)-(9) o f LOSC.
143 Art. 151 (4)-(6) o f LOSC.
144 Art. 151 (7) o f LOSC.
145 Art. 151 (9) o f LOSC.
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in the Area with a view to minimising their difficulties, and to assist them in their 
economic adjustment.146
II. The Position under the 1994 Agreement.
The whole production policy contained in Part XI raised concerns for certain 
developed states. In their view the original LOSC provisions on production policy 
were based on regulatory principles evincing central planning, rather than free market 
principles which they preferred. Further, they felt that these provisions gave the ISA 
unnecessarily wide discretionary powers in selecting which applications would get a 
production authorisation to embark on commercial production in cases where the 
competing applications for production authorisations exceeded the production limit. 
In addition, they were of the opinion that the detailed formula provided by the LOSC 
based on nickel consumption alone had become unrealistic in the light of the 
recession in the international metals market. Also, they felt that the production policy, 
especially the commodity arrangement, under Part XI was protective in favour of 
land-based producers to the detriment o f seabed producers and therefore did not 
encourage investment in seabed mining. On the issue of the compensation funds, 
these states were concerned that it would be very costly for all states parties. These 
concerns were raised at the Secretary-General’s consultations on Part XI. The 1994 
Agreement therefore modified the original Part XI to meet these concerns.147
(a) Commodity Arrangements and Production Controls.
The 1994 Agreement, a document embodying free market principles, in one fell 
swoop set aside the provisions of Part XI on commodity agreements and production 
controls.148 It advocated a development o f the resources of the Area in accordance 
with “sound commercial principles.”149 The Agreement, restricting itself to merely 
stating general principles, incorporated the provisions of GATT and the successor
146 Art. 151 (10) o f LOSC. For a similar compensatory mechanism, see the special financing facility 
(SYSMIN) under the EC/ACP Lome IV Convention. This was an EC compensatory finance scheme to 
stabilise export earnings in respect o f mineral resources o f ACP States. See Arts. 214-219 o f Lome IV 
Convention, 29 I.L.M.783 (1990).
147 See “Information Note concerning the Secretary-General’s informal consultation on outstanding 
issues relating to the deep seabed mining provisions o f the UN Convention on the Law o f the Sea, New  
York, 25 March 1991” in Secretary-General’s Informal Consultations on Outstanding Issues Relating 
to the Deep Seabed Mining Provisions o f  the United Nations Convention on the Law o f  the Sea: 
Collected Documents, op.cit.pp. 16-17.
148 Section 6 para.7.
149 Ibid, para.l (a).
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WTO Agreement.150 It went on to prohibit subsidisation of activities of the Area 
except in a manner permitted by the GATT/WTO Agreement.151 The 1994 
Agreement further allows a state party to request the Council to take appropriate 
measures on the ground that one of the states parties is engaged in subsidisation that is 
prohibited or has resulted in adverse effects on the interests of another state party and 
appropriate steps have not been taken by the relevant state party or other state 
parties.152 Any acceptance of prohibited subsidies by a contractor is said to constitute 
a violation of the fundamental terms o f the contract forming a plan of work for 
carrying out activities in the Area.153 Again in line with GATT/WTO, the 1994 
Agreement further states that there shall be no discrimination between minerals 
derived from the Area and from other sources. Neither shall there be preferential 
access to markets for such minerals or for imports of commodities produced from 
seabed minerals, in particular by the use o f tariffs or non-tariff barriers, given by 
states parties to minerals or commodities produced by their states enterprises or by 
their nationals, both natural or juridical persons, as well as juridical persons controlled 
by such state or their nationals.154 The plan of work for exploitation in the Area 
approved by the ISA is to indicate an anticipated production schedule, which should 
include the estimated maximum amounts of minerals to be produced per year under 
such plan of work.155
The GATT/WTO Agreement, incorporated into the 1994 Agreement, in the view of 
most developing states, including African states, tends to lean in favour of the 
developed states.156 According to a Declaration by the Ministers of State of the 
Organisation of African Unity/African Economic Community (OAU/AEC):
Ibid, para. 1 (b).
151 Ibid, para. 1(c). See the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal e/24-scm.pdf [Accessed on 25 October 2004]. Art.l o f the 
Agreement gives the definition o f a subsidy.
15 Section 6, para. 1 (g) o f the Annex to the Agreement.
153 Ibid, para. 3. See Art. 3-6 of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures on 
prohibited subsidies and remedies available to affected member states.
154 Section 6, para. 1(d).
155 Ibid, para. 1(e)
156 See Fasan, O., “Global Trade Law: Challenges and Options for Africa,” (2003)47(2) Journal o f  
African Law, pp. 143 at 155-162.
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“We reiterate our concern with the imbalances in the WTO Agreement.
We underscore the difficulties that many African countries face in 
adapting their laws and regulations and improving their institutional 
capacities to meet their WTO obligations. ” 157
Although generally the GATT/WTO Agreement makes provision for Special and 
Differential (S&D) treatment for developing states members, such S & D treatment is 
usually temporary in nature; does not constitute a binding commitment on the part of 
developed states; can be withdrawn in whole or in part, either unilaterally or 
following international negotiations; and gives room for the developed states to select 
the particular developing states they want to grant S & D  treatment.158
The whole idea of incorporating the GATT/WTO principles into the 1994 Agreement
was in essence a move by the developed states to set aside the regulated regime of
production policy under the LOSC in favour of a more laissez-faire, free market
oriented regime. This is reflected in the statement of the representative of the
President of the United States of America on the law of the sea to the effect that:
“The United States believes that its interests... will best be served by 
developing the resources o f  the deep seabed as market conditions 
warrant. We have a consumer-oriented philosophy .”159
The GATT/WTO regime infused into the 1994 Agreement, with its strong emphasis 
on free market liberalism, is reflective of a system that fails to accept the crucial need 
for special, generalised, legally binding protection for economically weaker states, 
such as African land-based producer states, in order to bridge the inherent inequality 
between these states and the industrialised, economically strong states.160
157 Para. 9 o f the Abuja Ministerial Declaration, Fourth Ministerial Conference o f the WTO (22-23 
September 2001), OAU/AEC/TD/MIN/Decl. 1 (IV) Rev.3 o f  23 September 2001 
http://www.uneca.org/eca resources/Conference Reports and Other Documents/espd/2001 /WTO rel 
ated/Declaration.Final.PDF [Accessed on 25 October 2004].
158 See, for example, Art.27 o f the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. See Bulajic, 
“Commercial Relations”, op. cit., pp. 637-638. Also see para. 4 o f the Abuja Ministerial Declaration, 
Ibid. Also see the United States o f America’s negative position on S&D to developing states at the 
Doha negotiations o f the WTO in Raghavan,C. “US Caveats on S&D, Wants “Full Integration of 
Developing Countries’ (2002), http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/5247a.htm quoted in Chimni, B.S., 
“International Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in the Making,” (2004) 15(1) EJIL, p .l at 8.
159 Statement by the Special Representative o f  the President, Feb.23,1982, DEPT. ST. BULL., May 
1982 quoted in Oxman, “The 1994 Agreement and the Convention”, (1994) 88(4) AJIL,p.691.
160 See Bennouna, M., “International Law and Development,” in Bedjaoui(ed.), International Law: 
Achievements and Prospects, op.cit.pp.619 at 624-625; Yusuf, A, Legal Aspects o f  Trade Preferences 
fo r  Developing States: A Study in the Influence o f  Development Needs on the Evolution o f  International 
Law  (The Hague/Boston/London, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1982), pp.24-41.
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(b) Economic Assistance.
The Agreement, while recognising the possible adverse impact of activities in the 
Area on the export earnings or economies of developing land-based producer states, 
jettisoned the idea of a generalised compensation system in favour of such states. 
Rather, it merely outlines principles on the establishment of an Economic Assistance 
Fund by the ISA.161 This Fund is to provide assistance, where appropriate, in co­
operation with other international organisations, whether regional or global, which 
have the infrastructure and expertise to carry out such assistance programmes.162
Only developing land-based producer states whose economies are determined to be 
“seriously affected" by the production of minerals from the deep seabed are to be 
assisted from the Fund.163 The Agreement provides that the Fund is to be established 
from the portion of the funds o f the ISA over and above its administrative 
expenses.164 The Fund is to receive monies only from payments received from 
contractors, including the Enterprise, and voluntary contributions.165
The amount to be set aside for the Fund is to be determined by the Council from time 
to time acting upon the recommendation o f the Finance Committee.166 The
167composition of the Council and the Finance Committee gives room for certain 
developed industrialised states to determine what amount actually goes into this Fund 
and thereby influences whether or not the Fund is effective. Brown argues that the
composition of the Finance Committee puts the industrialised states in a position to
168ensure that excess amounts are not set aside for the Fund. It does appear by 
extension that this will mean that such industrialised states are also in a position to
161 Section 7. See Nelson, L.D.M, “The New Deep Sea-Bed Mining Regime”, (1995) 10(2) The 
International Journal o f  Marine & Coastal Law, p. 191 at 199.
162 Ibid. para. 1(c).
163 Ibid. para.l (b).
164 The Fund has since been established. See Regulation 5.8 o f  the ISA’s Financial Regulations which 
became effective on 23 March 2000, ISBA/6/A/3, o f  28 March 2000. See Brown, Sea Bed Energy and 
Minerals Vol.2, op.cit, p. 130.
165 Section 7 para, fra) o f the Annex to the Agreement.
166 Ibid.
167 See section 4.1.3.1 o f  chapter 4 o f this thesis.
168 See Brown, “The 1994 Agreement on the Implementation o f Part XI of the UN Convention on the 
Law o f the Sea: breakthrough to universality?” op.cit. at p. 13.
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determine the extent of economic assistance a land-based producer state may get. The 
strong position of the industrialised developed states in the Council and the Finance 
Committee, coupled with the requirement that the extent and period of the assistance 
be determined on a case by case basis,169 exposes the Fund to the inherent danger of it 
being used as a subtle tool by developed industrialised states to control developing 
land-based producers’ domestic policies.170 This has been the experience of African 
states in respect of international multilateral financial institutions, such as the IMF 
and the World Bank, that are dominated by certain industrialised states. African states 
seeking financial assistance from these organisations have had to comply with rigid 
conditionalities imposed by these organisations, amounting in certain cases to 
interference with these states’ domestic policies, in order to have access to the
• 171financial assistance.
The 1994 Agreement, through its provisions on economic assistance to developing 
land-based producers, has in essence entrenched the influence of the industrialised 
states over the regime.
3.2.3. Financial Terms o f  Contracts
The LOSC lists six objectives that should guide the ISA in adopting rules, regulations 
and procedures concerning the financial terms o f contracts between it and contractors. 
These objectives are namely: to ensure optimum revenues for the ISA from the 
proceeds of commercial production; to attract investments and technology to deep 
seabed mining; to ensure equal financial treatment and comparable financial 
obligations for all contractors; to provide incentives for contractors on a uniform and 
non-discriminatory basis with a view to encouraging joint ventures between the 
contractors, the Enterprise and developing states and their nationals in order to 
stimulate transfer of technology and expertise to the Enterprise and developing states; 
to enable the Enterprise to engage in seabed mining effectively at the same time as
169 Section 7 para. 1(d) o f the Annex to the Agreement.
170 On how internal policies o f African nations are controlled by industrialised nation dominated 
international aid bodies see Lancaster, C., Aid to Africa -  So Much to Do, So Little Done, 
(Chicago/London, University o f Chicago Press, 1999), pp.74-82;
171 Harris, L., “The Bretton Woods System and Africa”, and Onimode, B., “IMF and World Bank 
Programmes in Africa” in Onimode, B. (ed.), The IMF, The World Bank and African Debt -  The 
Economic Impact, (London/New Jersey, Zeb Books Ltd, 1989), pp. 19-24 and 25-33 respectively; See 
also Toussaint, E., and Drucker, P., IMF/World Bank/WTO: The Free Market Fiasco (Amsterdam, 
Netherlands, IIRF/IIRE, 1995).
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other contractors; and to ensure that seabed mining contractors are not through 
financial incentives subsidised so as to give them an artificial competitive advantage
19 9  • •over land-based miners. A perusal of these objectives, as rightly pointed out by 
Brown, indicates that some of them are rather contradictory.173 The LOSC sought to 
accommodate, on the one hand, the interest of developing states to have a financially 
buoyant and independent ISA, with its commercial corporation, the Enterprise, able to 
effectively embark on seabed mining, as well as the need to protect land-based 
producers from a diversion of investment from land-based mining to deep seabed 
m ining.174 On the other hand, there was the interest of developed, industrialised states 
to have minimal and non-discriminatory financial terms that would encourage 
investment in seabed mining. The aim of accommodating these divergent interests in 
the objectives was to achieve compromise, a hallmark of UNCLOS III.175
Brown identifies, as one of the reasons for the developing states’ stance on financial 
terms, that:
“...the developing countries were concerned to ensure not only that the 
overall share o f  the Authority in the proceeds o f  deep-sea mining should 
be substantial but also that a significant part o f  the Authority’s share 
should take the form o f front-end’ payments, that is, payments made at 
the beginning or in the early years o f  the contract before commercial 
production has started to generate income fo r  the contractor. The reason 
fo r  this preference was the need, as then perceived, to provide funds to 
enable the Enterprise to commence operations without too much 
delay. ”176
In addition to a desire for funds to enable the Enterprise to commence operations 
promptly, it does appear that the whole idea could also suggest a yearning on the part 
of developing states, including African states, for some level of financial 
independence of the ISA from contributions of member states. This in itself suggests 
an attempt on the part of developing states to reduce the influence of industrialised
172 Annex III, Art. 13 (1) o f  LOSC.
173 See Brown, Sea-bed Energy and Minerals, Vol.2, op.cit.pp. 136-137. For more on the negotiations in 
the Conference concerning financial terms o f the contract, see Ogley, Internationalizing the Seabed, 
(England, Gower Publishing Company Limited, 1984), pp. 156-161.
174 See the statement o f the Chairman o f the Working Group o f 21, UNCLOS III Official Records 
Vol.XII, p.78.
175 See Report o f the Chairman o f Negotiating Group 2 to the First Committee, NG2/10/Rev.l o f 14 
September 1978, UNCLOS III, Official Records Vol.X, pp.63 and 144 and Brown, Sea-Bed Energy 
and Minerals, Vol.2, op.cit.p.136.
176 Brown, Seabed Energy and Minerals, Vol.2, op.cit. p. 135.
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developed states, which through financial contributions to international organisations 
generally exert considerable influence. An international organisation, able to generate 
its own funds independently of its members’ financial contributions, would certainly 
be more independent of control of high contributing states parties. This in essence, 
along with the original composition of the institutions of the regime,177 would have 
created an environment whereby the developing states, including African states, by 
working in concert through fora such as the Group of 77, would through numerical 
strength effectively influence the agenda of the ISA.
I. The Position under Part XI.
In a bid to be as detailed as possible concerning the financial terms of the contract, the 
Convention, in Annex III, embarked on a rather complicated and longwinded 
elucidation of such terms. 178 In essence the provisions required three kinds of 
payments from the contractors, namely:
• An administrative processing fee of $US 500,000 per application, provided that if 
the cost of processing an application was less than $US 500,000, the difference 
was to be refunded to the applicant. This fee was to be reviewed from time to time 
by the Council;179
• An annual up front fixed fee of $US 1 million from the date of entry into force of 
the contract, provided that if  the approved date o f commencement of commercial 
production was postponed because o f a delay in issuing the production 
authorisation, this annual fee would be waived during the period of such 
postponement. However from the date of commercial production the contractor 
was to pay either the production charge or the annual fixed fee, whichever was 
greater; 180
• Within a year from the date of commencement of commercial production the 
contractor could either choose to continue to pay the ISA a production charge or a 
combination of production charge and a share of net proceeds calculated in 
accordance with certain complicated methods stated in Article 13.181 These latter
177 See Chapter 4 o f this thesis.
178 See Art. 13 (1)-(15) o f Annex III to LOSC. For details see Brown, Seabed Energy and Mineral 
Resources and the Law o f  the Sea, vol.2 (1986), op.cit.pp. II.4 37-48; Jagota, “The Seabed outside the 
Limits o f National Jurisdiction”, op.cit.pp.927-928.
179 Art. 13 (2) o f Annex III to the LOSC.
180 Art. 13 (3) o f Annex III.
181 Art. 13 (4) o f Annex III.
142
payments could either be in convertible currency or equivalent market value of 
processed metals. 182
Along with dispute settlement procedures over the financial terms of contracts, 
complex rules on the calculation of production charges and net proceeds, accounting 
and auditing procedures, they constituted rather detailed provisions on financial
matters for a venture which was not anticipated to be undertaken on a commercial
1 8^scale in the near future.
II. The Position under the 1994 Agreement.
The financial terms o f contracts were also a matter of concern to some industrialised 
states, concerns that were raised at the Secretary-General’s consultations on the 
original Part XI provisions. These states were of the view that the up front fixed fee 
had become a disincentive to investment in seabed mining. Further, some states 
expressed concerns at the rate of taxation on profits, though it compared favourably 
with the rates paid by those engaged in land-based production of similar minerals.184 
These concerns were addressed by the 1994 Agreement.
The provision dealing with application fees was modified and the fee reduced from 
US$500,000 to US$250,000,185
Although retaining the objectives of the financial terms contained in Part XI, the 1994
Agreement swept aside the detailed provisions of Article 13 of Annex III,186 and
opted for merely laying down general principles. These principles are as follows187:
(a) The system o f payments to the Authority shall be fa ir both to the 
contractor and to the Authority and shall provide adequate means o f  
determining compliance by the contractor with such system;
182 Art. 13 (12) o f Annex III.
183 Art. 13 (5)-(15) o f  Annex III.
184 “Information Note concerning the Secretary-General’s informal consultation on outstanding issues 
relating to the deep seabed mining provisions o f  the UN Convention on the Law o f the Sea, New York, 
25 March 1991” in Secretary-General’s Informal Consultations on Outstanding Issues Relating to the 
Deep Seabed Mining Provisions o f  the United Nations Convention on the Law o f  the Sea: Collected 
Documents, op.cit.p.18.
185 Section 8 para.3 and Section 1 para. 6(a) (ii) o f  the Agreement.
186 The Agreement in Section 8 para. 2 states that the provisions o f Annex III article 13, paragraphs 3 to 
10 shall not apply.
187 Section 8 para.l (a)-(f) o f the Agreement. See for details Brown, Sea-bed Energy and Minerals, 
Vol.2 (2001), op.cit.pp.134-140.
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(b) The rates o f  payments under the system shall be within the range o f those 
prevailing in respect o f  land-based mining o f the same or similar minerals 
in order to avoid giving deep seabed miners an artificial competitive 
advantage or imposing upon them a competitive disadvantage;
(c) The system should not be complicated and should not impose major 
administrative costs on either the Authority or on a contractor. 
Consideration should be given to the adoption o f a royalty system or a 
combination o f  royalty and profit-sharing system. I f  alternative systems 
are decided upon, the contractor has the right to choose the system 
applicable to its contract. Any subsequent change in choice between 
alternative systems, however, shall be made by agreement between the 
Authority and the contractor;
(d) The annual fixed fee shall be payable from the date o f commencement o f  
commercial production. This fee  may be credited against other payments 
due under the system adopted in accordance with subparagraph(c). The 
amount o f  the fee  shall be established by the Council;
(e) The system o f  payment may be revised periodically in the light o f 
changing circumstances. Any changes shall be applied in a non- 
discriminatory manner. Such changes may apply to existing contracts only 
at the election o f the contractor. Any subsequent change in choice 
between alternative systems shall be made by agreement between the 
Authority and the contractor;
(f) Disputes concerning the interpretation or application o f  any rules and 
regulations based on these principles shall be subject to the dispute 
settlement procedures set out in the Convention.
Whilst the objectives of the financial terms of the contract under LOSC were not 
touched by the Agreement, the potency of such objectives favourable to the 
developing states, including African states, has been effectively watered down by the 
general principles enunciated in the Agreement. The payment of up front fixed fees 
has been suspended by the Agreement and is payable only upon commencement of 
commercial production. This in essence removes any hope in the near future of the 
ISA having funds independent of members’ contributions. Therefore the ISA would 
still depend on members’ contributions with the inevitable fall out of having to 
succumb to the dictates of the major contributors. This, together with the power 
conferred by the Agreement upon the Council (where western industrialised states 
have significant powers to block unfavourable decisions) to determine the amount of 
the annual fixed fee due upon the commencement of commercial production, 
effectively diminishes any hope of the developing states, including African states, 
assuming a more influential role in a financially independent and self-sufficient ISA. 
Brown, in examining the modification by the Agreement of the original Part XI
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provisions on financial terms, points out that the Agreement “reflects a change in the 
balance o f influence as between the developing and developed states.... ” 188
3.2.4. Review Conference.
According to Mahmoudi the possibility of a review of the parallel system of mining 
was sine qua non ” for developing states’ acceptance of this system of utilisation of 
the resources o f the Area. 189 He identified two possible reasons for the importance 
attributed to the review scheme by developing states. First, he pointed out that it was 
partly because, in accepting the parallel system, they were accepting something which 
had not yet been tried in practice, and second, because the whole idea of the parallel 
system was contradictory to the idea of joint management under the common heritage 
of mankind.190 The idea of the review system, which interestingly had its origins in 
the proposal of the Secretary o f State of the United States of America,191 was to create 
an opt-out route for the developing states after a certain period of time, in the 
eventuality that the parallel system, which they had conceded as part of the 
mechanism of compromise, did not ultimately accomplish the essence of the principle
192of the common heritage of mankind.
I. The Position under Part XL
The LOSC made provision for a review mechanism, consisting of a Periodic Review 
and a Review Conference. While the Periodic Review provisions of Part XI have not 
been modified by the 1994 Agreement, this is not the case for Review Conference 
provisions as will be seen in the section below. It appears that the crux of developed 
industrialised states’ objection to the review mechanism, in view of the retention of 
the Periodic Review provisions in the Agreement, was not an objection to the idea of 
the review per se. Rather, their objection was in respect of the possibility that a review 
introducing amendments would be binding upon a state party that had not consented 
to such amendments. Under the Periodic Review, the developing states dominated 
Assembly193 is given the power every five years to undertake a general and systematic 
review of the manner in which the regime of the Area has operated in practice.
188 Brown, Sea-bed Energy and Minerals, Vol.2 (2001), op.cit.pp. 134-140.
189 Mahmoudi, op.cit.p.222.
190 Ibid.
191 Brown, Sea-Bed Energy and Mineral Resources etc, vol. 2 (1986), op.cit.p.II.3, 9.
192 Ibid. II.4 7-10.
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However, there is no indication that such review will be binding on states parties 
without their consent. All that the Periodic Review provision says is that the 
Assembly may thereafter, in the light of the review, adopt, or recommend that other 
organs adopt, measures in line with the provisions of Part XI and the annexes related 
thereto, which will lead to the improvement of the operation of the regime.194 The first 
of such review was to take place in 2000, during the sixth session of the ISA. 
However, the Assembly accepted the advice of the Secretary-General of the ISA that 
as a result of the brief experience in implementing the regime such review would be 
rather premature.195 The Periodic Review is expected to be taken up at the Eleventh 
Session of the ISA in 2005.196
The Review Conference, on the other hand, was more contentious. It was to be
convened fifteen years from 1 January o f the year in which the earliest commercial
production commenced under an approved plan of work. The Assembly was also
given the power to convene this Conference to review the provisions of Part XI and
the annexes thereto. In reviewing these provisions, the Conference was to consider
certain issues, in the light of the experience gained during the fifteen years, namely:197
“(a) whether the provisions o f  this Part which govern the system o f 
exploration and exploitation o f  the resources o f  the Area have achieved 
their aims in all respects, including whether they have benefited mankind 
as a whole;
(b) whether, during the 15-year period, reserved areas have been 
exploited in an effective and balanced manner in comparison with non­
reserved areas;
(c) whether the development and use o f  the Area and its resources have 
been undertaken in such a manner as to foster healthy development o f the 
world economy and balanced growth o f  international trade;
(d) whether monopolisation o f  activities in the Area has been prevented;
(e) whether the policies set forth in articles 150 and 151 have been 
fulfilled; and
(g) whether the system has resulted in the equitable sharing o f benefits 
derived from activities in the Area, taking into consideration the interests 
and needs o f the developing States. ”
193 See Chapter 4 o f  this thesis on institutions.
194 Art. 154 o f LOSC.
195 See Para.5 o f  the Report o f the Secretary-General o f  the International Seabed Authority under article 
166, paragraph 4, o f the United Nations Convention on the Law o f the Sea, ISB A/10/A/3 o f 31 March 
2004.
196 Ibid.
197 Art. 155 (1) (a)-(f) o f LOSC.
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Whilst the focus of the Conference was to review the system of exploitation, i.e., the 
parallel system, it was to also ensure the maintenance of certain “core” matters, 
including the principle of the common heritage of mankind; the equitable exploitation 
of the resources of the Area for the benefit of all states, especially developing states; 
the power of the ISA to organise, conduct and control activities in the Area; the 
exclusion of claims or exercise of sovereignty over any part of the Area; the 
prevention of monopolisation of activities in the Area; the exclusive use of Area for 
peaceful purposes; and the principles of Part XI concerning marine scientific research, 
transfer of technology, protection of environment and human life, rights of coastal 
states and other states in respect of the Area, and the legal status of the waters
198supeijacent to the Area and the air space thereof.
The decision-making procedure for the Review Conference, like that of the UNCLOS 
III, was to initially make every effort to arrive at an agreement concerning any 
amendments by way of consensus.199 However, if  five years after the commencement 
of the Conference such consensus was not arrived at in respect of the system of 
exploration and exploitation, in the ensuing 12 months a three-fourths majority of the 
states parties could adopt and submit for ratification or accession amendments 
changing or modifying this system. Thereafter, such amendments would enter into 
force for all states parties, whether or not they consented to it, 12 months after the 
deposit of instruments of ratification or accession by three-fourths of the states 
parties.200 It was, however, emphasised that such amendments adopted by the Review 
Conference were not to affect rights acquired under existing contracts.201
The negotiations during the UNCLOS III concerning the review system sought to 
achieve a compromise between the developing states and developed states.202 Despite 
certain concessions on this issue by the developing states, including for example 
conceding to the increase from two-thirds to a three-fourths majority the threshold for 
adoption and ratification of amendments, certain developed states remained 
unsatisfied.
198 Art. 155 (2) o f  LOSC.
199 Art. 155 (3) o f LOSC.
200 Art. 155 (4) o f LOSC.
201 Art. 155 (5) o f LOSC.
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II. The Position under the 1994 Agreement.
Certain developed industrialised states expressed concerns at the informal 
consultations that amendments under the Review Conference could be binding 
automatically on a state without its approval. They expressed the view that any 
amendment under the review system should only be effective if ratified or acceded to 
by all states parties.203 The objections of these states were not surprising, since under 
the general law of treaties an amending agreement, as a general rule, does not bind a 
state party which has not consented to such amending agreement,204 although the 
original treaty may deviate from this general rule by providing otherwise.205
The Agreement, in addressing the concerns of the industrialised states, starts off by 
saying that the “provisions relating to the Review Conference in Article 155, 
paragraphs 1, 3 and 4 shall not apply.”206 However, the requirement under Article 
155, paragraph 2 o f LOSC that certain core principles207 be maintained, along with 
the provision of paragraph 5 preserving the existing rights of contractors after an 
amendment, are retained by the Agreement.208 The Agreement then declares that the 
amendment procedures in Articles 314, 315 and 316 of the LOSC shall apply to 
amendments relating to the Agreement and Part XI.209
Under Article 314 a proposal for amendment made by a state party after having been 
circulated by the Secretary-General to all states parties, may be adopted subject to the
202 See UNCLOS III Official Record, vol. IX, p.25 at para.40; UNCLOS III Official Record, vol. X, 
p.26, UNCLOS III Official Record, Vol.XIII, pp.l 13 and 137.
203 “Information Note concerning the Secretary-General’s informal consultation on outstanding issues 
relating to the deep seabed mining provisions o f  the UN Convention on the Law o f the Sea, New York, 
25 March 1991” in Secretary-General’s Informal Consultations on Outstanding Issues Relating to the 
Deep Seabed Mining Provisions o f  the United Nations Convention on the Law o f  the Sea: Collected 
Documents, op.cit. p.20.
204 Art.40 (4) o f the Vienna Convention on the Law o f  Treaties (VCLT) 1969 provides “The amending 
agreement does not bind any state already a party to the treaty which does not become a party to the 
amending agreement.. .”
205 Art.40 (1) o f VCLT states “Unless the treaty otherwise provides, the amendment o f multilateral 
treaties shall be governed by the following paragraphs.’’(emphasis added).
206 Section 4 o f  the Annex to the Agreement.
207 See text at note 198 above.
208 Section 4 o f the Annex to the Agreement.
209 Ibid. These formal amendment procedures have so far not been utilised by states parties to the 
LOSC. See Freestone, D, and Oude Elferink, “Flexibility and Innovation in the Law o f the Sea- Will 
the LOSC Amendment Procedures ever be used?”, Paper presented at the Third Verzijl Symposium, 
Stability and Change in the Law o f the Sea: Selected Issues, Utrecht University, The Netherlands, 3 
December 2004.
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approval of the Assembly, following the approval of the Council. In considering 
whether to approve any such proposed amendment, the Council and the Assembly are 
to ensure that it does not prejudice the system of exploration and exploitation of the
91 nresources of the Area, pending the Review Conference. However, the Agreement 
provides that notwithstanding this latter provision “the Assembly, on the 
recommendation o f  the Council, may undertake at any time a review o f the matters
t *  211referred to in article 155, paragraph 1, o f  the Convention. ” The representatives of
states parties in the Assembly and Council are deemed to have full powers to consider
212and approve the proposed amendment. This may seem to suggest that since 
decision-making in the Assembly and the Council can be by a qualified majority, if an 
attempt to arrive at a decision by way of consensus fails, such amendments, if 
approved by a qualified majority in those organs, would be binding even on states 
parties that had not consented. However, this is not the case. Under the LOSC 
decisions of the Council, in respect of the adoption of amendments to Part XI, must be 
taken by consensus.213 Thus amendments could not be adopted if they were not 
acceptable to the industrialised developed states.
Article 316(5) of LOSC goes on to state that any amendment relating exclusively to 
activities in the Area and Annex VI (the statute o f ITLOS) “shall enter into force fo r  
all States Parties one year following the deposit o f  instruments o f  ratification or 
accession by three fourths o f  the States Parties.” This provision appears to suggest 
that any such amendments shall enter into force for all states parties, including states 
parties that have not consented to such amendments. It is not clear if the retention of 
Article 316(5) by the Agreement is an oversight. However, it does appear that any 
such amendments, as mentioned earlier, would need the approval of the Assembly, 
following the approval of the Council, to be adopted. It is unlikely in practice that 
Article 316(5) would raise any significant concern for developed industrialised states 
since the prior approval of the Council, where consensus is required for such 
approval, would be required before such amendment is adopted.
210 Art.314(2) o f LOSC.
211 Section 4 o f the Annex to the Agreement.
212 Art.314(1) o f LOSC
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In theory, therefore, although the review of the matters referred to in Article 155(1) 
can be done at any time and could result in amendments utilising the procedures of 
Articles 314, 315 and 316, the power of the Assembly to unilaterally embark on a 
review has been curtailed since it is required to act upon the recommendation of the 
Council.214 In reality it is doubtful if  the Council, where the industrialised developed 
states have a strong position, would make any such recommendation for review that 
would be against the interest of the developed industrialised states. The Agreement 
has therefore effectively curtailed the ability of African states and other developing 
states to use their numerical dominance in the Assembly to unilaterally embark on a 
review of matters of interest to them in respect of the system of mining.
3.3. Factors influencing the decision o f  African states to concede to the 1994 
Agreement.
As a result of the refusal of certain industrialised states, including the United States of 
America, United Kingdom, Germany, Netherlands, Belgium and Italy, to ratify the 
LOSC as a result of the original Part XI provisions, the then Secretary-General of the 
United Nations, Javier Perez de Cuellar, in a bid to pave the way for universal 
participation in the Convention, initiated informal consultations to consider and take 
steps to address the concerns of these states.215 These informal consultations, which 
commenced in 1990 and went on till 1994, were in two phases. The first phase, from 
1990 to 1992, involved a small closed group of some 30 key states, including the 
industrialised states objecting to certain provisions o f the original Part XI, and was to 
identify the concerns that had led to the industrialised states’ refusal to ratify the 
Convention. Thereafter, the second phase, from 1992 to 1994, was thrown open to all 
interested states and about 90 delegations were represented at the consultations in this 
phase.216 Ambassador Frank Njenga holds the view that the initial closed door 
meetings (1990-1992) of the informal consultations, during which period negotiations
213 Art. 161 (7) (d) o f LOSC. See section 3, paragraph 5 o f  the Agreement which excludes decisions that 
under the LOSC must be taken by consensus in the Council. See section 4.1.3.1(11) (iii) o f chapter 4 on 
decision-making in the Council.
214 Section 4 o f the Annex to the Agreement.
215 Even before the Informal Consultations, the Group o f  77, through its Zambian Chairman, had 
indicated the Group’s willingness to address specific concerns o f  the industrialised states in respect of 
Part XI as far as August 1989. See Anderson, D.H., “Efforts to Ensure Universal Participation in the 
United Nations Convention on the Law o f the Sea”, (1993) 42 I.C.L.Q., pp. 654 at 657.
216 “Introduction” in Secretary-General’s Informal Consultations on Outstanding Issues Relating to the 
Deep Seabed Mining Provisions o f  the United Nations Convention on the Law o f  the Sea: Collected 
Documents, op.cit.pp. 1-5.
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advanced far, excluded most developing states, including African states and gave an 
unfair advantage to the industrialised states, a number of which were part of that 
meeting.217 He further opines that even the second stage of the consultations, which 
was thrown open to all states, witnessed a situation where developing states, 
especially African states, were inadequately represented, either due to lack of funds to 
send any representative or, in cases where there were representatives, to the absence 
of experts of high quality on the subject, as was the case with UNCLOS III, to 
represent the interest of these nations.218 According to him this resulted in the 
Agreement, which has "... far-reaching consequences and [involve], to a large 
extent, one-sided concessions to industrialised countries with hardly any
>>219 •corresponding obligations on their part. ” He further pointed out that the 
Agreement made "... significant concessions to industrialised countries without any
95220tangible benefits fo r  developing countries.” Although it may be the case that 
African states were not significantly represented in the first phase of the consultations, 
there is some evidence of the attendance of representatives of African states.221
In this writer’s view the significant, almost one-sided, concessions made by African
states during the consultations goes beyond the exclusive nature of the first phase of
the consultations and the quality of the African representatives. It is suggested that
two broad reasons can be identified for these concessions. First, unlike the UNCLOS
III negotiations where the African states had articulated a common position in the
• 222form of the O.A.U. Declaration on the law o f the sea issues, there was no clear cut
217 See Frank Njenga’s Commentary in Mensah, T.A., (ed.), Ocean Governance: Strategies and 
Approaches fo r  the 21st Century - Proceedings,, the Law o f  the Sea Institute twenty-eighth annual 
conference, Honolulu, Hawaii, July 11-14, 1994 (Honolulu, University o f Hawaii, Law o f the Sea 
Institute, 1996), pp. 261-262.
218 Njenga’s intervention from the floor, ibid. at pp.271 and 273. See, however ,contradicting this 
position the intervention from the floor o f Barbara Kwiatkowska and Wesley Scholz at ibid. pp.267 and 
263 respectively.
219 Njenga, ibid.p.262.
220 Ibid.
221 For example, at the informal consultation held on 19 July 1990 the Secretary-General o f the United 
Nations acknowledged the presence o f Ambassador Jose Luis Jesus o f Cape Verde (also chairman o f  
the PrepCom) and even at the informal consultation held on 23 July 1991 the Tanzanian Ambassador is 
recorded to have raised some procedural points. See “Introductory Remarks by the Secretary-General 
for the Informal Consultation on the Law o f the Sea, 19 July 1990” and “Mr. Nandan’s summary at the 
conclusion o f the Secretary-General’s Informal Consultation on outstanding issues relating to the deep 
seabed mining provisions o f the UN Convention on the Law o f the Sea, 23 July 1991” in Secretary- 
General ’s Informal Consultations on Outstanding Issues Relating to the Deep Seabed Mining 
Provisions o f  the United Nations Convention on the Law o f  the Sea: Collected Documents, op.cit.pp.9 
and 32.
222 UNCLOS III, Official Records, Vol. Ill, pp.63-65.
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written articulated position taken by African states in these informal consultations. It 
is suggested that this lack of a common articulated position on the deep seabed issues, 
under the auspices of the then O.A.U, significantly weakened the standing of African 
states in such negotiations and therefore it is not surprising that they appear to have 
made substantial concessions during the consultations. Second, the concessions on the 
part of African states could be attributed to certain factors arising from economic and 
political changes emerging in the global sphere as well as the domestic setting of 
these states. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, in seeking to justify the 
informal consultations, identified certain reasons for them, including the fact that, 
contrary to the expectations at the UNCLOS III, commercial mining of the Area was 
no longer imminent; the evolution of international relations from tension and 
confrontation towards co-operation; the change of the global economic climate 
favouring the free-market oriented policy; and the work of the PrepCom, which gave 
more understanding of the practical aspects of deep seabed mining.223 While these 
reasons generally explain the informal consultations and the eventual 1994 Agreement 
overwhelming adopted by a number o f states, including African states, at the forty- 
eighth session of the General Assembly, the following analysis seeks to pinpoint 
certain factors that could have particularly influenced the decision of African states to 
concede to the Agreement.224 In so doing, the writer is not unaware that the different 
states in Africa would have their own peculiar reasons based on national and/or 
foreign policy interests for becoming parties to the Agreement. This analysis therefore 
does not purport to be a state by state examination of such peculiar reasons that have 
caused these states to concede to and become parties to the 1994 Agreement, though it 
is at variance with certain hard-won victories in favour of developing states, including 
African states, contained in the original Part XI, which were attained after
223 “Introductory Remarks by the Secretary-General for the Informal Consultation on the Law o f the 
Sea, 19 July 1990” in Secretary-General’s Informal Consultations on Outstanding Issues Relating to 
the Deep Seabed Mining Provisions o f  the United Nations Convention on the Law o f  the Sea: Collected 
Documents, op.cit.pp.9-10. Also see at the 100th meeting o f  the forty-eighth session o f the General 
Assembly the comments o f the Kenyan representative, Mr. Muthaura, basically rehashing the reasons 
given by the Secretary-General as the reason why many states, including those that had already ratified 
the LOSC ,accepted the draft 1994 Agreement. General Assembly, forty-eighth session, Official 
Records, A/48/PV.100 o f 27 July 1994, p.5.
224 Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Congo, Cote d’ Ivoire, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Tanzania and Zimbabwe voted in 
favour o f the Resolution. See Law o f  the Sea Bulletin, Special Issue IV, 16 November 1994, p.7. There 
are presently 24 African states that are parties to the Agreement. See Table 1 in Chapter 2 o f this thesis 
for the number o f African states that are parties to the Agreement.
152
excruciating and time-consuming negotiations in UNCLOS III. Neither does it profess 
to be an exhaustive examination of all the possible factors influencing the decision of
99 cAfrican states as regards the 1994 Agreement. Rather, the analysis seeks to pinpoint 
certain crucial broad factors, including certain changes in the international polity, 
which either directly or indirectly influenced the decision of African states to accept 
the Agreement.226
3.3.1. Emergence o f  the market-oriented economy as the dominant world policy.
In the Report of the Secretary-General on the informal consultations, the shift to a
more market-oriented economy was one of the reasons given for the informal
consultations on issues affecting Part XI.227 According to the Report,
“The general economic climate had been transformed as a result o f the
changing perception with respect to the roles o f the public and private
sectors. There was a discernible shift towards a more market-oriented 
>, 228 economy .
This shift to a market-oriented economy, which emerged as the dominant world 
policy with the collapse of the former USSR, had a strong influence in altering the 
perception of African states of the deep seabed regime. A market-oriented policy, that 
advocates a more deregulated economy and discourages state-owned enterprises, has 
emerged as an important element in the domestic policy of most African states. Not 
surprisingly it is reflected in the present international policy of African states on the 
deep seabed.
225 On other factors influencing the need for the 1994 Agreement, see Joyner, C., “The United States 
and the New Law o f the Sea”, (1996) 27 Ocean Development and International Law, pp.41-58, 
especially at pp.49-50; Chamey J., “The United States and the Revision o f the 1982 Convention on the 
Law o f the Sea”, (1992) 23 Ocean Development and International Law , pp.279-303; Anderson, D.H., 
“Universal Participation in UNCLOS” and “Further Efforts to Ensure Universal Participation in the 
UNCLOS” in (1993) 42 I.C.L.Q.,pp.654-664 and (1994) 43 /.C.L.0.,pp.886-893 respectively; and 
Baslar,K., The Concept o f  the Common Heritage o f  Mankind in International Law, (The 
Hague/Boston/London, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1998),pp.205-220.
226 See, for example, the comments o f the representative o f  Algeria, Mr. Lamamra, to the 100th plenary 
meeting o f the forty-eighth session o f the General Assembly as follows: “It should be noted that, at 
times, some provisions o f  the draft Agreement [ 1994 Agreement] go well beyond mere implementation 
o f  certain provisions o f  Part XI o f  the Convention and often introduce substantive modifications o f  the 
original text. Yet realism led my delegation to agree with the terms o f  the draft Agreement, which in the 
circumstances are the only possible basis fo r promoting universal acceptance o f  the Convention, in 
particular by the world's largest maritime Powers. ” General Assembly, forty-eighth session, Official 
Records, A/48/PV.100 o f 27 July 1994, p.26.
227 Law o f  the Sea Bulletin, Special Issue IV, 16 November 1994, p.l.
228 Ibid.
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Prior to the current shift to a market-oriented economy policy, most African states 
had on independence, mostly in the fifties and sixties, established a number of state- 
owned enterprises and thereby had mainly a regulated government dominated 
economy. By the eighties these states found themselves in dire economic condition 
mainly as a result of corruption and mismanagement of the economy. Consequently, 
many of them approached international financial institutions, such as the IMF and the 
World Bank, for financial aid. These institutions prescribed deregulation of the 
economies for these African states, largely in the form of government divestment
229from state-owned enterprises (Privatisation). The reasoning of these international 
financial institutions, based on their ethos of promoting a free market economy, was, 
amongst other things, that deregulation promotes economic efficiency. Over the years 
the policy-makers in most African states appear to have accepted that regulation as 
exemplified in state-owned enterprises leads to economic inefficiency. They believe 
that deregulation in order to promote a free-market milieu will lead to economic 
efficiency and cost-effectiveness. For example, President Olusegun Obasanjo of 
Nigeria in support of deregulation through privatisation declared that state enterprises 
“suffer from fundamental problems o f  defective capital structure, excessive 
bureaucratic control or intervention, inappropriate technology, gross incompetence
9*230and mismanagement, blatant corruption and crippling complacency.” Another top 
policy-maker in Egypt contends that “Public opinion is different today from ten years 
ago. People used to be afraid o f  privatisation. They thought the intervention o f the 
government was crucial. ”231 He went on to remark that, “After many successful 
privatisations people have become convinced that it is good. Many people tell us we 
are not going fast enough.1,232
It is therefore not surprising, in the light of the various domestic policies of African 
states embracing deregulation through privatisation, that a number of African states
229 See Makalou, O., Privatisation in Africa: A Critical Analysis, 9th International Anti-Corruption 
Conference(IACC),10-15 October 1999, Durban, South-
Africa.http://www.transparencv.org/iacc/9th iacc/papers/davl/wsl/dnld/dlwsl omakalou pdf 
[Accessed 11 February 2005] and Harsch, E., “Privatisation shifts gears in Africa”, Africa Recovery(A 
United Nations Publication), Vol. 14(1), April 2000,
http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vol 14no 1 /apr00.htm [Accessed 11 February 2005]
230 Harsch, ibid.
231 “Special Advertising Section, World Focus -Egypt”, Time Magazine, Vol. 160(22), 25 November
2002, p.2
232 Ibid.
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were not averse to accepting the 1994 Agreement in the international sphere. The 
basis of the Agreement is that the original Part XI, which in many ways involved 
much regulation by the ISA, would lead to economic inefficiency. The 1994 
Agreement purports to promote economic efficiency in the deep sea bed regime 
through free-market principles233 and cost-effectiveness.234
3.3.2. Lack o f  finance.
The effect of lack of finance cannot be overlooked as one of the critical factors 
influencing the decision of African states to concede to the Agreement. Njenga, 
relying on a United Nations Office of Ocean Affairs background note on the 
Administrative Arrangements, Structure and Financial Implications of the ISA, and 
also the proposal of the AALCC and IOI,235 argued that the financial requirements of 
the new institutions could be effectively met by developing states.236 The reality on 
ground suggests the contrary.237 In the international sphere the bulk of the financial 
contributions that ensures the effective day to day running of global international 
institutions, comes mainly from the developed industrialised states, the instigators of 
the need to alter the original Part XI.238 The attempt by developing states to reduce 
this influence by trying to evolve an institutional framework able to generate its own 
income independent of financial contributions of member states, was flawed in the 
sense that this income was to come from contractors’ fees to be derived mainly from 
the entities of the industrialised developed states that had refused to be parties to the
See, for example, sections 5, 6 and 8 o f the Annex to the Agreement.
234 See Section 1 o f the Annex to the Agreement.
235 Alternative Cost-Effective Models for Pioneer Cooperation in Exploration and Technology 
Development and Training: Joint Study by the IOI and AALCC (1989) in NILOS Documentary 
Yearbook, op.cit. Vol.5 (1991), pp.558-594. This study arose out o f  a joint seminar o f the AALCC and 
IOI organised during the 8th Summer Session o f  the PRECOM in August 1990.
236 See Njenga, F.X., “The Significance and Cost o f  Ratification o f  the Law o f the Sea Convention 
1982”, Paper presented at Pacem in Maribus XIX, on the theme “Ocean Governance: National, 
Regional, Global Institutional Mechanisms for Sustainable Development in the Oceans”, Lisbon, 
Portugal, 18-21 November 1991. http.7/www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uul5oe/uul5oe08.htm See 
also Doc. AALCC/XXX/CAIRO/91/7 in NILOS Documentary Yearbook, op.cit. Vol.6 (1990), pp.524- 
544.
237 As at 31 March 2004, 52 members o f the ISA, mainly developing states, were in arrears for a period 
of two years or more in respect o f payment o f their contributions, out o f which 23 were African states 
(Benin, Cape Verde, Comoros, Cote d’ Ivoire, the Democratic Republic o f Congo, Egypt, Equatorial 
Guinea, Gabon, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Sao Tome 
and Principe, Seychelles, Somalia, the Sudan, Togo, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe). See para. 58 of  
the Report o f the Secretary-General o f  the International Seabed Authority under article 166 paragraph 
4, o f  the United Nations Convention on the Law o f  the Sea, ISBA/10/A/3 o f 31 March 2004.
238 See Part II o f Chapter 4 o f this thesis.
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LOSC, as a result of the original Part XI provisions. If such states are not parties to 
the LOSC, their entities cannot apply for contracts to undertake seabed mining.240
The other side o f the coin concerning the issue of lack of finance, which in many 
regards must have been a determining factor in the unwillingness of African states, 
along with other developing states, to go it alone, was what Marffy-Mantuano 
describes as the “tragically depressed situation” of these states.241 Around the 
eighties and the nineties most African states found themselves in dire economic crisis, 
not even able to meet the costs o f their domestic needs, as a result of scarce resources. 
This made international commitments, including supporting international institutions, 
an additional strain on scarce resources. These states were therefore in no position to 
wholly support the institutional framework o f the deep seabed regime even if cost 
effective measures were adopted. This was all the more so since seabed mining was 
unlikely to be undertaken on a commercially profitable scale in the near future.
3.3.3. The effect o f  the collapse o f  the U.S.S.R. on the international balance ofpower.
In his report on the informal consultations leading to the Agreement, the United
Nations Secretary-General also pointed out that beyond the shift to a free-market
economy “certain significant po liticar  changes also underpinned the need for the
consultations.242 The collapse of the former U.S.S.R., as a result of Mikhail
Gorbachev’s glasnost and perestroika, can certainly be regarded as one of the
“significant politicar  changes which led to the informal consultations, eventually
culminating in the Agreement. The effect of the collapse of U.S.S.R. in the
international balance of power was described by Margaret Thatcher who, as the
former Prime Minister of Britain, had the privilege of being involved in realpolitik, in
the following words:
“As the jargon o f the experts in geopolitics has it -and in such matters a 
certain amount ofjargon is permitted — we have moved with the end o f the 
cold war and the implosion o f  the Soviet Union from a ‘bipolar' to a 
‘unipolar ’ world. Today America is the only superpower -  not even the
239 See 3.2.3. above.
240 See Art. 153(2) (a) o f LOSC.
241 Marffy-Mantuano, “The Procedural Framework o f  the Agreement Implementing the 1982 
UNCLOS”, op.cit.p.815.
242 Law o f  the Sea Bulletin, Special Issue IV, 16 November 1994, p .l.
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Roman, Habsburg or British Empires in their prime -  had the resources, 
reach or superiority over its closest rival enjoyed by America today. ” 243
This shift from a ‘bipolar’ to a ‘unipolar’ world had an impact on African states’
'clout’ in the international sphere.244 For as long as there were two “superpowers”, 
both trying to expand their sphere of influence, African states were able to utilise the 
conflict between these “superpowers” to induce favourable concessions from one or 
the other of them.245 It has been argued that during the Cold War the two “super 
powers” were attracted to Africa for strategic reasons, an attraction that has since 
waned with the end of the Cold War.246 For instance, as a result of the United States 
interest to maximise the freedoms o f the high seas, especially as regards navigation 
and overflight, in order to counter any perceived threat from the former USSR, the 
developing states, including African states, were, as a result of the package deal 
approach in UNCLOS, able to eke concessions, including those on the deep seabed, 
from the United States of America.247 However, during the course of the informal 
consultations African states were faced with a situation where the existing unipolar 
world left “the lesser powers” with little choice but to accept the dictates of the only 
“superpower” and its “allies. ”
243 Thatcher, M., Statecraft -  Strategies fo r  a Changing World, (London, HarperCollins Publishers, 
2002), p.25. On the Cold War see LaFeber, W., America, Russia and the Cold War 1945-1990 (New  
York, McGraw-Hill Inc., 1991).
244 Okoth, P.G., “A Decade o f  Post-Cold War Disorder and Regional Disintegration in Africa”, Paper 
presented at the African Association o f Political Science (AAPS) 13th Biennial Congress on the theme, 
“African Politics in the New Millennium: Facing the Challenges,” held in Yaounde, Cameroon, June 
19-22,2001. http://www.aaps.co.zw/Publications/AIJP/Okoth.html; Reisman, W.M., “International 
Law after the Cold War”, (1990) 84(4) AJIL, p.859 at 863.
245 This is not, however, to suggest that even in the heat o f  the Cold War the two superpowers did not 
in certain situations, even including the issue o f  the seabed regime, have common interests to protect. 
For example at the initial stages o f negotiations at UNCLOS III, the then two superpowers both took 
the position that the Authority should not have the exclusive right to explore and exploit the Area. The 
only point o f  divergence appears to have been based on ideology. For the USA its preference was for 
private companies to be the ones to engage in seabed mining while the then USSR wanted it to be only 
States that should be engaged in such mining. See Ogley, Internationalizing the Seabed,
op.cit.pp.pp.34-36 and 148-149 and Mahmoudi, The Law o f  Deep SeaBed Mining, op.cit.pp.180-182.
246 See Callaghy, T. M., “Africa and the World Political Economy: More Caught between a Rock and a 
Hard Place” in Harbeson, J.W., & Rothchild, D., (eds.), Africa in World Politics: The African State 
System in Flux (Boulder, Westview Press, 2000), p.43 at 44. For another view, see Aka, P. C., “Africa 
in the New World Order: The Trouble with the Notion o f  African Marginalization”, (2001) 9 Tulane 
Journal o f  International & Comparative Law, pp. 187-221, where the writer argues that the whole 
notion o f marginalisation of Africa as a result o f  superpower disengagement is misleading.
247 See Chamey, J.I., “The United States and the Revision o f the 1982 Convention on the Law o f the 
Sea”, op.cit. p.282; Schmidt, M.G., Common H eritage or Common Burden? : the United States 
Position on Development o f  a Regime fo r  Deep Sea-Bed Mining in the Law o f  the Sea Convention, 
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989), pp. 103-213; Larson, D.L., “Reagan Rejection o f the UN Convention, 
(1984-85) 14 Ocean Development and International Law, p.337 at 338-339 and “Security Issues and 
the Law o f the Sea: A General Framework” (1985) 15 Ocean Development and International Law, 
pp.99 at 101, 123-124.
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3.4. Conclusion.
There is no doubt that the 1994 Agreement has significantly altered the original Part 
XI provisions. Apart from altering the institutional framework, which is discussed in 
more detail in chapter 4 of this thesis, the Agreement has substantially modified the 
original Part XI provisions on transfer of technology, production policy, financial 
terms of contracts and the review conference. These alterations, in most part, tend to 
favour the industrialised developed states to the disadvantage of developing states, 
including African states. While some of the provisions of the original Part XI are 
unchanged by the Agreement, it does appear, in the light of the 1994 Agreement and 
divergence in interpretation, these provisions are not in practical terms what was 
originally envisaged by African states. For example, the principle of the common 
heritage of mankind, although unchanged, has been significantly watered down by the 
Agreement. Also the principle of the use o f the Area for only peaceful purposes 
appears to be weakened by the fact that certain states argue that it does not preclude 
the use of the Area for military activities in certain situations. The natural question, 
therefore, is why African states, which had taken a vocal position in the UNCLOS III 
on these issues, were ready to make concessions during the informal consultations 
that culminated in the 1994 Agreement. This chapter suggests two broad reasons for 
this. The first is the lack of an articulated common position on deep seabed issues 
during the informal consultations, similar to the OAU Declaration during the 
UNCLOS III, to serve as a base point for a common negotiating stance by African 
states on the concerns raised by certain developed industrialised states in respect of 
the original Part XI provisions. Second, certain economic and political changes in 
both the international sphere and the domestic setting of African states led to a change 
in their perception of the issues of the deep seabed regime. These economic and 
political changes identified in this chapter are the emergence of the market-oriented 
economy as the dominant policy in most African states; the lack of finance to go it 
alone for most African states, most o f which from the eighties were already going 
through dire economic crisis; and the collapse of the former USSR, which had the 
effect of diminishing the ability of African states to play the then two superpowers 
against each other in order to get concessions in international fora.
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Although African states have accepted the Agreement, which has as its bedrock free 
market principles, it is recommended that the Agreement in its application needs to 
take into consideration the peculiar disadvantaged position of the African continent in 
relation to deep seabed mining. In applying free market principles, unequal parties 
cannot be treated alike. Even in the domestic setting of virtually all the industrialised 
states involved in bringing about the 1994 Agreement, the application of free market 
principles clearly recognises that certain disadvantaged members of society require 
special dispensation based on clear-cut guidelines to enable them to enjoy the benefits
9 4 8of a free market economy. There is no reason why similar special consideration 
should not exist in the international society for the continent of Africa in respect of 
deep seabed mining activities. The concessions under the Agreement are vague and 
appear to be based on the arbitrary largesse of the industrialised states, rather than on 
clear and specific guidelines. While it is arguable that general, rather than detailed, 
principles may be more appropriate for the Agreement, especially at this stage when 
commercial exploitation of the deep seabed is not imminent, it is suggested that the 
ISA start to fashion out detailed rules and policies that would not only encourage 
African states and other disadvantaged developing states to participate in deep seabed 
mining activities, but would also provide effective protection for African land-based 
producers.249
248 For example, in the domestic setting o f most industrialised states operating the free market economy 
there are certain social security benefits for poor persons and also special provisions for disabled 
members o f the society.
249 See Art. 160(2)(k) o f LOSC that gives the Assembly the power “to consider problems o f a general 
nature in connection with activities in the Area arising in particular for developing states, as well as 
those problems for states in connection with activities in the Area that are due to their geographical 
location, particularly for landlocked and geographically disadvantaged states.” On the participation of  
African states in deep seabed mining, the issues will be returned to in chapter 5 and 6.
159
CHAPTER FOUR
INSTITUTIONS OF THE DEEP SEABED REGIME AND AFRICAN STATES.
This chapter shall limit its scope to considering institutions established in respect of the 
legal regime of the deep seabed under Part XI of the LOSC, as modified by the 1994 
Implementation Agreement, having regard to the contributions and role of African states. 
It is divided into three parts. The first part of the chapter will examine the institutional 
framework of the regime and the role of African states. This part is divided into two sub­
parts, Part A deals with the International Seabed Authority (ISA), while Part B deals with 
the dispute settlement mechanism. The second part of the chapter examines the issue of 
funding of these institutions and the contributions of Africa states, having in mind the 
influence exercised in an international organisation by the states parties that are the major 
financiers, while the third part is the conclusion.
Part I
4.1. Institutional framework o f the deep seabed regime.
The institutional framework of the regime of the Area was a critical part of the agenda in 
the course of deliberations and negotiations during the UNCLOS III. The negotiations at 
the UNCLOS III on the status, composition, powers, functions and decision-making in 
the various institutions once again manifested the great friction in the law of the sea 
between the interests of the international community as a whole and national interests; 
between mare liberum and mare clausum; and between the north (represented by 
technologically superior developed states) and the south (represented by the 
technologically less endowed developing states). By the end of the conference a rather 
comprehensive and complicated institutional framework was put in place by the LOSC 
82, which was later modified by the 1994 Agreement. The regime established an 
institutional framework, an “international government” over the seabed,1 consisting of
1 Allott, P., “Power Sharing in the Law o f the Sea”, (1983) 77(1) AJIL, pp.l at 13-14. These structures can 
be equated to the structures contained in a typical democratic setting found in municipal governments. The 
Assembly could be said to a type o f legislative arm, while the Council, with its Commissions, could be 
placed as the executive. Of course the Seabed Chamber o f the ITLOS would be the judicial arm. However, 
despite this analogy with the municipal democratic system it must, o f course, be pointed out that whatever 
similarities exist between the international and municipal law systems, there are peculiarities which
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the ISA and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), Seabed Disputes 
Chamber.
4.1.1. The African position on institutions o f the seabed at UNCLOS III.
African states favoured at the UNCLOS III a deep seabed Authority with considerable 
powers that was autonomous, strong and in complete control of deep seabed mining 
activities. This was in contrast with the position of certain industrialised developed states 
that wanted a weak Authority, acting merely as a licensing or registry body for seabed 
miners.2 The African position was articulated in the 1974 Declaration of the Organisation 
of African Unity on Issues of the Law of the Sea, which declared as follows:
“That the African States affirm that:
(a) The competence o f the international machinery shall extend over the seabed 
and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof beyond the limits o f national 
jurisdiction;
(b) The machinery shall possess fu ll legal personality with functional privileges 
and immunities. It may have some working relationship with the United 
Nations system but it shall maintain considerable political and financial 
independence;
(c) The machinery shall be invested with strong and comprehensive powers. 
Among others it shall have the right to explore and exploit the area, to 
regulate the activities in the area, to handle equitable distribution o f benefit 
and to minimise any adverse economic effects by the fluctuation o f prices o f 
raw materials resulting from activities carried out in the area; to distribute 
equitably among all developing countries the proceeds from any tax (fiscal 
imposition) levied in connexion with activities relating to the exploitation o f 
the area; to protect the marine environment; to regulate and conduct 
scientific research and in this way to give fu ll meaning to the concept o f the 
common heritage o f mankind;
(d) There shall be an assembly o f all members which shall be the repository o f 
all powers and a council o f limited membership whose composition shall 
reflect the principle o f equitable geographical distribution and shall exercise, 
in a democratic manner, most o f  the functions o f the machinery. There shall 
also be a secretariat to service all the organs and a tribunal for the settlement
distinguish the two. For example, in respect o f the international law system, sovereignty and the formal 
equality o f states require the consent of states before they can be bound by decisions of an international 
organisation. On this see generally Sands, P., & Klein, P., Bowett’s Law o f International Institutions, 5th 
edition (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2001), pp.261-438.
2 Rembe,N.S., Africa and the International Law o f  the Sea: A Study o f  the Contribution o f  the African 
States to the Third United Nations Conference on the Law o f  the Sea, (Alphen aan den Rijn, the 
Netherlands, Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1980), pp. 57-68; See generally Adede, A., “The Group of 77 and the 
Establishment of the International Sea-Bed Authority”, (1979) 7 Ocean Development and International 
Law, pp. 31-63.
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o f disputes. The Assembly and the Council would be competent to establish as 
appropriate subsidiary organs for specialised purposes 3
The Nigerian delegation in its statement before the First Committee of UNCLOS III
emphasised the African position, by stating:
“This broad concept [common heritage o f mankind], translated into practice; 
calls fo r  the establishment o f an international machinery which should have 
jurisdiction over the uses o f  the seabed beyond the limits o f national 
jurisdiction, with properly defined powers, functions and authority. The 
functions and powers o f the international machinery must not, in our opinion, 
be restricted to those o f a simple registration or licensing office, as some 
would wish. On the contrary the international machinery should have 
extensive and far-reaching powers and functions ” 4
An underlying consideration of African states as regards the institutional machinery of 
the Area as reflected by the OAU Declaration that advocated an “Assembly o f all 
members which shall be the repository o f all powers” was that it should be a 
democratised institutional framework, devoid of the dominance of developed industrial 
states.5 This was in contrast with the situation in the United Nations where the General 
Assembly, the plenary body, rather than being the repository of all powers, appears to be 
more of a deliberative organ only able to make non-binding recommendations, with 
executive powers being conferred on the Security Council of limited membership, 
including the permanent members.6 The deliberations at the UNCLOS III on the 
institutional framework of the regime of the Area were in essence a struggle for the 
control of the decision-making mechanism of these institutions. African states and other 
like-minded developing states, coalesced under common interest groups such as the
3 Para. 22 of Document A/CONF.62/33, UNCLOS III, Official Records, Vol.III, p.63
4 DOALOS, Law o f  the Sea, Concept o f  Common Heritage, Legislative History ofArticles 133 to 150 and 
311(6) o f the United Nations Convention on the Law o f  the Sea( New York, United Nations, 1996), p.l 15. 
See also the views o f the following African states on the institutional framework of the regime: Egypt in 
UNCLOS III, Official Records, Vol.I, p.76,para.72 ,and Kenya; Madagascar; Tanzania; Congo; Tunisia; 
Algeria; Libya in UNCLOS III, Official Records, Vol. II, pp. 19-20, paras.27-32; pp.20-21, paras.38-39; 
Tanzania, p.33, paras.38 and 40; p.35, paras.67 and 69; p.36, para.3; p.41, paras.52-56; p.43, paras.79-80, 
respectively.
5 See Conclusions in the General Report o f the African States’ Regional Seminar on the Law of the Sea, 
Yaounde, 20-30 June 1972, 12 ILM 210 (1973), Recommendations 111(4) & (5) and IV(1) that stressed the 
necessity for the Authority to function democratically devoid of any veto and weighted voting system. Also 
for the Authority to be structured and operated in such a way that the developing states would be the 
primary controllers and beneficiaries.
6 See Chapter IV(General Assembly) and Chapter V (Security Council) o f the United Nations Charter and 
Sands and Klein (eds.), Bowett’s Law o f  International Institutions,op.cit.pp.21-55.
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Group of 77, pushed for a more democratic institutional framework that would enable 
them exert influence by reason of their numerical strength. On the other hand, 
industrialised developed states, which already had extensive control over existing 
international organisations, were of course interested in retaining such influence in the 
institutions of the deep seabed regime in order to protect their financial, political and 
other strategic interests.7
The decision-making structure of the original Part XI, which vested a lot of powers in the
Assembly, the plenary organ, was therefore one of the reasons why certain industrialised
states initially refused to ratify the LOSC. According to Oxman, these states wanted “a
decision-making role in the deep seabed regime that fairly reflects and effectively
protects the political and economic interests and financial contributions o f participating
States”* In other words, they wanted a decision-making process in which they, as the
providers of the technology and finance, would have control. This is more bluntly
expressed by Ambassador James L. Malone, the special representative of the President of
the United States, in his statement to the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries
Committee when he said:
“The decision-making system should provide that, on issues o f highest 
importance to a nation, that nation will have affirmative influence on the 
outcome. Conversely nations with major economic interests should be secure 
in the knowledge that they can prevent decisions adverse to their interests. ” 9
The refusal of certain industrialised developed states to ratify the LOSC eventually led to 
the 1994 Agreement, which accommodated their concerns. The whole of section 3 of the 
annex of the Agreement deals with various rules on decision making by the organs of the 
ISA to ensure that the interests of the minority industrialised developed states are 
adequately protected. Under the 1994 Agreement there is an emphasis on decision­
making in all the organs of the ISA, as a general rule, being by consensus.10 Thereafter it 
provides various rules on decision-making in the event that the organs are unable to reach
7 Rembe, Africa and International Law o f  the Sea, op.cit. pp.64-68
8 Oxman, B., “The 1994 Agreement and the Convention,” (1994)88 AJIL, pp.687 at 689.
9 Ibid, p.690.
10 Section 3(2) of the Annex to the Agreement.
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a decision by consensus.11 While providing for various means to arrive at decisions 
through voting in the event of a failure to arrive at a consensus, certain inbuilt provisions 
effectively weaken the powers of the Assembly. Such inbuilt provisions include a 
requirement that decisions of the Assembly on certain matters shall be based on a 
recommendation of the Council, and that decisions of both the Assembly and the Council 
related to financial and budgetary matters shall be based on the recommendations of the 
Finance Committee.12 This, coupled with the fact that the Agreement has effectively, as 
will be seen subsequently in this chapter, carved out a strong position for the 
industrialised developed states in the Council and the Finance Committee, has had the 
effect of weakening the influence of the Assembly. Oxman points out that the 
Agreement: " ...increases the influence o f the United States and other industrial states in 
the Sea-Bed Authority, and reflects their long standing preference for emphasizing 
interests, not merely numbers, in the structure and voting arrangements o f international 
organizations. ” 13
4.1.2. Decision Making and Voting Rights in International Institutions.
Although international organisations are usually set up with the altruistic idea of 
implementing a common goal of the member states which make up the organisation, in 
actuality these states are by and large interested in protecting their narrow national 
interests in such organisations, sometimes even to the detriment of the common goal. In 
order to protect such national interests a strong influence is required in the decision­
making process of an international organisation.14 Such decision-making may be by
15 16 17 18unanimity, majority voting, weighed voting or consensus. The last three methods 
are utilised in one way or another in the LOSC and the 1994 Agreement.
11 The voting procedures include the requirement o f a majority decision in respect of procedural matters 
and two-thirds majority in respect o f substantive matters. See for example Section 3(3) and (5) o f the 
Annex to the Agreement.
12 Section 3(4) and (7) o f the Annex to the Agreement.
13 Oxman, “The 1994 Agreement and the Convention”, op.cit.p. 695.
14 See generally Cox, R., & Jacobson, H., (eds.), The Anatomy o f  Influence: Decision Making in 
International Organization, (New Haven/London, Yale University Press, 1973). Also on the procedural 
aspects of decision making in international organisations, see Sands & Klein, (eds.), Bowett’s Law o f  
International Institutions, op. cit. pp.263-275.
15This requires the agreement of all members. See, for example, Art.5 of the Covenant o f the League of 
Nations which stated: “Except where otherwise expressly provided in this Covenant or by the terms of the
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4.1.3. Institutions o f  the Seabed Regime.
Examination of the institutions of the deep seabed regime will include an examination of 
the membership of African states and their role in the decision-making process of each 
institution under the LOSC, as modified by the Agreement, with a view to determining 
the extent of the influence of African states, if any, in the various institutions.
4.1.3.1. International Seabed Authority (ISA).
I. International personality
As far back as 1949 the International Court of Justice (ICJ) confirmed that 
international organisations could have international personality, if so conferred 
expressly or by necessary implications by the constituent treaty.19 The ICJ, giving an 
advisory opinion specifically related to the international personality of the United 
Nations, said:
“That is not the same thing as saying that it is a State, which it certainly is 
not, or that its legal personality and rights and duties are the same as those 
o f a State ... What it does mean is that it is a subject o f international law and
present Treaty, decisions at any meeting o f the Assembly or o f the Council shall require the agreement of 
all the Members of the League represented at the meeting.”
16 This may be by way o f a simple majority or a qualified majority such as two-thirds or three-quarters. See 
for example Art. 18 (2) and (3) o f the United Nations Charter which states: “Decisions of the General 
Assembly on important questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority o f the members present and 
voting.” “Decisions on other questions, including the determination o f additional categories o f questions to 
be decided by a two-thirds majority, shall be made by a majority o f the members present and voting.”
17 This is a system whereby votes are allocated to members o f an international organisation on the basis of 
political, economic, financial or other predetermined relevant criteria. This usually gives certain members 
of the Organisation a veto over certain decision o f the organisation. See for example Article V section 3 of 
the Articles o f Agreement o f the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which states:
“(a) Each member shall have two hundred fifty votes plus one additional vote for each share of stock 
held;(b) Except as otherwise specifically provided, all matters before the Bank shall be decided by a 
majority o f the votes cast.” http://www.worldbank.org/ [Accessed on 20 May 2005].
18 This is when the decision is made in the absence o f formal objection by any o f the Parties. See for 
example Article IX of the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organisation, 33 ILM 
1144(1994), which states: “The WTO shall continue the practice o f decision-making by consensus 
followed under GATT 1947. Except as otherwise provided, where a decision cannot be arrived at by 
consensus, the matter shall be decided by voting.” This method of decision making was adopted by the 
UNCLOS III. See Buzan, B., “Negotiating by Consensus: Developments in Technique at the United 
Nations Conference on the Law o f the Sea”, (1981) 75 A//L.324-348. On decision making in international 
organisations generally, see Sands & Klein, B ow ett’s Law o f  International Institutions, op.cit. pp. 263-275.
19 Reparation fo r  Injuries Suffered in the Service o f  the United Nations Case, ICJ Reports, 1949, p. 174. See 
generally Montaldo, R., “International Legal Personality and Implied Powers of International 
Organisations”, (1970) 44 B. Y.B.I.L. pp. 111-155 and also Sands & Klein, (eds.), Bowett ’s Law of  
International Institutions, op.cit. pp. 469-531.
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capable o f possessing international rights and duties, and that it has the 
capacity to maintain its rights by bringing international claims ” 20
In the case of the ISA, Article 176 of the LOSC provides: “The Authority shall have 
international legal personality and such legal capacity as may be necessary for the 
exercise o f its functions and the fulfilment o f its purpose. ”
II. Membership
All states parties to the LOSC are automatically members of the ISA.21 As of 1 February 
2005 there were 148 members of the ISA, consisting of 147 states, including 39 African 
states, and an international organisation, the European Community.22 The LOSC also 
makes provision for certain states to participate in the ISA as observers. 23 Currently 
there are 44 observer states, including the United States of America and 13 African states, 
mainly landlocked states.24 The ISA is based on the principle of sovereign equality of its 
members.25
III. Seat o f the ISA.
Under the Convention the seat of the ISA is located in Jamaica, a state which belongs to
26the Latin American and Caribbean regional grouping. However, the ISA is empowered 
to establish such regional centres or offices as it deems necessary for the exercise of its 
functions.27 Presently the ISA has not exercised its powers to establish regional offices.
On 26 August 1999 and 17 December 2003 the Headquarters Agreement and the 
Supplementary Agreement was signed between the government of Jamaica and the ISA
20Reparations Case, Supra at p. 179.
21 Art. 156 (2) of LOSC.
22 See UN website http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference files/status2005.pdf and ISA website 
http://www.isa.org.im/en/members/default.asp [Accessed on 6 May 2005]. Denmark, Latvia and Burkina 
Faso became the latest members of the ISA having become parties to the LOSC on 16 November, 2004, 23 
December 2004 and 25 January 2005 respectively.
23 See Art. 156 (3) of LOSC.
24 http://www.isa.org.im/en/members/default.asp [Accessed on 6 May 2005]. African observer states are 
Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Malawi, Morocco, 
Niger, Rwanda and Swaziland.
25 Art. 157 (3) of LOSC.
26 Art. 156 (4) of LOSC.
27 Art. 156 (5) o f LOSC.
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to regulate the relationship between the ISA and the host state, as well as the facilities to 
be utilised by the ISA in the territory of Jamaica.
IV. Powers and Functions o f the ISA.
The ISA is a creation of the LOSC as modified by the 1994 Agreement, and these treaties 
determine the scope of its powers and functions. The LOSC makes it clear that the 
powers and functions of the ISA shall be those expressly conferred upon it by the 
Convention. However, it adds that the ISA shall also have such incidental powers, which 
are consistent with the provisions of the Convention, that are implicit in, and necessary 
for the exercise of, its powers and functions with respect to activities in the Area.29 The 
“implicit” and “necessary” test must be satisfied before the ISA can exercise any powers 
or functions that are not expressly conferred by the LOSC, as modified by the 
Agreement. A literal interpretation of the provisions of the LOSC on incidental powers 
would seem to suggest that such powers are available only for the exercise by the ISA of 
its powers and functions in relation to activities in the Area and not in respect of its 
powers and functions under Article 82 in relation to the extended continental shelf. 
However, in the view of this writer, there is no logical reason why the ISA should not 
have similar incidental powers in respect of its functions and powers under Article 82.
i. The Area.
The ISA is established as the body through which states parties are to organise and 
control activities in the Area, particularly with a view to administering the resources 
therein.30 It is also to provide for the equitable sharing on a non-discriminatory basis of 
the financial and economic benefits derived from activities in the Area through any 
appropriate mechanism, giving special consideration to the interest and needs of 
developing states and peoples that have not gained independence.31
28 See Paras.60-64 of the Report o f the Secretary-General o f the International Seabed Authority under 
article 166, paragraph 4, o f the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, ISBA/10/A/3 of 31 
March 2004.
29 Art. 157(2) of LOSC and Section 1 paragraph 1 o f the Agreement.
30 Art. 157(1) o f LOSC and Section 1, paragraph 1 o f the Annex to the Agreement.
31 Arts. 140 and 160(f) o f LOSC.
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The LOSC defines the resources of the Area as “all solid, liquid or gaseous mineral
resources in situ in the area at or beneath the sea-bed, including polymetallic nodules, ”
which when recovered are referred to as “minerals”32 This rather restricted definition of
the resources of the Area limits the ISA to mineral-related activities of the seabed under
the high seas. Presently, it appears that use of the Area for other activities, such as
pipeline and cable laying 33 and scientific research,34 unconnected with exploitation of
seabed mineral resources do not fall within the competence of the ISA and therefore can
be freely carried out as part of the freedoms of the high seas.35 Although this is so in
theory, in reality there are potentials for overlap between the freedoms of the high seas
and the functions of the ISA in the Area. The Secretary-General of the ISA alludes to this
possibility when he says:
“The problem is that, while there is a freedom to engage in marine scientific 
research on the high seas and in the seabed, mineral resource prospecting 
and exploration in the Area are regulated through the Authority. The 
Convention fails to adequately distinguish between the terms “marine 
scientific research ”, “prospecting ” and “exploration ”, nor does it make a 
distinction between “pure” and “applied” scientific research. The problem 
becomes even more acute when we consider the new scientific discoveries 
that have been made in recent years, particularly the deep sea vents, which 
comprise both mineral resources (polymetallic sulphides) and genetic 
resources in the form o f rich biological communities o f  unknown potential 
use to science. Here we have not only a very real conflict between true 
marine scientific research and mineral prospecting, but also the potential for  
multiple use conflicts between, fo r  example, deep seabed miners, so-called 
bioprospectors, and the proper conservation and management o f the deep 
ocean environment. Clearly, there is a close relationship between the conduct 
o f activities relating to non-living resources, fo r  which the Authority has 
responsibility and the sustainable use o f living resources o f the deep ocean ”.
The limited role of the ISA in relation to natural resources, with an undue emphasis on 
polymetallic nodules, has been criticised by Elizabeth Borgese who makes a case for an
32 Art. 133 (a) and (b) of LOSC.
33 Art. 112 o f LOSC.
34 Arts. 143 and 256 of LOSC.
35 Art. 87 o f LOSC and also see Churchill, R.R. and Lowe, A.V., The Law o f the Sea, 3rd 
edition(Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1999),pp. 239-240.
36 Statement o f Satya N. Nandan, Secretary-General o f the International Seabed Authority, Agenda Item 
30(a): Oceans and the Law of the Sea, 56th Session o f the General Assembly of the United Nations, 28, 
November, 2001, p.5.
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expanded role for the ISA.37 She takes the view that there is undue emphasis by the ISA 
on manganese nodules, the exploitation of which is uneconomical in the foreseeable 
future. She advocates that the ISA should in addition examine other mineral resources 
such as sulphides and methane hydrates, the exploitation of which in her view is more 
imminent.38 At present the ISA is working on a request submitted to it in respect of the 
adoption of regulations for the exploration of polymetallic sulphides and cobalt-rich 
crusts.39 Borgese also suggests an expanded role for the ISA in respect of the tremendous 
genetic resources within the Area with vast potential markets in such industries as the 
pharmaceutical, the waste treatment, food processing, oil-well services and paper 
processing industries.40 She argues that, although the present definition of natural 
resources in the Area does not seem to cover these genetic resources,41 it is a lacuna that 
must be filled through a regime of rules and regulations, which would allow for not only 
the conservation of bio-diversity in the Area and also sustainable use of its components, 
but would also provide for the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the 
use of genetic resources, the participation of developing states in the bio-industries and 
international co-operation in technology development in this sector.42 Borgese further 
suggests an expanded role for the ISA with regard to the service sector being developed
37 Borgese, E., The Oceanic Circle: Governing the Seas as a Global Resource, (Tokyo, Japan, United 
Nations Press, 1998), pp. 171 and 199; Borgese, E., “Caird Medal Address”, (2001) 25 Marine Policy, pp. 
391-397.
38 Borgese, “Caird Medal Address,” ibid. pp. 393-394.
39Paras. 111-113 o f the Report o f the Secretary-General o f the International Seabed Authority, 
ISBA/10/A/3 o f 31 March 2004.
40 It has been suggested, for instance, that the potentially market uses o f hyperthermophilic bacteria, much 
of which may be found round the hydrothermal vents on the deep seabed, are potentially worth US$3 
billion annually. See Anthon, D.K, “Law o f the Sea’s Biological Diversity,” (1998) 36 Columbia Journal 
o f  Transnational Law, pp.341 at 348-349. Also see generally Glowka, L., “Genetic Resources, Marine 
Scientific Research and the International Seabed Area,” (1999) 8(1) Review o f European Community & 
International Environmental Law {RECIEL), pp.56-66.
41 The restricted definition of the resources o f the Area can be compared with the wider definition o f the 
natural resources of the continental shelf under Article 77 o f LOSC which not only includes minerals but 
also “.. ..other non-living resources of the sea-bed and subsoil together with living organisms belonging to 
sedentary species, that is to say, organisms which, at the harvestable stage, either are immobile on or under 
the sea-bed or are unable to move except in constant physical contact with the sea-bed or the subsoil.” See 
Borgese, The Oceanic Circle: Governing the Seas as a Global Resource, op.cit. pp. 170-171.
42 Borgese, “Caird Medal Address,” op. cit.p.395. More recently Professor Tullio Scovazzi o f the 
University o f Milano-Bicocca, Milan, Italy urged closer scrutiny o f the mandate of the ISA in the 
exploration of genetic resources since this would be a more immediate and profitable activity on the 
seabed. See International Seabed Authority, Press Release, SB/10/20 of 4 June 2004. See also Scovazzi, T., 
“Mining, Protection of the Environment, Scientific Research and Bio prospecting: Some Considerations on
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within the Area. She argues that the ISA should have a regulatory role over the 
telecommunications industry in respect of cables laid in the Area and in return be entitled 
to impose a minimal tax in respect of these cables that would generate income.43 She 
compares this with the regulatory powers exercised by coastal states in respect of the 
laying, routing and maintenance of cables on their continental shelves44 Also she 
identifies certain developed states that are using the Area for the construction of 
permanent deep-sea ocean floor observatories to aid deep-sea research. She then 
advocates that the ISA be given the mandate to keep a register of these observatories and 
also generate additional income by charging a fee.45
However, these suggestions for an expanded role for the ISA, as recognised by Borgese, 
suffer from the constraint of the rather limited scope of the definition of natural resources 
under the Convention, which cannot be interpreted to include her suggested expanded 
role. Such an expanded role for the ISA ordinarily could only be conferred by either 
amending the LOSC through the so far unused and rather complicated amendment 
procedures of the Convention, or through the utilised, but similarly complicated, means 
of an “implementation” Agreement, in reality an amendment instrument similar to the 
1994 Agreement46 In practice there is indication that when there is consensus amongst 
the states parties it may be possible to amend provisions of the LOSC, without utilising 
the formal amendment procedures or the mechanism of a so-called implementation 
agreement, through the role of the Meeting of States Parties to the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (SPLOS).47 It is suggested that obtaining such a
the Role of the International Sea-Bed Authority”, (2004) 19(4) The International Journal o f Marine and 
Coastal Law, pp.383-409.
43Borgese, ibid. pp. 395-396.
44 Art.79 of LOSC. Borgese, ibid.p.396.
45 Borgese, ibid. pp.396-397.
46 Freestone, D and Oude Elferink, A.G., “Flexibility and Innovation in the Law of the Sea - Will the LOSC 
Amendment Procedures ever be used?,” Paper presented at the Third Verzijl Symposium, Stability and 
Change in the Law o f the Sea: Selected Issues, Utrecht University, The Netherlands, 3 December 2004.
47Art.319 (2) (e) o f LOSC. For example, there is a precedent in the SPLOS decision, which in essence 
extended the date o f submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) for 
broad-margin states that were parties to the LOSC before 13 May 1999, by determining that their ten year 
deadline “shall be taken as having commenced on 13 May 1999.” See SPLOS/72 of 29 May 2001. This 
amounted to an “amendment” of Art.4 o f Annex II o f LOSC. See Treves, T., “The General Assembly and 
the Meeting o f the States Parties in the Implementation o f the UN Law of the Sea Convention,” Paper 
presented at the Third Verzijl Symposium, Stability and Change in the Law o f the Sea: Selected Issues,
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consensus would be difficult in respect of an expanded role of the ISA concerning genetic
resources since industrialised developed states, whose entities would be interested in
unhindered access to these resources, could arguably claim that bio-prospecting and
exploitation of these resources fall under the freedoms of the high seas.48 Similarly, it is
not likely that there would be consensus on the other propositions of Borgese in respect
of regulating cables in the Area and marine research since these also would be contrary to
the freedoms of the high seas.49 Recognising the limitations of her suggestions, she
advocates as follows:
“I f  through an evolutionary and co-operative approach and the adoption o f 
protocols as may be required, the Authority could adjust its scope to 
changing times and circumstances while remaining faithful to the principles 
on which it was founded, in particular, the principle o f the Common Heritage 
o f Mankind establishing that the Area its resource base and services must be 
used for the benefit o f  humankind as a whole, with particular consideration o f 
the needs o f poor countries, the conservation o f the environment and 
biodiversity and that it must remain reserved fo r  exclusively peaceful 
purposes, this really may be the beginning o f  the building o f a new economics 
ofpeace. ” 50
An expanded role for the ISA capable of generating, in the near future additional, income 
would certainly be of great benefit to African states, which stand to gain from any income 
generated from activities in the Area, since special consideration is to be given to 
developing states in the equitable distribution of such resources amongst states parties.51 
Despite the difficulties that may arise with obtaining consensus amongst states parties, it 
is suggested that African states, perhaps through the avenue of the African Union (AU), 
should develop an articulated plan towards promoting at the ISA, SPLOS and the General 
Assembly of the United Nations the agenda of expanding the scope of the ISA’s role in 
the Area.
Utrecht University, The Netherlands, 3 December 2004. However, it must be pointed out that the extension 
of the deadline for submissions was in the interests o f all states parties.
48 Art.87 of LOSC and Paras. 90 and 93 o f the Report on the work o f the United Nations Open-ended 
Informal Consultative Process on Oceans and the Law o f the Sea at its fifth meeting, A/59/122 of 1 July 
2004. See also Anton, D.K, “Law for the Sea’s Biological Diversity,” op.cit.pp.360-361.
49 Art.88 of LOSC.
50 Borgese, “Caird Medal Address”, op.cit.p.397.
51 Art. 140 o f LOSC.
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Apart from its principal function of regulating the mining of the deep seabed, the ISA has 
the ancillary, though crucial, function in the Area of protecting the marine environment 
from pollution as well as protecting and conserving flora and fauna52 and protecting of 
human life.53 Also the ISA is to promote and encourage marine scientific research on 
deep seabed mining and to co-ordinate and disseminate the results of such research.54 
However, under the LOSC, such ancillary functions must be related to “activities in the 
Area, ” which has been defined to mean all activities of exploration for, and exploitation 
of, solid, liquid or gaseous mineral resources in the Area.55
Under the 1994 Agreement, the ISA, between the entry into force of the Convention and 
the approval of the first plan of work for exploitation, is to concentrate on processing 
applications for approval of plans of work for exploration; implementing the decisions of 
the PrepCom on pioneer investors; monitoring compliance with the approved plans of 
work for exploration; monitoring and reviewing trends and developments relating to deep 
seabed mining activities, including regular analysis of world metal markets conditions 
and metal prices, trends and prospects; continuing with the work of the PrepCom 
studying the potential impact of mineral production from the Area on developing land- 
based producers with a view to minimising such difficulties and assisting in economic 
adjustment; adopting rules, regulations and procedures necessary for the conduct of 
activities in the Area; adopting rules, regulations and procedures for the protection and 
preservation of the marine environment; promoting and encouraging scientific research, 
especially research on the environmental impact of activities in the Area, and the 
dissemination of the results of such research; acquiring scientific knowledge and 
monitoring the development of deep seabed mining technology, especially technology 
relating to the protection and preservation of the marine environment; assessing available 
data relating to prospecting and exploration; elaborating rules, regulations and procedures
52 Art. 145 o f LOSC. See Kaye S., “Implementing high seas biodiversity conservation: global geopolitical 
considerations,” (2004) 28(3) Marine Policy, pp.221 at 224-225; Halfar, J., and Fujita, R.M., 
“Precautionary management o f  deep-sea mining,” (2002) 26(2) Marine Policy, pp. 103-106 and 
International Seabed Authority, Press Release, SB/10/8 o f 27 May 2004.
53 Art. 146 of LOSC.
54 Art. 143 o f LOSC.
55 Arts.l (3) and 133 o f LOSC.
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for exploitation, including those related to protection and preservation of the marine 
environment.56
Significant achievements of the ISA include the approval in July 2000 of the Regulations 
for prospecting and exploration for polymetallic nodules in the Area.57 This approval 
opened the way for the ISA to issue exploration contracts for a period of 15 years, in line 
with the Convention and Agreement, to the seven registered pioneer investors, namely 
Institut francais de recherche pour 1’exploitation de la mer (IFREMER)/Association 
francaise pour 1*etude et la recherche des nodules (AFERNOD) (France); Deep Ocean 
Resources Development Co. Ltd. (DORD)( Japan); Yuzhmorgeologiya (Russian 
Federation); China Ocean Minerals Research and Developmental Association (COMRA) 
(China); Interoceanmetal Joint Organization (IOM) (Bulgaria, Cuba, Czech Republic, 
Poland, Russian Federation and Slovakia); the Government of Republic of Korea and the
CO
Government of India.
Further the ISA has been actively engaged in research and studies in respect of the 
implications for the marine environment of deep seabed mining activities.59
The LOSC emphasises that in the exercise of its powers and functions the ISA should 
avoid discrimination, although it is required to engage in “positive discrimination” by 
taking into consideration the interests and needs of developing states.60 This special 
consideration for developing states, a sort of affirmative action in favour of these states, 
is intended to encourage the participation of developing states in seabed mining activities. 
However despite this “positive discrimination” African states are yet to be involved in 
seabed mining activities. This indicates the need for the ISA to take positive steps to
56 Section 1, paragraph 5 o f the Annex to the Agreement.
57 See Lodge M., “The International Seabed Authority’s Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for 
Polymetallic Nodules in the Area”, (2002) 10(2) The Centre fo r  Energy, Petroleum and Mineral Journal 
http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/iournal/html/volumel O.html [Accessed on 1 December 2004]
58 For more on pioneer investors, see section 5.2.3 o f chapter 5 of this thesis.
59 See Paras. 127-136 of the Report of the Secretary-General o f the International Seabed Authority,
ISBA/10/A/3 of 31 March 2004.
60 Arts. 152 of LOSC.
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specifically encourage the direct involvement of African states in deep seabed mining 
activities.61
ii. Extended Continental Shelf.
Beyond its functions in the Area, the Convention also gives the ISA certain powers and 
functions in relation to the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles.62 Under Article 
82 of the LOSC, the ISA is to receive the payments or contributions of broad margin 
states. Upon receipt of the payments or contributions the ISA is required to distribute 
them among states parties on the basis of equitable sharing criteria. In doing so, the ISA 
is to take account of the interests of developing states, particularly the least developed 
and the landlocked states which are states parties.63 This in essence gives the ISA a 
distributive role in respect of benefits derived from a maritime zone outside that of its 
field of primary competence, the Area.
4.1.3.1.1. Organs o f  the ISA.
The powers and functions of the ISA are exercised through a number of organs, namely 
the Assembly, the Council and the Secretariat.64 There are also subsidiary organs of the 
Council such as the Legal and Technical Commission, presently also carrying out the role 
of what was to have been the Economic Planning Commission,65 and also the Finance 
Committee. Further, there is the Enterprise, which is the seabed-mining corporation of 
the ISA, whose functions are presently being carried out by the Secretariat.66
The ISA, under the 1994 Agreement, as a result of the insistence of the developed states,
is a lean and cost-effective institution. This has an attendant effect on the frequency,
duration and scheduling of meetings of its organs, and the evolutionary approach to the 
setting up and the functioning of certain organs. One of the concerns of certain 
industrialised states, which initially refused to ratify the LOSC, was that the structure
61 See Art. 148 o f LOSC.
62 See section 1.2.1 of chapter 1.
63 Art. 82(4) of LOSC.
64 Art. 158 (1) o f LOSC.
65 Section 1 paragraph 4 o f the Annex o f the Agreement.
66 Section 2 paragraph 1 of the Annex o f the Agreement.
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under the original Part XI was too elaborate and therefore the running costs of the ISA 
would be considerable. They therefore favoured an evolutionary approach to 
establishing the organs, having in mind their functionality, a position that was adopted by 
the Agreement.68 As will be seen subsequently in the examination of the various organs 
of the ISA, the issue of cost effectiveness is reflected greatly in determining the priority 
in terms of setting up the relevant organs. The developing states, including African states, 
not being in a position to effectively fund the institutional framework of the ISA, had no 
choice but to concede to the evolutionary approach of establishing the organs.
4.1.3.1.1(1). The Assembly 69
i. Membership
The Assembly is the plenary organ of the ISA consisting of all the states parties to the 
LOSC.70
The attendance of states at meetings of the Assembly has so far generally been poor, such 
that there has been difficulty in securing a quorum at the meetings.71 The Secretary- 
General of the ISA attributes this to the fact that many states parties have little direct or
• • 72even indirect interest in the exploratory stages of deep seabed mining. A perusal of the 
attendance of African states at the last four sessions of the Assembly confirms the poor 
attendance. At the seventh,73eighth,74ninth75and tenth76 sessions of the Assembly the
67 Secretary-General’s Informal Consultations on Outstanding Issues Relating to the Deep Seabed Mining 
Provisions o f  the United Nations Convention on the Law o f  the Sea: Collected Documents,(Jamaica., 
International Seabed Authority, 2002),pp.l5-16.
68 See Section 1, paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Annex to Agreement.
69 See Arts. 159-160 o f LOSC 82 and Section 1, paragraph 4 o f the Annex to the Agreement.
70 See Art. 159 (1) of LOSC.
71 A majority of the members o f the ISA constitutes a quorum. Art. 159(5) of the LOSC. See Paras.12-14 of 
the Report of the Secretary-General o f the International Seabed Authority, ISB A/10/A/3 of 31 March 2004.
72 Para. 14 o f the Report o f the Secretary-General o f ISA, ibid.
73 Cameroon, Egypt, Gabon, Ghana, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa and Zambia. 
See Credentials o f representatives to the seventh session o f  the Assembly o f the International Seabed 
Authority, Report o f the Credentials Committee, ISBA/7/A/4 of 9 July 2001 and ISBA/7/A/4/Corr. 1 of 11 
July 2001
74 Cameroon, Gabon, Ghana, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan and Uganda. 
See Credentials o f representatives to the eighth session o f the Assembly o f the International Seabed 
Authority, Report o f the Credentials Committee, ISBA/8/A/8 of 14 August 2002.
75 Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, 
Sudan and Uganda. See Credentials o f representatives to the ninth session of the Assembly o f the 
International Seabed Authority, Report o f the Credentials Committee, ISB A/9/A/6 o f 5 August 2003.
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attendance record of African states were 10 states (out of a total attendance of 52 states); 
10 states (out of a total attendance of 53 states); 12 states (out of a total attendance of 55 
states) and 18 states(out of a total attendance of 73 states), respectively. The Sierra 
Leonean representative at the 58th session of the General Assembly, while encouraging 
states parties, including African coastal states, to attend and participate in meetings of the 
ISA in order to ensure that their views are articulated and reflected in the work of the 
ISA, attributed the lack of participation of many states, presumably including African
77states, to mainly financial constraints. It is suggested that though finance is an important 
consideration, the main reason for the poor attendance of African states parties in the 
Assembly could be attributed more to the lack of sufficient interest in the activities of the 
ISA, as a result of the indefinite postponement of commercial exploitation of the Area.78
The current President of the Assembly, Mr. Dennis Francis of Trinidad and Tobago, is
79 •nominated from the Latin American and Caribbean group. Since its establishment there 
have been two presidents from the African group, namely Mr. S. Amos Wako of Kenya 
(1997) and Mr. Martin Belinga-Eboutou of Cameroon (2002).80
76 Cameroon, Comoros, Cote d’ Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, 
Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, the Sudan, Tunisia, Uganda and the United 
Republic o f Tanzania. See Credentials o f representatives to the tenth session of the Assembly o f the 
International Seabed Authority, Report o f the Credentials Committee, ISBA/10/A/7 of 2 June 2004.
77 United Nations General Assembly, Fifty-eighth session, 64th plenary meeting, Monday, 24 November 
2003, 3p.m, New York, Official Record.s,A/58/PV.64,p.l4
78 Paras. 12-14 of the Report of the Secretary-General o f the ISA. See note 71 above.
^International Seabed Authority, Press Release, SB/10/3 o f 26 May 2004.
80 See International Seabed Authority Handbook 2004 (Jamaica, International Seabed Authority,
2004),p.l4
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Table 4
A Comparative Tabular Analysis o f the Representation o f each Regional Grouping in the 
Assembly 81
Regional grouping Number
African Group 39
Asian Group 41
Latin American and 27
Caribbean (LAC) Group
Western European and 22
others (WEOG) Group
Eastern European Group 18
ii. Powers and Functions
The Assembly is empowered to establish the general policies of the ISA in collaboration 
with the Council.82 Apart from this, the Assembly is given the following additional 
powers and functions:
• to elect the members of the Council in the manner required by the Convention and 
Agreement;
• to elect the Secretary-General from the candidates proposed by the Council;
• to elect, upon the recommendation of the Council, the members of the Governing 
Board and the Director-General of the Enterprise, as and when it commences 
independent operations;
• to establish such subsidiary organs as it finds necessary for the exercise of its 
functions, and, in prescribing the composition of these organs, to take account of the 
principle of equitable geographical distribution and of special interests, as well as the
81 See note 22 above. The analysis of representation o f regional grouping in Table 4 above does not include 
the European Community which is an international organisation member of the ISA.
82 See Section 3, paragraph 1 o f the Annex o f the Agreement.
83 Art. 160 (2) o f LOSC.
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need for the members to be qualified and competent to deal with the questions within 
the competence of such organs;
• to assess the contributions of members to the administrative budget of the ISA in 
accordance with the agreed scale of assessment, based on the scale used for the 
United Nations budget, until the ISA is able to raise sufficient income from other
84sources to meet its administrative expenses;
• to consider and approve rules and regulations, upon the recommendation of the 
Council, concerning the equitable sharing of the financial and other economic 
benefits of seabed mining having regard to the interests and needs of developing 
states. If the Assembly does not approve the recommendations of the Council, it is 
obliged to return the matter back to the Council for reconsideration in the light of the
O f
views of the Assembly;
• to decide upon the equitable sharing of financial and other economic benefits from 
seabed mining in accordance with the Convention, subject to the recommendation of 
the Finance Committee;
• to consider and approve rules, regulations and procedures of the ISA adopted by the 
Council concerning seabed mining, financial management and internal administration 
of the ISA;
• upon recommendation by the governing board of the Enterprise, when it commences 
independent operations, to transfer funds from the Enterprise to the ISA;
• to consider and approve the annual budget of the ISA as submitted by the Council;
• to examine periodic reports from the Council and from the Enterprise and also special 
reports which it requests from the Council or any other organ of the Authority;
• to initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of promoting 
international co-operation concerning activities in the Area and encouraging the 
progressive development of international law relating thereto and its codification;
• to consider problems of a general nature in connection with activities in the Area 
arising in particular for developing states, as well as those problems for states in
84 On issues of finance and budgetary matters the Assembly can only act upon the recommendation of the
Council and the Finance Committee. See Section 3, paragraphs 4 and 7 of the Annex to the Agreement and
below on decision-making.
85 Art. 160 (f) o f the LOSC and Section 3, paragraph 4 o f Annex to the Agreement.
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connection with activities in the Area that are due to their geographical location, 
particularly for landlocked and geographically disadvantaged states;
• to establish upon the recommendation of the Council, which in turn is to act on the 
recommendation of the Finance Committee, a system of economic assistance for 
developing land-based producer states which are seriously affected by the production 
of minerals from the seabed;
• to suspend the exercise of rights and privileges of membership of a state party once it 
has been decided by the Seabed Disputes Chambers that that state party has grossly 
and persistently violated the provisions of Part XI;
• to discuss any question or matter within the competence of the ISA and to decide 
which organ shall deal with any question or matter not specifically entrusted to any 
particular organ provided such distribution is consistent with the distribution of 
powers and functions among the organs of the ISA.
The Assembly under the LOSC is said to be the supreme organ of the ISA to which all
RA . • • • •other principal organs shall be accountable. This provision was in line with the desire of 
African states for a democratic supreme plenary organ. The O.A.U. declaration on Issues 
of the Law of the Sea called for “.... an assembly o f  all members which shall be the 
repository o f all powers....” 87A supreme plenary organ, as conceived by the African 
states as regards the Assembly, is in many regards similar to the institutional structure 
under the O.A.U Charter.88 Under the latter there was an institutional structure consisting 
of the Assembly of Heads of State; the Council of Ministers; the General Secretariat and
89the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration, with the Assembly, the 
plenary body, being the supreme organ, with each state having one vote and decisions on 
substantive matters being by resolutions passed by a two-thirds majority.90 All other 
organs, including the Council of Ministers, were inferior to the Assembly. Such 
institutional framework consisting of a supreme plenary organ appears to be the more 
familiar structure in most African based international organisations. Apart from the OAU,
86 Art. 160 (1) of LOSC.
87 Para. 22 of the O.A.U. Declaration. See note 3 above.
88 2 ILM 766(1963).
89 A \ / T T
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other African based international organisations, such as the Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa (COMESA),91 Southern African Development Community 
(SADC),92 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)93 and even more 
recently the African Economic Community (AEC)94 and the African Union (AU),95 
though having a plethora of institutions,96 appear to have a common institutional structure 
of a supreme and democratic plenary organ called the Assembly,97 Authority,98 Summit99 
or Conference.100
Although the Assembly is still referred to as the supreme organ of the ISA, the 1994 
Agreement has greatly reduced its powers by removing its authority to act alone and 
make decisions.101 This in turn has reduced the capacity of developing states, including 
Africa states, with their numerical strength in the Assembly, to exercise considerable 
influence upon the regime through the Assembly. According to E.D. Brown, Article 
160( 1) of the Convention which talks about the Assembly being the supreme organ of the 
ISA, "... is largely an empty formula designed to satisfy the demands o f the group o f 77 
in form, i f  not in substance, and is not matched by any residual powers whereby the
90 Art. VIII.
91 33 ILM 1067(1994).
92 32 ILM 116(1993).
93 Revised Treaty 35 ILM 663 (1996).
94 30 ILM 1241 (1991).
95 http://www.africa-union.org/home/Welcome.htm [Accessed on 16 November 2004]
96 For example, ECOWAS (Conference o f Heads o f  State/Government; Council o f Ministers; Executive 
Secretariat; Court o f Justice and Specialised Technical Commissions); SADC (Summit; Troika; Organ on 
Politics, Defence and Security; Council o f Ministers; Integrated Committee of Ministers; Tribunal; 
Secretariat; Standing Committee o f Senior officials; National Committees); COMESA (the Authority of 
Heads of State/Government; the Council o f Ministers; the Court o f Justice; Secretariat; Committee of 
Governors of Central Banks; the Intergovernmental Committee; Technical Committees; the Consultative 
Committee); AEC (Assembly o f Heads o f  State/Government; Council o f Ministers; Pan-African 
Parliament; General Secretariat; the Court of Justice; Specialised Technical Committees); AU (the 
Assembly; the Executive Council; the Pan-African Parliament; the Court o f Justice; the Commission; the 
Permanent Representatives Committee; the Specialised Technical Committees; the Economic, Social and 
Cultural Council and Financial Institutions).
97 For AEC and AU see Arts.7-10 and Arts.5-7 respectively o f their constituent treaties.
98 For COMESA see Arts.7 (1) and 8 o f the constituent treaty.
99 For SADC see Arts.9 and 10 o f the constituent treaty.
100 For ECOWAS see Arts.6 and 7 of the Constituent treaty.
101 See Article 160(1) of LOSC and Section 3, paragraph 1 of the Annex to the Agreement. Also see 
Churchill, R.R. and Lowe, A.V., The Law o f  the Sea, 3rd edition, (Manchester, Manchester University 
Press, 1999), p. 240.
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Assembly may assert its authority over Council in central areas o f decision-making.”102 
This appears correct in the sense that the Agreement, as will be seen subsequently in the 
decision-making section of the Council below, gives considerable powers in the Council 
to the minority developed industrialised states to veto certain decisions unfavourable to 
them. However, the powers of the Assembly should not be underestimated since the 
Agreement makes provision for the Assembly to reject the recommendations of the 
Council. Upon rejection, the recommendation is returned to the Council which should 
reconsider it in the light of the views expressed by the Assembly.103 While this power 
may not be as far-reaching as desired by the developing states, including African states, a 
wise and effective use of this tool in an Assembly where they command a numerical 
majority would certainly give a leeway to exercise some level of influence in the regime.
Hi. Decision-making
At the meetings of the Assembly each member, irrespective of size, stage of 
development, resources, geographical location or any other factors, has only one vote.104
Under the LOSC decisions on questions of procedure, including the convening of special 
sessions of the Assembly, are by a simple majority of the members present and voting. 
On the other hand, decisions on questions of substance are by a qualified majority of two- 
thirds of the members present and voting, provided that such majority includes a majority 
of the members participating in the session. Whenever there is contention about whether 
an issue is a question of substance or not, it will be treated as a question of substance 
except where otherwise decided by the majority required for decisions on questions of 
substance.105 Further, the Convention provides for deferment, in certain instances, of 
voting concerning questions of substance. This is done either by the President of the 
Assembly, at his discretion, or if there is a request by at least one fifth of the members of 
the Assembly, the President is obliged to defer such voting. Such deferment can be done 
only once in relation to any particular question and should not exceed five calendar days.
102 Brown, E.D., Sea-Bed Energy and Minerals: The International Legal Regime, Vol. 2, Seabed Mining, 
(The Hague/Boston/London, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2001), p.311.
103Section 3 paragraph 4 of the Annex to the 1994 Agreement.
104 Art. 159 (6) o f LOSC.
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It should also not result in a deferment beyond the end of the particular session of the ISA 
where the question is raised.106
The decision-making process in the Assembly has been modified by the Agreement
which requires that all organs of the ISA, including the Assembly, should as a first step
make efforts to arrive at decisions by way of consensus.107 However, if all efforts to reach
a decision by way of consensus fail, the Agreement requires the Assembly to revert to the
1 08voting procedure under the LOSC to arrive at a decision.
The voting procedures of the Assembly requiring a majority of votes, and excluding any 
weighted voting on the part of certain industrialised states, appear to be in line with the 
desire by African states for a plenary organ that is democratic. However, any significance 
of the role of the decision-making procedures of the Assembly is diminished by the 1994 
Agreement, which has extensively cut down the powers of the Assembly. The numerical 
advantage of the developing states, including African states, in the Assembly appears 
rather meaningless as a result of the provisions of the Agreement on the relationship 
between the plenary Assembly, the limited Council and the Finance Committee. First, the 
Agreement limits the powers conferred on the Assembly to establish general policies109 
by requiring such policies to be established by the Assembly “in collaboration with the 
Council ”110 Second, the Agreement states that decisions of the Assembly on any matter 
for which the Council also has competence or on any administrative, budgetary or 
financial matter shall be based on the recommendations of the Council. In situations 
where the Assembly rejects the recommendations of the Council, it cannot substitute its 
own decision but must return the matter to the Council for further consideration in the 
light of the views expressed by the Assembly.111 Third, any decisions by the Assembly 
having financial or budgetary implications must be based on the recommendations of the
105 Art. 159 (7) and (8) o f LOSC.
106 Art. 159(9) of LOSC.
107 Section 3(2) of the Annex to the Agreement.
108 Section 3, paragraph 3 of the Annex to the Agreement.
109 Art. 160 (1) of LOSC.
110 Section 3, paragraph 1 of the Annex to the Agreement.
111 Section 3, paragraph 4 of the Annex to the Agreement.
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Finance Committee.112 In reality under the Agreement the real repository of significant 
powers under the institutional framework of the regime is not the Assembly but rather the 
Council.113 This differs from the original conception of the African states for a supreme 
democratic plenary body with considerable decision-making powers. The whittling away 
of the powers of the Assembly has undermined the advantage of numerical strength 
enjoyed by the developing states, including African states, in decision-making in the 
Assembly.
4.1.3.1.1(11). The Council 
i. Membership
The Council is a smaller organ of the ISA in terms of representation but it is the 
executive organ of the ISA.114 It is composed of 36 members elected by the Assembly for 
a four-year term.115 The Agreement made significant modifications to the original Part XI 
provisions of the LOSC on the Council by declaring that the original provisions of the 
LOSC on the composition of the Council '’'shall not apply”.116 The Agreement, after 
declaring the categorisation set out in the LOSC shall not apply, breaks down the 
categories of Council membership into an almost identical but significantly modified five 
group structure,117 namely, the consumer/importer states; investor states; major exporter
states; developing states representing special interests; and states elected to ensure
118equitable geographical representation.
112 Section 3, paragraph 7 of the Annex to the Agreement.
113 See Brown, Sea-Bed Energy and Minerals: The International Legal Regime, Vol. 2, Seabed Mining, op. 
cit.p.297.
114 Art. 162(1) o f the LOSC.
115 Section 3, paragraph 5 of the Annex to the Agreement.
116 See Art. 161 (1) of LOSC and Section 3, paragraph 16 o f the Annex to the Agreement.
117 Section 3, paragraph 15 of the Annex to the Agreement.
118 There were, however, some changes in the consumer/importer group [the deletion of the word 
“socialist” and an addition that the state from the Eastern region should have “...the largest economy in that 
region in terms of gross domestic product” as well as replacing the largest consumer state with “the state, 
on the date of entry into force of the Convention, having the largest economy in terms of gross domestic 
product,” if such states wish to be represented in this group]; the investor group [the deletion by the 
Agreement of the phrase in the LOSC, “...including at least one state from the Eastern European (Socialist) 
region”] ; and developing states representing special interests [the Agreement includes island states as part 
of this group]. See Art. 161 (1) (a) (b) and (d) o f LOSC and compare with Section 3, paragraph 15(a) (b) 
and (d) o f the Annex to the Agreement.
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Each group of states is to be represented in the Council by those members nominated by 
that group. Each group is to nominate only as many candidates as the number of seats 
required to be filled by that group. However, when the potential candidate states in each 
group of the Council exceed the number of seats available to that group, states satisfying 
the criteria are required, as a matter of principle, to apply the rule of rotation to ensure 
that all states satisfying the criteria in the particular group have the opportunity to be 
represented therein at one time or the other. It is, however, left to each group of states to 
determine how they will apply the principle to their group.119 Also if a state fulfils the 
criteria for membership in more than one group, it is only to be proposed by one of the 
groups for election to the Council.120 For the purpose of determining the states members 
fulfilling the criteria for the various groups in the Council, an indicative list of states 
fitting the criteria for each group has been prepared by the ISA Secretariat.121 It was 
agreed that this list would be regarded as an indicative guide only and not as establishing 
definitive criteria. This list is also without prejudice to the right of states parties to submit 
or use other criteria.122 The Assembly uses this indicative list as a guide in establishing 
the lists of states fulfilling the criteria for membership of each group for the purposes of
i nelecting the members of the Council.
Group A (The consumer/importer states) 124
This group is composed of four members from among those states parties which, during 
the last five years for which statistics are available, have either consumed more than 2 per 
cent in value terms of the total world consumption or have net imports of more than 2 per 
cent in value terms of total world imports of the commodities produced from the 
categories of minerals to be derived from the Area. It is, however, required that amongst 
the four members there shall be a guaranteed seat for the state from the Eastern European
119 Section 3 paragraph 10 o f the Annex to the Agreement.
120 Section 3 paragraph 9(b) o f the Agreement.
121 See Indicative List o f States Members of the International Seabed Authority which would fulfil the 
Criteria for Membership in the Various Groups o f States in the Council in accordance with Paragraph 15 of 
Section 3 o f the Annex to the Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law o f  the Sea o f 10 December 1982, ISBA/10/A/CRP.2 of 5 March 2004, prepared in 
line with Section 3 paragraph 9(b) o f the Agreement.
122 See Para. 18 o f ISBA/10/A/3 o f 31 March 2004.
123 See Rule 83 of the Rules o f Procedure of the Assembly, ISBA/A/L.2 and Para. 22 of ISB A/10/A/3
124 Section 3 Paragraph 15(a) o f the Annex to the Agreement.
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region having the largest economy in that region in terms of gross domestic product and 
also for the state, on the date of entry into force of the LOSC, having the largest economy 
in terms of gross domestic product, if such states wish to be represented in this group.
In this group the Russian Federation presently fits the criterion laid down for the 
guaranteed seat for the state from the Eastern European region, while the United States of 
America satisfies the criterion for the second guaranteed seat, as and when it becomes a 
party to the LOSC and the Agreement. The guaranteed seat for the United States of 
America, as and when it becomes a party to the relevant treaties, is a permanent seat since 
the cut-off date for having the largest economy in terms of gross domestic product has 
been frozen at the date of entry into force of the LOSC (hereinafter called “the freeze 
date”). Therefore, even if there is a change of the position in the future, it does not in 
anyway debar the United States of America when it becomes a state party from assuming
its seat in this group if it so wishes.125 On the other hand, it is significant to note that from
126 • •the language in which the freeze date is couched, the seat given to the state with the
largest economy in the Eastern European region does not appear to confer a permanent
seat to any state from that region. Presently, although the Russian Federation qualifies for
this seat, there is the possibility of another state from that region replacing it as the largest
economy in terms of gross domestic product (GDP). Since certain states from that region
127have become part of the European Union (EU), a major economic union aimed at 
promoting the economy of its member states, it is conceivable that the GDP of one of 
these states might one day overtake that of the Russian Federation.
Five African states are included in the indicative list of members of this group prepared 
by the ISA Secretariat, with Zambia, Democratic Republic of Congo(cobalt) and South
125 This is reminiscent o f the permanent seats in the Security Council o f the United Nations. See Art. 23 of 
the United Nations Charter. See, “Senate Testimony Regarding the U.S. Adherence to Law of the Sea 
Convention”, (2004) 98 A//Z,,pp.l73 at 174, where arguments in support of the U.S. adherence to the 
LOSC, referring to the guaranteed seat o f the U.S in the Council o f the ISA, alluded to the effective veto it 
would have (in combination with two other consumer states).
126 Note the positioning o f the phrase incorporating the freeze date suggesting that it applies only to the 
state with the largest economy i.e. the United States o f America.
127 On 1 May 2004 10 new member states were admitted into the European Union, including states in 
Eastern Europe such as the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and 
Slovenia.
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Africa(manganese) listed under major consumers and Botswana, Zimbabwe (nickel) and 
again South Africa(cobalt and nickel) listed under major net importers.128
129Group B. (Investor states)
This group is composed of four members from among the eight states parties which have 
made the largest investment in preparation for and in the conduct of activities in the Area 
either directly or through their nationals. No African state is represented in this group as 
African states have not yet made any significant investment in seabed activities.130
131Group C. (Major producer/exporter states)
This group is composed of four members from among states parties, which on the basis 
of production under their jurisdiction, are net exporters of the categories of minerals to be 
derived from the Area. The membership of this group is to include at least two 
developing states whose exports of such minerals have a substantial bearing upon their 
economies.
The group allows for representation by African land-based producer states, provided that 
they can show a high dependence on the foreign exchange proceeds of these minerals for 
the sustenance of their economy. In the indicative list prepared by the ISA Secretariat, the 
following African states are included in this group: Botswana, Democratic Republic of 
Congo and Morocco (cobalt); Ghana and Gabon (manganese); Zambia (cobalt and 
copper); Zimbabwe (nickel) and South Africa (cobalt, manganese and nickel).132
Group D. (Developing states representing special interests)
This group is composed of six members from among developing states parties 
representing special interests. The non-exhaustive list of special interests includes states
128 See ISBA/10/A/CRP.2 o f 5 March 2004.
129 Section 3 paragraph 15(b).
130 See ISBA/10/A/CRP. 2 o f 5 March 2004. Under Art. 161(1) of the LOSC, which Section 3 paragraph 16 
of the Agreement declares shall not apply, this group was required to include at least one state from the 
Eastern European (Socialist) region.
131 Section 3 paragraph 15(c).
132 ISBA/10/A/CRP.2 o f 5 March 2004.
133 Section 3 paragraph 15(d).
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with large populations; landlocked or geographically disadvantaged states; developing 
island states; states that are major importers of the categories of minerals to be derived 
from the Area; states that are potential producers of such minerals; and least developed 
states. A number of African states fit into these criteria in one form or another under the 
indicative list prepared by the Secretariat of the ISA. In the category of special interests 
as major producers and net producers of relevant minerals the following African states 
are listed: Botswana (cobalt and nickel); Democratic Republic of Congo, Morocco and 
Namibia (Cobalt); Ghana and Gabon (manganese); Zambia (cobalt and copper); 
Zimbabwe (nickel); and South Africa (cobalt, copper, manganese and nickel). The only 
African state included in this group as a developing state with a large population is 
Nigeria. For developing states which are landlocked or geographically disadvantaged the 
African states included are Botswana, Mali, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe (landlocked) 
and Algeria, Cameroon, Djibouti, Gambia and Sudan (geographically disadvantaged). 
For the category of developing island states the following African states are listed: Cape 
Verde, Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Sao Tome and Principe, and Seychelles. In the 
category of the developing states which are major importers of the categories of minerals 
to be derived from the Area, Botswana and Zimbabwe (nickel) and South Africa (cobalt, 
manganese and nickel) are the African states listed. While in the category of developing 
states that are potential producers of the categories of minerals to be derived from the 
Area, the following African states are listed: Botswana and Cote d’ Ivoire (nickel); 
Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia (copper); Uganda (cobalt); South Africa 
(copper and nickel) and Zimbabwe (cobalt, copper and nickel). Under the least developed 
states category, out of the 33 states listed, 23 are African states, namely: Angola, Benin, 
Cape Verde, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, 
Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Sao Tome 
and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Uganda, Tanzania and 
Zambia.134
134 ISBA/10/A/CRP.2 o f 5 March 2004.
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135Group E. (Equitable geographical representation)
This group, the largest, has eighteen members elected according to the principle of 
ensuring an equitable geographical distribution of seats in the Council as a whole. There 
is, however, a proviso that each geographical region shall have at least one member in 
this group. The geographical regions, just like the practice in the United Nations General 
Assembly, are Africa; Asia; Eastern Europe; Latin America and the Caribbean; and 
Western Europe and others. At the time of the adoption of the General Assembly 
resolution on the 1994 Agreement there was an informal understanding that once there is 
widespread participation in the ISA and the number of members of each regional group is 
substantially similar to its membership of the United Nations, each regional group would 
be represented in Group E by at least three members.
135 Section 3 paragraph 15(e) o f the Annex to the Agreement.
136 See Informal Understanding contained in Annex II of document A/48/950, quoted in General Assembly, 
48th Session 101st meeting, Thursday, 28 July, 1994, New York, Official Records A/48/PV.101.
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Council Membership 2003-2006 137
Table 5
Group A (4) - (The consumer/importer states)
2003 2004 2005 2006
Italy(i) Italy Italy Italy
Japan Japan Japan Japan
Russian Russian Russian Russian
Federation Federation Federation Federation
United
Kingdom
United
Kingdom
China China
(1) With the possibility o f relinquishment to the United States o f America once it becomes a party to 
the Convention;
Table 6
Group B (4) - (Investor states)
2003 2004 2005 2006
China China United
Kingdom
United
Kingdom
France France France France
Germany Germany Germany Germany
India India India India
137 See http://www.isa.org.im /en/m em bers/com position.council.stm  [Accessed on 31 March 2005] and
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Table 7
Group C (4) - (Major producer/exporter states)
2003 2004 2005 2006
Australia Australia Canada Canada
Indonesia Indonesia Indonesia Indonesia
Portugal Portugal Portugal Portugal
Zambia Gabon(2) South Africa South Africa
(2) It is the understanding within the African Group that f o r  2005, South Africa w ill be elected to the seat in 
Group C  that is to be occupied by  Gabon in 2004(ISBA/8/A/10)..
Table 8
Group D (6) - (Developing states representing special interests).
2003 2004 2005 2006
Brazil Brazil Brazil Brazil
Egypt Egypt Egypt Egypt
Fiji Fiji Fiji Fiji
Jamaica Jamaica Jamaica Jamaica
Papua New 
Guinea
Papua New 
Guinea
Malaysia Malaysia
Sudan Sudan Sudan Sudan
International Seabed Authority, Press Release, SB/10/17 of 3 June 2004
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Table 9
Group E (18)-(Equitable geographical representation)
2003 2004 2005 2006
Nigeria Nigeria Nigeria Nigeria
Cameroon Cameroon Cameroon Cameroon
Cote
d’Ivoire
Cote
d’Ivoire
Cote
d’Ivoire
Cote
d’Ivoire
Algeria Algeria Gabon Gabon
Namibia Namibia Namibia Namibia
Senegal Senegal Senegal Senegal
Gabon South Africa Kenya Kenya
Myanmar Myanmar Myanmar Myanmar
Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia
Republic of 
Korea
Republic of 
Korea
Republic of 
Korea
Republic of 
Korea
Czech
Republic
Czech
Republic
Czech
Republic
Czech
Republic
Poland Poland Poland Poland
Honduras Honduras Honduras Honduras
Chile Chile Chile Chile
Argentina Argentina Argentina Argentina
Trinidad & 
Tobago
Trinidad & 
Tobago
Trinidad & 
Tobago
Trinidad & 
Tobago
Guyana Guyana Guyana Guyana
Malta Malta Netherlands Netherlands
Spain Spain Spain Spain
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The tables above reveal the highly complicated138 and extremely politicised nature of the 
system for the composition of the Council under the Agreement. A perusal of the 
composition of the Council reveals that the African group has the largest number of the 
seats, but the 1994 Agreement totally undermines any advantage of numerical 
superiority, especially when combined with other developing states in the Asian and 
Latin American and Caribbean groups, and appears to put the real clout in the hands of 
the minority industrialised states through the decision-making mechanism as will be seen 
in the discussion below on decision-making.
By the March 1996 elections to the Council it was agreed that the regional groups would 
have the following number of seats in the Council -  10 seats for African group; 9 seats to 
the Asian group; 8 seats to the Western European and others group; 7 seats to the Latin 
American and Caribbean group; and 3 seats to the Eastern European group.139 The total 
number of seats under this arrangement adds up to thirty-seven, although the total 
membership of the Council is thirty-six. This led to another rather complex procedure, 
invoking the principle of burden sharing, called the “floating seat” system. Under this 
system each regional group is expected to give up one seat during the term of four years. 
The only exception to this is the Eastern European group, which had expressed 
reservations about the application of the system to it because it would result in its share 
being less than the minimum number of three members from each regional group as 
envisaged by the informal understanding. The relinquishment of a seat merely disentitles 
the member from voting though it may participate in the deliberations of the Council.140 
The question that has rightly been asked is whether this result could not have been 
reached through a simpler procedure of revision of the composition of the Council.141
Members of the Council are to be elected for four years. However, at the first election, in 
order to ensure continuity of membership, half of the members of each group were
138 Borgese describes it as a three-dimensional jigsaw puzzle. See Borgese, The Oceanic Circle: Governing 
the Seas as a Global Resource, op. cit. p. 175.
139 Brown, Sea-Bed Energy and Minerals: The International Legal Regime, Vol. 2, Seabed Mining, 
op.cit.p.300.
140 Ibid, pp. 300-301.
141 Borgese, The Oceanic Circle: Governing the Seas as a Global Resource, op.cit.pp. 176-177.
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elected for a two-year term. Upon the expiration of their term, the next election was for a 
four-year term. In order to avoid confusion, although the first elections took place on 21 
March 1996, it was decided to harmonise the terms of office with the calendar years. The 
terms of office the members elected in 1996 for a two year term ended on 31 December 
1998, while that of the members elected in 1996 for a four-year term ended on 31 
December 2000. Thereafter the terms of office of elected Council members commence on 
1 January and continue for a period of four calendar years to expire on 31 December.
The current President of the Council, Mr. Biady Diene of Senegal, is nominated from the 
African group.142 The other President emerging from the African group was Charles 
Manyang D’Awol of Sudan, who was President in 1999.143
ii. Powers and Functions.
The Council, the executive arm of the ISA, though a body of limited membership, has 
been conferred with immense powers that are even further enhanced by the 1994 
Agreement. The LOSC describes the Council as “ ...the executive organ o f the Authority, 
having the power to establish in conformity with this Convention and the general policies 
established by the Assembly, the specific policies to be pursued by the Authority on any 
questions or matters within the competence o f the Authority. ” 144 The Agreement, 
expanding the powers of the Council, states that; “The general policies o f the Authority 
shall be established by the Assembly in collaboration with the Council”.145 (Emphasis 
added)
The plethora of powers of the Council includes the supervision and co-ordination of the 
provisions of Part XI and the Agreement and to draw the Assembly’s attention to cases 
of non-compliance; to propose a list of candidates to the Assembly for election as 
Secretary-General of the Secretariat; to recommend to the Assembly candidates for 
election as members of the Governing Board and Director-General of the Enterprise; to
l42Intemational Seabed Authority, Press Release, SB/10/4 of 27 May 2004.
143 See International Seabed Authority Handbook 2004, op.cit.p.14.
144 Art. 162 (1) of LOSC.
145 Section 3 paragraph 1 of the Annex to the Agreement.
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determine when the Enterprise should operate independently of the Secretariat; to issue 
directives and approve plans of work submitted by the Enterprise and other operators; to 
recommend to the Assembly the rules, regulations and procedures for sharing of the 
benefits of the Area as required by the LOSC and the Agreement; to adopt and apply, 
subject to approval by the Assembly, rules, regulations and procedures relating to 
prospecting, exploration and exploitation in the Area and also the financial management 
and internal administration of the ISA; to make emergency orders including suspension 
or adjustment of operations; to disapprove of certain areas for mining by operators, 
including the Enterprise, in order to prevent harm to the marine environment and to 
determine, upon the recommendation of the Finance Committee, the amount to be set 
aside to assist developing land-based producers.146
The LOSC and the Agreement confer upon the Council extensive recommendatory 
powers in respect of the Assembly on any administrative, budgetary or financial 
matter.147 The issue arises as to whether the Assembly can act on these matters without 
the recommendation of the Council. A similar issue came up in respect of the United 
Nations in the Advisory Opinion of the International Court on Justice (ICJ) on the 
Competence o f the General Assembly for the Admission o f a State to the United 
Nations.14* In this case, the ICJ had to look into the question of whether the General 
Assembly of the United Nations could make a decision admitting a state as a member of 
the United Nations without the recommendation of the Security Council as required by 
Article 4 paragraph 2 of the United Nations Charter. The Court, by a vote of twelve to 
two, was of the opinion that the General Assembly could not make such a decision 
without the recommendation of the Security Council. In arriving at this opinion the ICJ 
alluded to the fact that both the General Assembly and Security Council are principal 
organs of the United Nations, with neither of these organs being subordinate to the other.
146 See Art. 162 (2) of LOSC and Section 1 paragraphs 6 and 15; Section 2 paragraph 2, Section 3 and 
section 7 paragraph 1(a) of the Annex to the Agreement.
147 Art. 162 (2) (s) o f LOSC and Section 3 paragraph 4 o f the Annex to the Agreement.
148 Advisory Opinion of 3 March, 1950. See International Law Reports 1950, Vol.17, pp.326-330.
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This appears to have influenced the Court, in certain regards, in arriving at its opinion.149 
Under the regime of the Area, the provision of the LOSC, which remains unchanged by 
the Agreement, in stating that the Assembly is “the supreme organ” of the ISA,150 
appears to suggest that the Council is subordinate to the Assembly. However, the 
requirement under the Agreement that the general policies of the ISA shall be established 
by the Assembly “z/z collaboration with the Council5,151 reveals that in reality the Council 
is no longer in a subordinate position to the Assembly. The Assembly, it would appear, 
can only act upon the recommendation of the Council. In situations where the Assembly 
disagrees with the recommendations of the Council, as has been pointed out earlier in this 
chapter, it has no powers to substitute such recommendation with its own decision but 
rather must return it to the Council for reconsideration in the light of the views expressed
152by the Assembly.
Hi. Decision-making 
For the purposes of decision-making the five groups in the Council are divided into four 
chambers. While each group of states elected under groups A (consumer/importers),
B (investors) and C (major producers/exporters) each form a separate chamber, 
developing states under groups D (developing states representing special interests) and 
E (equitable geographical representation) are lumped together to make up the fourth 
chamber.153 This in itself reveals the upper hand of the industrialised states in the whole 
negotiations, culminating in the Agreement’s provisions on decision making. The 
Council, through its enhanced powers under the Agreement, as well as the chamber 
system of decision making, has entrenched the control over the regime by the 
industrialised developed states and thereby weakened the influence of developing states, 
including African states. Under the LOSC the decision making process of the Council
was favourable to the numerically advantaged developing states since each member of
149 Ibid.p.329.
150 Art. 160(1) of LOSC.
151 Section 3 paragraph 1 o f the Annex to the Agreement.
152 Section 3 paragraph 4 o f  the Annex to the Agreement.
153 Section 3 paragraph 9(a) o f the Annex to the Agreement. For an analysis of the decision-making process 
in the Council, see Brauninger, T., “When Simple Voting Doesn’t Work: Multicameral Systems for the 
Representation and Aggregation of Interests in International Organizations”, (2003) 33(4) British Journal 
o f Political Science, p.681 at 688-703.
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the Council was to have one vote with decisions being by way of a majority on 
procedural matters and by way of a qualified majority of either two-thirds or three- 
fourths on varying matters of substance.154 There were, nevertheless, certain decisions 
that were required to be taken by way of consensus. These included decisions concerning 
the exercise of control over activities in the Area to ensure compliance with the LOSC 
and the requisite regulations and plans of work; recommendations to the Assembly on 
compensation and economic assistance for developing land-based producers; and the 
adoption of amendments to Part XI.155
The 1994 Agreement, however, as with other organs of the ISA, requires that decision­
making should be by consensus as a first step.156 As a result of the pre-eminence given to 
decision-making by consensus, the Agreement additionally makes provision for the 
Council to defer the taking of a decision in order to facilitate further negotiation 
whenever it appears that all efforts at arriving at a consensus have not been exhausted.157 
However, in the event that the Council is unable to arrive at a decision by consensus, the 
Agreement, while retaining the decision-making process of the LOSC on questions of 
procedure, discards the elaborate process enunciated by the Convention on questions of 
substance158 and provides that "... decisions o f substance, except where the Convention 
provides fo r  decisions by consensus in the Council, shall be taken by a two-thirds 
majority o f members present and voting, provided that such decisions are not opposed by 
a majority in any one o f the chambers referred to in paragraph p.”159
As an exception to the decision-making procedure just described, the Council, under the 
Agreement, is required to approve a plan of work recommended by the Legal and 
Technical Commission, unless a two-thirds majority of its members present and voting, 
including a majority of the members present and voting in each chamber, disapprove it. 
However, if the Council does not take a decision on a recommendation for approval of a
154 Art. 161 (6) and (7) o f LOSC.
155 Art. 161 (7) (d) and (f) o f LOSC.
156 Section 3 paragraph 2 o f the Annex to the Agreement.
157 Section 3 paragraph 6 o f the Annex to the Agreement.
158 Section 3(8) of the Annex to the Agreement states that the provisions of Art. 161 (8) (b) and (c) o f the 
LOSC “shall not apply. ”
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plan of work within a prescribed period (60 days unless the Council prescribes a longer 
period), approval is deemed to have being given at the end of that period. If the Legal and 
Technical Commission recommends the disapproval of a plan of the work or does not 
make a recommendation, the Agreement empowers the Council, through the decision­
making process on matters of substance, to override the Commission by approving the 
plan of work.160
The decision-making process of the Council under the Agreement undermines any 
benefit of numerical advantage of developing states in the Council and puts the minority 
industrialised states in an advantageous position. This was rightly identified by Brown 
when he said:
“The considerable emphasis on the representation o f special economic 
interest groups (as opposed to a straightforward representation based on 
equitable geographical distribution) has to be seen as favouring the minority 
o f industrialised states which will always have predominant representation in 
Chambers A and B ( ‘consumers ’ and ‘investors ’ groups) and, o f course, i f  the 
United States accedes to the UN Convention, it will be guaranteed permanent 
membership o f the Council under the formula for membership o f Group A, 
provided only that it ‘wish[es] to be represented in this group’. Taken with 
the voting rules..., the composition o^ the Council places those states in a 
significantly advantageous position. ”
Although the Agreement enjoins that in taking decisions the Council should seek to 
promote the interests of all the members of the ISA, the reality is that it effectively 
creates a situation by which a majority of states in any of the chambers could veto the 
decision of the Council.162 This gives developed industrialised states a potent weapon to 
block any decision in the Council they perceive to be detrimental to their interests. 
According to Oxman: “This approach to voting enables interested States (including the 
United States) to block undesirable decisions. Because blocking power encourages
159 Section 3 paragraph 5 o f the Annex to the Agreement.
160 Section 3 paragraph 11(a) o f the Annex to the Agreement. Paragraph 11(b) of this section declares that 
the provisions of Art.l62(2)(j) o f LOSC that categorically require the Council to act upon a plan of work 
within 60 days of its submission by the Legal and Technical Commission “shall not apply.”
161 Brown, Sea-Bed Energy and Minerals: The International Legal Regime, Vol. 2, Seabed Mining, 
op.cit.p.307.
162 Section 3 paragraph 5 o f the Annex to the Agreement.
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negotiation o f decisions desired by and acceptable to the States principally affected, it
99 163enhances affirmative as well as negative influence.”
Whilst the Agreement certainly gives the industrialised states a veto power to block 
unfavourable decisions, it also gives developing states, which together form the fourth 
chamber, the same veto power to block unfavourable decisions. In the course of the 
negotiations of the Agreement there was a view that the chambers for decision making 
should be restricted to the consumer, investor and exporter states to the exclusion of the 
developing states special interest group and equitable geographical representation group. 
However, a better view prevailed that this right of veto should be extended to all the 
categories on the grounds that to do otherwise would be discriminatory.164 This 
concession of a veto to the developing states shows that, although the Agreement 
drastically diminishes the influence of the developing states arising from their numerical 
advantage, there still remains some vestige of influence for such states in the Council. 
However, the task of achieving a veto is made more difficult for developing states as a 
result of the greater number of states required to attain the necessary majority in this 
chamber to oppose unfavourable decisions.
It is, however, important to point out that whatever benefit both developed and 
developing states will derive from the provisions on decision making in the Council will 
depend on whether they are able to maintain a cohesive front without certain states 
breaking ranks. In the reality of international relations there are possibilities of states 
breaking out of the bipolarity of the north/south divide as a result of their peculiar 
national interests, with certain developed states supporting the position of developing 
states on certain issues and vice versa. For example, at the WTO November 2001 trade 
summit held in Doha (Qatar), the United States of America backed the developing states
163 Oxman, “The 1994 Agreement and the Convention”, op. cit. p. 691.
164 Nelson, “The New Deep Sea-Bed Mining Regime”, (1995) 10 International Journal o f Marine and 
Coastal Law, pp. 189 at 197-198.
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in their protest against European farm subsidies, while the European Union supported the 
stand of the developing states against United States of America’s anti-dumping rules.165
4.1.3.1.1(11) (A) Subsidiary Organs o f Council.
The institutional framework of the regime makes provision for the Council to act through 
subsidiary organs. The LOSC established two such subsidiary organs - the Legal and 
Technical Commission and the Economic Planning Commission. However, as a result of 
the 1994 Agreement, the latter’s functions due to the goal of cost effectiveness in the 
operation of the organs of the ISA are at present being carried out by the former.166 In 
addition, the Agreement establishes the Finance Committee.167 Further, the Council is
given powers to establish additional subsidiary organs if it is appropriate and having due
168regard to economy and efficiency. So far, no additional subsidiary organs have been 
established.
(1) Legal and Technical Commission,
i. Members
The Legal and Technical Commission, like the Economic Planning Commission whose 
functions it has presently assumed, is composed of 15 members elected by the Council in 
their personal capacity upon nomination by the states parties. The Council is, however, 
empowered to increase the size of the membership having regard to economy and 
efficiency.169 In 1996 the Council increased the size of the Legal and Technical
165 See Foroohar, R. (with Mackinnon, I. in Delhi, Margolis, M in Rio, Mooney, P in Beijing and Ashurst, 
M in London), “The Poor Speak Up”, Newsweek Magazine, 11 February, 2002, p. 38.
'66 Art. 163 of LOSC and Section 1 paragraph 4 of the Annex to the Agreement. The Legal and Technical 
Commission is to perform the functions o f the Economic Planning Commission until the Council decides 
otherwise or until the approval of the first plan o f work for exploitation.
167 Section 9 of the Annex to the Agreement.
168 Art. 162(2) (d) of LOSC states that the Council shall “establish, as appropriate, and with due regard to 
economy and efficiency, such subsidiary organs as it finds necessary for the exercise of its functions in 
accordance with this Part. In the composition o f subsidiary organs, emphasis shall be placed on the need for 
members qualified and competent in relevant technical matters dealt with by those organs provided that due 
account shall be taken of the principle of equitable geographical distribution and of special interests”. This 
is not tampered with by the Agreement. See also Art. 162(2) (y) of LOSC that empowers the Council to 
establish a subsidiary organ to deal with financial matters. Under Section 9 paragraph 9 of the Agreement 
the Finance Committee is deemed to be established under Art. 162 (2) (y) of LOSC. On subsidiary organs 
under the United Nations, see Sarooshi, D., “The Legal Framework Governing United Nations Subsidiary 
Organs”, (1996) LXVIIB. Y.I.L, pp. 411-478.
169 Art. 163 (2) o f LOSC.
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Commission to 22 members;170 subsequently in 2001 the membership was further 
increased to 24.171 A comparative analysis of the number of members from each regional 
grouping shows a membership leaning heavily in favour of the Asian and African 
groupings.172 The attendance record of members from developing states at the meetings
171of the Legal and Technical Commission has been generally poor. To seek to encourage 
attendance the Assembly in 2003 approved an exceptional one-time authorisation for the 
Secretary-General of the ISA to advance up to $75,000 from ISA funds for the purpose of 
helping to defray the costs of attendance by developing states members of the 
Commission as well as the Finance Committee.174 Further, the Secretary-General has 
been authorised to advance up to $10,000 in 2005 from ISA funds to help defray the 
expenses of such developing states members, if so required.175
Members of the Commission are elected by the Council for a five-year term and are 
eligible for re-election for a further term.176 As a result of the specialised and technical 
nature of the Commission, members are required to possess appropriate qualifications in 
respect of the area of competence of the Commission. Such qualifications are those 
relevant to exploration for and exploitation and processing of mineral resources; 
oceanology; protection of the marine environment; or economic or legal matters relating
177to ocean mining and related fields of expertise. Presumably, since it is presently 
carrying out the functions of the Economic Planning Commission, its members may also 
possess the appropriate qualifications related to that Commission, namely, qualifications 
relevant to mining, management of mineral resource activities, international trade or 
international economics and including at least two members from developing states 
whose exports of the categories of minerals to be derived from the Area have substantial
170 ISBA/C/L.3.
171 ISBA/7/C/6.
172 See Table 9 (comparative analysis o f the number o f each regional grouping in the Legal and Technical 
Commission) below.
173 Para.33 of ISBA/10/A/3 o f 31 March 2004.
174 International Seabed Authority, Press Releases, SB/9/11 o f 5 August 2003 and SB/10/9 of 31 May 
2004.
175 International Seabed Authority, Press Releases, SB/10/11 of 1 June 2004.
176 Art. 163 (7) of LOSC.
177 Art. 165 (1) o f LOSC.
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bearing upon their economies.178 The qualifications required of the members of the Legal 
and Technical Commission, overlap to some extent with those of the Economic Planning 
Commission. This probably explains why it is convenient to merge the two Commissions 
for the time being. Despite the requirement of certain specialised and technical 
qualifications, it is emphasised that in electing such qualified members due account 
should be given to the need for equitable geographical distribution and the representation 
of special interests.179 In the event of the death, incapacity or resignation of a member 
before the expiration of the term of office, the Council is obliged to elect a member from 
the same geographical region or area of interest to serve for the remainder of the term of 
the previous member.180 In order to ensure transparency and impartiality, no member is to 
have any financial interest in any activity relating to exploration and exploitation in the 
Area.181 Also the members are bound during and after the termination of their term of 
office to a duty of secrecy concerning any industrial secrets, proprietary data or any other 
confidential information coming to their knowledge by reason of their duties for the 
ISA.182 A critical issue that arises, which is of course not new to nominated technocrats in 
international organisations, is how to maintain a balance between the loyalty to the 
nominating government and the Legal and Technical Commission. Further, to what 
extent can a member of the Legal and Technical Commission from a developing state 
whose term has ended use the knowledge acquired during tenure for the development of 
his or her home state’s marine technology?
The current Chairman of the Commission is Albert Hoffman (South Africa). The 
Commission presently also includes five other Africans from Cameroon, Mozambique, 
Senegal, Egypt, and Namibia.183
178 Art. 164(1) o f LOSC.
179 Art. 163 (4) o f the LOSC. Certain members of the Council have expressed concerns that the 
requirements for equitable geographical representation and representation of special interests were not 
being respected in the present composition of the Legal and Technical Commission. See Para. 30 of 
ISBA/10/A/3 o f 31 March 2004.
180 Art. 163 (6) of the LOSC.
181 Art. 163 (8) o f the LOSC.
182 Ibid.
183http://www.isa.org.im/en/members/legal.technical.stm [Accessed on 31 March 2005] and ISBA/10/C/10 
of 3 June 2004
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Table 10
Current members o f Legal and Technical Commission (2002-2007)
Name Country
Baidy Diene Senegal
Sami Ahmad Addam Lebanon
Shahid Amjad Pakistan
Frida Maria Armas Pfirter(Vice-Chairman) Argentina
Helmut Beiersdorf (i) Germany
Arne Bjorlykke Norway
Ferry Adamhar Indonesia
Galo Carrera Hurtado Mexico
Walter de Sa Leitao Brazil
Miguel dos Santos Alberto Chissano Mozambique
Mohammed M. Gomaa Egypt
Ivan F. Glumov Russian Federation
Albert Hoffmann(Chairman) South Africa
Yoshiaki Igarashi(2) Japan
Jung-Keuk Kang Republic of Korea
Jean-Marie Auzende(3) France
Lindsay M. Parson United Kingdom
M. Ravindran India
Giovanni Rosa Italy
Alfred T. Simpson Fiji
Rodrigo Miguel Urquiza Caroca Chile
Yuwei Li China
Inge K. Zaamwani Namibia
Samuel Sona Betah Cameroon
202
1. Deceased since 30 May 2004 but yet to be replaced at the time o f  writing this thesis.
2. Elected to replace the earlier member from Japan, Mr. Yuji Kajitani, for the remaining part o f his term.
3. Elected on 24 May 2004 to fill the vacancy caused by Jean-Pierre Lenoble’s resignation.
Table 11
A Comparative Analysis o f the Number o f Members from each Regional Grouping in the 
Legal and Technical Commission (2002-2007).
Regional Grouping Number
African group 6
Asian group 8
Latin American and Caribbean (LAC)Group 4
Western European and Others Group(WEOG) 5
Eastern European (EE) Group 1
ii. Powers and Functions
The Legal and Technical Commission is given quite a number of advisory and 
recommendatory powers in relation to the Council, including making, at the request of 
the Council, recommendations with regard to the exercise of the ISA’s functions; to 
review formal written plans of work and make appropriate recommendations to the 
Council; to supervise at the request of the Council, either solely or in conjunction with 
other entities or states, activities in the Area and report on the same to the Council; to 
prepare assessments of, as well as formulate and submit to the Council draft rules, 
regulations and procedures on, the environmental implications of activities in the Area 
and to make recommendations on the protection of the marine environment to the 
Council; to make recommendations to the Council regarding the establishment of a 
monitoring process to guard against the risks or effects of pollution of the marine 
environment from activities in the Area; to recommend to the Council when proceedings 
should be instituted by the ISA at the Seabed Disputes Chambers of ITLOS and, upon a 
decision by the Chambers, what measures should be taken; and to make 
recommendations to the Council on emergency measures to be taken to prevent serious 
harm to the marine environment from mining activities in the Area.184
184 Art. 165(2) of the LOSC and Section 1 paragraph 6 of the Annex to the Agreement.
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The Legal and Technical Commission played a crucial role in the preparation of the 
Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules in the Area (the 
Mining Code) 2000.185 It also plays a very active role in assessing the possible impacts on 
the environment arising from mining activities in the Area. Further, it engages in the
1 87evaluation of annual reports received from contractors. The Commission has also been 
active in the current attempt by the ISA to prepare Regulations on Prospecting and 
Exploration for Polymetallic Sulphides and Cobalt-Rich Crusts in the Area.188
iii. Decision-making
Under the LOSC the decision-making procedures of the Commission are to be 
established by the rules, regulations and procedures of the ISA.189 Anticipating the 
possibility of divergent opinions in the Commission, the LOSC goes on to provide that 
recommendations from the Commission to the Council should be accompanied where
190necessary by a summary of the divergent opinions.
The 1994 Agreement is, however, more specific on decision making by the Commission. 
It says that decision by voting in the Legal and Technical Commission shall be by a 
majority of members present and voting.191 If this provision is read along with the 
consensus rule,192 it means that the Commission must first make an attempt at reaching a 
consensus and only if this fails will the decision be reached by voting. This is confirmed 
by the Rules of Procedure of the Commission, which clearly state:
185 See, for example, Draft Regulations on prospecting and exploration for polymetallic nodules in the 
Area-Proposed by the Legal and Technical Commission, ISBA/4/C/4/Rev. 1 of 29 April 1998.
186 See, for example, Recommendations for the guidance o f the contractors for the assessment of the 
possible environmental impacts arising from exploration for polymetallic nodules in the Area, 
ISBA/7/LTC/l/Rev.l ** of 13 February 2002.
187 See, for example, Status of Annual Reports received from Contractors, ISBA/10/LTC/2 of 10 May 
2004.
188 See Report of the Chairman of the Legal and Technical Commission on the work o f the Commission 
during the Tenth Session of the ISA, ISBA/10/C/4 of 28 May 2004.
189 Art. 163( 11) o f LOSC
190 Ibid.
191 Section 3 paragraph 13 o f the Annex to the Agreement.
192 Section 3 paragraph 2 o f the Annex to the Agreement.
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“As a general rule, decision-making in the Commission should be by
consensus. I f  all efforts to reach a decision by consensus have been
exhausted, decisions by voting shall be taken by a majority o f members 1present and voting
Whatever impact the voting procedure may have in favour of African states and other 
developing states, which together have a majority in the Commission, is eliminated by 
the fact that decisions of substance by this body are subject to approval by the Council.194 
Under the Agreement, for instance, the Council is not bound by the recommendations of 
the Commission and is allowed to approve plans of work even if the Commission 
recommends disapproval of such plans of work or has made no recommendation at all.195
(2) Finance Committee
i. Members
The Finance Committee is established by the 1994 Agreement196 and is deemed to be a 
subsidiary organ established by the Council to deal with financial matters, as required by 
the LOSC.197 The Committee consists of 15 members nominated by states parties, with 
the requirement that they have appropriate qualifications relevant to financial matters and
• • 198are persons of the highest standards of competence and integrity. They are not to have 
any financial interest in any activity relating to matters upon which they have the 
responsibility to make recommendations. There is also a duty of secrecy requiring them, 
even on termination of their functions, not to disclose any confidential information 
coming to their knowledge by reason of their duties for the ISA.199 No two members of 
the Finance Committee shall be nationals of the same state party. The Assembly, and not 
the Council, elects the members of the Committee, unlike the position with the members 
of the Legal and Technical Commission. In electing the members, the Assembly is to 
have due regard to the need for equitable geographical distribution and the representation 
of special interests. In addition, the four different groups in the Council
193 Rule 44 of the Annex to the Decision o f  the Council o f the Authority Concerning the Rules of Procedure 
of the Legal and Technical Commission, ISBA/6/C/9 o f 13 July 2000.
194 Art. 165(2) o f LOSC and Section 1 paragraph 6(a) o f the Annex to the Agreement.
195 Section 3 paragraph 11 (a) o f the Annex to the Agreement.
196 Section 9 of the Annex to the Agreement.
197 Section 9 paragraph 9 of the Annex to the Agreement and Art. 162(2) (y) o f the LOSC.
198 Section 9 paragraph 1 of the Annex to the Agreement.
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(consumer/importer; investor; major producer/exporter; and developing states 
representing special interests) are each to be represented by at least one member in the 
Committee. Furthermore, until the ISA has sufficient funds other than assessed 
contributions to meet its administrative expenses, the Committee is to include the 
representatives of the five largest contributors to the administrative budget of the ISA.200 
Members of the Committee shall hold office for a term of five years and shall be eligible 
for re-election. In the event of the death, incapacity or resignation of a member before the
expiration of the term, the Assembly shall elect for the remainder of the term a member
201from the same geographical group or interest group. Again, as with the Legal and 
Technical Commission, the attendance of members from developing states has so far 
been poor.202
The current chairman of the Finance Committee is Mr. Hasjim Djalal (Indonesia) of the 
Asian group and there are only two members from Africa, namely from Nigeria and 
Uganda.203
199 Section 9 paragraph 6 o f the Annex to the Agreement.
200 Section 9 paragraph 3 of the Annex to the Agreement.
201 Section 9 paragraphs 4 and 5 o f the Annex to the Agreement.
202 Para.33 of ISBA/10/A/3 o f 31 March 2004.
203 http://www.isa.org.im/en/members/finance.committee.stm [Accessed on 31 March 2005].
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Table 12
Current members o f Finance Committee (2002-2007)
Name Country
Domenico Da Empoli Italy
Bemd Kreimer(i) Germany
Ivo Dreiseiti Czech Republic
Boris G. Idrisov Russian Federation
Tadanori Inomata Japan
Jian Liu China
Jean-Pierre Levy France
Juliet Semambo Kalema Uganda
Michael Wood(2) United Kingdom
M. Ghandi(3) India
Coy Roache Jamaica
Djalal Hasjim Indonesia
Htoo Aung Myanmar
Florentina Adenike Ukonga Nigeria
Joseph Samih Matta Lebanon
1. E lected to replace Mr. Peter D ollekes (Germany). ISBA/7/A/7
2. E lected to replace Mr. Paul M ckell (United Kingdom). ISBA/8/A/3
3. E lected to replace Mr. Narinder Singh (India)ISBA/9/A/1
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Table 13
A Comparative Analysis o f the Number o f each Regional Grouping in the Finance
Committee (2002-2007)
Regional grouping Number
African group 2
Asian group 6
Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) group 1
Western European and others group (WEOG) 4
Eastern European (EE) group 2
ii. Powers and Functions
The 1994 Agreement requires that in taking decisions on the following matters the
Assembly and the Council must take into account the recommendations of the Finance
Committee:204
• Draft financial rules, regulations and procedures of the organs of the ISA and the 
financial management and internal financial administration of the ISA;
• Assessment of contributions of members to the administrative budget;
• All relevant financial matters, including the proposed budget of the Secretary-General 
of the ISA and financial aspects of the implementation of the programmes of work of 
the Secretariat;
• The administrative budget;
• Financial obligations of states parties arising from the implementation of Part XI of 
the LOSC and the Agreement, as well as the administrative and budgetary 
implications of proposals and recommendations involving expenditure from the funds 
of the ISA;
• Rules, regulations and procedures on the equitable sharing of financial and other 
economic benefits derived from activities in the Area and the decisions to be made 
thereon.
204 Section 9 paragraph 7 of the Annex to the Agreement.
208
The Finance Committee was involved in the preparation of the Financial Regulations for 
the ISA which were approved by the Council on 23 March 2000. It has also since its 
establishment considered and recommended to both the Council and Assembly the 
budget of the ISA and the scale of assessed contributions. Further, it has been engaged in 
reviewing the audit reports of the ISA’s finances and making reports on such to the 
Council and Assembly as well as making recommendations on the appointment of 
auditors.205 Also, recently the Assembly mandated the Committee to review modalities to 
defray the cost of participation at ISA meetings of members of the Legal and Technical 
Commission, as well as of the Finance Committee, from developing states.
iii. Decision-making
The Agreement states that decisions of procedure in the Committee shall be taken by a 
majority of the members who are present and voting, while decisions of substance shall 
be taken by consensus.207 The Agreement does not state what steps should be taken if 
consensus is not possible. In the other organs consensus is used as a first option and if 
this fails, a decision is arrived at by voting. In the case of the Finance Committee, 
consensus is the only option on matters of substance. This no doubt would lead to a 
stalemate in cases where there are divergent views of the members. To avoid such 
situations, the draft rules of procedure of the Committee produced in 1996 recommended
that in the event of a failure to reach a consensus within a reasonable time, the Committee
208  •should prepare a report reflecting the different opinions. This in essence means that the 
Committee makes no final decision, whether by way of simple or qualified majority, in 
such a situation, but rather appears to push the task of going through the divergent
205 See Appointment o f an Auditor, ISBA/9/FC/1 o f 25 July 2003 and Para.28 of ISBA/10/A/3 of 31 March 
2004.
206Modalities to defray the cost o f participation o f members o f the Legal and Technical Commission and 
Finance Committee from developing Countries, ISBA/9/FC/2 of 25 July 2003.
207 Section 9 paragraph 8 o f the Annex to the Agreement. See “Senate Testimony Regarding the U.S. 
Adherence to Law o f the Sea Convention”, (2004) 98 AJIL p. 173 at 174-175, where arguments in support 
of the U.S. adherence to the LOSC alluded to the absolute veto it would have in the Finance Committee 
with respect to any decision with financial and financial implications as well as the distribution o f all 
revenues generated from the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles.
208 ISBA/F/WP. 1, 24 July, 1996, Rule 21. See Brown, Seabed Energy and Minerals: The International 
Legal Regime, op. cit. 316.
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opinions and arriving at its own decision to the organ to which the Committee is making 
a recommendation. It is difficult to reconcile this with the requirement under the 
Agreement that the Council must take into account the recommendations of the Finance 
Committee in certain matters.209 Which of the diverse views will the Assembly or the 
Council have to take into account? This position was, however, not followed in the final
Rules of Procedure adopted on the 20 August 1999, which merely restate that decisions
210of substance should be by consensus. This is understandable since to do otherwise
would amount to utilising the Rules of Procedure to amend the Agreement, which would
be contrary to the amendment procedure prescribed by the LOSC and the Agreement.211
Fortunately, so far the Finance Committee has always been able to arrive at decisions on
212matters of substance by way of consensus.
4.1.3.1.1(111). Secretariat213 
I. Membership
This is the third principal organ of the ISA.214 This organ, an administrative organ, is 
intended to be independent and secluded from politics; consequently it is not significantly 
tampered with by the 1994 Agreement, except that it is given the additional role of 
performing the functions of the Enterprise until the latter begins to operate 
independently.215 It has been opined that the efficient functioning of a secretariat of an 
international institution is, to a large extent, contingent upon it being independent, 
impartial and not serving any particular interest of a particular member or group of 
members.216
209 Section 9 paragraph 7 o f the Annex to the Agreement
210 ISA/00/01 of 20 April, 1999, Rule 22(2).
211 Section 4 of the Annex to the Agreement and Arts. 314, 315 and 316 of LOSC
212 Para. 28 of ISBA/10/A/3 of 31 March 2004.
213 See generally Paras. 36 -53 o f ISBA/10/A/3.
214 Art. 158 (1) and 166 o f LOSC. See generally on the secretariat o f international organisations, Sands & 
Klein, Bowett’s Law o f  International Institutions, op. cit. pp. 302-315; Schermers, H., & Blokker, N., 
International Institutional Law- Unity within diversity, (The Hague/London/Boston, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1997), pp. 433-547 and specifically on the United Nations Secretariat see Meron T., “Staff of 
the United Nations Secretariat: Problems and Directions”, (1976)70 AJIL. pp.659-693.
215 Section 2 paragraph 1 o f the Annex to the Agreement.
216 Sands & Klein, Bowett’s Law o f  International Institutions, op.cit.p.302.
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The Secretariat of the ISA is headed by a Secretary-General who is its chief
217administrative officer and is organised into four functional units, namely the Office of 
the Secretary-General; Office of Legal Affairs; Office of Resources and Environmental 
Monitoring; and Office of Administration and Management.218 The Secretary-General is 
to be elected for a four-year term by the Assembly from candidates proposed by the 
Council and is eligible for re-election. The LOSC does not seem to make specific 
provisions for the qualifications of the Secretary-General but says that all the staff of the 
Authority shall be persons who have the highest standards of efficiency, competence and 
integrity and who also have the scientific, technical and other qualifications which may 
be required to fulfil the administrative functions of the ISA.219 It appears that discretion 
as to the exact qualifications of the Secretary-General, subject to the provisions of the 
Convention, is left to the Council, which compiles the list of qualified candidates before 
sending it to the Assembly. The Secretary-General is empowered to appoint the staff of 
the Secretariat who are subject to the same personnel standards, methods and 
arrangements as the United Nations.220 However, in making such appointments due 
regard should be paid to recruiting staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible.221 
The Secretary-General and the staff of the Secretariat are international civil servants who 
are not to seek or receive instructions from any government or source outside the ISA.222 
In the United States v. Egorov and Egorova,223 a United States court, in respect of the 
staff of the United Nations, held that, “[e]employees o f the United Nations are separate 
and distinct from persons designated by foreign governments to serve as their foreign 
representatives in or to the United Nations”.
The Secretary-General and the staff are not allowed to have any financial interest in any 
activity relating to exploration and exploitation in the Area. Also there is a duty of
217 Art. 166(3) of LOSC.
218 International Seabed Authority Handbook 2004, op.cit.pp.74-76.
219 Art. 167 of LOSC.
220 See Art. 11 of the Agreement concerning the Relationship between the United Nations and the 
International Seabed Authority annexed to General Assembly Resolution A/RES/52/27 of 26 January 1997 
which was adopted by consensus on 26 November 1997. Also see generally the Staff Regulations of the 
ISA, ISBA/6/C/10 of 13 July, 2000 and ISBA/7/A/5 o f 10 July 2001.
221 Art. 167 (2) of LOSC.
222 Art. 168 (1) of LOSC.
223 2 22 F. Supp.106 at 108 (E.D.N.Y., 1963).
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secrecy imposed on them not to disclose, even upon the termination of their functions, 
any industrial secret, proprietary data or any other confidential information coming to 
their knowledge by reason of their employment with the ISA.224
The current Secretary-General is Satya N. Nandan (Fiji) who was elected for a four-year 
term in March 1996, re-elected for another four-year term in 2000, and only recently in 
2004 was further re-elected for another four year term.225 Interestingly, during the 
election of the first Secretary-General of the ISA in 1996, one of the four candidates 
proposed by the Council to the Assembly was an African.226 The candidate, Mr. Joseph 
Warioba of Tanzania, the first President of the PrepCom, following a secret indicative 
vote, withdrew and the current Secretary-General was elected by the Assembly.227 Also 
recently for the 2004 elections an African candidate sponsored by the African Union, Mr. 
Charles Manyang D’Awol (Sudan), was proposed along with the present Secretary-
General by the Council to the Assembly, which elected the latter by a vote of 48 to 29
228with one spoilt vote.
ii. Powers and Functions
The main functions of the Secretariat are administrative and include:
• Preparation by the Secretary-General of an annual report to the Assembly on the work 
of the ISA;
• Arrangements by the Secretary-General, on matters within the competence of the ISA 
and subject to the approval of Council, for consultation and co-operation with 
international and non-governmental organisations recognised by the Economic and 
Social Council of the United Nations;
• Distribution by the Secretary-General to states parties of written reports submitted by 
non-governmental organisations with special competence on matters related to the 
work of the ISA;
224 Art. 168 (2) o f LOSC and Regulations 35 and 36 o f the Mining Code, ISBA/6/A/18 of 4 October 2000.
225 See International Seabed Authority Press Releases, SB/6/16 of 31 March 2000 and SB/10/20 of 4 June 
2004.
226 The candidates were Satya N. Nandan(Fiji); Luis Preval Paez (Cuba); Kenneth Rattray (Jamaica) and 
Joseph Warioba (Tanzania)
227 See Para. 36 of ISBA/10/A/3 o f 31 March 2004.
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• Preparing and submitting draft texts, reports and other documents, analysis, research 
findings, policy suggestions and recommendations etc.;
• Providing secretariat services to the Assembly, the Council, the Legal and Technical 
Commission and the Finance Committee; providing information and advice to the 
bureaux of those organs and bodies and to delegations; and assisting in planning the 
work of the sessions, the conduct of the proceedings and drafting of reports;
• Providing meeting services (including interpretation, translation, document 
reproduction services and press releases);
• Producing publications, information bulletins and analytical studies;
• Organising and servicing expert group meetings, seminars and workshops;
• Disseminating information on activities and decisions of the ISA;
• Programme planning and allocating resources for the effective, economic and
99Qefficient performance of the services and functions of the Secretariat;
• In addition, it presently performs the functions of the Enterprise. These functions, 
which are listed by the Agreement, are merely administrative functions.230
Hi. Decision-making
The Secretary-General, as the chief administrative officer, is responsible for decisions in 
the Secretariat, including recruitment and employment of staff, determination of their
terms of employment and dismissal based on the recommendation of the appropriate 
tribunal.231 In reaching his decisions the Secretary-General is subject to the rules, 
regulations and procedures of the ISA, and the provisions of the LOSC and the
232Agreement.
228 International Seabed Authority, Press Release, SB/10/20 of 4 June 2004.
229 Arts. 166 and 169 of LOSC. See also International Seabed Authority Handbook 2004,op.cit.pp.79-86 
and http://www.isa.org.im/en/seabedarea/TechBrochures/ENG2.pdf [Accessed on 30 November 2004]
230 Section 2, paragraph 1 of the Annex o f the Agreement. See discussion below, section 4.1.3.1.1. (IV), on 
the Enterprise.
231 Art. 167 (3) and 168(1) and (3) o f LOSC.
232 Arts. 167 (3) and 168(3) and (4) o f the LOSC and Art.2 of the 1994 Agreement.
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4.1.3.1.1 (IV). The Enterprise. 233
i. Legal personality and seat o f business.
Another organ of the ISA, the Enterprise, an international mining corporation, has, within 
the framework of the legal personality of the ISA, such legal capacity as conferred upon 
it by the Statute of the Enterprise annexed to the LOSC. 234 Its principal place of business 
is to be located in the same place as the seat of the ISA, Jamaica.235
ii. Membership
As a result of the concerns expressed by certain industrialised states and the indefinite 
postponement of commercial exploitation of the Area, the 1994 Agreement conferred the 
functions of the Enterprise on the Secretariat, until such a time as the Council issues a 
directive permitting the Enterprise to function independently.236 Consequently the 
Enterprise is presently composed of the staff of the Secretariat with the Secretary-General 
of the ISA specifically given the power to appoint from one of his staff an interim 
Director-General.237 It is interesting to note that the Secretary-General under this 
provision is not required to liaise with any other organ of the ISA in making this 
appointment. The present interim Director-General is an African, Nii Allotey Odunton 
(Ghana), the Deputy to the Secretary-General.
Prior to this the LOSC had made elaborate provisions, which will be applicable if and 
when the Enterprise starts to operate independently of the Secretariat, on the composition 
of the Enterprise. Under the LOSC its membership is to consist of a Director-General and 
a fifteen member Governing Board. An attempt by France during the UNCLOS III to 
ensure that the selection of the Board, for a certain period, be made by the major
233 See generally Legislative History o f  the Enterprise under the United Nations Convention on the Law of  
the Sea and the Agreement Relating to the Implementation o f  Part XI o f the Convention (Jamaica, 
International Seabed Authority, 2002) and Lee, R., “The Enterprise: Operational Aspects and 
Implications”, (1980) 15(14) Columbia Journal o f  World Business,pp.62-74.
234 See Art. 170(2) and Art. 13 (2) o f Annex IV, LOSC. The creation of the Enterprise as the operational 
arm of the exploitation system was first proposed in 1971 by thirteen Latin American Countries who 
submitted to the Seabed Committee a working paper on the seabed regime. See A/AC. 135/49 of 1971. This 
later was adopted by the group o f 77. See Lee, Ibid.p. 62.
235 Art. 170 (3) of LOSC.
236 Section 2 paragraphs 1 and 2 o f the Annex to the Agreement.
237 Section 2 paragraph 1 of the Annex to the Agreement.
238 See http://www.isa.org.im/en/about/office.resource.stmrAccessed on 30 November 2004].
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contributors to the funds of the Enterprise was scuttled by the Group of 77, which insisted 
that the Board should be elected by the Assembly.239 The members of the Governing 
Board are to be elected in their personal capacity by the Assembly, upon the 
recommendation of the Council, for a period of four years with the option of being re­
elected, although consideration is to be paid to the principle of rotation of membership 
amongst nominees from different states parties.240 The LOSC, however, emphasises that 
the members of the Board should be of the highest standard of competence having the 
requisite qualifications in the relevant fields needed to effectively and successfully direct 
the operations of the Enterprise.241
The day to day running of this international mining corporation, inclusive of the 
organisation, management, appointment and dismissal of the staff of the Enterprise, is 
vested in a Director-General. The Director-General is to be elected for a fixed term, not 
exceeding five years, by the Assembly, upon the nomination of the Governing Board and 
the recommendation of the Council, and may be re-elected for further terms. Although 
not a member of the Board, the Director-General is directly responsible to the Board, and 
may participate in its meetings, as well as those of the Council and the Assembly when 
they are dealing with matters concerning the Enterprise, but has no right to vote.242
The staff of the Enterprise are to be persons of the highest standard of efficiency and 
technical competence but due regard is required to be paid to the importance of recruiting
243staff on an equitable geographical basis.
iii. Powers and Functions
Under the LOSC the Enterprise had extensive powers to embark on seabed mining, 
transportation, processing and marketing of minerals recovered in the Area.244 According
239 See A/CONF.62/C. 1 /L.28, 23d August 1980 UNCLOS III Official Records, Vol. XIV, p. 167 and Brown, 
Seabed Energy and Minerals: The International Legal Regime, op. cit.p.323.
240 See Article 5 of Annex IV o f LOSC. The members o f the Governing Board are to continue in office 
until their successors are elected. See Article 6 o f Annex IV of LOSC for the powers and functions o f the 
Board.
241 Art.5 (1) of Annex IV o f LOSC.
242 Art.7 (1) and (2) of Annex IV o f LOSC.
243 Art.7 (3) of Annex IV o f LOSC.
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to Nelson this organ was viewed by the Group of 77 “as a mechanism for translating into 
reality, so to speak, the idea o f the common heritage o f mankind. ”245 The modification 
introduced by the 1994 Agreement has, however, significantly limited the powers of the 
Enterprise. Under the LOSC, the Enterprise was given significant powers to embark on 
seabed mining, either on its own or jointly with willing and qualified entities, including 
those from developing states, using technology, which initially the industrialised 
developed states were obliged to transfer to the ISA under fair and reasonable terms.246 
The United States of America had during the UNCLOS III, in a bid to arrive at a 
compromise on the system of mining the Area, indicated that the developed states would 
be willing to finance and provide technology for the Enterprise in return for the 
acceptance of the parallel system of mining by the Group of 77.247
The provisions of Part XI of the LOSC on the Enterprise became one of the concerns that 
led to the refusal of certain industrialised developed states, including the United States of 
America, to ratify the LOSC. These industrialised states were of the view that the 
provisions of the LOSC on the Enterprise would inhibit free market principles and 
thereby adversely affect seabed mining. As far as they were concerned, the advantageous 
financial and compulsory transfer of technology provisions, along with other operating 
conditions, provided the Enterprise, under the LOSC, with an unfair advantage over other 
commercial operators.248 The 1994 Agreement addressed the concerns of these 
industrialised states by limiting the powers and functions of the Enterprise. It excludes 
the application of provisions of the LOSC on mandatory transfer of technology and 
requires the Enterprise and developing states to obtain seabed mining technology on fair
244 Art. 170(1) o f LOSC
245 Nelson, “The New Deep Sea-Bed Mining Regime”, (1995) 1 0 IJMCL, p.189 at 196.
245 Arts. 153, 144 and Annex III, Arts.5 and 9 o f the LOSC.
247 Anand, R.P., “Odd Man Out: The United States and the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea,” in 
Van Dyke, J.M.,(ed.), Consensus and Confrontation: The United States and the Law o f the Sea Convention, 
(Honolulu, The Law o f the Sea Institute University o f  Hawaii, 1985),pp.73 at 82-83 and also Oxman, B., 
“The Third United Nations Conference on the Law o f the Sea: The 1976 New York Sessions,” (1977)71 
AJIL, p. 247 at 254
248 “Information Note concerning the Secretary-General’s informal consultation on outstanding issues 
relating to the deep seabed mining provisions o f the UN Convention on the Law of Sea, New York, 25 
March 1991” in Secretary-General’s Informal Consultations on Outstanding Issues Relating to the Deep 
Seabed Mining Provisions o f  the United Nations Convention on the Law o f the Sea: Collected Documents, 
(Jamaica, International Seabed Authority, 2002), p. 15
216
and reasonable commercial terms and conditions in the open market 249 or through joint 
venture arrangements between them and the commercial operators.250 The obligation 
under LOSC requiring states parties to finance the operations of the Enterprise is declared 
by the Agreement not to apply, and the latter imposes upon this organ the same 
obligations applicable to other contractors. Further, in the interim, it is made an 
appendage of the Secretariat with mere administrative functions, namely,
• Monitoring and review of trends and developments relating to deep seabed mining 
activities, including regular analysis of world metal market conditions and metal 
prices, trends and prospects;
• Assessment of the results of the conduct of marine scientific research with respect to 
activities in the Area, with particular emphasis on research related to the 
environmental impact of activities in the Area;
• Assessment of available data relating to prospecting and exploration, including the 
criteria for such activities;
• Assessment of technological developments relevant to activities in the Area, in 
particular technology relating to the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment;
• Evaluation of information and data relating to areas reserved for the Authority;
• Assessment of approaches to joint-venture operations;
• Collection of information on the availability of trained manpower;
• Study of managerial policy options for the administration of the Enterprise at 
different stages of its operations.252
In the event of actual seabed mining the Enterprise is required to conduct its initial 
operations through joint ventures.253 Upon the receipt of the approval of a plan of work 
for exploitation by any of the commercial operators or on a receipt by the Council of an 
application for a joint venture with the Enterprise, the Council shall consider the issue of
249 Compare with Article 144 (2) (b) o f the LOSC that merely requires transfer to be, “.... under fair and 
reasonable terms and condition”.
250 Section 5 paragraph 1 o f the Annex to the 1994 Agreement.
251 Section 2 paragraphs 3 and 4 o f the Annex to the 1994 Agreement.
252 Section 2 paragraph 1 of the Annex to the 1994 Agreement.
253 Section 2 paragraph 2 of the Annex to the Agreement.
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the independent functioning of the Enterprise. If the proposed joint venture operation 
with the Enterprise accords with sound commercial principles, the Council shall issue the 
directive providing for the independent functioning of the Enterprise.254 It is not too clear 
exactly what is meant by sound commercial principles, but what is clear is that the 
question of whether or not the Enterprise would be independent has been answered by 
putting it under the effective control of the Council where the industrialised states have a 
strong veto power. In his comments on the Enterprise the Namibian representative at the 
Forty-eighth Session of the General Assembly maintained as follows "... unless the 
Enterprise is granted favourable conditions for its proper and effective functioning, it 
will be unable to fulfil its intended role. Therefore, the evolutionary approach and joint 
venture envisaged in the Agreement is quite acceptable to my delegation, but this should 
not be used to undermine the early and effective operation o f the Enterprise. ” 255
iv. Decision-making
The Enterprise, which is an international mining corporation, has a decision making 
procedure akin to most multinational corporations. The Governing Board, which is to 
direct the operations of the Enterprise, is akin to a Board of Directors of a multinational 
corporation. 256 The Board is required to meet as often as the business of the Enterprise
257requires and a quorum is formed by two thirds of the members. Each member of the 
Board has one vote and matters before it are decided by a majority vote, with members 
having a conflict of interest on a matter required to refrain from voting.258 The members 
of the Board, although to be appointed in line with the principle of equitable geographical 
distribution, are to act in their decision making, not as representative of such region, but
y  c q
in their personal capacity.
The Director-General is to be responsible for decisions on day to day operations, such as 
the organisation, management, appointment and dismissal of the staff. The decisions of
254 Section 2 paragraph 2 of the Annex to the Agreement.
255 United Nations General Assembly, Forty-eighth Session, Official Records, A/48/PV.101 of 28 July 
1994, p.9.
256 Arts. 5 and 6 of Annex IV to LOSC.
257 Art. 5 (7) o f Annex IV to LOSC.
258 Art. 5(8) of Annex IV to LOSC
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the Director-General, however, are to be subject to the relevant rules and regulations of 
the Assembly and the provisions of the Statute of the Enterprise.260
At present, as pointed out earlier, the functions of the Enterprise are being performed by 
the Secretariat with the interim Director-General being a staff member of the Secretariat 
appointed by the Secretary-General of the ISA.261 Naturally this appointee, as a staff 
member of the Secretariat, is subject to the normal decision-making process in the 
Secretariat and directly accountable to the Secretary-General.
4.1.3.2. Institutions fo r  the settlement o f  disputes under the deep seabed regime.
The LOSC provides generally for a comprehensive and compulsory dispute settlement 
mechanism, with the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law 
of the Sea (ITLOS) being the main dispute settlement forum for disputes arising under 
the deep seabed regime.262 The regime in addition to the Seabed Disputes Chamber 
provides various dispute settlement options, namely the Ad Hoc Chambers of the Seabed 
Disputes Chamber and the Special Chamber established by the ITLOS, as well as 
commercial arbitration and the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. This section shall, 
however, be more focused on the Seabed Disputes Chamber and its Ad Hoc Chambers, 
though brief mention shall be made of the other dispute settlement mechanism.
4.1.3.2.1. (I) (A). ITLOS dispute settlement mechanism. 263
i. Seat
The ITLOS is an independent judicial body established by the LOSC to adjudicate on 
disputes and applications submitted to it in accordance with the constituent treaty or by 
any other agreement which confers jurisdiction on the Tribunal.264 Although it is located
259 Art. 5(1) and (4) o f Annex IV to LOSC
260 Art.7(2) of Annex IV to LOSC
261 Section 2 paragraph 1 o f the Annex to Agreement.
262 Arts. 286-296 o f LOSC. See Brown, E.D, “Dispute Settlement and the Law o f the Sea: the UN 
Convention Regime, (1997) 21(1) Marine Policy, pp. 17-43.
263 See the Statute o f the International Tribunal for the Law o f the Sea, Annex VI to LOSC and Mensah, T., 
“The place of the International Tribunal for the Law o f the Sea in the international system for the peaceful 
settlement o f disputes’’^  1997) 37 Indian Journal o f  International Law,]pp.466-477.
264 Art.21 of Annex VI to the LOSC.
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in Hamburg, Germany, there is provision for the Tribunal to sit and function elsewhere
9 f\f\whenever it considers this to be desirable.
ii. Members
The tribunal is composed of 21 Judges, elected by the Meeting of States Parties (SPLOS), 
in their personal capacity from among persons enjoying the highest reputation for fairness 
and integrity, as well as having recognised competence in the field of the law of the 
sea.267 In electing these judges, consideration is to be given to the need to represent the 
principal legal systems and also equitable geographical distribution.268 Further, no two 
members of the tribunal may be nationals of the same state and there shall be no fewer
• • 269than three members from each geographical grouping. In addition no member of the 
tribunal may exercise any political or administrative function or associate actively with or 
be financially interested in any of the operations of any enterprise involved in seabed 
mining activities; neither shall they act as agent, counsel or advocate in any case.270 The 
judges are elected for a term of nine years and may be re-elected, with the terms of one
271third of the members expiring every three years.
Out of the 21 judges of the ITLOS, five are from Africa, namely Thomas Mensah 
(Ghana); Paul Bamela Engo (Cameroon); Mohamed Mouldi Marsit (Tunisia); Tafsir 
Malick Ndiaye (Senegal) and Jose Luis Jesus (Cape Verde). The African representation
Art. 1(1) and (2) o f Annex VI to the LOSC.
266 Art. 1(3) o f Annex VI to the LOSC. This is similar to Art. 22 o f the Statute of the ICJ which was used 
for the first time in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project Case (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgement, (1997) I.C.J 
Rep.7.
267 Art.2 (1) o f Annex VI o f LOSC. Compare with Art.2 o f the Statute o f the ICJ which states: “The Court 
shall be composed o f a body o f independent judges, elected regardless o f their nationality from among 
persons of high moral character, who possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for 
appointment to the highest judicial offices, or are jurisconsults o f recognised competence in international 
law.”
268 Art.2 (2) o f Annex VI to the LOSC. Compare with Art. 9 o f the Statute of the ICJ which states that the 
electors should in addition to the professional qualifications o f the candidates also take into consideration 
“...that in the body as a whole the representation o f the main forms o f civilisation and of the principal 
systems of the world should be assured.”
269 Art.3 of Annex VI to LOSC.
270 Art. 7 of Annex VI to LOSC.Compare with Arts. 16 and 17 o f Statute of ICJ
271 Art.5 of Annex VI to LOSC. Compare with Art. 13 o f the Statute o f the ICJ. At the first election the 
terms of seven members expired at the end o f three years and the seven more members expired at the end 
of six years. Lots were drawn by the secretary-general immediately after the first election to choose these 
members. See SPLOS/9 o f 31 May 1996.
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at the ITLOS, when contrasted with the current representation on the ICJ, reveal a slight 
percentage increase.272
Disputing state parties which do not have a national as a judge may appoint a suitably 
qualified person as judge ad hoc. The current president of the tribunal is L. Dolliver M. 
Nelson (Grenada), while the registrar is Philippe Gautier (Belgium).274
Table 14
Current Judges o f the ITLOS275
Name (Order of 
Precedence)
Country Date of Expiry of 
Term of Office
President L. Dolliver M. 
Nelson
Grenada 30 September 2005
Vice-President Budislav Vukas Croatia 30 September 2005
Judges Hugo Caminos Argentina 30 September 2011
Vicente Marrotta 
Rangel
Brazil 30 September 2008
Alexander Yankov Bulgaria 30 September 2011
Soji Yamamoto Japan 30 September 2005
Anatoly Lazarevich 
Kolodkin
Russian Federation 30 September 2008
272 The ICJ with 15 judges has three African judges -  Raymond Ranjeva (Madagascar); Abdul G. Koroma 
(Sierra Leone) and Nabil Elaraby (Egypt). See http://www.icj-
cii.org/iciwww/igeneralinformation/icignnot.html On African representation at the ICJ, see Bedi R.S.B., 
“African Participation in the International Court o f Justice (1946-1998)” in Yusuf, A. A., (ed.), African 
Yearbook o f International Law, Vol.6,1998, ( The Hague/London/Boston , Kluwer Law International, 
1999),pp.l 81-222 and Higgins, R., “The International Court of Justice and Africa,” in Yakpo, E., and 
Boumedra, T.,(eds.), Liber Amicorum -  Mohammed Bedjaoui(The Hague/London/Boston, Kluwer Law 
International, 1999), pp.343-369
273 See Art. 17 and also Arts. 2, 8 and 11 o f Annex VI to LOSC. Compare with Art.31 (2) of the Statute of 
ICJ.
274 He became registrar on 21 September 2001 for a term of five years to replace Mr. Gritakumar E. Chitty 
(Sri Lanka) who resigned on 30 june 2001.
275 See General Information-Judges http://www.itlos.org/start2 en.html. The agreed allocation of seats to 
each regional grouping is African group(5); Asian group(5); Latin American and Caribbean group(4); 
Western European and Other States group(4) and Eastern European group(3). See SPLOS/34 of 21 
April, 1999
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Choon-Ho Park Republic of Korea 30 September 2005
Paul Bamela Engo Cameroon 30 September 2008
Thomas A. Mensah Ghana 30 September 2005
P. Chandrasekhara 
Rao
India 30 September 2008
Joseph Akl Lebanon 30 September 2008
David Anderson United Kingdom 30 September 2005
Rudiger Wolfrum Germany 30 September 2008
Tullio Treves Italy 30 September 2011
Mohamed Mouldi 
Marsit
Tunisia 30 September 2005
Tafsir Malick 
Ndiaye
Senegal 30 September 2011
Jose Luis Jesus Cape Verde 30 September 2008
Gungjian Xu China 30 September 2011
Jean-Pierre Cot France 30 September 2011
Anthony Amos 
Lucky
Trinidad and 
Tobago
30 September 2011
Table 15
ITLOS- Number o f Representatives o f each Regional Grouping
Regional grouping Number
Africa 5
Asian 5
Latin American & Caribbean (LAC) 4
Western European & others (WEOG) 4
Eastern European (EE) 3
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Table 16
Comparison o f the Number o f Representatives o f Regional Groupings on ITLOS and ICJ
Regional Grouping ITLOS (21 Members) ICJ (15 members)
Africa 5 (23.81%) 3 (20%)
Asian 5(23.81%) 3 (20%)
Latin American & Caribbean 
(LAC)
4(19.05%) 2(13.33%)
Western European & Others 
(WEOG)
4(19.05%) 5 (33.33%)
Eastern European (EE) 3 (14.29%) 2 (13.33%)
The ITLOS is given the power under the LOSC to establish Special chambers.276 The 
LOSC however specifically mentions and establishes the Seabed Disputes Chamber to 
exercise jurisdiction over Part XI matters.277
1. The Seabed Disputes Chamber.
At UNCLOS III the possibility of the Seabed Disputes Chamber being an organ of the 
ISA was considered but eventually abandoned. It was discarded in favour of a 
comprehensive system of settlement of disputes for the whole Convention with the 
Seabed Disputes Chamber as part of the ITLOS.278 A perusal of the Statute of the ITLOS 
shows an attempt to make clear that the Chamber is an integral part of the ITLOS. This is 
conveyed in the provisions on its composition, which comprises judges of ITLOS, and
276 Art. 15 of Annex VI to LOSC. Compare with Arts.26 and 27 o f Statute of ICJ. Pursuant to Art. 15 the 
following chambers have been formed -  the Chamber o f Summary Procedure, the Chamber for Fisheries 
Disputes, the Chamber for Marine Environment Disputes and at the request of Chile and the European 
Community, a special chamber was formed to deal with the Case Concerning the Conservation and 
Sustainable Exploitation of Swordfish Stocks in the South-Eastern Pacific Ocean. See General Information- 
Overview: International Tribunal for the Law o f the Sea http://www.itlos.org/start2 en.html [Accessed on 6 
December 2004].
277 Art. 186 of LOSC and Art. 14 o f Annex VI.
278 See Adede, A., The System fo r  Settlement o f  D isputes under United Nations Convention on the Law o f  
the Sea: a drafting history and  a commentary, (Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster, Martinus Nijhoff, 1987),
pp. 185-186. Also Eiriksson, G, International Tribunal fo r  the Law o f  the Sea, (The Hague/London/Boston, 
Martinus Nijhoff, 2000), p.68.
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also that its judgement is regarded as that of the ITLOS.279 Although the Seabed Disputes
Chamber is not an organ of the ISA, Gudmundur Eiriksson points out that it maintains
links with the latter organisation in three specific aspects:280 first, through the role given
to the Assembly of the ISA to adopt recommendations of a general nature in relation to
281the composition of the Chamber; second, as a result of the relationship between the 
Chamber and the Assembly, as well as the Council of the ISA, on advisory opinions;282 
and third, with regard to the amendment of the Statute of the ITLOS in relation to 
activities in the Area, where the approval of the Assembly and Council is required.283 In 
addition, such link is maintained through the provision requiring the ISA to be partly 
responsible for the expenses of the ITLOS on such terms and manner to be decided by the 
Meeting of States Parties (SPLOS).284
i. Members
The Seabed Disputes Chamber is composed of 11 judges selected by a majority of the 
members of the ITLOS from amongst themselves for a term of three years. They may 
also be selected for a second term.285 In selecting the judges due consideration is to be 
given to the need for representation of the principal legal systems of the world and 
equitable geographical distribution.286 The Chamber elects its own President from
287amongst its members to serve for the tenure of the selected members. A quorum of
288seven (7) judges is required to properly constitute the Chamber.
The current members of the Chamber were selected in October 2002 and their tenure is 
due to end on 30 September 2005. It includes three African judges, namely Mohamed
Arts. 35 and 15(5) of Annex VI.
280 Eiriksson, op. cit. pp. 68-69 and 283-285.
281 Art.35 (2) of Annex VI.
282 Art. 191 of LOSC.
283 Art. 314 of LOSC and Art. 41 o f Annex VI.
284 Art. 19 (1) of Annex VI.
285 Art. 35(1) and (3) o f Annex VI. Art.22 o f ITLOS Rules o f the Tribunal, ITLOS/8 of 21 September 2001.
286 Art.35 (2) of Annex VI.
287 Art.35 (4) o f Annex VI; Art.26 o f ITLOS Rules o f  the Tribunal, ITLOS/8.
288 Art.35 (7) o f Annex VI.
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Mouldi Marsit (Tunisia), who is also the President of the Chamber, as well as Thomas A. 
Mensah (Ghana) and Jose Luis Jesus (Cape Verde).289
Table 17
Composition o f the Seabed Disputes Chamber (2002-2005).
Name Country
President Mohamed Mouldi Tunisia
Marsit
Hugo Caminos Argentina
Alexander Yankov Bulgaria
P. Chandrasekhara Rao India
Choon-ho Park Republic of Korea
Thomas Mensah Ghana
David Anderson United Kingdom
Jose Luis Jesus Cape Verde
Guangjian Xu China
Jean-Pierre Cot France
Anthony Amos Lucky Trinidad and Tobago
Table 18
Seabed Disputes Chamber -  Number o f Representatives o f  each Regional Grouping
Regional grouping Number
African 3
Asian 3
Latin American & Caribbean (LAC) 2
Western European & Others (WEOG) 2
Eastern European (EE) 1
289 See Resolution on the Seabed Disputes Chamber adopted on 8 October 2002 and General Information- 
Judges. http://www.itlos.org/start2 en.html [Accessed on 6 December 2004],
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ii. Jurisdiction.
The Seabed Disputes Chamber allows access not only to states parties, but also to 
institutions such as the ISA and the Enterprise, as well as state enterprises and natural or 
juridical persons.290 It is set up to deal with disputes that may arise from seabed mining 
activities and has compulsory jurisdiction over states parties.291 It has jurisdiction over 
the following types of dispute:292
• Disputes between states parties concerning the interpretation or application of Part 
XI and the Annexes relating to it. Presumably this would include also jurisdiction to 
interpret the 1994 Agreement since the states parties “undertake to implement Part 
XI in accordance with this Agreement” and the provisions of the Agreement and Part 
XI are to be “interpreted and applied together as a single instrument. ” 293
• Disputes between a state party and the ISA concerning:
■ acts or omissions of the ISA or of a state party alleged to be in violation of Part XI 
or the annexes or the rules, regulations and procedures of the ISA, presumably 
this would also include such acts or omissions in violation of the 1994 
Agreement; or
■ acts of the ISA alleged to be ultra vires its jurisdiction or a misuse of its power. In 
exercising this jurisdiction the Chamber, however, cannot pronounce on the 
question of whether the rules, regulations and procedures are in conformity with 
the LOSC, neither can it declare them invalid. Its powers are merely limited to 
determining whether the application of such rules, regulations and procedures 
would be in conflict with the contractual or conventional obligations of the parties 
in the particular case before it.294
• Disputes between parties to a contract, whether states parties, the ISA or the 
Enterprise, state enterprises and natural or juridical persons concerning;
■ the interpretation or application of a relevant contract or a plan of work; or
290 Art. 20 of Annex VI and Art. 187(c), (d) and (e) o f LOSC. Compare with Art. 34(1) of the Statute of the 
ICJ which allows only states to be parties to contentious cases.
291 Art.287 (2) of LOSC.
292 Art. 187 of LOSC.
293 Arts. 1(1) and 2(1) of the 1994 Agreement.
294 Art. 189 of LOSC.
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■ acts or omissions of a party to the contract relating to activities in the Area and 
directed to the other party or directly affecting its legitimate interests.
• Disputes between the ISA and a prospective contractor sponsored by a state party, 
which has fulfilled all the conditions as required by the Convention, concerning the 
refusal of a contract or a legal issue arising in the negotiation of a contract;
• Disputes between the ISA and a state party, a state enterprise or a natural or juridical 
person sponsored by a state party where it is alleged that the ISA has incurred liability 
as a result of its wrongful acts in the exercise of its powers and functions;
• Any other disputes for which jurisdiction is specifically conferred on it by the 
Convention.295
The Chamber is also competent to give advisory opinions on legal questions arising 
within the scope of the activities of the ISA, when the Assembly or the Council so 
request.296
The LOSC does not appear to specifically allot jurisdiction to the Chamber in respect of
the ISA’s role under Article 82. Allot, however, points out that:
"Disputes relating to the ISA ’s role under Article 82 would appear not to be 
within the contentious jurisdiction o f the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber o f the 
International Tribunal on the Law o f the Sea under Article 187, but some 
matters arising under Article 82 might in some circumstances be the subject 
o f a request fo r  an advisory opinion under Article 191 or (if they involved a 
"dispute ” between states, in the technical sense) o f  proceedings under the
297general provisions o f part XV. ”
The reason for this is clear because the jurisdiction of the Chamber in contentious cases 
is limited and specific,298 whereas its advisory jurisdiction appears wide enough to cover 
ISA activities under Article 82 because it extends to ''''...legal questions arising within the 
scope o f their [the Assembly and the Council] activities”?99 Disputes between states
295 For more on the jurisdiction o f the Seabed Chambers see Brown, Seabed Energy and Minerals: The 
International Legal Regime, op. cit.pp.357-369.
296 Art. 191 of LOSC.
297 Allot, “Power Sharing in the Law o f the Sea”, (1983) 77 AJIL pp. 1 at 15-16.
298 See Arts. 187 (f) and 288(3) o f LOSC.
299 Art. 191 of LOSC.
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concerning Article 82 would therefore have to be resolved through utilising the general 
dispute settlement mechanism available under Part XV. However, the latter cannot 
generally be used in respect of any dispute between the ISA and a state party arising from 
Article 82 since Part XV applies mainly to disputes between states parties.300 In the view 
of this author there is no reason why the ITLOS, though not the Seabed Disputes 
Chamber, cannot have jurisdiction to hear such dispute under Articles 20, paragraph 2 
and 21 of Annex VI of the LOSC, if such jurisdiction is conferred upon the Tribunal by 
the express agreement of the disputing parties.301 Further, there is no reason why such a 
dispute could not be submitted to arbitration or conciliation under the general rules of 
international law, if the ISA and the state party so agree.
2. Ad Hoc Chambers o f the Seabed Disputes Chamber
The Seabed Disputes Chamber is empowered to form an Ad Hoc Chamber but only in the 
case of disputes between states parties.302 This is to be done at the request of any of the 
disputing parties, within three months from the date of the institution of proceedings, to 
deal with the interpretation or application of Part XI of the LOSC and the related 
annexes, and presumably the 1994 Agreement.303 This Ad Hoc Chamber is composed of 
three members to be determined by the Seabed Disputes Chamber with the approval of 
the parties.304 If however the parties do not agree on the composition of the Ad Hoc 
Chamber, each party is allowed to appoint one member and the third member is 
appointed by them in agreement. In the event that this fails, the President of the Seabed 
Disputes Chamber is to make the appointment after consultations with the parties.305 The
300 See generally Art. 279-296 o f LOSC.
301 Art.20(2) o f Annex VI says: “The Tribunal shall be open to entities other than States Parties in any case 
expressly provided for in Part XI or in anv case submitted pursuant to any other agreement conferring 
jurisdiction on the Tribunal which is accepted bv all the parties to that case.” (Emphasis added). While 
Art.21 of Annex VI provides that, “The jurisdiction o f the Tribunal shall comprise all disputes and 
applications submitted to it in accordance with this Convention and all matters specifically provided for in 
any other agreement which confers jurisdiction on the Tribunal.”
302 Art. 188 (1) of LOSC.
303 Art. 188(1) (b) of LOSC and Art. 36 o f Annex VI. See also Art.27 of ITLOS Rules of Procedure of the 
Tribunal, ITLOS/8 of 27 April 2005.
304Under Art.27(2) of ITLOS Rules o f  Procedure o f the Tribunal,ITLOS/8, if  within a time-limit fixed by 
the President of the Seabed Disputes Chamber the parties do not agree on the composition o f the Ad Hoc 
Chamber the President shall establish a time-limits for the parties to make the necessary appointments.
305 Art.36 (2) of Annex VI.
228
members of the Ad Hoc Chamber are not to be in the service of, or be nationals of, any of 
the disputing parties.306
Schwebel talking about the Ad hoc Chambers of the ICJ describes it as a "... halfway
3 0 7house between adjudication and arbitration. ” Brown has criticised the inclusion of the 
Ad Hoc Chambers in the dispute settlement mechanism as an attempt to solve political
308problems through “institutional proliferation.” However, it does appear, at least for the 
ICJ, the Ad Hoc Chamber system has enjoyed some measure of success amongst states, 
including African states.309 Perhaps, such proliferation might just be the price to pay to 
encourage states parties to bring their disputes concerning the seabed to the Chambers. 
Arguably, since the Seabed Chamber is dominated by judges from developing states, 
unlike, for instance, the ICJ which is western dominated; African states ought to have 
confidence in the full Court of the Seabed Chamber. However, in view of certain 
divergence of interests between developing seabed mining and non-seabed mining states, 
it is possible that African states might not have confidence in Asian judges from seabed 
mining states, and might opt in certain instances for the Ad Hoc Chamber system. There 
is, of course, a possible disadvantage of the use of Ad Hoc Chambers since its 
widespread use might lead to differing interpretations of the LOSC, especially if a
310Chamber consists of two ad hoc judges and an ITLOS judge.
So far no such Ad Hoc Chamber of the Seabed Disputes Chamber has been constituted, 
neither have any of the procedures for settling seabed disputes been used.
306 Art. 36 o f Annex VI.
307 Schwebel, S., “Ad Hoc Chambers o f the International Court o f Justice” (1987) 81 AJIL pp.831 at 854.
308 Brown, Seabed Energy and Minerals: The International Legal Regime, op. cit. pp. 356-357; Also 
Brown, Dispute Settlement and the law o f the Sea: the UN Convention Regime, op. cit.p.38
309 See the Gulf o f  Maine Judgement, (1984) ICJ Rep. 361; Frontier Dispute Case (Burkina Faso/Mali), 
(1986) ICJ Rep. 554; Elettronica Sicula Case, Supra-, Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El 
Salvador/ Honduras), (1987) ICJ Rep. 12 and Frontier Dispute Case(Benin/Niger), Order of 27 November 
2002(2002) ICJ Rep.l.
310 However, Judge Mensah disagrees that a proliferation o f international tribunals would necessarily lead 
to a danger o f fragmentation o f jurisprudence or conflicting decisions. He argues that such a view on the 
danger o f fragmented jurisprudence is based on mere speculation, with no evidence in support. See 
Mensah, T., “The Role o f Peaceful Settlement in Contemporary Ocean Policy and Law” in Vidas, D and 
Ostreng, W.(eds.) Order fo r  the Oceans at the Turn o f  the Century, (Hague/London/Boston, Kluwer Law
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3. Special Chamber o f ITLOS.
The ITLOS is empowered to form a Special Chamber composed of three or more 
members to deal with particular disputes submitted to it.311 The establishment of this 
Special Chamber can only be done at the request of the disputing states parties, and the 
composition is determined by the ITLOS with the approval of the parties.312 Such Special 
Chamber may be formed in respect of the deep seabed regime, at the request of disputing 
states parties, as regards disputes concerning the interpretation or application of Part XI 
and the relevant annexes to the LOSC,313 and presumably also in respect of disputes 
concerning the interpretation or application of the 1994 Agreement. The judgement of the 
Special Chamber would be considered as that of the ITLOS.314 No such Special Chamber 
has been formed in respect of the deep seabed regime.
4.1.3.2.1(1) (B). Decision-making fo r  ITLOS dispute settlement Bodies 
The decision-making process of the ITLOS, which includes the Seabed Disputes 
Chamber, in respect of cases before it is by a majority vote of the members present and 
voting.315 There is, however, provision for judges to attach a separate or dissenting 
opinion to such decision.316 In the event of an equality of votes, the President or any
317member who acts in his place has a casting vote.
Although there has been no decision on the part of the Seabed Disputes Chamber, which 
presently has not heard any case, it is arguable that in such decisions there would be an 
implicit role of ideological considerations founded on the north/south divide that would 
influence the decisions of the judges of the Chamber. While there is no allusion to any 
possibility of overt bias on the part of the eminent judges, one cannot dismiss the 
sociological/extra-judicial factors that come in to play in the decision of each particular
International, 1999), pp.81 at 92.
311 Art. 15 (1) o f Annex VI and note 276 above.
312 Art. 15 (2) o f Annex VI and Arts.29 to 30 o f ITLOS Rules o f Procedure, ITLOS/8 of 27 April 2005.
313 Arts. 187 (a) and 188(1) (a) ofLOSC.
314 Art. 15 (5) o f Annex VI.
315 Art.29 (1) of Annex VI and ITLOS, Internal Judicial Practice, ITLOS/10 of 31 October 1997. For the 
ITLOS the quorum of sitting judges is eleven, while for the Seabed Disputes Chamber it is seven. Of 
course for the Ad Hoc Chambers all three members must be present and voting.
316 Art. 125 (2) of ITLOS Rules o f Procedure o f the Tribunal, ITLOS/8.
317 Art.29 (2) o f Annex VI.
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judge. It is suggested that the deep rooted ideological basis of the deep seabed regime, 
founded on the north/south divide, as reflected in the UNCLOS III and the United 
Nations Secretary-General’s consultations, would be implicit in the decisions of the
318individual judges of the Seabed Chamber. This view is further strengthened by the fact 
that some of the present members of the Seabed Disputes Chamber, as well as other 
members of the ITLOS who are potential members of the Chamber, including certain 
African members, were actively involved in the UNCLOS III negotiations that clearly 
manifested the north/south divide.319 The tacit influence of the north/south divide is, in 
some regards, reflected in the tendency of certain African judges in the ICJ to be 
unsympathetic to a viewpoint that appears to perpetuate what they perceive as a 
Eurocentric view of international law. An obvious example of this concerns the position 
of certain African judges in the ICJ on the effect of colonial laws in contemporary 
international law. For instance in the Case concerning Maritime Delimitation and
320Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrainf the joint dissenting opinion of 
three African judges, Bedjaoui (Algeria), Ranjeva (Madagascar) and Koroma (Sierra 
Leone) was critical of the reliance by the majority on a 1939 colonial decision of the 
British government as the sole basis for awarding title to the Hawar Islands to Bahrain.321 
These judges, identifying the absence of consent on the part of Qatar to the colonial 
decision, alluded to the inequality of relationship that necessarily existed during 
colonialism between the occupying power and the occupied state by pointing out as 
follows:322
“In the present case, the indivisibility o f  the consent has not been established: 
it is simply presumed. In political terms, the nature o f the relationship 
between the protecting Power and the protected State did not permit the use
318 See generally II Ro Suh, “Voting Behaviour o f National Judges in International Courts”, (1969) 63 
AJIL.pp. 224-236.
319 For example, Judge Mohammed Mouldi Marsit (Tunisia), presently the President of the Seabed Disputes 
Chamber, was a member of the Tunisian delegation to UNCLOS III from 1974-1982; Judge Jesus (Cape 
Verde), another current member of the Chamber was a delegate and head of Cape Verde’s delegation to 
UNCLOS III from 1979-1982 and also Chairman, Group of 77 for the Law o f the Sea (1986) and Chairman 
of the PrepCom 1987-1995. A previous member o f the Chamber, until 30 September 2002, Judge Bamela 
Engo (Cameroon) and still a member o f ITLOS, was not only a member o f the Cameroonian delegation to 
UNCLOS III but was also the Chairman o f the First Committee. See General Information-Judges 
http://www.itlos.org/stai~t2 en.html [Accessed on 12 December 2004].
320 (2001) I.C.J. Rep. 40.
321 Ibid at pp. 145 to 214.
322 Ibid. at p. 159, para.38.
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o f any language other than the deferential terms in which the local rulers 
expressed themselves; thus to interpret that language as evidence o f consent 
to the renunciation o f territorial jurisdiction is in reality to give the opposite 
sense to the natural meaning o f the words and conduct in 1939. In legal 
terms, when the judgement invokes against Qatar its consent to the substance 
o f the 1939 decision -  a consent that was in reality hypothetical -, it 
reproaches Qatar with its failure to abide by a decision with which it had 
already been threatened in veiled terms since 1937. Independently o f the 
fraudulent nature o f  the manoeuvres o f the British representatives, the 
question is whether Qatar was legally bound to abide by the decision. The 
answer must be a negative one. ” 323
The Ad Hoc Chamber of the Seabed Chamber, constituted by three members, would 
appear to have the same rules on decision making applicable to it as the Seabed Chamber. 
However Schwebel, in discussing the Ad Hoc Chamber of the ICJ, points out that the size 
of the Ad Hoc Chamber tends to give more room for a particular judge to exercise 
influence than when it is a full court sitting.324 This could also be said to be the same 
concerning any Special Chamber to deal with disputes related to the deep seabed regime, 
as and when they are established at the request of disputing states parties.
Other decisions that have to be taken by the ITLOS include the determination of whether
• 3 9 5any member of the Tribunal is involved in incompatible activities or should participate 
in a decision in a case in which he has previously participated as agent, counsel or 
advocate or as a member of a national or international court or tribunal.326 This decision 
is to be taken by a majority of members of the Tribunal present and voting.327 Further, 
decisions on the election of the President and the Vice-President, Registrar, Deputy 
Registrar and Assistant Registrar of the ITLOS are to be by a majority of the judges
328composing the Tribunal at the time of the election. On the other hand, decisions on the 
removal of the Registrar, Deputy Registrar and the Assistant Registrar from office require
323 See also Judge ad hoc Georges Abi-Saab (Egypt)’s separate opinion in the Chamber of the ICJ decision 
in the Case concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Republic o f Mali), (1986) ICJ Rep.pp. 554 at 
659- 663, especially at p.659, para.4
324 Schwebel, op. cit.p.846.
325 Art. 7 of Annex VI.
326 Art. 8 of Annex VI.
327 Arts.7 (3) and 8(4) o f Annex VI.
328 Arts. 11(2) and (3), 32(4) and 33 o f ITLOS Rules o f the Tribunal, ITLOS/8.
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the approval of two thirds of the members of the Tribunal.329 The removal of these 
officers requires a higher majority than that required for their appointment. Eiriksson 
points out that it is unclear whether the removal of these officers merely requires the 
approval of two thirds of the judges present at the meeting or of all the judges composing 
the Tribunal at the time. He takes the view that in the light of the requirement for the 
election of the officers, it should be the latter.330 This appears to be the position since the 
provision clearly intends a higher threshold to apply in the case of removal. The selection 
of the members of the Seabed Disputes Chamber is by a majority of the members of the 
Tribunal,331 while the election of the President is by a majority vote of the members of 
the Chamber.332
The decisions of the Chambers shall be enforceable in the territories of the state parties as 
judgements or orders of the highest court of such party in whose territory it is to be 
enforced.333
4.1.3.2.1(11). Dispute Settlement under Unfair Economic Practices Multilateral 
Agreements
The LOSC makes it clear that rights and obligations relating to unfair economic practices 
under relevant multilateral Agreements shall apply to seabed mining in the Area. It 
allows states parties to the LOSC, which are parties to such Agreements, to have recourse 
to the dispute settlement procedures under such Agreements.334 The 1994 Agreement 
declares that the provisions of the GATT, its relevant codes and successor or superseding 
agreements shall apply with respect to activities in the Area as regards production policy 
of the ISA. The WTO rules have since superseded the GATT provisions. Therefore, in 
respect of disputes concerning the WTO rules which involve states parties that are 
members of the WTO, recourse shall be had to the WTO dispute settlement
329 Arts.39 (2) and (3) of ITLOS Rules o f the Tribunal, ITLOS/8.
330 Eiriksson, op. cit. p.260.
331 Art.35 (1) of Annex VI.
332 Art.26 (1) o f ITLOS Rules of the Tribunal, ITLOS/8.
333 Art.39 of Annex VI to LOSC.
334 Art.151 (8).
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mechanism.335 However, in the event that such dispute involves one or more states parties 
which are not parties to the WTO recourse shall be to the dispute settlement procedure 
under LOSC.336 Presently there are 148 members of the WTO, including 41 African
337states. These member states of the WTO are therefore required in respect of disputes 
concerning the WTO rules on seabed mining activities to have recourse amongst them to 
the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. A perusal of the cases so far involving the WTO 
dispute settlement mechanism reveals that the bulk of the disputes are actually initiated 
by developed industrialised states against themselves, with very few disputes involving
T O O
African states.
4.1.3.2.1(111). Commercial Arbitration.
Disputes concerning the interpretation or application of a relevant contract or a plan of 
work related to the deep seabed regime can also, at the request of any of the parties to the 
contract or plan of work, be submitted to binding commercial arbitration, unless otherwise 
agreed by the parties.339 In the absence of any provision in the contract on the arbitration 
procedure, the case shall be conducted in accordance with the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules or such other arbitration rules as may be prescribed in the rules, regulations and 
procedures of the ISA, unless the parties to the dispute otherwise agree.340 However, the 
commercial arbitral tribunal shall have no jurisdiction to decide on questions relating to 
the interpretation of the Convention.341 In any situation where an arbitral tribunal 
determines, either at the request of a party or of its own accord, that its decision depends
335 Section 6 paragraphs 1(f) (I) and 4.
336 Section 6(1) (f) (ii) and 4.
337 As at 13 October 2004 the following African states were members o f WTO: Angola, Benin, Botswana, 
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Cote d’ Ivoire, Democratic 
Republic o f the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, 
Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, 
Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe. See http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/whatis e/tif e/org6 e.htm [Accessed on 
9 December 2004].
338 See WTO Dispute settlement- Status in brief o f the disputes,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/disou e/dispu status e.htm [Accessed on 10 December 2004] and 
Romano C.P.R., “International Justice and Developing Countries: A Quantitative Analysis”, (2002) 1(2), 
The Law and Practice o f International Courts and Tribunals (A Practitioners’ Journal), p.367 at 385- 397.
339 Art. 188 (2) (a) o f LOSC. Generally on African states and commercial arbitration, see Asouzu, A., 
International Commercial Arbitration and African States: Practice, Participation and Institutional 
Development, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001).
340 Art. 188 (2) (c) o f LOSC.
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upon the interpretation of Conventional provisions it shall refer such question to the 
Chamber for a ruling. Thereafter its award must await the ruling of the Chamber and must 
conform to such ruling.342
Part II
4.2. Funding the institutions o f the deep seabed regime (The impact o f African member 
states ’ contributions.)
The financial aspect of international organisations is crucial, since proper funding is 
required to enable an international organisation effectively to carry out its aims and 
objectives, as well as to meet its operational costs, such as salaries of staff, printing, 
meetings, travelling expenses, conferences, seminars etc.343 Usually the financing of 
international organisations is derived mainly from the contributions of members, thereby 
providing for an avenue of influence in the organisation for member states that are the 
major financiers.344 The significance of the influence of major financial contributors to 
international institutions is indicated in the United Nations Secretary-General 
consultations that led to the 1994 Agreement following the refusal by certain 
industrialised states, major contributors to international organisations, to ratify the LOSC 
because of the original Part XI provisions.
4.2.1(1). The ISA
Up until 31 December 1997 the funding of the ISA was from the regular United Nations 
budget. However from 1998 the ISA started to operate its own budget derived from the 
contributions of the member states in accordance with the provisions of the LOSC, the
341 Art. 188 (2) (a) o f LOSC.
342 Art. 188 (2) (b) o f LOSC.
343 See generally on financial aspects o f international organisations Sands & Klein, Bowett’s Law o f  
International Institutions, op. cit. pp. 565 — 580.
344 See the example o f the United States o f America, a major financial contributor to the United Nations 
system forcing reforms in the United Nations and the UNESCO. See
http://www.globa1policv.org/finance/chronol/index.htm and http://www.un.org/reform/dossier.htm 
[Accessed on 12 December 2004]. Also see Nelson, R., “International Law and U.S. withholding payments 
to International Organisations” (1986) 80 /tJ/L,pp.973-983; Zoller, E., “The ‘Corporate Will’ o f the United 
Nations and the Rights o f the Minority”, (1986) 81 AJIL, pp. 610-634 and Chimni,B.S., “International 
Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in the Making” (2004) 15 EJIL, pp.lat 2-4 ;
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1994 Agreement and its financial regulations.345 Initially the ISA operated an annual 
budget but by the sixth session the Assembly decided to move to a biennial budget 
cycle.346
The funds of the ISA are to be derived from assessed contributions made by its states 
members; agreed contributions, as determined by the ISA, made by international 
organisations which are its members; funds received by the ISA in connection with 
activities in the Area; funds transferred by the Enterprise, when it commences 
commercial operations, under Annex IV, Article 10(2) of the LOSC; funds borrowed 
pursuant to its borrowing powers under Article 174 and Section 1 paragraph 14 of the 
Agreement (such borrowing should not be used to finance the ISA’s administrative 
budget); voluntary contributions made by members or other entities; economic assistance 
funds; and such other funds which the ISA is entitled to receive, including income from
347investment.
Presently, the main source of funding for the ISA is from the assessed contributions of 
the states parties in accordance with an agreed scale of assessment based on the scale 
used for the regular budget of the United Nations.348 The Secretary-General of the ISA 
prepares the draft budget which he submits to the Finance Committee. Thereafter, the 
Finance Committee prepares a report with its recommendations and submits it to the 
Council for consideration. The Council, after its consideration, passes it on to the 
Assembly for consideration and approval. Any decision made by the Council or the 
Assembly on the budget must “take into account recommendations o f the Finance 
Committee.”349 This appears to suggest that by being required only to take account of
345 Art. 171-175 of LOSC and Sections 1 paragraphs 1(12)(c)(i) and 14; 2 paragraph 3; 3 paragraph 7 and 9 
paragraph 7(c) o f the Annex to the 1994 Agreement as well as the Financial Regulations, ISBA/6/A/3 of 28 
March 2000.
346 The budget has been between the range o f $4,697,100 for 1998 and $10,509,400 for the 2003-2004 
financial years. For details o f the exact amount o f the budget o f the ISA from 1998 to 2004 see the Part IV 
of the Report o f the Secretary-General o f the International Seabed Authority under Article 166, paragraph 
4, o f the United Nations Convention on the Law o f the Sea, ISBA/10/A/3 of 31 March 2004. For the 2005- 
2006 financial year the Assembly has adopted a budget o f $10,816,700. See ISBA/10/A/8 of 2 June 2004.
347 Art.171 of LOSC; Section 7 paragraph 2 o f Agreement and Reg. 6.1 of the Financial Regulations
348 Art. 160 (2) (e) o f LOSC and Section 1 paragraph 14 o f the 1994 Agreement. The present United Nations 
scale is capped at a maximum assessment rate o f 22% and a minimum assessment rate of 0.01 %.
349 Section 9 paragraph 7 of the Annex to the Agreement.
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such recommendations the Council and Assembly are not bound by them. However the 
further provision of the Agreement stating that: “Decisions by the Assembly or the 
Council having financial or budgetary implications shall be based on the 
recommendations o f  the Finance Committee, ”350suggests that the "recommendations” of 
the Finance Committee are of immense weight in such decision of the Council and the 
Assembly. The recommendatory powers of the Finance Committee under the Agreement 
appear considerable since, unlike the Council, there is no provision for the Assembly to 
refuse to accept such recommendations and thereafter send them back to the Committee
-1 r  i
for further consideration. The Finance Committee, which has a guaranteed place for 
the representatives of the five largest financial contributors to the administrative budget 
(at least until the ISA has sufficient funds other than the assessed contributions to meet its 
administrative expenses), is dominated by the developed industrial states. This therefore 
ensures that these states protect their '’''financial interests ” in the organisation352 and exert 
considerable influence over the ISA.
Despite the rather modest budget of the ISA, as at 31 March 2004, 52 states member, 
including 23 African states, had been in arrears for a period of two years or more.353 
Under the LOSC and the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly a state in arrears for two or 
more years shall have no right to vote in the Assembly. It is not very clear if this rule is 
being applied, however at the tenth session of the Assembly two African states, Comoros 
and Somalia, who were in arrears are reported to have sought and successfully obtained a 
dispensation to allow them participate in the elections of the Secretary-General.354 It is, 
however, doubtful, in view of the current poor attendance of states parties at the
350 Section 3 paragraph 7 o f the Annex to the Agreement.
351 See Section 3 paragraph 4 o f the Annex to the Agreement which allows the Assembly to refuse to accept 
the recommendations o f the Council and to return such to the Council for further consideration in the light 
of the views expressed by the Assembly.
352 Oxman, “The 1994 Agreement and the Convention”, op. cit. p.689
353 The African states in arrears were Benin, Cape Verde, the Comoros, Cote d’Ivoire, the Democratic 
Republic o f the Congo, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Somalia, the Sudan, Togo, Uganda, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe. See Para.58 o f ISBA/10/A/3 o f 31 March 2004.
354 See International Seabed Authority, Press Release, SB/10/18 of 3 June 2004.
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Assembly meetings; if this rule is being stringently applied as otherwise nearly 40% of 
the Assembly members would not be able to vote.355
For as long as the ISA depends on the assessed contributions of members, the industrial 
developed states by virtue of their contribution and “financiar veto in the Finance 
Committee, as a result of the requirement of consensus in decision making, will continue 
to have more influence in the ISA’s affairs. The developing states, including African 
states, will only be able to overturn this state of affairs if the ISA has other sources 
beyond members’ contributions. As a result of the indefinite postponement of 
commercial exploitation of the Area, any such independent source of funding for the ISA 
is not probable in the near future.
4.2.1(H). The Enterprise
As has been mentioned, the Enterprise has not yet commenced independent operations
• 356since its functions are currently being performed by the Secretariat. However, it is 
pertinent to point out that upon commencement of its independent functioning357 it would 
have its own budget separate from the ISA. This arises from the fact that it has its own
358legal capacities distinct from those of the ISA.
359The Enterprise is to derive its funds from the following sources:
• amounts received from the ISA funds outside the assessed contributions, after 
payment by the ISA of all its administrative expenses, to enable it carry out its 
functions;
• voluntary contributions made by states parties for the specific purpose of financing 
the activities of the Enterprise;
• income derived by the Enterprise through its operations;
• amounts borrowed by the Enterprise under the powers stated in its Statute.
355 Art. 184 of LOSC and Rule 80 o f the Rules o f Procedure o f the Assembly. See Para. 58, ISBA/10/A/3 of 
31 March 2004.
356 Section 2 paragraph 1 o f the Annex to the Agreement.
357 Section 2 paragraph 2 o f the Annex to the Agreement.
358 See Art. 170(2) and Arts.2 and 13(2) o f Annex IV, LOSC.
359 Art. 11 of Annex IV.
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Under the original Part XI provisions, states parties were under an obligation to provide 
interest-free long-term loans to assist in financing the Enterprise’s first mining operations 
and its initial expenses. However this obligation, which was felt by the developed 
states to be a form of subsidy, thereby giving the Enterprise an unfair advantage over 
other operators, has been declared not to apply by the 1994 Agreement.361 Also the 
original provisions of Part XI giving the Enterprise an advantage over other operators, by 
exempting it from any payments to the ISA, do not apply because all the obligations 
applicable to contractors are to apply to the Enterprise.362
The financial provisions under the original Part XI provisions were intended to place the 
Enterprise in a position where it would have been able to compete with other operators 
which have the tremendous advantage of possessing the necessary technology and 
finance.363 The 1994 Agreement, by deleting the relevant provisions of LOSC giving the 
Enterprise favourable financial terms, has in essence placed the Enterprise in a position of 
disadvantage vis-a-vis other commercial operators from developed industrialised states. 
The representative of Iran at the 48th Session of the General Assembly identified this by 
stating:364
“Despite the fact that the Enterprise is to conduct its initial deep seabed 
mining operations through joint ventures, it has been deprived o f any 
preferential treatment from the Authority ...In accordance with Article 11(3), 
o f annex IV  to the Convention, the financing o f  the Enterprise's operations in 
its first mine site is to be borne by states parties so that it can initiate 
activities as quickly and effectively as possible. With the deletion o f these 
provisions, one can hardly conceive o f a situation where the institution could 
reach the stage o f being able to engage in commercial activities and compete 
with other operations, as the principle o f  the common heritage o f mankind 
requires. ”
Art 11(3) of Annex IV.
361 Section 2 paragraph 3(b) o f the Annex to the Agreement.
362 Art. 10 (3) o f Annex IV and Section 2 paragraph 4 o f the Annex to the Agreement.
363 Legislative History o f  the Enterprise under the United Nations Convention on the Law o f the Sea and the 
Agreement Relating to the Implementation o f  Part XI o f  the Convention, op.cit,pp. 183-187
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4.2.2. ITLOS
The expenses of the ITLOS are to be borne by the states parties to the LOSC and by the 
ISA on such terms and in such manner as determined by the meeting of the states parties 
(SPLOS).365 However, presently the expenses of ITLOS are bome entirely by the states 
parties, as well as international organisations that are parties to the LOSC, and not the 
ISA.366 The contributions of the states parties are based on the scale of assessments for 
the regular budget of the United Nations for the preceding financial year.367
The budget of the ITLOS is approved by the SPLOS based on a proposed budget by the 
President of the Tribunal. The budget proposals are first considered by an open-ended 
working group under the chairmanship of the President of the SPLOS.368 This working 
group deliberates on the overall budget proposals and carries out an item-by-item 
examination. After consideration by the working group, it is brought before the plenary 
body which approves the budget.369 Such approval shall be by a two-thirds majority of 
the states parties present and voting, provided such majority includes a majority of the 
states parties participating in that meeting.370 A proposal by the United Kingdom to raise 
the qualified majority to three-fourths in respect of decisions on financial and budgetary 
matters was eventual withdrawn due to reservations expressed by certain members.371 
This therefore means that, like Article 17(2) of the United Nations Charter, the numerous 
developing states contributing an insignificant amount to the budget are able to exert
364 General Assembly, Forty-eighth Session, 101st Meeting, A/48/PV.101 o f 28 July 1994, p.l 1.
365 Art. 19 (1) o f the Statute o f  ITLOS. The frrst meeting o f SPLOS was convened by the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations in the exercise o f his powers under Art.319 (2) (e) o f LOSC in New York on 21 
November 1994. SPLOS/3 o f 28 February 1995.
366 See Decisions on budgetary matters o f the International Tribunal for the Law o f the Sea for 2002, 
Eleventh Meeting o f States Parties, New York, 14-18 May 2001, SPLOS/70 of 17 May 2001, paragraph 4.
367 See Decision on the scale o f assessments for the budgets o f the International Tribunal for the Law of the 
Sea for 2004 and 2005-2006, SPLOS/97 o f 12 June 2003. The 2004 budget is to use a ceiling rate of 24% 
and a floor rate of 0.01%, while for 2005-2006 the ceiling rate is 22% and the floor rate 0.01%.
368 The working group is a compromise solution to arrive at a balance between two groups at the SPLOS, 
on the one hand those which wanted a Finance Committee to be set up to serve as a subsidiary organ to 
consider the budget and other financial matters and thereafter make recommendations to the SPLOS, and 
on the other hand those which wanted no such body but wanted all the details o f the budget to be 
considered by the plenary body. See SPLOS/71 o f  17 May 2001 and SPLOS/73 o f 14 June 2001, pp.8-9, 
paras.47-50.
369 SPLOS/73, at p.7, para.38
370 Rule 53 o f SPLOS Rules o f  Procedure, SPLOS/2/Rev.3 of 26 July 1995.
371 SPLOS/73, at p.8, paras. 45 and 46.
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immense influence over the budget.372Again, like the ISA, the response of states parties 
to the payments of their assessed contributions has been poor.373 As at 31 December 
2003, 78 states had not made payments of their assessed contributions for 2003.374
When an entity other than a state party or the ISA is a party to a case submitted to the 
ITLOS, the Tribunal shall fix the amount which that party is to contribute towards the
375expenses incurred by the Tribunal. The latter situation is obviously in view of Article 
20 of the ITLOS Statute, which gives the ITLOS competence over non-state entities 
under Part XI, including state enterprises and natural and juridical persons. It also deals 
with situations where a case is submitted to the ITLOS pursuant to an agreement by non­
states parties. In fixing the contributions of such other entities, it is open to the Tribunal 
to take into consideration such factors as the circumstances of the case, the travel and 
subsistence of witnesses, production of evidence and administrative costs.376
Part III
4.3. Conclusion
This chapter has sought to examine the institutions of the regime of the Area from the 
point of view of African states. The regime created a number of new international 
institutions. In a bid to please the developed industrialised states certain provisions of the 
original Part XI relating to the institutions of the regime have been significantly altered 
by the 1994 Agreement. Despite the changes made by the 1994 Agreement the African 
group generally appears to be favoured in terms of numerical composition in the various
372 It is however pertinent to note that at the second meeting of the SPLOS it was agreed that the principle 
of cost effectiveness would apply to all aspects o f the ITLOS’s work. See SPLOS/4 of 26 July 1995, p.9, 
Para.25 (e).
373 As at 1 November 2004 there was an unpaid balance of assessed contributions covering the period from 
1996/97 to 2004 amounting to $2,569,684. See Para. 17 o f the Statement by the President o f the 
International Tribunal for the Law o f the Sea on Agenda item 49(a) at the Plenary of the Fifth-Ninth 
session of the United Nations General Assembly on 17 November 2004.
374 See Annual Report o f the International Tribunal for the Law o f the Sea for 2003, SPLOS/109 of 8 April 
2004, Para.69. There is, however, no indication as to the exact defaulting states in documents in the public 
domain, unlike the ISA. Efforts to obtain the details o f  the defaulting states from the ITLOS in order to 
determine the number o f defaulting African states were unsuccessful as the ITLOS was not inclined to 
make the information available to the public. (Personal Communication with Ms Julia Pope of the Press 
Office, International Tribunal for the Law o f the Sea. (On file with the author).
375 Art. 19 (2) o f  Annex VI to LOSC.
376 Eiriksson, op. cit.p.282.
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institutions. This in itself, at least to a limited sense, is indicative of some level of 
influence of the African “late comer ” 377 states on the international scene, including the 
deep seabed regime. However, with the extensive amendments to the ISA made by the 
1994 Agreement the numerical strength of African states, even when combined with 
other G-77 developing states members, has not translated into considerable influence in 
the decision-making processes of the ISA.
Although the original Part XI provisions, by vesting significant decision-making powers 
in the plenary institution, the Assembly, opened up an avenue for African states and other 
developing states to exercise substantial influence over the ISA, the alterations introduced 
by the 1994 Agreement have overturned such influence. The Assembly has been rendered 
largely impotent by the Agreement stripping it of its powers to take independent action. 
The Assembly, however, still retains some influence, albeit limited, since it is still under 
the Agreement allowed to reject the recommendations of the Council and send them back 
for reconsideration “in the light o f the views expressed by the Assembly
In the Council, the developed industrialised states, although a minority, have a virtual 
veto to block any decision unfavourable to them through the chamber system of decision 
making under the Agreement since a decision cannot be taken if opposed by a majority in 
one of the chambers. The Agreement lumps developing states representing special 
interests and the equitable geographical representation group, with its potential to include 
a number of developing states, together as merely one chamber while the other groups, 
namely the consumer/importer, the investor nations and major exporters groups, are 
given separate chambers. This in itself, by reason of the criteria for the composition of 
the latter groups, gives the developed industrialised states the potential to control one or 
more of these groups/chambers in order to veto unfavourable decisions. In the same vein 
African states, along with other developing countries, could in theory also have a veto in 
the fourth chamber to block decisions unfavourable to them. This would, however, 
require a greater number of states to achieve a majority to block such a decision. While
377 Most African states started to emerge as independent states and active participants in the international 
community in the 1960s. See section 2.1 o f chapter 2 o f this thesis.
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this might appear a daunting task, the level of unity displayed by African states, along 
with other developing states in the G-77, during the UNCLOS III indicates that this is not 
an impossible task to accomplish.
As for the Legal and Technical Commission, a subsidiary organ of the Council, its 
powers are merely recommendatory and can be accepted or rejected by the Council. The 
Finance Committee, on the other hand, another sub-organ of the Council, is conferred 
with considerable powers in respect of decisions relating to financial matters since the 
Assembly and Council are to act in such matters based on its recommendations. Further, 
through the insistence that decisions of the Finance Committee on matters of substance 
should be by way consensus the Agreement appears to have vested in industrialised 
developed states the ability to block decisions that they perceive are unfavourable. On the 
other hand, the requirement of consensus could also allow members from developing 
states, including African states, to block financial matters that are unfavourable to the 
interests of developing states. Unfortunately, the Agreement gives no indication as to 
what happens when there is a failure to reach a consensus in the Finance Committee. 
Fortunately, so far there has not been an instance of such stalemate in practice. However, 
it would be appropriate to have clear provisions as to what should be done in the event of 
a failure to arrive at a consensus decision.
The regime of the Area provides a dispute settlement mechanism for the resolution of 
disputes, significantly through the Seabed Disputes Chamber that has compulsory 
jurisdiction. So far there has been no case brought before this Chamber, although it has, 
in line with the Statute of the ITLOS, been constituted, with the present membership 
including three African judges. While conceding the eminent qualifications of the judges 
of the ITLOS from which the members of the Seabed Disputes Chamber are chosen it 
would be interesting to observe, in the eventuality of cases coming before the Chamber, 
whether decisions of the various judges would have the implicit influence of the 
ideological position of the north/south divide that was manifestly prevalent in positions 
taken at the UNCLOS III. This is especially so, since a number of the judges of ITLOS, 
including certain African judges, were active and direct participants in UNCLOS III.
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Would there be a divergence as between the decisions of developing states judges, 
including African judges, and judges from developed states in certain respects in the 
interpretation of the regime of the common heritage of mankind as embodied in LOSC 
and the 1994 Agreement?
Presently, the funding of the institutions of the regime of the Area is derived from 
assessed contributions of member states. While there are suggestions in certain quarters 
for an expanded role for the ISA in the Area which could be used to derive alternative 
funding, through, for instance, providing access to genetic materials of the Area for a fee, 
the present definition of the role of the ISA under the constituent treaty appears to limit 
its role to one over non-living resources defined as "all solid, liquid or gaseous mineral 
resources in situ in the Area at or beneath the sea-bed, including polymetallic 
nodules. ” 378 Any expansion of such role would necessarily entail an amendment of the 
LOSC, a process that is complicated and has not presently been utilised. It only suffices 
to say that it would be in the interest of African states, which are likely to be amongst the 
major beneficiaries of any benefit of the Area, to have an articulated plan, perhaps 
through the auspices of the AU, to promote in the ISA, the SPLOS and the General 
Assembly of the United Nations an agenda for such an expanded role for the ISA.
Presently, the ISA, along with the ITLOS, continues to rely on the assessed contributions 
of member states, a large chunk of which comes from developed industrialised states, 
with a number of developing states, including those from Africa, defaulting in paying 
their assessed contributions. The major contributions of the developed industrialised 
states to the budget of these institutions assure them of an immense influence over the 
policy direction of these institutions.
378 Art. 133 (a) of LOSC.
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CHAPTER FIVE.
EXPLORATION AND EXPLOITATION OF THE AREA AND AFRICAN 
STATES.
This chapter will start off by looking at the system of exploration and exploitation of 
the seabed within national jurisdiction beyond 200 nautical miles. While strictly 
speaking this is not part o f the Area, the peculiar nature of this part of the seabed, 
involving a role for the ISA, the custodian of the Area, under Article 82 of the LOSC 
1982, makes it necessary to also examine the system operating therein. Thereafter the 
chapter will examine the peculiar system of mining involving the parallel system in 
the Area proper, the contributions of African states to this and its effect on such states. 
In addition, the chapter will scrutinise the Mining Code 2000 as regards the system of 
exploration o f the Area and its impact on African participation in seabed mining in the 
Area will also be considered. Finally, the ongoing negotiations at the ISA on 
regulations for prospecting and exploration for hydrothermal polymetallic sulphides 
and cobalt-rich ferromanganese crusts and certain implications for African states will 
also be examined.
5.1. Article 82 o f the LOSC.
As pointed out in chapter one of this thesis, certain portions of the seabed beyond 200 
nautical miles were conceded to national jurisdiction.1 As a result of the inherent and 
exclusive rights vested in the coastal state over its continental shelf, under customary 
international law and conventional law, a coastal state with such extensive continental 
shelf has the exclusive sovereign right to exploit the outer continental shelf by 
whatever arrangements it determines.2 The only role the ISA plays in the extended 
continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles is one of merely distributing certain 
payments or contributions derived from production in this part of the sea, therefore 
the coastal state in the exercise o f its sovereign rights over this part of the sea would 
have to utilise the system o f exploitation it deems fit.
1 See Section 1. 2.1 o f Chapter 1 o f  this thesis.
2 See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, I.C.J. Rep. 1969, p.3; Art. 2 o f the Geneva Convention on the 
Continental Shelf 1958, (1958) 52 AJIL, pp.858-862 and Arts.77 and 81 o f the LOSC.
3 See Art.82 o f LOSC. However, see also Art. 142 o f LOSC in respect o f resource deposits in the Area 
which '‘Hie across limits o f  national jurisdiction. ” Here the ISA is to conduct activities in the Area 
giving due regard to the rights and legitimate interest o f  the relevant coastal state with consultations, 
including a system o f prior notification, being maintained with the coastal state. In cases where
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5.1.1. Economic Potential o f the Seabed subject to Article 82.
The claim by broad shelf states to the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles is 
largely premised on economic considerations based on the perception of great 
prospects o f valuable natural resources located therein. However until actual 
exploitation is embarked upon in this part of the seabed, this perception is largely 
speculative.4 The rich discoveries o f natural resources in the continental shelf of 
certain coastal states,5 especially with the improvement of technology, are indicative 
of the potential o f the seabed beyond 200 nautical miles to be replete with natural 
resources.6 Eamey conjectures that four main classes of nonliving resources are likely 
to be discovered in the continental margin: hydrocarbons; construction aggregates and 
sand; minerals in placer deposits such as diamonds, gold, and ilmenite; and industrial 
chemicals such as sulphur and phosphate. From the current commercial value of 
these resources, it appears that the potential cache of hydrocarbons and industrial 
minerals, including those contained in polymetallic nodules and sulphides, to be 
found in the seabed beyond 200 miles would be o f great interest to potential offshore 
miners.8
activities in the Area may result in the exploitation o f  resources within such coastal state’s national 
jurisdiction its prior consent must be obtained.
4 This potentially rich part o f the continental shelf is estimated to cover approximately 59 million 
square kilometres with certain states such as Australia, United States o f America, Canada, New  
Zealand, Russia, Argentina and Indonesia enjoying the lion’s share. See Prescott V., “Resources o f the 
Continental Margin and International Law,” in Cook, P.J. and Carleton, C.M., (eds.) Continental Shelf 
Limits: The Scientific and Legal Interface, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 66-71 and 
Murton, B .J., Parson, L.M, Hunter, J.H., and M iles, P.R., “Evaluation o f  the Non-living Resources of 
the Continental Shelf beyond the 200-Mile Limit o f the World’s Margins” in Minerals other than 
Polymetallic Nodules o f  the International Seabed Area, Proceedings o f  the International Seabed 
Authority Workshop held on 26-30 June 2000 in Kingston, Jamaica (Kingston, Jamaica, International 
Seabed Authority, 2004), pp.667-751. Certain broad-margin states have issued exploration licences in 
respect o f the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. For instance the Canada-Newfoundland 
Offshore Petroleum Board (CNOPB) has issued several exploration licences and at least one significant 
discovery licence to various petroleum companies. However, it appears that most o f the wells drilled 
under the exploration licences and the North Dana 1-43 well in respect o f the discovery licence have 
been abandoned. See Chircop, A., and Marchand,B.A., “International Royalty and Continental Shelf 
Limits: Emerging Issues for the Canadian Offshore,” paper presented at the Canadian Petroleum Law 
Foundation, Second East Coast Seminar, September 18-20, 2003 at Terra Nova Park Lodge and Golf 
Resort Newfoundland and Labrador,p.8.
http://www.pphm.com/uploads/Intern Rovaltv&Con Shelf.pdf [Accessed on 22 December 2004].
5 See Prescott, ibid.pp.75-77; Ford, N., “Oil from deep waters (2): Africa: World’s greatest deepwater 
potential,” Platts Energy Economist, Issue 248, June 2002.
6Prescott, ibid. p.75.
7 Eamey, F.C.E., Marine M ineral Resources (1990, London) referred to in Prescott, Ibid. Studies have 
shown potential for phosphite deposits on the continental shelf o ff North Carolina and the Blake 
Plateau o f Florida and in the Chatham Rise east o f  New Zealand, as well as polymetallic nodules and 
sulphides in the East and Southeast Pacific Ocean, Manus Basin between New Ireland and New Britain 
in Papua New Guinea. See Prescott, ibid. pp.79-80
8 Prescott, ibid. pp.75-80.
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5.1.2. African states and Article 82.
In the eventuality of seabed production taking place in the continental shelf beyond 
200 nautical miles, African states would certainly be amongst the preferred 
beneficiaries. Under Article 82, in distributing the payments or contributions amongst 
states parties, the ISA is required to take into consideration the interests and needs of 
developing states, which includes African states. It is especially required to take into 
consideration the interests and needs of the least developed and landlocked 
developing states, the bulk of which are in the African continent.9 From the current 
trend of offshore mining it is unlikely that African states will get any revenue from 
this source for a while to come. Even in the eventuality of offshore mining beyond 
200 nautical miles, it is difficult to imagine that the amount of revenue from this 
source will have any significant impact on their economy.
However, some African states with continental shelves extending beyond 200 nautical 
miles may obtain considerable revenue from exploiting their shelves, although they 
would also have to make payments or contributions in kind as required by Article 82 
unless they could show that they were net importers of the mineral resource in respect 
of which the payments or contributions are to be made.10 Recently for example, the 
Namibian government indicated its interest in claiming a continental shelf beyond 200 
nautical miles as a result its potential for heavy mineral sands, diamonds, phosphites, 
manganese nodules, hydrocarbons, gas hydrates and gas seeps. According to the 
Namibian Minister of Land, Resettlement and Rehabilitation, Hon. Hifekepunye 
Pohamba, a move by Namibia to extend its continental shelf up to 350 nautical miles, 
“wz7/ benefit the country’s economy now and in the future .”n Also Southern Africa 
generally is reported to have extensive potassium and phosphorus-rich mineralization
9 Art.82 (4) o f LOSC. See http://www.un.org/special-rep/ohrlls/ldc/list.htm [Accessed 29 September 
2004] for list o f least developed states.
10 Art.82 (3) o f LOSC and Section 1.2.1 o f  the thesis.
11 See Media Release from the Namibian Cabinet Chambers titled “Cabinet approves N$2million for 
Delineation o f Continental Shelf.” This Media Release is in respect o f the decision o f the Cabinet at its 
28th meeting held on 5 November 2002. http://www.gmnet.gov.na/Nav frames/News launch.htm and 
“Quest for more Sea Territory”, The Namibia Economist, 15 November 2002. 
http://www.economist.com.na/2002/15nov/11-15-02.htm [Both sites accessed on 21 December 2004], 
See also Moller, L.E., “The Outstanding Namibian Maritime Boundaries with Angola and South 
Africa”, (2003) Vol. 18 (2) The International Journal o f  Marine and Coastal Law, p.241 at 248.
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on the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles.12 With rapidly improving 
technology for offshore mining of natural resources, the possibility of exploitation of 
the seabed beyond 200 nautical miles in the future may be quite feasible. However, it 
suffices to say at this stage that this area of the seabed remains of interest to broad 
margin African states because of its economic potential.
The present onshore and offshore production mining activities in African states 
involve mainly the participation of Transnational Corporations (TNCs). It is therefore 
likely that such TNCs, as a result o f being possessors of the required technology for 
seabed mining, will be involved in the eventuality of production in the continental 
shelves beyond 200 nautical miles of African states. Most African states enter into 
various contractual arrangements with such TNCs for the exploration and exploitation
13 •of the natural resources onshore and offshore. One issue that would likely arise from 
this is whether the resources, especially in the form of the natural resources produced 
that are allocated to the TNCs to meet the costs incurred by them under such 
arrangements as Production Sharing Contracts (PSCs),14 would qualify as “resources 
used in connection with exploitation.”15 Presumably they should, because such 
allocation to the TNCs are intended to be part of production costs rather than profit, 
and should therefore be excluded for the purposes o f determining payments or 
contributions. This may need to be clarified by broad-margin African states either by 
domestic legislation or the terms of the contractual arrangements entered into with 
TNCs.16 Further practical issues that might also arise include the following: Would
12 Coles, S.K.P., Wright, C.I., Sinclair D.A., and Van Den Bossche, P., “The Potential for 
Environmentally Sound Development o f Marine Deposits o f  Potassic and Phosphatic Minerals 
Offshore, Southern Africa,”(2002), 20 Marine Georesources and Geotechnology,pp.87-110.
13 Such arrangements include Joint Ventures Agreements (JVs), Production Sharing Contracts (PSCs) 
and Risk Service Contracts. See generally Omorogbe, Y., The Oil and Gas Industry: Exploration & 
Production Contracts, (Lagos/Oxford, Malthouse Press Limited, 1997) and Asante, S.K.B., 
“Restructuring Transnational Mineral Agreements”, (1979) 73 AJIL. pp. 335-371.
14 By this arrangement the TNCs that bears all the risk o f  exploration is allowed recoup its investments 
from a portion o f the oil which is often referred to as cost recovery oil upon discovery o f oil in 
commercial quantities. Omorogbe, ibid, pp. 60-63 and Smith D.N., and Wells Jnr., L.T., “Minerals 
Agreements in Developing Countries: Structures and Substance”, (1975) 69(3) AJIL. p.560 at 585-588
15 Art.82 (2) o f LOSC provides, “ ... Production does not include resources used in connection with 
exploitation.”
16 Recently exploration licences issued by the United States o f  America in respect o f the Gulf o f  
Mexico includes a clause cautioning industry that a special royalty charge may be applicable in relation 
to future development beyond 200 nautical miles. See Chircop and Marchand, “International Royalty 
and Continental Shelf Limits: Emerging Issues for the Canadian Offshore,” op.cit. p.23 quoting a 
personal communication from Michael W. Lodge, the then Chief, Office of Legal Affairs, International 
Seabed Authority, Kingston, Jamaica, dated 10 July 2003,
http://www.pphm.com/uploads/Intern Rovaltv&Con Shelf.pdf [Accessed on 22 December 2004].
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the calculation of the percentage of the payments or contributions by the ISA under 
Article 82 include also the resources allocated to the TNCs as their share of the profit 
under the contractual arrangements or would it be limited to the share of the states 
parties? For payments in cash, in what currency are such payments to be made? 
Obviously, whatever currency is utilised must be convertible. In the case of 
contributions in kind, how is the ISA to make arrangements for distribution of such 
contributions? Should the ISA sell such contributions at site or arrange to transport 
them and store them at an ISA storehouse? At whose cost should this be done? How is
• 17 •the value o f the contribution in kind to be determined? These issues, which are not 
clearly dealt with by Article 82, would be of interest to broad-margin states, including 
African states that are not exempt from making payments or contributions.18 In the 
eventuality o f commercial exploitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical 
miles, the ISA would have to formulate necessary regulations to clarify these issues.19
5.2. The System o f  Mining in the Area — the Parallel System
5.2.1. Position o f  African states in UNCLOS III
The original stance of African states, like most other developing states, favoured a 
system whereby a strong international organisation would have the exclusive right to 
mine the Area.20 Mahmoudi points out that this was based on the view that there was 
a direct relationship between the issue of “who owns the Area and the resources 
therein” and “who should exploit” the resources. The argument of African states was 
to the effect that since the Area and its resources were the common heritage of 
mankind, an international institution (the ISA) as “agent” or “trustee” of mankind 
should have the exclusive right to mine the Area. This was, of course, without 
prejudice to the right of the Authority to choose, at any stage of production, to enter
17 Chircop and Marchand, ibid.pp.21-25.
18 The Secretary-General o f  the ISA had recently indicated that the ISA would need to consider the 
implementation o f Art.82 (4) o f  the LOSC. See Paras. 60 and 61 o f the Report o f the Secretary-General 
o f the International Seabed Authority under article 166, paragraph 4, o f the United Nations Convention 
on the Law o f the Sea, ISBA/9/A/3 o f 4 June 2003.
19 See Lodge, M.W., “Difficult Issues in the Law o f  the Sea and Future Challenges for the International 
Seabed Authority”, Paper presented at the Third Advisory Board on the Law o f the Sea(ABLOS) 
International Conference, Addressing Difficult Issues in UNCLOS, International Hydrographic Bureau, 
Monaco, 28-30 October 2003, http://www.gmat.unsw.edu.au/ablos/ABLOSQ3Folder/PAPER3-2.PDF 
[Accessed on 16 May 2005].
20 See Art.22(c) o f the 1974 Declaration o f  the Organisation o f African Unity on the Issues o f the Law 
of the Sea, Doc. A/CONF.62/33, UNCLOS III, Official Records, V ol.l, p.64 and Conditions 1 and 2 o f  
the 1974 Text on conditions o f  exploration and exploitation prepared by the Group o f Seventy-Seven, 
Doc., A/CONF.62/C. 1/L.7.
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into contract, by way o f joint ventures or other form of association, with any other 
person, whether natural or juridical.21 The developed industrialised states took the 
contrary position that private entities were to be allowed the exclusive right to mine 
the Area with the ISA acting merely as a licensing body. Even the then USSR, while 
opposing the position that exploitation should be by private entities, was of the view 
that only states and not the ISA should have the right to mine.22 At one point in the 
course of negotiations three possible systems of exploitation of the Area were posited 
by the diverse interests at the UNCLOS III, of which two represented the extreme 
positions o f the developing and developed countries mentioned above. The third view, 
which was proposed as a way out of the deadlock of the two extreme positions, was 
an attempt to find a middle course, in the usual manner of compromises permeating 
the UNCLOS III.23 This compromise was in the form of the parallel system, proposed 
by the then Secretary o f State o f the United States of America, Henry Kissinger.24 
Under this compromise system the Area was to be exploited both by the ISA (through 
the Enterprise or in conjunction with developing states) and either individuals (natural 
or juridical) or state enterprises. The individuals or state enterprises, in applying for a 
contract for exploitation o f the Area, were to propose to the Authority two alternative 
sites of equivalent commercial value. Thereafter the Authority would have the right of 
first choice to select either one o f the sites, which it would bank to be exploited by the 
ISA either through the Enterprise or in association with interested developing states.25 
The applicant, on the other hand, would mine the other site. This compromise 
proposal of the United States o f America, in order to get the developing states to 
budge from their original position, came with the additional incentive that the United 
States of America would ensure that the Enterprise was in a position to participate in 
exploitation by giving it access to the requisite finance and technology. Further, the
21 See Mahmoudi, S., The Law o f  Deep Sea-Bed Mining: A Study o f  the Progressive Development o f  
International Law Concerning the M anagement o f  the Polymetallic Nodules o f  the Deep Sea-Bed, 
(Stockholm, Sweden, Almqvist & W iksell International, 1987), pp. 180-181. See also generally Adede, 
A.O., “The System for Exploitation o f  the ‘Common Heritage o f  Mankind’ at the Caracas Conference,” 
(1975) 69(1) AJIL, pp.31-49.
22 Mahmoudi, ibid, pp.181-182.
23 See the Report by Mr. Bamela Engo, Chairman o f the First Committee on the work o f the 
Committee, September 1976, UNCLOS III, Official Record, Vol. VI, p.130 at 132 and Mr Frank 
Njenga’s statement as chairman o f  the Negotiating Group in the Explanatory Memorandum by the 
Chairman concerning document N G 1/10/R ev.l, UNCLOS III, Official R ecord, Vol. X, p.19.
24 See Anand, R., “Odd Man Out: The United States and the U.N. Convention on the Law o f the Sea,” 
in Van Dyke, J., (ed.), Consensus and Confrontation: The United States and the Law o f  the Sea 
Convention, a Workshop o f  the Law o f  the Sea Institute, Honolulu, Hawaii, January 9-13, 1984, 
(Honolulu, Hawaii, the Law o f  the Sea Institute, 1985), pp.82-83.
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United States of America indicated its willingness to agree to a periodic review of the 
system.26 The parallel system was eventually incorporated into the LOSC.27 However, 
as has been pointed out in Chapter 3 of this thesis, while the parallel system has been 
retained by the 1994 New York Agreement, this Agreement appears to have pulled 
the carpet from under the feet of developing states, including African states, in respect 
of the system of exploitation, by effectively amending the provisions of the LOSC on 
the transfer o f technology, as well as the Review Conference and also by
9 Qdowngrading the role o f the Enterprise.
5.2.2. African states and the Parallel System: LOSC 82 and the 1994 Agreement.
Part XI o f LOSC 82,29 the 1994 Agreement30 and the rules, regulations and 
procedures of the ISA, presently the Mining Code 2000,31 govern the parallel 
system.32 This part will examine the provisions of Part XI of LOSC, as modified by 
the 1994 Agreement, on the parallel system of mining as it affects African states. 
Thereafter, in part 5.3 below, the Mining Code 2000 and its effect on African states 
will be examined.
As pointed out in 5.2.1 above, one o f the main controversial issues as regards the
33 •system of mining was to determine who should mine the Area. This, as also pointed 
out, was resolved through a compromise between the initial divergent views. The 
Convention, while recognising that activities in the Area shall be “organised, carried
25 As a result o f this, the parallel system is also called “site-banking”.
26 See Ogley, op.cit. pp. 138-149; Mahmoudi, op.cit.pp.180-190 and Oxman, “The Third U.N. 
Conference on the Law o f  the Sea: The 1976 N ew  York Session”, (1977) 71(2) AJIL. pp. 247 at 253- 
254.
27 See Art. 153 and Brown, Brown, E.D, Sea-Bed Energy and Minerals: The International Legal 
Regime, Vol.2 Seabed Mining (The Hague/Boston/London, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2001), 
pp. 109-123.
28 See Sections 2, 4 and 5 o f  the Annex to the 1994 Agreement discussed in sections 3.2 and 
4.1.3.1 (IV) o f this thesis.
29 See Art. 153 and Annex III o f  the LOSC.
30 See Section 1 paras. 4-17; Section 2 paras. 2-6 and Section 3 paras. 11-12 o f the Annex to the 1994 
Agreement.
31ISBA/6/A/18 o f 4 October 2000.
32 For detailed examination o f  these provisions on prospecting, exploration and exploitation under the 
parallel system, see Brown, Sea-Bed Energy and Minerals: The International Legal Regime, vol.2, 
op.cit. pp.96-243.
33 Mining involving a non-exclusive right to prospect, extending to any part o f the Area except those 
covered by an approved plan o f work or a reserved area, and an exclusive right based on an approved 
plan o f work issued by the ISA to explore and then exploit. While the LOSC and the Agreement 
acknowledge three stages o f mining- prospecting, exploration and exploitation - it was not till the 
Mining Code 2000 that these terms were actually defined. See Reg. 1 of the Mining Code.
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out and controlled by the Authority on behalf o f  mankind as a whole, ”34 goes on to 
incorporate a mixed system, whereby mining of the Area is to be done not only by the 
Authority, through the Enterprise, but also by “states parties or states enterprises, or 
natural or juridical persons which possess the nationality o f  states parties or are 
effectively controlled by them or their nationals, when sponsored by such states or
35 • • •any group o f  the foregoing .” The activities of states parties or enterprises and natural 
or juridical persons are to be done “in association with the Authority.”36 This appears 
to emphasise the role of the ISA as the organiser and controller of activities in the 
Area.37 As was pointed out by Mahmoudi, “ ...the Convention has a consistent patent 
tendency to give, though sometimes unsuccessfully, the Authority as the agent o f  
mankind a status superior to the States and private entities.” However, the reality is 
that the ISA cannot mine the Area without the technology and finance of developed, 
industrialised states parties. The attempt by the ISA to acquire this technology for 
itself and developing states, through mandatory transfer of technology, and to obtain 
the necessary finance, as has been pointed out earlier, has been thwarted by the 1994 
Agreement.39
5.2.2.1. Non-Reserved Areas.
While all states parties to the LOSC, including African states, or their enterprises or 
nationals, natural or juridical, are prima facie qualified to apply for an approved plan 
of work to carry out activities in the Area, the issue of lack of technology and finance, 
in itself, creates a problem as regards the participation of African states in mining 
activities in the Area. The LOSC, in laying down the qualification standards for 
applying for a plan o f work, requires the applicant not only to have the nationality or 
be under the effective control of at least one state party and be sponsored by such state 
party, but also to have the requisite financial and technological capabilities.40 The 
applicant, except in the case of a reserved area,41 is to indicate in its application a total
34 Art. 153(1) o f LOSC. However under the 1994 Agreement in Section 1 para. 1 however the role of 
the ISA is limited to merely “organising and controlling” (it excludes “carrying out ”) activities in the 
Area. It is however not clear if  this was deliberately done to curtail the activities o f the ISA or if  it was 
just an oversight.
35 Art. 153 (2) o f LOSC and Reg. 9 o f  the Mining Code.
36 Ibid.
37 Reg. 14(b) o f the Mining Code.
38 Mahmoudi, The Law o f  Deep Sea-Bed Mining etc, op.cit. p.207.
39 See note 28 above.
40 See Art. 4(l)-(3) o f  Annex III to the LOSC and Regs. 12 and 21(3) (c) o f the Mining Code.
41 See below 5.2.2.2.
252
area, not necessarily a single continuous area, which is sufficiently large and of 
sufficient estimated commercial value to allow for two mining operations. Such 
application shall indicate the co-ordinates dividing the area into two parts of equal 
estimated commercial value and be accompanied by necessary data relating to 
mapping, sampling, the abundance of nodules and their metal content. Thereafter, the 
ISA is to designate which part of the area is to be the reserved area for conduct of 
mining operations by the ISA through the Enterprise or in association with developing 
states.42 This requirement of designating two sites, of course, merely confirms the 
need for an applicant to have immense financial and technological capabilities 43
The current trend, in respect of both onshore and offshore mining within national 
jurisdiction, reveals a dearth of such financial and technological capabilities on the 
part of African states. This in itself shows the constraints such states will face in terms 
of meeting “the financial and technological capabilities ” requirement in a sector that 
would certainly require even more financial and technological capabilities than 
onshore and offshore mining activities within national jurisdiction.44 Virtually all 
major mining activity within the national jurisdiction of African states is conducted by 
transnational corporations (TNCs), which possess the requisite technology and 
finance.45 Usually these TNCs incorporate local subsidiaries within these African 
states under the latter’s domestic laws, with such local subsidiaries being ostensibly 
nationals of such African states; though in reality they are controlled from a base, 
usually located in a developed industrialised state.46 Under international law the 
nationality of a corporate entity, like that o f natural persons, falls within the domain of 
states’ domestic jurisdiction. However, the traditional rule is that corporations have 
the nationality of the state of incorporation,47 though certain states determine 
nationality by different tests, including the place of central administration (siege
42 Art.8, Annex III to the LOSC and Regs. 15 and 16 o f  the Mining Code.
43 For more on the constraints on African states’ participation in deep seabed mining, see Chapter 6 of 
this thesis.
44 See section 6.2 o f  chapter 6 o f this thesis.
45 Muchlinski, P., “Technology Transfer: Shifting Models o f Law and Development” in Hatchard, J., 
and Perry-Kessaris, A., (eds.), Law and Development: facing Complexity in the 21st Century (London, 
Cavendish Publishing Ltd., 2003), p.57 at 58-62
46 For instance under Nigerian domestic law all TNCs engaged in mining operations within Nigeria 
have to be incorporated under the Companies Act o f  Nigeria, as Nigerian companies. See the Nigerian 
Companies and Allied Matters Act No.59, 1990.
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social) or the place of effective control or the nationality of the majority 
shareholders.48 In this regard, the issue arises if  an African state party to LOSC can 
participate in deep seabed mining through the subsidiary of a multinational company 
incorporated under the domestic laws of that state? Can an African state sponsor such 
a multinational subsidiary company as a juridical person possessing its nationality?49 
Technically, a subsidiary of a multinational company once incorporated in an African 
state, if  so recognised as such under the domestic laws of that state, becomes its 
national. The Convention provides that each applicant for an approved plan of work 
shall be sponsored by the state party of which it is a national; or in the case where the 
applicant is effectively controlled by another state, by both the national state and the 
state of effective control; or in the case where the applicant has more than one 
nationality, such as the case of a partnership or consortium, by all the states parties 
involved.50 Can African states therefore participate, albeit in a nominal role, through 
the subsidiaries o f multinational companies incorporated within their jurisdiction? 
There seems to be no reason under the Convention why this cannot be done, provided 
the application is sponsored not only by the African state but also by the state(s) 
whose nationals have effective control of the corporation.51 This is all the more so 
when this is not expressly prohibited, unlike the provision under Resolution II of the 
LOSC where a pioneer investor made up of two or more components could not have 
the different components registered separately as pioneer investors in their own right 
or under the concession provision in the Resolution [paragraph 1(a) (iii)] for 
developing states.52 The situation would be straightforward in cases where effective 
control is with nationals of just one other state, but it becomes rather complicated if 
such effective control is spread between nationals of a number of states. In such a
47 Case concerning the Barcelona, Light and Power Company Limited, Belgium v. Spain (1970) ICJ 
Reports, p.3 at 42. See Staker C., “Diplomatic Protection o f  Private Business Companies: Determining 
Corporate Personality for International Law Purposes”, (1990) 61 B.Y.I.L. 155.
48 Verzijl, J.H.W., International Law in H istorical Perspective, Vol. V (Leiden, A.W.Sijthoff, 1972), 
pp.l 11-144.
49 In applying for the approval o f  a plan o f  work for exploration, such an entity under Reg.l0(3)(a) of  
the Mining Code is to give sufficient information to determine the nationality o f  the Applicant or the 
identity o f the state or states by which, or by whose nationals, the Applicant is effectively controlled.
50 Art. 4(3) o f Annex III o f LOSC and Regs. 10(3) (a) and 11 o f the Mining Code.
51 Art. 4(3) o f Annex III o f LOSC and Regs. 11 (2) and (3) o f the Mining Code.
52 Para. 4 o f Resolution II Governing Preparatory Investment in Pioneer Activities Relating to 
Polymetallic Nodules o f the Final Act o f  the Third United Nations Conference on the Law o f the Sea. 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention agreements/texts/final act eng.pdf [accessed on 22 
December 2004].
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situation, presumably, just like the case of partnerships and consortiums, all states 
with effective control would be required to be involved in the sponsorship.53
However, the question arises as to the likelihood of TNCs incorporating local 
subsidiaries in African states in order to engage in seabed mining. It is doubtful how 
attractive this option would be considering that, unlike the present onshore and 
offshore mining within the jurisdiction of African states, the natural resources 
concerned are located outside the jurisdiction of such states. The likelihood would 
only be feasible if  there was some kind of advantage, such as a favourable tax regime 
or proximity to the mining area, which TNCs could obtain by incorporating a local 
subsidiary in an African state in order to participate in deep seabed mining.54 It is not 
likely that African states would be able or willing to give the kind of favourable tax 
regime that would attract TNCs to participate in such a capital intensive project as 
deep seabed mining, an industry that would not in any way yield immediate economic 
benefits. The advantage of proximity to the mining area does not appear to lean in 
favour of African states.55 For polymetallic nodules the bulk of the potential locations 
are at the centre of the northcentral Pacific Ocean and the Peru Basin in the Southeast 
Pacific Ocean, both considerable distances from the African continent.56 While there 
are potential sites of polymetallic nodules in the centre of the north Indian Ocean, 
which in comparison to the Pacific is closer to the African continent, such potential 
sites do not appear extensive. It is, however, recorded that India, since it started 
survey and exploration for deep seabed polymetallic nodules in 1981, picked up the 
first nodule from 4800m water depth from the Seychelles-Somali basin in the SW 
Carlsberg Ridge,57 an indication o f the existence of some limited level of nodules 
close to the African continent. As for cobalt-bearing ferromanganese crusts, the 
richest deposits are also found in the Pacific Ocean, with fewer resources located in 
the Indian and Atlantic Oceans, with only a few having relative proximity to African
53 Art.4 (3) o f Annex III o f  LOSC and Regs. 11(1) and (2) o f the Mining Code.
54 See Staker, “Diplomatic Protection o f  Private Business Companies: Determining Corporate 
Personality for International Law Purposes”, op.cit.p.158.
55 For maps on potential locations o f  polymetallic nodules see http://www.isa.org.im/data- 
rep/MAPS/maior workspace.htm [Accessed on 6 October 2003] and o f cobalt-bearing ferromanganese 
crusts see http.7/www.isa.org. im!data-rep/MAPS/crust.htm [Accessed on 6 October 2003].
56 See http://www.isa.org.im/en/publications/IA ENG/ENG7.pdf [Accessed on 9 October 2003].
57 Valsangkar, A., “Deep-Sea Polymetallic Nodule Mining: Challenges Ahead for Technologists and 
Environmentalists,” (2003) 21 Marine Georesources and Geotechnology, p.81 at 82.
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states such as South Africa, Namibia, Morocco and Western Sahara.58 Polymetallic 
sulphides are also mainly located in mid-ocean at the East Pacific Rise, the Southeast 
Pacific Rise and South western Pacific, while relatively fewer quantities are located at 
the mid-Atlantic Ridge. Even fewer are located at the Central Indian Ridge.59 All 
these factors, coupled with the general political and economic instability in most 
African states, makes the option of TNCs incorporating local subsidiaries in African 
states to participate in mining in the Area a very remote possibility.60
Further, a situation whereby African states purport to act as nominal sponsoring 
national states would raise the issue of responsibility, as the sponsoring states, to 
ensure that the activities of the sponsored entity in the Area were carried out in 
conformity with the LOSC, the 1994 Agreement and regulations issued by the ISA. A 
failure by a sponsored entity to carry out its activities in conformity with the LOSC, 
1994 Agreement and ISA regulations which results in damages would result in joint 
and several liabilities on the part o f all the sponsoring states, unless such a state could 
show that it had taken all necessary and appropriate measures to secure effective 
compliance.61 Taking such necessary and appropriate measures in a sophisticated and 
intricate deep seabed mining industry would constitute a major challenge for any 
African state with any design to sponsor an entity for deep seabed mining, especially 
one over which it does not exercise effective control. It would also entail putting in
place the necessary legislative framework to ensure effective domestic compliance by
• • 62the applicant entity with the rules and regulations of the regime.
In addition to the rather remote possibilities of participation by African states in deep 
seabed mining through subsidiaries of TNCs, it is argued that any such nominal 
participation would defeat the provisions o f the LOSC that encourage the promotion
58 See http://www.isa.org.im/en/publications/IA ENG7ENG9.pdf [Accessed on 9 October 2003].
59 See http://www.isa.org.im/en/publications/IA ENG/ENG8.pdf [Accessed on 9 October 2003]
60 See United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), Economic Report o f Africa, 
http://www.uneca.org/ERA2004/full.pdf [Accessed 14 January 2005]. This report, while painting an 
optimistic picture o f a general improvement in the economic situation in Africa, still acknowledges the 
challenges o f economic and political instability to the development o f the African continent.
61 Art. 139 o f the LOSC and Reg. 11(3) (a) o f  the Mining Code.
62 See, for example, Czech Republic Act No. 158 o f 18 May 2000 on Prospecting, Exploration for and 
Exploitation o f Mineral Resources from the Seabed beyond the Limits o f National Jurisdiction and 
Amendments to Related Acts, Law o f  the Sea Bulletin No.51 ,(New York, United Nations, 2003), 
pp.78-87.
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of effective and direct participation of developing states in activities in the Area,.63
The reality is that as long as African states lack the requisite technological and
financial capabilities, their direct participation in such activities in the Area would be
remote. In her comments at the 64th plenary meeting of the fifty-eighth session of the
General Assembly the Nigerian representative, Ms. Wadibia-Anyanwu, said:64
“We would like to underscore the fact that developing states are 
disadvantaged in terms o f  the acquisition o f technology and expertise 
relating to many aspects o f  activities in the oceans and seas, particularly 
in the seabed...There is no doubt that developing countries need help 
through co-operation, partnership and technical assistance in line with 
article 140 o f  the United Nations Convention on the Law o f the Sea, which 
states that activities in the area are to be carried out fo r  the benefit o f  
mankind as a whole, taking into consideration the interests and needs o f  
developing countries. ”
5.2.2.2. Reserved Areas.
Once the plan o f work, in the form of a contract, for the non-reserved area is
approved, the other area is reserved solely for the conduct of activities by the ISA
through the Enterprise or in association with developing states.65 Under the LOSC:
“Any State Party which is a developing State or any natural or juridical 
person sponsored and effectively controlled by it or by other developing 
State which is a qualified applicant, or any group o f  the foregoing, may 
notify the Authority that it wishes to submit a plan o f  work...with respect 
to a reserved area. The plan o f  work shall be considered i f  the Enterprise 
decides, pursuant to paragraph 1, that it does not intend to carry out 
activities in that areaC 66
The Enterprise shall be given the first option of carrying out activities in the reserved 
areas, either solely or through joint ventures with interested eligible states or entities. 
Under the 1994 Agreement the Enterprise has become an appendage of the Secretariat 
carrying out purely administrative functions until such time that “the Council shall 
take up the issue o f  the functioning o f  the Enterprise independently o f the
63 Art. 148 o f LOSC. See Art.9(4) o f  Annex III o f  LOSC, in respect o f a developing state applicant for a 
reserved area, which emphasises that the juridical person sponsored by a developing state must be 
“effective controlled” by the developing state or by another developing state, which is a qualified 
applicant. See also by way o f  analogy, in respect o f  exploitation o f the living resources within the EEZ, 
the conclusions in the General Report o f  the African states regional seminar on the Law o f the Sea, 
Yaounde, 20-30 June 1972, where it was said “The exploitation o f the living resources within the 
economic zone should be open to all African states both land-locked and near land-locked, provided 
that the enterprises o f these states desiring to exploit these resources are effectively controlled bv 
African capital and personnel.” (Emphasis added). 12 ILM 210(1973).
64 General Assembly, fifty-eighth session, Official Records,AJ5%fPV.64 o f 24 November 2003, p.27.
65 Art. 8 of Annex III o f  LOSC and Section 1 para. 10 o f  the Annex to the 1994 Agreement.
66 Art. 9 (4) o f Annex III o f  LOSC.
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Secretariat”.67 The independent functioning of the Enterprise, which is tied to the 
approval of a plan of work for exploitation for an entity other than the Enterprise or 
the receipt by the Council of an application for a joint-venture operation, 68 is not 
likely to take place in the near future.
The ability of the Enterprise to determine its joint venture partners has been curtailed
by the Agreement insisting that the contractor that contributed the reserved area
should have the right of first refusal to enter into a joint venture arrangement with the
Enterprise.69 Further, the ability of developing states to apply to undertake mining
activities in the reserved areas is curtailed since it appears that these states, in the
event that the Enterprise declines to carry out activities in the reserved area, are put
behind the contributing contractor, in terms of priority right to mine such area. The
Agreement provides that:
“I f  the Enterprise does not submit an application fo r  a plan o f  work for  
activities in respect o f  such a reserved area within 15 years o f  the 
commencement o f  its functions independent o f  the Secretariat o f  the 
Authority or within 15 years o f  the date on which that area is reserved for  
the Authority, whichever is the later, the contractor which contributed the 
area shall be entitled to apply fo r  a plan o f  work fo r  that area provided it 
offers in good faith to include the Enterprise as a joint-venture partner”10
However, the Mining Code, in what appears to be a slight modification of the 
Agreement, states that the obligation to apply for a plan of work within 15 years is not 
limited to only the Enterprise, but also applies to developing states (or their natural or 
juridical persons) interested in submitting a plan of work for the reserved area.71 It is 
not too clear what is the legal basis for extending this obligation, considering that the 
Agreement is given a position o f primacy over the original Part XI provisions under 
which the Mining Code is made.72 Perhaps it could be argued that since the original 
provision of LOSC in article 9(4) o f Annex III ( which allows a developing state party 
or any natural or juridical person sponsored and effectively controlled by it or any 
other qualified developing state to submit a plan of work in respect of a reserved area 
if the Enterprise decides not to carry out activities in that area) is not specifically
67 Section 2, para.2 o f the Annex to the 1994 Agreement.
68 Ibid.
69 Section 2 para.5 o f the Annex to the 1994 Agreement.
70 Section 2 paragraph 5 o f  the Annex to the Agreement.
71 Reg. 17(3) o f Mining Code.
72 Art.2 (1) o f the Agreement.
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stated by the Agreement “not to apply, ” the Mining Code does not amount to a 
deviation from the provision of the Agreement, but rather amounts to an elaboration, 
reconciling the provisions of the Agreement with article 9(4) of Annex III. It could be 
said that paragraph 5 of the Agreement implies that the application by developing 
states under Article 9(4) of Annex III must be within the 15 year period and the 
Mining Code makes this implication explicit.
There appears to be more potential for African states to be involved in direct 
participation in reserved areas where conditions for direct participation are less 
onerous. This is so for several reasons. First, by participating in a reserved area, 
African states are not in competition with consortia or states enterprises from 
developed industrialised states parties, by reason of the concession given to 
developing states to apply for a plan of work in a reserved area if the Enterprise
- j ' l
declines to carry activities in such an area. Second, such developing states are saved 
the expense necessarily involved in prospecting to locate an area of sufficient 
estimated commercial value to permit two mining operations; also in demarcating 
such an area and collating the necessary data.74 However, while the possibility of 
carrying out activities in the reserved area may be a plus for African states’ 
participation, it still remains a highly capital intensive project requiring sophisticated 
technology, which most African states lack. Nevertheless, this does open up the 
possibility of African states’ direct participation in activities in the Area, by forming a 
consortium with other developing states, such as India, Korea and China, which as
■ • 75pioneer investors have the ability to carry out such activities.
5.2.3. Pioneer Investors and Africa
The Pioneer Investment Protection (P.I.P) Scheme was introduced into the LOSC 
under resolution II in a bid to encourage the principal industrialised states, which were 
pioneer investors in the Area and had objected to Part XI, to become parties to the 
Convention; while at the same time retaining the essential features of the common
73 Art.9 (4) o f Annex III o f  LOSC and Reg. 17 o f  the Mining Code.
74 See Art.8 o f Annex III o f  LOSC and Regs. 15 and 16 o f  the Mining Code. See also Shyam, M.R., 
“Deep Seabed Mining: An Indian Perspective,” (1986) 17(4) Ocean Development and International 
Law, pp.325 at p. 344.
75 These states have been registered as pioneer investors pursuant to resolution II o f UNCLOS III. See 
International Seabed Authority Handbook 2003, (Jamaica, The International Seabed Authority, 2003),
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heritage regime to satisfy the developing states.76 Under Resolution II, the PrepCom 
was empowered to register certain categories of qualified investors as pioneer 
investors.77 The amount of money expended by a state or its entities in mining 
activities in the Area, pegged at an equivalent of SUS 30 million, by a certain date 
was used as a yardstick to determine what states or their entities were eligible to apply 
to be registered as pioneer investors. The resolution divided the pioneer investors into 
three categories:78
• France, India, Japan and the then USSR (now Russian Federation), or a state 
enterprise or one natural or juridical person which possessed the nationality of or 
was effectively controlled by each of those states, or their nationals, provided that 
such a state had signed the Convention and either through itself or its state 
enterprise or its national, whether natural or juridical, had spent before 1 January 
1983 at least $US 30 million in pioneer activities79 in the Area, of which not less 
than ten per cent must have been expended towards location, survey and 
evaluation of the mining area;
• Four entities, whose components being natural or juridical persons possessed the 
nationality of one or more of the following states or were effectively controlled 
by one or more of them or their nationals: Belgium, Canada, the Federal Republic 
of Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, United Kingdom and the United States
pp.29-30 and below section 5.2.3 o f  this chapter. For more on the possibility o f  co-operation between 
African states and developing seabed mining states see section 6.3.3 o f chapter 6 o f this thesis.
76 For more on the Pioneer Investors Protection Scheme (PIP) see Ogley, R.C., Internationalizing the 
Seabed (Aldershot, England, Gower, 1984), pp.224-247; Mahmoudi, op.cit. pp.309-334; Brown, Sea- 
Bed Energy and Minerals: The International Legal Regime, Vol. 2, op.cit. pp. 187-243; Hayashi, M., 
“Registration o f  the First Group o f  Pioneer Investors by the Preparatory Commission for the 
International Sea-Bed Authority and the International Tribunal for the Law o f the Sea,” (1989) 20 
Ocean Development and International Law, pp. 1-33.
77 Para. 2 o f Resolution II, Governing Preparatory Investment in Pioneer Activities Relating to 
Polymetallic Nodules. Also see Para. 5(h) o f  Resolution I, Establishment o f  the Preparatory 
Commission for the International Sea-Bed Authority and for the International Tribunal for the Law of  
the Sea, listing the functions o f  the PrepCom.
78 Para.l (a) o f Resolution II.
79 Para. 1(b) o f Resolution II defines “Pioneer activities” as “undertakings, commitments o f financial 
and other assets, investigations, findings, research, engineering development and other activities 
relevant to the identification, discovery, and systematic analysis and evaluation o f polymetallic nodules 
and to the determination o f  the technical and economic feasibility o f exploitation”. This paragraph goes 
on to say that it includes, “(i) any at-sea observation and evaluation activity which has as its objective 
the establishment and documentation o f  the nature, shape, concentration, location and grade o f  
polymetallic nodules and o f  the environmental, technical and other appropriate factors which must be 
taken into account before exploitation; and (ii) the recovery from the Area o f polymetallic nodules with 
a view to the designing, fabricating and testing o f  equipment which is intended to be used in the 
exploitation o f polymetallic nodules.”
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of America, provided the certifying state(s)80 signed the Convention and the entity 
concerned had spent before 1 January 1983 the amount referred as above;
• Any developing state which signed the Convention or its state enterprise; or a 
natural or juridical person which possessed the nationality of such state or 
effectively controlled by it or its nationals, or any group of the foregoing, which 
had spent the amount referred to above before 1 January 1985.
Such qualified state or entity was to apply to the PrepCom which was to register it, if 
such state, or in the case o f other entities the sponsoring state, had signed the 
Convention; the application was accompanied by a certificate by such state certifying 
the level of expenditure; and the application covered a total area large enough and of 
sufficient commercial value to allow two mining operations in line with the system of 
“site banking.” The applicant was also to ensure before it applied that there was no 
overlap with another applicant’s area or with that previously allocated as pioneer 
areas. This interim regime under Resolution II in itself failed to satisfy certain major 
industrialised states, which proceeded to unilaterally enact domestic laws to regulate 
seabed mining in the Area.81 This, along with the need to resolve the issue of possible 
overlapping claims amongst various claimants, led to a series of rather intricate and 
complicated understandings and agreements.82 Eventually, on 17 August 1987, the 
PrepCom registered India as the first pioneer investor. The pending applications of 
France, Japan and the then USSR were delayed until the complex Midnight 
Agreement, which Brown described as being “part o f  an interlinked network o f  
agreements,”83 resolved the overlapping claims between the then USSR and certain
84 • • •industrialised states, including non-signatory states. With this Midnight Agreement 
that committed all the states concerned, both signatories and non-signatories to the
80 Para. 1( c) defines a “certifying state” as “ a state which signs the Convention, standing in relation to 
a pioneer investor as would a sponsoring state pursuant to Annex III, article 4, o f the Convention and 
which certifies the levels o f  expenditure specified in subparagraph (a) [ at least $ US 30 million by the 
date specified].
81 See the United States o f  America’s Deep Sea-bed Hard Mineral Resources Act 1980 , 1 9 1.L.M.
1003 (1980); Germany’s Act o f  Interim Regulation o f  Deep Sea-bed Mining 1980,19 I.L.M. 1330 
(1980); United Kingdom’s Deep Sea Mining(Temporary Provisions) Act 1981, 20 I.L.M. 1219 (1981); 
France’s Law on the Exploration and Exploitation o f  Mineral Resources 1981, 21 I.L.M. 808 (1982); 
and Japan’s Law on Interim Measures for Deep Sea-Bed Mining 1982, 22 I.L.M. 102(1983).
82 See Hayashi, “Registration o f  the First Group o f  Pioneer Investors etc.” op.cit. pp. 10-21 and Brown, 
Sea-Bed Energy and Minerals: The International Legal Regime, Vol. 2, op.cit.pp. 196-228.
83 Brown, ibid.p.227.
84 Belgium, Canada, Italy and the Netherlands (signatories to LOSC); and Germany, United Kingdom 
and United States o f America (non-signatories to LOSC). See Brown, ibid. pp.226-228.
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LOSC, to respect the boundaries as laid down by the Agreement, the applications of
o r  o z r  o*7
France, Japan and the then Soviet Union (now the Russian Federation) were 
considered and approved by the PrepCom on 17 December 1987.88 Subsequently, 
PrepCom approved the application China89 as pioneer investor on 5 March 1991.90 On 
4 March 1991 a group of Eastern European states, namely Poland, Bulgaria, the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia, and the then Soviet Union (now the Russian 
Federation), along with Cuba, a developing socialist state, applied to the PrepCom 
through a multinational organisation, the Interoceanmetal Joint Organisation (IOM), 
to be registered as a pioneer investor.91 This was approved on 21 August 1991.92 In 
1994, the Republic o f Korea applied to be registered as a pioneer investor and the 
application was approved on 2 August 1994. The approval and registration gave the 
pioneer investor the exclusive right to carry out pioneer activities in the pioneer area 
allocated to it.94 It is important to note that no African state or group of African states 
qualified nor applied to be registered as a pioneer investor, despite the category three 
concessions under paragraph 1(a) of Resolution II to developing states.95 This is in 
spite of the fact that the Third Regional Conference on the Development and 
Utilization of Mineral Resources in Africa, held in 1988 at Kampala, Uganda, 
encouraged the formation o f an African deep seabed mining company.96 No such 
company has in fact been set up.
85 Applying through Institut Francais de Recherche pour l ’exploitation de la Mer/ Association francaise 
pour l ’etude et la recherche des nodules (IFREMER/AFERNOD).
6 Applying through Deep Ocean Resources Development Co. (DORD).
87 Applying through Yuzhmorgeologiya.
88 Hayashi, “Registration o f  the First Group o f  Pioneer Investors etc.,” op.cit. pp.21-22 and Brown, 
Sea-Bed Energy and Minerals: The International Legal Regime, vol. 2, op.cit. p.228.
89 Applying through China Ocean Mineral Resources Research and Development Association 
(COMRA).
90 Brown, vol.2, op.cit, pp.230-231.
91 See Brown, ibid. 239-240 describing the unusual situation o f  Interoceanmetal. See 
http://www.iom.gov.pl/welcome.htm [Accessed 20 January 2005]
92 Brown, ibid.pp.231-232.
93 Ibid.p.231.
94 Para. 6 o f Resolution II. Pioneer investor application areas are located in the Pacific Ocean and the 
Indian Oceans. For map see http://www.isa.org.im/en/seabedarea/investorstatus.stm and 
http://www.isa.org.im/en/publications/IA ENGZENG3.pdf fAccessed 10 September 2003].
95 See Kwiatkowska, B., “Ocean affairs and the law o f  the sea in Africa: Towards the 21st century,” 
(1993) Marine Policy, p. 11 at 29.
96 See Report on the Work o f  the Third Regional Conference on the Development and Utilization of  
Mineral Resources in Africa, Kampala, 6-15 June 1988, UN Doc LOS/PSN/SCN.l/WP.5/Add 3, 1989 
and Kwiatkowska, ibid.
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Originally, under Resolution II a registered pioneer investor was to apply to the ISA 
for an approved plan of work for exploration and exploitation within six months of the 
entry into force of the Convention.97 However in 1990, with the adoption of the 
Understanding on Pioneer Investors’ Obligations,98 it was agreed that this deadline 
would be reviewed as a result o f the delay in the likelihood of commercial production 
in the distant future. The New York Agreement subsequently extended the deadline 
for pioneer investors to apply for a plan of work for exploration to thirty-six months 
of the entry into force o f the Convention.99 Between 2001 and 2002 the ISA, in 
consonance with the Mining Regulations 2000, entered into the first fifteen year 
contracts for exploration for polymetallic nodules in the Area with the former pioneer 
investors100, namely IFREMER/AFERNOD101, DORD102, Yuzhmorgeologiya103, 
COMRA104, IOM105, the Republic of Korea106 and the Government of India.107 A 
perusal of the pioneer investors reveals that all regional grouping, except the African 
group, are in one way or the other represented in pioneer activities in the Area.
97 Resolution II, Para. 8(a). The fee paid was US$250,000. Resolution II, Para.7 (a).
98 See LOS Bulletin, Special Issue III, p.261 quoted in Brown, op.cit. vol.2, pp.229-230.
99 Annex, Section 1 para. 6(ii). See Brown, “The 1994 Agreement on the Implementation o f Part XI o f  
the UN Convention on the Law o f  the Sea: breakthrough to universality,”(1995) 19(1) Marine Policy, 
pp.5 at 10-11 and Plans o f Work for exploration o f  the Government o f India, Insitut francais de 
recherche pour 1’exploitation de la mer (IFREMER)/Association ffancaise pour l ’etude et la recherche 
des nodules (AFERNOD)(France), Deep Ocean Resources Development Co. Ltd. (DORD) (Japan), 
Yuzhmorgeologiya (Russian Federation), China Ocean Mineral Resources Research and Development 
Association (COMRA) (China), Interoceanmetal Joint Organization (IOM) (Bulgaria, Cuba, Czech 
Republic, Poland, Russian Federation and Slovakia) and the Government o f  the Republic o f Korea. 
Report o f the Secretary-General, ISBA /4/A /l/R ev.2 o f  2 September 1998 in International Seabed 
Authority, Selected Decisions and Documents o f the Fourth Session, (Jamaica, International Seabed 
Authority, 1999), pp. 1-39.
100 See International Seabed Authority Handbook 2003, op.cit. pp.29-30. Reg. 23(3) o f the Mining 
Code requires that subsequent contracts with any State or entity shall include arrangements that shall be 
similar and no less favourable than that agreed with any registered pioneer investor. Also if  such 
subsequent contracts are granted more favourable arrangements than that o f  the registered pioneer 
investors the council shall make similar or no less favourable arrangements in favour o f the pioneer 
investors provided such arrangements do not affect or prejudice the interests o f  the ISA.
101 Signed on 20 June 2001 between the Secretary-General o f  the ISA and Ambassador Pierre-Antoine 
Bemiard on behalf o f  Mr. Jean-Francois Minster, President o f  IFREMER.
102 Signed on 20 June 2001 between the Secretary-General o f  ISA and Mr. Toshio Takada, President o f  
DORD.
103 Signed on 29 March 2001 between the Secretary-General o f  ISA and Mr. Ivan F. Gloumov, Deputy 
Minister — State Secretary o f  the Ministry o f  Natural Resources, Russian Federation.
104 Signed on 22 May 2001 between the Secretary-General o f  ISA and Mr. Jin Jincai, Secretary-General 
o f COMRA.
105 Signed on 29 March 2001 between the Secretary-General o f  ISA and Dr. Ryszard Kotlinski, 
Director-General o f  IOM.
l06Signed on 27 April 2001 between the Secretary-General o f ISA and the Minister for Maritime
Affairs and Fisheries o f the Republic o f  Korea, Mr. Woo-Taik Chung.
263
Table 19: Regional Groupings and Pioneer Investors
Regional G roup108 Country Entity Date of
Registration as 
Pioneer
Investor/Contract 
of Exploration
African Group N il Nil N il
Asian Group India; China; Japan 
and Republic o f 
K orea
Departm ent o f 
Ocean
Developm ent 
(India); COM RA 
(China) DORD 
(Japan) and the 
Korean Ocean 
Research and 
D evelopm ent 
Institute (Republic 
o f  Korea).
India- 17 March 
1987/25 M arch 
2002
CO M RA-5 M arch 
1991/22 M ay 2001 
DORD-17 
D ecem ber 1987/20 
June 2001 
Korea-2 August 
1994/29 March 
2001
Eastern European 
Group
Russian Federation; 
Bulgaria; Czech 
Republic; Poland 
and Slovakia
State Enterprise 
Y uzhm orgeologiya 
(Russian 
Federation) and 
IO M (Bulgaria; 
Czech Republic; 
Poland; Slovakia 
and Russian 
Federation)
Yuzhmorgeologiya 
-17 Decem ber 
1987/29 M arch 
2001
IOM-21 August 
1991/29 M arch 
2001
Latin A m erican 
and Caribbean 
States Group
Cuba IOM IOM-21 August 
1991/29 M arch 
2001
W estern European France IFREM ER/A FERN  IFREM ER/AFERN 
and Other OD. O D -17 March 
States(W EOG) 1987/20 June 2001 
Group
5.2.4. Regulations on prospecting and exploration fo r  polymetallic nodules and 
African States.
In July 2000 the ISA approved a set o f  Regulations on the Prospecting and 
Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules in the A rea (the M ining C ode),109 made up o f
107 Signed on 25 March 2002 between the Secretary-General o f ISA and Mr. H.K. Gupta, Secretary o f  
the Department of Ocean Development.
108 See International Seabed Authority Handbook 2004 (Jamaica, International Seabed Authority, 
2004), pp.8-9.
109 ISBA/6/A/18 o f July 2000. For analysis o f  the regulations see generally, Lodge, M., “The 
International Seabed Authority’s Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules
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40 regulations, and divided into 9 parts, along with 4 annexes. It deals with only 
prospecting and exploration of polymetallic nodules in the Area.
The Code is largely founded upon the work of Special Commission (SC) 3 of the
PrepCom upon which the Secretariat of the ISA based its prepared draft that was the
initial starting point of the Legal and Technical Commission’s work.110 Thereafter the
Legal and Technical Commission, after working from 1997 through to March 1998,
produced a draft Mining Code containing 33 articles.111 This draft Mining Code was
afterwards transmitted to the Council, which adopted it on 13 July 2000 after a
112
paragraph by paragraph review of the regulations. The Mining Code, a product of 
rather complicated and sometimes contentious negotiations, was finally approved by 
the Assembly on 13 July 2000 as “the first set o f regulations to be issued by the 
Authority since its conception as the custodian o f the ‘common heritage o f  mankind’ 
more than 30 years ago.”U7> During the negotiations Nigeria, for the African group, 
had misgivings about the draft Code balancing the interests of protection of 
investment vis-a-vis the protection of the interests of mankind.114 This section will 
examine the provisions of the Mining Code in order to determine whether, with the 
adoption and approval of the Code, such balancing of these diverse interests was 
achieved in respect of African states. In doing this the section does not purport to 
embark on a detailed examination of all the provisions of the Code but will merely 
restrict itself to three pertinent areas of the Mining Code which, in the view of this 
writer, are of relevance to African states’ participation in mining in the Area.115 These 
are the Code’s provisions in respect of the finance and technology of prospective 
applicants; confidentiality of data and information; and the obligation to train 
personnel of the ISA and developing states. The reason these three aspects are
in the Area,” (2002) 10(2) The Centre fo r  Energy, Petroleum and Mineral Law and Policy Journal 
http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/iournal/html/vol. 10.2.html.
110 Ibid. p.5.
111 ISBA/4/C/4/Rev. 1 o f 29 April 1998.
112 See ISA, Press Releases (Council) SB/5/6 o f 11 August 1999; SB/5/9 o f 12 August 1999; SB/5/11 
of 13 August 1999; SB/5/21 o f 23 August 1999; SB/6/4 o f 20 March 2000; SB/6/12 o f 24 March 2000 
and (Assembly), SB/6/16 o f 31 March 2000. Also see ISA, Background Press Release, SB/6/1 o f 17 
March 2000 and Roundup o f  Session, SB/6/29 o f 14 July 2000.
113 Lodge, “The International seabed Authority’s Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for 
Polymetallic Nodules in the Area”, op.cit.p.l and also see pp.9-13 for an account o f the background 
work o f the Legal and Technical Commission and the Council on the Mining Code.
114 See ISA, Press Release, SB/6/16 o f 31 March 2000.
115 For detailed examination o f the Mining Code see Brown, Sea-Bed Energy and Minerals, vol.2, 
op.cit.pp.96-100; 104-109 and 152-186 and Lodge, op.cit.
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selected is because the finance and technology provisions are crucial to the 
determination o f the capability of African states to participate in seabed mining, while 
confidentiality is relevant as regards the access by these states to information relevant 
to acquisition o f the necessary know-how. The obligation to train, on the other hand, 
is relevant in the development of the requisite manpower in these states that would 
apply the know-how and utilise the necessary technology in participation in mining 
activities in the Area. The question that this section in essence seeks to answer is 
whether, in this regard, the Code, as an elaboration of the LOSC and 1994 Agreement, 
in any way provides any optimism for the participation of African states in deep 
seabed mining.
5.2.4.1. Finance and Technology Provisions.
Like the provisions o f the Convention, the Mining Code, though in more detail, makes 
financial and technical capability an important precondition for the approval of an 
application for a plan of work for exploration.116 The provisions apply to applicants 
other than registered pioneer investors. They require an application to be accompanied 
by a certification of the sponsoring state(s) that the applicant has expended the 
equivalent of at least US$ 30 million in research and exploration activities, of which 
no less than 10 per cent must have been expended on the location, survey and
117evaluation of the area referred to in such plan of work. In addition, such sponsoring
state(s) is to certify that the applicant has the necessary financial resources to meet the
118 .  .  •estimated cost of the proposed plan of work. The application is to be accompanied 
by copies of audited financial statements, including balance sheets as well as the 
profit and loss statements of the three years immediately preceding the application, 
which are conformity with internationally accepted accounting principles” and 
certified by a qualified firm of public accountants. For newly organised entities where 
a certified balance sheet is not available, a pro forma balance sheet certified by an 
appropriate officer o f the applicant will suffice. In the case of an applicant which is a 
subsidiary of another entity, what is required are the financial statements of the parent 
entity and a statement from such parent entity, in conformity with internationally 
accepted accounting principles duly certified by a qualified firm of public
116 Regs. 12 and 21(3) (c) o f  the Mining Code.
117 Reg. 12 (2) o f  the Mining Code.
118 Reg. 12(4) o f  the Mining Code.
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accountants, that such applicant will have the financial resources to carry out the plan 
of work. In the case of an applicant controlled by a state or a state enterprise, the 
applicant is required to submit a statement from such state or state enterprise 
certifying that the applicant will have the financial resources to carry out the plan of 
work.119 In situations where the applicant intends to finance its plan of work by 
borrowings, it is also required to submit the amount of such borrowings, the 
repayment period and the interest rate.120
In addition to evidence of its financial capability, the applicant is also to show its 
technological abilities by giving a general description of its previous experience, 
knowledge, skills, technical qualifications and expertise; a general description of the 
equipment and methods to be used and other relevant non-proprietary information 
about the characteristics o f the technology to be used, and a general description of its
financial and technical capability to respond to any incident or activity which causes
121serious harm to the environment.
In cases where the applicant is a partnership or consortium each o f the members 
therein are to provide all the information required by the Code on their financial and 
technological details.122
These twin requirements of finance and technology, which are no doubt crucial 
requirements for deep sea bed mining, merely highlight the difficulties, in view of the 
dearth of finance and technology amongst African states, arising with regard to
• 123 •Africa’s participation in actual direct activity in the Area. Perhaps there is a need to 
lower the threshold in respect o f African states and their entities to encourage them to 
actually participate, especially in co-operation with other entities that are already
• • • • • 124participating in seabed mining activities.
119 Reg. 12 (5) o f the Mining Code.
120 Reg. 12 (6) o f the Mining Code.
121 Reg. 12 (7) o f the Mining Code.
122 Reg. 12 (8) o f the Mining Code.
123 See section 6.1 and 6.2 o f chapter 6 o f  this thesis for more details.
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5.2.4.2. Confidentiality o f Data and Information.
The Mining Code, in seeking to elaborate on the rather vague and obscure provisions 
of the Convention on confidentiality of data and information,125 was faced with the 
need to balance diverse interests in this regard.126 There was the need to balance the 
interests o f the seabed mining states and their entities, concerned about protecting 
industrial secrets and proprietary data from competitors, on the one hand, with the 
interest o f the ISA wanting to utilise such data and information in order to carry out 
its functions effectively, on the other hand. In addition, there was the need to balance 
the competing interests between seabed mining states and their entities, interested in 
keeping confidential as much information, especially commercially valuable 
information, and those o f non seabed mining states (including African states) 
interested in having access to such information and data, in order to use it as a launch 
pad to acquire technology. During the negotiating process the attempt to reconcile the 
competing interests and to fine-tune the provisions of the Code raised the need to 
resolve three main issues: Who decides on what is confidential? How should such 
confidential information be handled? For how long should confidentiality be 
maintained?127
Under the Code it is left to the contractor “iw consultation with the Secretary-General 
o f  the ISA” to decide on what information and data is confidential.128 This designation 
of data and information as confidential is, however, subject to some exceptions where 
such confidentiality is excluded, namely: data and information that is generally known 
and available from other sources;129 that had been previously made available by the 
owners to others without an obligation concerning its confidentiality;130 or that which 
is already in the possession o f the ISA with no obligation concerning 
confidentiality.131 It appears that the Secretary-General is under a duty to refuse to
124 See section 6.3 o f  chapter 6 o f  this thesis.
125 See Art. 168 (2); Arts. 14 and 22 o f  Annex III o f  LOSC and Part VI o f the Mining Code. Also see 
Brown, Sea-Bed Energy and Minerals, Vol. 2, op.cit.pp.182-186.
126 See for e.g. ISA, Press Release, SB/5/6 o f  11 August 1999; ISA, Press Release, SB/5/9 o f 12 
August 1999; ISA, Press Release, SB/5/21 o f  23 August 1999; ISA, Press Release, SB/6/1 o f 17 
March 2000; ISA, Press Release, SB/6/12 o f  24 March 2000; ISA, Press Release, SB/6/16 o f 31 March 
2000 and ISA, Press Release, SB/6/29 o f  14 July 2000.
127 See ISA, Press Release, SB/6/1 o f  17 March 2000.
128 Reg. 35(1) o f the Mining Code.
129 Reg. 35(1) (a) o f  the Mining Code.
130 Reg. 35(1) (b) o f  the Mining Code.
131 Reg. 35(1) (c) o f  the Mining Code.
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accept that data and information are confidential if the conditions for the exceptions 
exist at the time of the consultations. In respect of the second exception in relation to 
data and information made available previously by the owner to others without an 
obligation concerning its confidentiality, this would appear not to include subsidiaries 
of the owner, but should be limited to autonomous persons. Presumably, it would be 
sufficient if  such disclosure was made to just one other person. Evidently non sea bed 
mining states, including African states, will favour an interpretation of the exceptions 
to confidentiality o f data and information in such a way that would make as much 
information and data accessible in the public domain.
Once information and data are successfully designated as confidential, it may only be 
used by the Secretary-General and, under his authority, by the staff of the Secretariat 
along with members o f the Legal and Technical Commission. The access of the staff 
of the Secretariat and the members o f the Legal and Technical Commission to such 
data and information is required to be authorised by the Secretary-General only for
• • • 1^ 9limited use in connection with their respective duties and functions. The Secretary- 
General therefore has the responsibility to maintain the confidentiality of such data 
and information, and he cannot release it to any person external to the ISA, except 
with the prior written consent o f the contractor. To carry through this responsibility, 
he is to establish procedures, consistent with the Convention, concerning the handling 
of confidential information by members o f the Secretariat, members of the Legal and 
Technical Commission and any other person participating in any activity or 
programme of the ISA.133 Such procedures include the maintenance of such 
information or data in secure facilities and the development of suitable security 
procedures to prevent unauthorised access to or removal of such data or information; 
development and maintenance o f a classification, log and inventory system of all 
written data and information received, including its type, source and routing from the 
time of receipt until final disposition.134 The Secretary-General is to require all 
persons authorised to have access to such confidential data and information to make a 
written declaration witnessed by the Secretary-General or his authorised 
representative, acknowledging his or her legal obligation to maintain confidentiality
132 Reg. 35(2) o f the Mining Code.
133 Reg. 36 o f the Mining Code.
,34 Reg. 36(1) (a) and (b) o f  the Mining Code.
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and to comply with the applicable regulations and procedures.135 Members of the 
Secretariat and members of the Legal and Technical Commission are not to disclose 
any confidential information coming to their knowledge by reason of their assignment 
with the ISA even after the termination of their employment or functions, as the case 
may be.136 Failure on the part of the ISA to maintain the confidentiality of such data 
and information will result in the ISA incurring responsibility or liability for any
1 "K ldamage arising from such breach, though the ISA may subsequently take 
appropriate action against any such person who directly breaches the duty of 
confidentiality.138
In the course o f the negotiations of the Code, certain delegates wanted confidentiality 
to remain indefinitely, while others wanted it to be for a limited period.139 Eventually 
the Code set a confidentiality period o f ten years from the date of submission of the 
data and information or the expiration o f the contract of exploration, whichever is 
later, at the first instance. Thereafter the Secretary-General of the ISA and the 
contractor are to review the data and information every five years to determine 
whether they should remain confidential. Such data and information will remain 
confidential as long as the contractor is able to establish that there is substantial 
risk o f  serious and unfair economic prejudice ” if  such data and information were to 
be released.140 No such data and information shall be released until the contractor is 
given a reasonable opportunity to exhaust the judicial remedies available to it under 
Part XI, section 5 o f LOSC.141 If  on the expiration of the contract of exploration, a 
contract o f exploitation is entered into in respect o f the exploitation area all such 
confidential data and information will remain confidential.142 Without prejudice to the 
various provisions requiring confidentiality, the contractor is given the discretion at 
any time to waive its right to confidentiality.143
135 Reg. 36(2) o f the Mining Code.
136 Reg. 36(3) and (4) o f  the Mining Code.
137 Art.22 o f Annex III o f  LOSC.
138 Reg. 36(5) o f  the Mining Code.
139 See ISA, Background Press Release, SB/6/1 o f  17 March 2000. Also Lodge, “The International 
Seabed Authority’s Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules in the Area,” 
op.cit. p.23.
140 Reg. 35(3) o f the Mining Code.
141 See section 4.1.3.2 o f  chapter 4 o f  this thesis on dispute settlement mechanism under the regime.
142 Reg. 35(4) o f  the Mining Code.
143 Reg. 35(5) o f the Mining Code.
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In respect of prospecting the Secretary-General may at any time, either with the 
consent o f the prospector or if  he determines that such prospector no longer exists or 
cannot be located, release data and information that would otherwise be 
confidential.144
The detailed provisions on confidentiality, covering also members of the Legal and 
Technical Commission, including those from African states, who are nominated by 
states parties, restrict information available in the public domain. This restriction 
limits the accessible information available to developing states, including African 
states, on seabed mining. Since an integral part of technology is the know-how,145 
which arises from access to relevant information, this restriction hinders the transfer 
of technology to African states. However, the crucial issue that arises is the delicate 
and difficult balance between the need to transfer technology and the protection of the 
intellectual property rights o f  the contractors through the confidentiality provisions. In 
line with the 1994 Agreement, the rather stringent confidentiality provisions of the 
Code appear to tilt the balance in favour o f the protection of the intellectual property 
rights of the contractors.146
5.2.4.3. Obligation to train personnel o f  ISA and developing states.
Under the Code each contract for exploration shall include as a schedule what is 
tagged “a practical program m e” for the training of personnel of both the ISA and 
developing states by the contractor.147 This programme is to be drawn up by the 
contractor in co-operation with the ISA and the sponsoring state(s). Such programmes 
are to focus not only on training o f such personnel but also provide for their full 
participation in all activities covered by the contract. The Code further provides that 
such training programmes may be revised and developed from time to time as may be 
necessary by mutual agreement, presumably between the contractor, the ISA and the 
sponsoring state(s) who work together in drawing up the original training programme. 
This regulation is pursuant to Article 15 o f Annex III o f LOSC that states that, “The
144 Reg.6 (2) o f  the Mining Code.
145 See Art. 5(8) o f Annex III o f  LOSC which defines technology as not only including “technical 
know-how.” Also Borgese, E.M., The Oceanic circle: Governing the Seas as a global resource 
(Tokyo/New York/Paris, United Nations University Press, 1998), p. 149, who explains that new 
technology is all about, “ .. .information, knowledge, development...”
146 See section 3.2.1 o f  chapter 3 o f  this thesis.
147 Reg. 27 o f  the Mining Code.
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contractor shall draw up practical programmes fo r  the training o f  personnel o f the 
Authority and developing states, including the participation o f  such personnel in all 
activities in the Area which are covered by the contract, in accordance with article 
144 paragraph 2. ” Since the Mining Code was adopted, the annual reports of the 
pioneer contractors received in 2002 and 2003 indicate that the contractors are yet to 
carry out any training in accordance with the programme of work.148
However, an examination of the training programmes of the pioneer investors
pursuant to Resolution II, paragraph 12(a)(ii), which similarly required the registered
pioneer investors to provide personnel training at all levels, indicates that the African
region is likely to benefit immensely when such training is commenced as required
by the Mining Code. O f the twenty-two personnel trained pursuant to Resolution II,
eight were from the African region.149 Prima facie this obligation to train appears to
be favourable to developing states, including African states, since training of
personnel is an effective way o f transferring knowledge, and eventually technology.
The transfer of technology through personnel training is encouraged by the LOSC
which requires co-operation between the ISA and states parties in promoting the
transfer of technology and scientific knowledge, through inter alia:
“measures directed towards the advancement o f  the technology o f  the 
Enterprise and the domestic technology o f  developing States, particularly 
by providing opportunities to personnel from the Enterprise and from  
developing States fo r  training in marine science and technology and fo r  
their fu ll participation in activities in the Area. ” 150
Despite this, the provisions on training still raise certain issues. The way in which 
training programmes are drawn up, while including the ISA, excludes the direct 
involvement of developing states, even though at the end they are meant to be the 
final beneficiaries. This reduces them to the position of rather passive participants in a 
training programme that appears to have the altruistic aim of advancement of their 
domestic technology for the purpose o f participation in activities in the Area. Some 
level of involvement o f developing states earmarked as possible beneficiaries in
148 See the Legal and Technical Commission Evaluation o f  the Annual Reports submitted by 
contractors, Eighth Session, ISBA/8/LTC/2 o f  13 August 2002, paras. 11, 21,31,41,51,61 and 71 and 
Legal and Technical Commission Evaluation o f  the Annual Reports submitted by contractors, Ninth 
Session, ISBA/9/LTC/2 o f  30 July 2003,paras. 15,27,43,56,68 and 94.
149 The personnel came from Algeria, Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Senegal, Sudan and Tunisia. See 
Legal and Technical Commission, Training Programmes under Resolution II o f the Third United 
Nations Conference on the Law o f  the Sea, Seventh Session, ISBA/7/LTC/2 of 25 June 2001.
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drawing up the training programme would enable such states to give their input in 
order to produce a programme that would actually be relevant to their peculiar milieu 
and developmental needs. It is arguable that this would also encourage them to play a 
more active role, not only in picking the personnel, but also in the effective utilisation 
of the skills o f such personnel in domestic technology advancement. Another issue is 
as regards the selection process o f candidates. In selecting the candidates for training, 
the ISA is to be guided by the guidelines set out in the final report of the Training 
Panel to the General Committee o f the PrepCom.151 First, the ISA requests by note 
verbale that the states members should nominate candidates for the training. 
Thereafter, the applications received are considered and a short-list of the applicants 
is drawn up, based on their qualifications, professional experience, and their reasons 
for seeking the training and how the training would benefit the nominating 
government. Upon selecting the most appropriate applicants based on these criteria, 
the ISA is then to consider geographic representation, with priority to be given to 
candidates from developing states.152 Although the selection emphasises geographic 
representation after the short-listing of applicants with qualifications and experience, 
it is argued that as a result o f the relatively limited amount of skilled manpower in 
Africa in this area, as compared to other developing regions such as Asia, it is likely 
that a number of African candidates may not make the short-list in the first place. 
Further, a perusal of the list o f those trained pursuant to resolution II reveals no clear- 
cut equitable geographical distribution. Although Africa had the second highest 
number of trainees, second only to Asia, the list does not reveal that the pioneer 
investors adhered to any rule o f equitable geographical distribution in respect of the 
trainees.153 It is not very clear from Regulation 27 of the Mining Code whether the 
African region would have any guaranteed place in the training programmes of the 
contractors based on equitable geographical distribution.154 It is suggested that in view 
of the non- participation o f African states in deep seabed mining activities, African
150 Art. 144 (2) (b) o f  LOSC.
151 LOS/PCN/BUR/R.48.
152 See the utilisation o f this process in the selection o f  Candidates for the training programme o f the 
Government o f the Republic o f  Korea. Report o f  the Legal and Technical Commission, ISBA/4/C/12 
and Corr. 1 o f 25 August 1998, International Seabed Authority Selected Decisions and Documents o f  
the Fourth Session, ISA/99/01.E (Jamaica, International Seabed Authority, 1999), pp.74-75.
153ISBA/7/LTC/2 o f  25 June 200, 1 Annex I. For example, Japan had 3 trainees, all o f whom were 
from the Asian regional grouping.
154 See ISA, Press Release, SB/5/9 o f  12 August 1999 where some states requested that the Regulation 
on training to be more detailed by outlining the number o f programmes, scope o f training, the funding 
o f programmes and the number o f  trainees.
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candidates should be given special consideration in selection in order to encourage 
African states’ participation in these activities.
Despite the shortcomings of Regulation 27, the prospect of personnel training for 
developing states is laudable. However, African states have the primary responsibility 
of putting in place domestic policies for the efficient management of these skilled 
human resources if any such training is to produce domestic technology advancement 
in real terms.155
5.2.5. Draft Regulations fo r  prospecting and exploration fo r  hydrothermal 
polymetallic sulphides and cobalt-rich ferromanganese crusts and African 
states.
As far back as August 1998 during the resumed fourth session of the ISA, 156 the 
Russian delegation requested that the ISA adopt regulations for the exploration of 
hydrothermal polymetallic sulphides (polymetallic sulphides)157 and cobalt-rich
1 Sftferromanganese crusts (cobalt crusts). Under the LOSC and the Agreement such 
regulations, when so requested, were to be adopted within three years o f such 
request.159 However, from 1997 up to 2000 the ISA had to focus on the regulations for 
polymetallic nodules. Upon the approval o f the latter regulations in 2000, the need to 
adopt regulations on polymetallic sulphides and cobalt crusts again came to the fore. 
Two major views emerged in this regard.160 One view, supported by states such as 
Belgium, China, Japan, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea and the United 
Kingdom, contended that work on such regulations would be premature, 
fundamentally because the possibility o f commercial exploitation of such resources
155 See Mutharika, P.A., “The Role o f  International Law in the Twenty-First Century: An African 
Perspective” (1994 -1995) 18 Fordham International Law Journal, p. 1706 at 1716, where the author 
identifies “efficient management and equitable distribution o f national resources, and the centrality o f  
the human person in development planning”, as some key issues African states have to deal with in 
order to rise out o f economic stagnation.
156ISBA/4/A/18, para. 14.
157 They contain high concentrations o f  copper, zinc, and lead in addition to gold and silver. See 
generally Herzig P.M., and Petersen, S., “Polymetallic Massive Sulphide Deposits at the modem  
Seafloor and their Resource Potential”, http://www.isa.org.im/en/seabedarea/PolvSulphRep/PartI.pdf 
[Accessed on 31 October 2003].
158 They contain primarily cobalt but also other resources, including titanium, cerium, nickel, platinum, 
manganese, thallium and tellurium. See generally Hein, J., “Cobalt-Rich Ferromanganese Crusts: 
Global Distribution, Composition, Origin and Research Activities,”
http://www.isa.org.im/en/seabedarea/PolvSulphRep/ParttII.pdf [Accessed on 31 October 2003].
159 Art. 162 (2) (o) (ii) o f  LOSC and Section 1 paras. 15 and 16 of the Annex to the Agreement.
160 ISA, Press Release, Council, Seventh Session, SB/7/14 o f  11 July 2001.
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lay in the distant future, and also because more research was needed by the ISA to 
devise such regulations. Another group, including African states such as Cameroon 
and Nigeria, along with Argentina, Chile, Fiji, Jamaica and Papua New Guinea, took 
the view that work on such regulations should begin immediately. As far as the latter 
group was concerned, such regulations were imperative because some states had 
already begun prospecting for some of these minerals. Further, they were of the view 
that such regulations were essential to guard against possible adverse effects on the 
marine environment and to consider the needs of developing states. In their view, 
insufficient knowledge about the resources could not be a basis for delaying work on 
the regulations since knowledge could be acquired while the Legal and Technical 
Commission deliberated on the regulations.161 Eventually the Council in July 2001 
agreed to start work on the regulations and the Legal and Technical Commission was 
directed to “commence consideration o f  the issues involved in the elaboration o f  
regulations•5,162 The Council, however, required the Legal and Technical Commission 
to adopt a flexible approach to the formulation of the regulations, particularly because 
of the lack of scientific knowledge of the possible effect o f exploitation of these 
resources on the deep sea ecosystems. Despite this flexible approach, the Commission 
was at the same time required to ensure that the regulations would be consistent with 
the LOSC, the Agreement and the existing regulations on polymetallic nodules.163
Work on the regulations is ongoing.164 The major challenge the Commission appears 
to face at this stage is the task of preparing regulations that do not detract from the 
provisions of the Convention and the Agreement in respect of the system of 
exploration, but yet cater for the peculiar variance between these resources and 
polymetallic nodules. For instance, as a result of the nature of these resources, unlike 
the polymetallic nodules, it is virtually impossible to determine two sites of equal 
estimated commercial value without substantial and costly exploration work on the
161 See SB/7/14 o f  11 July 2001. The Russian Federation, which had earlier requested for the 
regulations and supported the latter position, was o f  the view that there were no valid juridical or 
technical arguments for postponing the commencement o f work on the regulations.
162Ibid.
163 See Report o f  the Secretary-General o f  the International Seabed Authority under article 166, 
paragraph 4, o f  the United Nations Convention on the Law o f  the Sea, Ninth Session, ISBA/9/A/3 o f 4 
June 2003, para.36.
164 See Draft Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Sulphides and Cobalt-rich 
Ferromanganese Crusts in the Area: Proposed by the Legal and Technical Commission, 
ISBA/10/C/WP.l of 24 May 2004.
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part of the contractor.165 Furthermore, the exploration of these resources in the Area, 
unlike the nodules, would be in competition with the exploration of such resources 
located within national jurisdiction of certain states,166 in much shallower waters. This 
has led the Commission to examine more innovative ways concerning the system of 
exploration which would be in line with the spirit of the LOSC and the Agreement.167 
At the ninth session o f the ISA the Commission convened four informal working
1 ARgroups o f its members to examine various issues: environmental issues; size of the
exploration areas and the system by which the contractors will relinquish some of the 
areas to the ISA; the form o f the work plans to be submitted by prospective 
applicants; and the type of arrangements between the contractors and the ISA, 
whether it should be like the parallel system applied to polymetallic nodules or should 
be a more innovative arrangement to meet the peculiar nature of these resources. The 
working group on the size o f the areas for exploration recognised that due to the 
nature of polymetallic sulphides and cobalt crusts it would not be appropriate to 
allocate broad areas to the contractor, as is the case with polymetallic nodules. Rather, 
it showed a preference for allocation by way of a block system much like that adopted 
by certain mineral producing states in respect o f domestic exploration and 
exploitation, especially in offshore zones. This group considered that the elements 
that should be taken into account for the purpose o f the regulations include the size 
and maximum number o f blocks to be available per contractor, the spatial definition 
of blocks, spatial organisation, the geometry/dimensions of blocks, the selection 
process, relinquishment procedures, timescale, encouragement factors for contractors 
and the economics o f the number of mining sites necessary to sustain contractor
165 See Consideration relating to the regulations for prospecting and exploration for hydrothermal 
polymetallic sulphides and cobalt-rich ferromanganese crusts in the Area, ISBA/7/C/2 o f 29 May 2001, 
para. 12.
166 Possible sites for massive seafloor sulphide deposits within national jurisdiction are Atlantis II Deep 
(EEZ o f  Saudi Arabia/ Sudan); Middle Valley and Explorer Ridge (EEZ o f  Canada); Lau Basin (EEZ 
o f Tonga); North Fiji Basin (EEZ o f  Fiji); Eastern Manus Basin; Central Manus Basin; Conical 
Seamount (EEZ o f  Papua N ew  Guinea); Okinawa Trough (EEZ o f  Japan); Galapagos Rift (EEZ o f  
Ecuador). See Table 4 o f  Herzig P.M., and Petersen, S., “Polymetallic Massive Sulphide Deposits at 
the modem Seafloor and their Resource Potential”,
http: //w w w. i sa.ore.im/en/seabedarea/PolvSulphRep/Partl.pdf [Accessed on 31 October 2003]. Possible 
sites within national jurisdiction for cobalt cmsts include the EEZ o f  Johnston Island (USA), Marshall 
Islands, French Polynesia, Kiribati and the Federated States o f Micronesia. See Hein, J., “Cobalt-Rich 
Ferromanganese Crusts: Global Distribution, Composition, Origin and Research Activities,” 
http://www.isa.org.im/en/seabedarea/PolvSulphRep/ParttII.pdffAccessed on 31 October 2003].
167 See generally ISBA/7/C/2 o f  29 May 2001 and Summary presentations on polymetallic massive 
sulphide deposits and cobalt-rich ferromanganese crusts, Eighth Session, ISBA/8/A/1 o f 9 May 2002.
168 Report o f the Chairman o f  the Legal and Technical Commission on the work o f the Commission 
during the ninth session, ISBA/9/C/4 o f  1 August 2003.
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operations. The working group was of the view that whatever the size of the mining 
site and the relinquishment period, it must be flexible enough to motivate the 
contractors to carry out effective exploration.169 The working group on the form of 
work plans to be submitted by prospective applicants, while of the view that it should 
be as close as possible to that of polymetallic nodules, was of the firm opinion that 
there should be a number of adjustments to reflect the peculiar nature of these 
resources. The significant differences, as far as the group was concerned, would relate 
to prospecting, the size o f the area allocated, the application of the site-banking 
system and the procedure for dealing with overlapping claims. Further, the group was 
of the view that it would be more practical and manageable to have only one form of
i nr\
contract for both polymetallic sulphides and cobalt rich crusts. The working group 
on the type o f arrangements needed to give effect to the parallel system took the 
position that site banking would be difficult to apply to polymetallic sulphides and 
cobalt-rich crusts. This group therefore looked into other alternatives that would 
reflect the “spirit o f  the parallel system” and suggested that an applicant could 
propose one o f three options to the ISA, namely, the option of contributing to a 
reserved area in line with strict site-banking; the option of a joint venture system 
involving a 50-50 equity participation between the Enterprise and the contractor; a 
production sharing contract whereby the contractor would recover its cost of 
production at the end o f each year and thereafter profit-sharing would be on a 50-50 
basis.171 It is not clear from the last two options how the participation interest of 
developing states, including African states, required to be promoted by LOSC , would 
be catered for.172 Would such developing states be allowed to have a certain share in 
the equity participation of the Enterprise in either the joint venture or production 
sharing arrangement proposed? If  so, what would be the percentage? The practicality 
and feasibility of the production sharing option are, however, doubtful considering 
that the regulations are meant to address the issue of prospecting and exploration and 
not exploitation. Therefore it is not too clear how the contractor would recoup its cost 
at the end of each year, certainly the contractor cannot recoup its profits until 
commercial exploitation takes place.
169 Ibid.para. 8.
170 Ibid. para. 10.
171 Ibid.paras. 11 and 12 and Regulation 19 o f  Draft Regulations, ISBA/10/C/WP.1 o f 24 May 2004.
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In these deliberations on the proposed regulations to govern prospecting and 
exploration o f polymetallic sulphides and cobalt-rich crusts, the Commission has been 
guided by relevant national legislation dealing with both land and offshore mining, 
including that o f African states.173
Despite the contributions o f African states in the push for the regulations and also the 
input of the domestic mineral resource legislation and mining agreements of certain 
African states in the discussions of the Legal and Technical Commission, the 
remoteness o f the actual participation of African states in mining for these resources 
also arises. Whatever innovative system is eventually adopted by these regulations, 
the twin requirements of technology and finance would in many regards limit such 
participation by African states.174
5.3. Conclusion.
This chapter has sought to examine the system of mining in the Area vis-a-vis African 
states. While strictly speaking the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles is not 
part of the Area, the system of mining has been examined as a result of the Article 82 
provisions, which through a compromise mechanism give the ISA a distributive role 
in line with the principle of the common heritage of mankind. As a result of the 
inherent exclusive sovereign rights vested in a coastal state to explore and exploit its 
continental shelf and to regulate and authorise drilling therein, African states with 
extended continental shelves have the right to determine the system of mining in this
172 Art. 148 o f  LOSC.
173 See information from relevant national legislation relating to issues associated with the draft 
regulations on prospecting and exploration for polymetallic sulphides and cobalt rich crusts in the Area, 
Ninth Session, ISBA/9/LTC/5 o f  14 May 2003, especially para.5. For example, the Hydrocarbon Code 
(Law N o.21-90) 1992 o f  Morocco; Minerals (Prospecting and Mining) Act 1992 o f Namibia; Minerals 
Act N o.50, 1991, as amended by Mineral Amendment Act N o .103, 1993, General Law Second 
Amendment Act, No. 108, 1993 and Mine Health and Safety Act No.29, 1996, all o f South Africa; 1980 
and 1982 Model Production Sharing Contract o f the Democratic Republic o f Sudan; Concession 
Agreement for Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation between the Arab Republic o f Egypt and the 
Egyptian General Petroleum Corporation 1990; Model Production Sharing Contract 1995 o f Nigeria. 
See Reference Materials for Model Clauses 1, 3, 5, 6 and 8 for Proposed Regulations for Prospecting 
and Exploration for Polymetallic Sulphides and Cobalt-Rich Ferromanganese Crusts in the Area, 
Prepared by the ISA Secretariat. (Undated).
174 The present reports appear to indicate that these resources, as a result o f  the relative scarcity of  
information compared to polymetallic nodules and their peculiar physical characteristics, would require 
even more capital and more sophisticated technology for mining activities. See generally Parts II and 
III o f ISBA/7/C/2 o f  29 May 2001 and also Parts II and III o f ISBA/8/A/1 o f 9 May 2002. See section 
6.1 o f chapter 6 o f  this thesis.
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part of the seabed. The current practice of offshore mining in much shallower waters 
of African states reveals that this is likely to be mainly carried out by TNCs, working 
in tandem with these states through various contractual arrangements, such as joint 
ventures and production sharing contracts. Under the provisions o f Article 82, which 
requires payments or contributions to the ISA from exploitation in the continental 
shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, African states with extended continental shelves 
would be exempt if they can establish that they are net importer of the mineral 
resources produced in their continental shelf. However, for African states that are not 
exempt, in the eventuality of commercial production in the extended continental shelf, 
it is suggested that they would need to clarify, through domestic legislation or the 
terms of the contractual arrangements with the TNCs, certain practical issues that 
would arise from Article 82. For instance, the role of TNCs (engaged under a 
contractual arrangement e.g. production sharing contract) in payments or 
contributions under Article 82 would have to be clarified. Also the ISA would have to 
formulate necessary regulations to address certain practical issues that would arise in 
the eventuality that it has to carry out its distributive function under Article 82.
Further, as potential beneficiaries o f such payments or contributions, African states 
are in good stead as developing states in a region where quite a number of the states 
are amongst the least developed and land-locked states. It is, however, doubtful if 
such amount when distributed amongst all states parties, even with the special 
consideration for developing states, would make a significant impact on the economy 
of African states.
In the Area proper, under the compromise parallel system, African states technically 
have access to participate in mining activities once they are states parties to LOSC. 
However, in reality the twin requirements of sophisticated technology and substantial 
finance needed to embark upon mining in the Area severely limit the possibility of 
direct participation o f African states in such mining. The example of pioneer 
investors, where, despite the concession to developing states under Resolution II, 
Africa failed to produce any such pioneer investor(s), confirms the remoteness of 
direct participation in seabed mining by African states. The possibility of African 
states participating indirectly through TNCs incorporated within those states was also 
examined. However, the nature o f the resources in the Area, which are located in “«o
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man's land ” and for the most part a considerable distance from the African continent, 
along with the generally unstable economic and political conditions in Africa, make 
such possibilities rather dim. While the possibility of African states’ participation in 
deep seabed mining is remote, there are sparks of hope if such states embark on south- 
south co-operation with other developing states that have the potential to actually 
participate in deep seabed mining activities, especially as regards the reserved areas, 
an issue that is examined in more detail in the subsequent chapter. The regulations, 
dealing with polymetallic nodules, which have been adopted and those on 
polymetallic sulphides and cobalt crusts currently being formulated, do not generally 
enhance the possibility o f participation of African states but rather, as instruments to 
elaborate the LOSC and the Agreement, tend to magnify the remoteness of such 
participation. Perhaps, if  contractors are encouraged under the practical training 
provision o f the regulation to train more personnel from African states this may result 
in the acquisition o f expertise by these personnel and hopefully help in the transfer of 
marine technology to such states. However, for such training to be meaningful there is 
a need for African states to have the political will to provide suitable domestic 
environment for such trained personnel to make use o f their expertise. This can be 
done, for instance, by making available appropriate research and development (R&D) 
facilities for trained personnel to embark on R&D to develop their expertise.175
175 For more on this, see section 6.2.2 o f  this thesis.
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CHAPTER SIX.
PARTICIPATION OF AFRICAN STATES IN DEEP SEABED MINING: 
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS.
The twin requirements o f adequate finance and sophisticated technology imposed by 
the LOSC and the Mining Code as an essential precondition for participation in deep 
sea bed mining activities in the Area in themselves constitute a major constraint to 
actual, direct and effective participation by African states, their entities and their 
nationals. While the LOSC provisions enjoin that effective participation of developing 
states in activities in the Area should be promoted having due regard to their special 
interests and needs, especially as it relates to those which are land-locked and 
geographically disadvantaged,1 the reality on the ground as regards Africa, a continent 
having several landlocked and geographically disadvantaged states, appears to point 
to a rather bleak possibility o f such participation. This chapter seeks to examine these 
preconditions of finance and technology in respect of deep sea bed mining activities 
vis-a-vis the poverty and lack o f sophisticated technology in Africa in order to lay 
bare the problems militating against the actual, direct and effective participation of 
African states in deep seabed mining. The chapter subsequently attempts to examine 
various possible co-operative endeavours that African states may embark upon to 
overcome some o f the constraints in order to advance the prospects of their actual, 
direct and effective participation in deep seabed mining activities.
6.1. Finance.
The deep seabed mining industry, which is capital-intensive, does not hold prospects 
of imminent commercial exploitation. Therefore at best states, their nationals and 
entities, investing in such seabed mining, are engaged in long-term investments with 
no certainty o f when or whether they will yield profitable returns.2 At worst such 
states are engaged in such mining, not really for commercial gains but rather for the 
purpose of the prestige o f being acclaimed as one of the seabed mining states,
1 See Arts. 148 and 160(2) (k) o f  LOSC.
2 Nyhart, J.D., and Triantafyllou, M., “Ocean Transportation Considerations in Deep Ocean Mining:
Cost Analyses from the MIT Deep Ocean Mining Model”, in Koers, A.W., and Oxman, B.H,(eds.), The 
1982 Convention on the Law o f  the Sea: Proceedings o f  the Law o f  the Sea Institute Seventeenth
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“symbolic o f  the maturation” 3 of its scientific, technological and industrial 
capabilities.4 Can African states afford to engage in such long term or prestige 
investment? This section seeks to examine the problem militating against African 
states’ participation in seabed mining by considering the capital-intensive nature of 
seabed mining operations vis-a-vis the dearth of financial resources resulting from 
acute poverty, which in turn requires such scarce finance to be diverted to pressing 
and immediate priority areas.
6.1.1. An examination o f  cost estimates fo r  seabed mining operations.
As commercial exploitation o f the Area is yet to commence, the total cost estimates of 
seabed mining operations (except perhaps those related to research and 
development(R&D) and prospecting and exploration which are ongoing) is largely a 
matter o f conjecture based on cost estimates proposed by certain experts. As far back 
as 1979 Ronald Katz opined, though without any reference to any specific data, that 
seabed miners must invest an approximate amount of between $500 million to $1 
billion in order to embark on seabed mining.5 In a more detailed scrutiny of the issue 
of cost estimates for seabed mining, J.D. Nyhart and M. Triantafyllou, of the 
Massachusetts Institute o f Technology (MIT) in a 1983 presentation, examined a 
hypothetical nodule mining project presumed to have begun in 1970 and proceeding 
to commercialisation, by a consortium of companies based in the United States of 
America with processing facilities on the west coast of America relatively close to the 
proposed mine-site located in the Clarion and Clipperton area of the Pacific Ocean, 
where the bulk o f the polymetallic nodules are situated.6 Their analysis covered 
various stages ranging from what they tagged “pre-production or up front work” (R & 
D to get the technology together and the prospecting and exploration work); “the 
contract and construction or investment phase” (actual assembling of facilities and 
equipment necessary for recovery, transportation and processing of target metals) and 
the commercial operations (construction of the equipment for mining, transportation
Annual Conference, July 13-16,1983, Oslo, Norway,(Honolulu, Hawaii, The Law o f the Sea Institute, 
University o f  Hawaii, 1984),p.381 at 382-386.
3 Shyam, M., “Deep Seabed Mining: An Indian Perspective”, (1986) 17(4) Ocean Development and 
International Law, p.325 at 340.
4 Ibid. pp.339-342.
5 Katz R.S., “Financial Arrangements for Seabed Mining Companies: An NIEO Case Study” (1979) 13 
Journal o f  World Trade Law, p. 209 at 214.
6 Nyhart and Triantafyllou, “Ocean Transportation Considerations in Deep Ocean Mining: Cost 
Analyses from the MIT Deep Ocean Mining Model”, op. cit at pp.381-427.
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and processing activities and actual commercial exploitation).7 Based on existing 
knowledge at the time of the presentation, in the eighties, they arrived at an estimated 
colossal sum of $1,121 million as capital costs after the preparatory costs of $172 
million. In addition they projected annual operating costs of $217 million.8 
IFREMER, one o f the pioneer investors, giving a cost estimate in 1988 money terms, 
projected the total investments in seabed mining at about $950 million with additional 
operating costs o f $240 million per year.9 In an in-depth joint study conducted in 
1989 by the International Ocean Institute (IOI) and the Asian-African Legal 
Consultative Committee (AALCC), after examining the expenditure and budgeted 
outlay o f various states involved in seabed mining activities, including Japan, India, 
USSR, France, Korea, Norway, Sweden and Finland, it was estimated that a minimum 
budget o f $200 million over four years could cover exploration, R&D and training.10
The LOSC, the Agreement and the Mining Code give an indication of the immense 
costs involved by requiring an applicant for a plan of work, both pioneer and other 
prospective investors, to show evidence o f having expended the sum of £30 million in 
pre-exploration activities.11 From available records it appears that seabed mining 
operations for polymetallic sulphides and cobalt crusts would be even more expensive 
in view of the peculiar geological characteristics and the relative lack of knowledge of 
these resources as compared with polymetallic nodules. For example, in an estimate 
based on 42 research cruises from 1981 through 2001 in respect of cobalt-rich 
ferromanganese crusts, it is suggested that a minimum expenditure of about US $32
7 Ibid.p.382.
8 Ibid.p.426.
9 See http://www.ifremer.fr/drogm uk/Realisation/Miner/Nod/texte/txtl8.html [Accessed on 19 
December 2003] {Translated from French to English by Mrs Valerie Taylor }.
10 Alternative Cost-Effective Models for Pioneer Co-operation in Deep Sea-Bed Exploration, 
Technology Development, and Training, Joint Study by the International Ocean Institute (IOI) and the 
Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee (AALCC) 1989, NILOS, International Organizations 
and the Law o f  the Sea, Documentary Yearbook, 1990, Vol. 6 (London/Dordrecht, Graham & 
Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff,1992), pp.552-594; See also Lodge, “The International Seabed Authority’s 
Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules in the Area,” The Centre fo r  
Energy, Petroleum and M ineral Law and Policy Journal, (2002) 10(2),
http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/iournal/html/vol. 10.2.html., p.8 where the author quoting as his 
source Sea-Bed Mineral Resource Development: Recent Activities o f the International Consortia, U.N. 
Doc.ST/ESA/107 and addenda(1982, United Nations Publications Sales No. E.80.II.A.9), lists in 
footnote 43 estimated investments o f  various seabed mining entities as at 1985, including certain 
consortia such as Kennecott Consortium (US$88 million); Ocean Mining Associates (US$158 million); 
Ocean Management Inc. (U S$70 million); Ocean Minerals Company (US$196 million).
11 Art.4 o f Annex III to the LOSC, Section 1, para.6(i) o f the Annex to the 1994 Agreement and Reg.
12 o f the Mining Code, ISBA/6/A/18 o f  4 October 2000.
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million for ship and associated scientific operations related to field operations would 
be required. Shore-based research in addition is estimated to be US $42 million, 
bringing the total investment to about $74 million.12
What clearly comes forth is that deep seabed activities involve large investments by a 
state or person, natural or juridical, engaged in such activities. Can African states 
afford to make such investments in such activities?
6.1.2. Poverty in Africa.
Africa, especially the sub-Saharan part, is inundated with poverty. Only about half its 
population, living on less than $1 a day, has access to basic requirements of living 
such as health care, nutrition, access to safe water and education. The HIV/AIDS 
pandemic, internal conflicts and war, the overwhelming burden of foreign debts,13 as 
well as corrupt and visionless governance, aggravate this poverty. 14 This problem of 
poverty in Africa remains, although there have been different initiatives that seek to 
eradicate the scourge o f poverty in Africa. These initiatives include the recent 
Cotonou ACP-EEC Agreement and the purely African initiative of the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD),15 which have as their central 
objective the reduction and the eventual eradication of poverty in Africa.16
The natural consequence o f the poverty level in Africa is that high-risk, capital 
intensive and non-immediate profit yielding ventures like the deep seabed mining
12 See Assembly Summary presentations on polymetallic massive sulphide deposits and cobalt-rich 
ferromanganese crusts, Eight Session, ISBA/8/A/1 o f  9 May 2002, para. 11 and also 
http://www.isa.im/en/publications/IA ENG/ENG9.ndf [Accessed 9 August 2004].
13 Out o f  the list o f  the World Bank o f  42 Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), a whooping 34 are 
from Africa, http://www.worldbank.org/hipc/about/map/map.html [Accessed on 16 January 2004].
14 See World Bank Annual Report 2003, http://www.worldbank.org/annualrenort/2003/affica.html and 
UNDP Human Development Report 2003, http://www.undp.org/hdr20Q3/ [Accessed on 16 January 
2004],
15 The Cotonou Agreement was signed on June 23, 2000 between the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
(ACP) Countries and the European Economic Community, the seventh o f such Agreements (Others 
were Yaounde I and II, Lome I, II, III and IV). The Cotonou Agreement is for 20-year duration subject 
to review every 5 years. See Art.95.
http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/cotonou/agreement en.htm [Accessed on 5 May 2004] 
The NEPAD is an initiative o f  the Organisation o f  African Unity (OAU) (now replaced by the African 
Union) and the NEPAD Strategic Framework document was formally adopted at the 37th Summit o f the 
OAU. See http://www.nepad.org/en.html [Accessed 5 May 2004].
16 See Arts. 1 and 19 o f  the Cotonou Agreement and paragraph 69 o f the NEPAD Framework 
Document, http://www.touchtech.biz/nepad/files/documents/nepad english version.pdf [Accessed 5 
May 2004].
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activities cease to be a priority. Priority matters revolve around what in developed 
industrialised states are mundane matters, sometimes taken for granted, such as 
providing basic food and portable water, basic education, shelter and health care.17 
The poor education level in Africa, a fall-out of poverty, results in an abysmal 
research and development (R&D) culture in African states, a sine qua non to effective 
participation in deep seabed mining activities. All these relegate African states to a 
position where they are disadvantaged in participating in deep seabed mining 
activities,18 but rather would appear to be destined to merely look towards the 
distributional benefits hoped to be derived in the distant future, under the common 
heritage principle, from the engagement of other states in deep seabed mining 
activities.19
Presently, it does appear that as a result o f the current poverty crisis in Africa, the 
active interest o f African states lies mainly in aspects of international law that are 
considered as contributing to the immediate developmental needs of the region.20 For 
as long as mining in the Area appeared to be imminent, with the likelihood of the 
distribution of revenue to African states under the common heritage of mankind and 
the effect it would have on land-based producers, African states took a great interest 
and were proactive in formulating the regime. However, with the postponement of 
commercial exploitation of the Area to the distant future, the interest of Africa 
appears to have waned in the light of more pressing priority needs. While this appears 
to be perfectly justifiable in view o f the national interest content of international 
law,21 this approach may in many regards leave African states in a position where in 
certain areas of international law they are perpetually reduced to a position of being 
mere observers and not actual direct participants. The immediate development
17 Snoussi, M., and Awosika, L., “Marine Capacity Building in North and West Africa”, (1998) 22(3) 
Marine Policy , pp.209-215.
18 Art. 148 and 153 o f  LOSC.
19 Art. 140 o f LOSC.
20 See generally Gelb H.A. (ed.), Can Africa Claim the 21st Century? (Washington D.C., World Bank, 
2000).
21 See the OAU Resolution on Problems o f  the Sea-Bed, Doc. CM/Res.238 (XVI), 1971 which 
emphasised in the second paragraph o f  its preamble its determination to protect individual national 
interests o f member States in respect o f  participation and effective exploitation o f the seabed, 
especially that within their territorial sea. See also generally Morgenthau, H.J., In Defense o f  the 
National Interest: A Critical Examination o f  American Foreign Policy/with a new introduction by 
Kenneth W. Thompson, (Washington D.C., University Press o f America, 1982) and Henkin, L., How 
Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy  (New York, Columbia University Press for Council on 
Foreign Relations, 1979), pp.36-37 and 331.
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approach to issues of international law is reflected in the fact that African states’ 
marine policy have a rather restricted focus on such areas of ocean use and utilisation 
as the development o f near offshore mineral resources; exploitation of fisheries 
resources, protection of their immediate marine environment and shipping.22 This can 
be contrasted with the marine policy of states such as Korea, China and India which, 
while not ignoring immediate developmental needs, have adopted a broader policy 
that does not neglect such long-term areas as deep seabed mining.23 While Africa 
must rightly, as its priority, address its immediate developmental needs, it cannot 
afford to close its eyes to high tech, high risk, non-immediate profit-yielding areas as 
deep seabed mining. Such participation in deep seabed mining cannot be based solely 
on the prospects o f immediate monetary returns. Other strategic policy considerations 
have propelled certain developing states to get involved in deep seabed mining. For 
states like Korea, China and India such considerations include the possibility of long 
term procurement o f strategic metals as an alternative to land-based minerals and the 
possibility of utilising R &D into deepsea bed mining technology to enhance their 
marine science and technology capabilities and to expand their capacity to use and 
exploit the oceans.24 As was pointed out by Shyam, in respect o f India’s participation 
in deep seabed mining activities, such participation, apart from the political prestige 
arising from the dynamics in the international sphere where the perception of power is 
influenced by a nation’s perceived scientific, technological and industrial capabilities, 
also provides a goal and challenge to indigenous scientists to have an “ocean-oriented 
fo c u s ” 25 This type of focus would be most useful for the African continent. Beyond 
deep seabed mining such ocean-oriented focus would be beneficial in acquiring 
indigenous technology for offshore mining of mineral resources replete within certain
22See the Report o f  the First Meeting o f  the Group o f  Experts on the Law o f  the Sea o f the States 
Members o f  the Zone o f  Peace and Co-operation o f  the South Atlantic, Brazzaville, Congo, 12-15 June 
1990, NILOS, International Organisations and the Law o f  the Sea, Documentary Yearbook, 1990, 
vol.6 (Netherlands, Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, 1992), pp. 162-173, where experts o f certain 
African states mentioned their priority areas in respect o f  LOSC, only the expert from Nigeria appears 
to have alluded to the acquisition o f  sea-bed mining capabilities. See also Snoussi and Awosika, 
“Marine Capacity Building in North and West Africa,” op.cit.; Ekpere J., “Pan-African Ocean 
Environment Management Programme,” (1998) 22(6) Marine Policy, pp.515-525 and Peter, C.M., 
“Tanzanian Marine Policy,” (1983) 7(1) Marine Policy, pp.58-59.
23 Seoung-Yong, H., “Marine Policy in the Republic o f Korea,” (1995)19(2) Marine Policy, pp.97-113; 
Wang Zhixiong, “China and the Exploitation o f  Deep Seabed Polymetallic Nodules,” (1991)15(2) 
Marine Policy, pp.132-135; Shyam, “Deep Seabed Mining: An Indian Perspective,” op.cit. p.327-338; 
Yates,J, and Roonwal, G.S., “Marine Science and Technology in India: Current Status,”(1994) 18(1) 
Marine Policy, pp.59-68 and Ford,G., “Indian Marine Technology Policy,”(1983) 7(2) Marine Policy, 
pp. 122-123
4 Seoung-Yong, Ibid. p.97 at 104-105; Wang, Zhixiong, ibid. Shyam, Ibid. and Ford, Ibid.
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African coastal states’ national jurisdiction.26 This would also be useful to African 
states with continental shelves beyond 200 nautical miles to enable them to acquire 
the technology that would empower them to exploit the natural resources located in 
this extended continental shelf. 27 Wang Zhixiong, writing about China, comments as 
follows:28
“Deep seabed mining involves many fields o f  science and technology. The 
exploitation o f  deep seabed polymetallic nodules relates to geology, 
meteorology, the electricity industry, the mining industry, the transport 
industry, the metals industry, the chemical industry, and so on. It has 
played a significant role in the development o f  these technologies and 
industries. Therefore, deep seabed mining could promote the development 
o f  marine science and technology in China. ”
Further, with the 1994 Agreement that has watered down the protection for land- 
based producers o f resources in the Area, some of which are African states, it would 
perhaps be o f strategic interest for these states to look towards participation in a 
competing industry as a means o f diversifying their production base, while for 
African non-land based producers it would be judicious to look towards participation 
as a means to obtaining alternative direct access to such resources in the Area. It is 
suggested that the prudent far-sighted strategy would be for African states, acting and 
pooling resources together, to have some level of participation in the development of 
human resources, technology development, prospecting and exploration, so that in the 
eventuality o f commercial mining in the Area they would be able to participate not 
only as beneficiaries under the common heritage of mankind,29 but also as actual 
participants in activities in the Area. It may be easy to argue that African states can 
actually defer their participation until such commercial mining is imminent. However 
the drawback o f this, as a result o f the long-term nature of investment in deep seabed
25 Shyam, “Deep Seabed Mining: An Indian Perspective,” op.cit. pp.339-342.
26 “Alternative Cost-Effective Models for Pioneer Co-operation in Deep Sea-Bed Exploration, 
Technology Development, and Training, Joint Study by the International Ocean Institute (IOI) and the 
Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee (AALCC) 1989”, op.cit. p.566, where it was pointed out, 
“...R&D in deep-sea mining technology does not take place in a vacuum, but is heavily dependant on 
progress in all the “n ew ” or “high ” information-based technologies o f  the so-called Third Industrial 
Revolution and its application to mining technology. ”
27 See sections 1.2.1 and 5.1.2 o f  this thesis.
28 Wang, Zhixiong, “China and the Exploitation o f Deep Seabed Polymetallic Nodules,” op.cit. p. 134.
29 Art. 140 o f  LOSC.
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mining, is that African states would continue, as in other areas such as space 
technology,30 to trail behind all other states that have opted for an early involvement.
6.2. Technology.
As a result o f the peculiar terrain of the Area, which is located a great distance from 
land with rough seabed topography, extreme physical and chemical conditions and 
largely unfamiliar biodiversity, deep seabed mining requires highly sophisticated
o  i
marine technology. This is even more so with polymetallic sulphides and cobalt- 
rich ferromanganese crusts, for which research and development (R&D) on the 
necessary technology in comparison to polymetallic nodules are at infancy stage.32 
Presently the search for technologies, which would make seabed mining 
commercially viable, is ongoing.
6.2.1. Deep Seabed Mining Technology.
The technologies required for deep seabed mining include those for surveying and 
prospecting, exploration, exploitation, as well as for transportation and processing of 
the resources, since the whole essence of mining is not only to win the resources but 
also to transport them to a place where they can be processed into a commercially 
viable state in order to put them on the commodity market for sale.33 Such 
technologies include state-of-the-art multi-purpose research vessels having 
sophisticated equipment like multi-beam swath mapping systems, manned or 
unmanned research submersibles or remotely operated vehicles (ROVs) equipped
30 See, for example, the Nigerian National Space Policy (2001)
http://www.nlgeriafirst.org/uploads/national policy on snace.ndf [Accessed on 20 January 2004], 
where the preamble o f  the executive summary in what appears to be an emphasis on the need to catch 
up in this area stated: “Over the years, mankind has benefited from the advances in space technology in 
diverse areas such as satellite communication, remote sensing and meteorology among others. The 
benefits have however accrued to us mostly indirectly as consumers o f products and services 
engineered and provided either by multi-lateral companies or intergovernmental agencies such as 
INTELSAT, INMARSAT, RASCOM, COPUOS, etc...There is no nation that can call itself developed 
in the 21st century that does not have indigenous critical mass o f trained space scientists and engineers 
who contribute actively to the solution o f the nation’s problems. Such critical mass can only be 
acquired through a well-defined and developed country space programme.” Nigeria is reported to have 
an annual budget o f  $22.4 million to finance its space policy. See Mustafa, N., “A new race for space: 
Its crowded up there,” Time Magazine, February 16, 2004, p. 18.
31 Valsangkar, A., “Deep-Sea Polymetallic Nodule Mining Challenges Ahead for Technologists and 
Environmentalists,” (2003) 21 M arine Georesources and Geotechnology, p.81 at 85-89.
32 See Paras. 6, 8 and 9, ISBA/7/C/2 o f  29 May 2001 and Paras. 12 and 14, ISBA/8/A/1 o f  9 May 2002.
33 However see Art. 1 (3) o f  the LOSC which defines “Activities in the Area” as “all activities o f  
exploration for, and exploitation of, the resources o f  the Area.” See also Yuwen Li, Transfer o f  
Technology fo r  Deep Sea-bed Mining: The 1982 Law o f  the Sea Convention and beyond, 
(Dordrecht/Boston/London, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994), p. 142.
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with photographic and video systems, TV-guided graps for controlled geological 
sampling and portable drilling and coring devices to embark on surveying, 
prospecting and exploration of the Area.34 To understand the terrain, computer­
generated maps, produced by reconstructing sonic images from sonar and seismic 
sounding equipment, are utilised. The kinds of rock and the depths of its layers in the 
Area are identified by seismic profiling.35 For the actual mining of polymetallic 
nodules three possible, rather complex, technologies have been developed36 -  the 
hydraulic mining system (HMS),37 the continuous line bucket (CLB)38 and the 
modular mining system (MMS). It is indicated that technology for nodule mining 
had actually been developed to the stage where, but for the crash of relevant metal
34 See http://www.isa.org.im/en/publicatioiis/IA ENGZENG7.pdf (Polymetallic nodules); 
http://www.isa.org.im/en/publications/IA ENGZENG8.pdf (polymetallic sulphides) and
http: // w w w . i s a. or g. i m/ en/pub 1 ications/1A EN G/E N G9 .pdf (cobalt crusts) [Accessed 9 August 2004]. 
See also Alternative Cost-Effective Models for Pioneer Co-operation in Deep Sea-Bed Exploration, 
Technology Development, and Training, Joint Study by the International Ocean Institute (IOI) and the 
Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee (AALCC) 1989, op.cit.570-575; Para.6 o f  ISBA/7/C/2 o f  
29 May 2001 and Para. 12 o f  ISBA/8/A/1 o f  9 May 2002.
35 http://www.isa.org.im/en/publications/IA ENG/ENG 10.pdf [Accessed 3 February 2004],
36 Yuwen Li, op.cit. pp. 143-145; Morgan, C., Odunton, N., and Jones, A., “Synthesis o f  Environmental 
Impacts o f  Deep Seabed Mining,” (1999) 17 Marine Georesources and Geotechnology, p.307 at 309- 
316 and Valsangkar, op.cit. pp.85-86.
37 A system involving the introduction o f  a specially produced pipe from the surface vessel to the 
ground o f  the Area and through specially contrived hydraulic means the nodules are transported from 
the bottom o f  the Area through the pipe to the surface ship. It consists o f a collector linked to the end o f  
the pipe, which is laid on the floor to move about the oceanfloor to dislodge nodules from the floor and 
then feed it to the pipe. Thereafter the nodules through a hydraulic pump and airlift are channelled to 
the surface ship. See Yuwen Li, ibid. p .143; Morgan, et al, ibid. pp.311-313 and Lenoble, J., 
“Technological Aspects o f  the Operation o f  Transport Vessels and Mining Ships”
in Koers, A.W ., & Oxman B., (eds.), The 1982 Convention on the Law o f  the Sea, op.cit. at p.377. This 
appears to be the current focus though the primary challenges are in keeping a steady ship position 
because o f  the distance at sea, ensuring that the pipe does not snap and that the collector is not lost or 
permanently stuck to the ocean floor. See Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law o f  the Sea 
(DOALOS), The United Nations Convention on the Law o f  the Sea (A historical perspective), 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention agreements/convention historical perspective.htm#Third%2 
OConference [Accessed 18 August 2004].
38 A system based on the classic dragline principle whereby empty buckets, with specially contrived 
teeth intended to be used to dislodge the nodules from the ocean floor, are let down from the surface 
ship(s) by special cables (made up o f  fibres that are light yet with strength as great as steel) to dredge 
the ocean floor for nodules. Once the buckets are filled they are hauled and emptied into the surface 
ship(s) having storage facilities. Yuwen Li, ibid. Morgan, et al, ibid. pp.313-316; and Lenoble, 
ibid.p.376. However, it appears to have been largely discarded because o f low recovery rates. See 
DOALOS, ibid.
39 A system whereby unmanned submersible collectors with ballast materials are launched from the 
surface ship and propelled downwards to the ocean floor by thrusters. On arrival at the bottom they 
shuttle around and collect the nodules. As they collect the nodules part of the ballast is released to 
adjust their buoyancy. Eventually when the collector has collected sufficient quantities o f  nodules and 
is filled up, mining is terminated. Subsequently they release the remaining ballast materials until they 
are propelled by thrusters to the surface and with the aid o f remote control mechanism docked with the 
surface ship where they are unloaded, serviced, reballasted and sent down again to collect more 
nodules. See Yuwen Li, ibid. pp. 143-144 and Lenoble, ibid. pp.377-378. This has largely been shelved
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prices and the poor global economic climate, it would have been possible to utilise 
such technologies, though they would still require more refining, for actual seabed
• • 40mining.
In the mining for polymetallic sulphides and cobalt crusts it appears that technology 
has not yet been specifically designed for this. However, in respect of polymetallic 
sulphides it is speculated that the technology is likely to focus more on continuous 
recovery systems using rotating cutter heads combined with airlift of the ore slurry to 
the surface vessel for onward transportation to the processing plant.41 For crust 
mining it is anticipated that the technology will be more difficult to develop than that 
for nodule mining because, unlike nodules which sit on soft-sediment, crusts are 
either weakly or strongly attached to substrate rock. It is suggested that mining 
operations for crusts would involve fragmentation, crushing, lifting, pick-up and 
separation. It is therefore proposed that the technology for exploitation should consist 
of a bottom-crawling vehicle attached to a surface ship through a hydraulic pipe lift 
system. Some have also suggested that this should include additionally technology for 
water-jet stripping o f the crusts from the substrate rock, in situ leaching techniques 
and even sonic removal o f crusts from the substrate 42 In developing technologies for 
deep seabed mining, the major challenge is to develop such technologies that would 
make seabed mining commercially viable in relation to the mining of similar 
resources onshore or in offshore locations closer to the landmass. What clearly comes 
out is that highly sophisticated technology and well-equipped surface vessels would 
be required for actual mining. In addition, surface vessels would have to be well 
equipped with adequate space for storage and geared either towards providing 
facilities on board to process the resources or to transport these resources for 
processing on land. Also the processing stage would require sophisticated technology. 
In respect o f processing polymetallic nodules, Valsangkar identifies that certain 
international consortia have already developed pyrometallurgical and 
hydrometallurgical techniques to conduct such processing. He points out that India 
has developed the process for recovering metals from nodules and is currently
because o f  its relatively high operational and investment costs though it is thought to be the technology 
o f the future. DOALOS, ibid.
40 Yuwen Li, ibid. p i45.
41 See Para.6 o f  ISBA/7/C/2 o f  29 May 2001.
42 See Para. 14 o f  ISBA/8/A/1 o f  9 May 2002.
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establishing a 500-kg per day processing plant. This plant is to recover metals from 
nodules through a complex process based on the principle of reductive leaching of the 
nodules.43
The complexities o f the whole surveying, prospecting, exploration and eventual 
exploitation and processing activities merely point to the fact that deep seabed mining 
requires immense technological capabilities.
6.2.2. Deep seabed mining technology and Africa.
The dearth o f technology, though a common characteristic shared by most developing 
states, appears to be very pronounced in Africa, where a combination of factors, 
including poverty, internal strife resulting in political instability and poor governance, 
result in a poor environment discouraging R&D, a necessary prerequisite for the 
acquisition of technology. The African continent has been identified as being the 
region with the lowest scientific and technological capabilities,44 a situation that 
remains the same to date despite growing technological exploits by certain states in 
other regions of the World, especially industrialised western states and to a lesser 
extent certain Asian states.45 This poor technological record o f the African continent 
is also evinced in the area of marine technology.46 This is all the more so in terms of 
the “high” marine technology required for deep seabed mining.47 The initial strategy, 
to require developed industrialised states to compulsorily transfer such technology to
43 Valsangkar, op.cit.p.87 and Morgan et al, op.cit.pp.318-320. For other processing technology see 
http://www.isa.org.irn/en/publications/IA ENGZENG7.pdf [Accessed 9 August 2004].
44 For instance, according to the UNESCO estimates for the period 1996/97 a global total o f $546.7 
billion was expended on R&D, with the African region accountable for only 0.7% o f  this expenditure. 
See UNESCO Institute for Statistics Report, The State o f Science and Technology in the World, 1996- 
1997 http://www.uis.unesco.org/ev.php?ID=4980201& ID2=DQ  TOPIC [Accessed on 16 February 
2004], See also Committee on Natural Resources and Science and Technology(CNRST), background 
paper on Science and Technology and Competitiveness o f  Natural Resources in Africa, 26 September 
2001, http://www.uneca.org/cnrst/background documents.htm [Accessed on 5 April 2004] and 
Kwiatkowska, B, “Ocean Affairs and the Law o f the Sea in Africa,” (1993) 17(1) Marine P o l i c y 11.
45 See the Interim Report o f  the Task Force on Science, Technology and Innovation United Nations 
Millenium Project titled “Science, Technology and Innovation: Challenges and Opportunities for 
Implementing the Millennium Development Goals.” February 1, 2004,
http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA content/documents/interim report.pdf [Accessed on 18 February 
2004],
46 Snoussi, and Awosika, “Marine Capacity Building in North and West Africa,” op.cit. pp.209-215 and 
Epkere, “Pan-African Ocean Environment Management Programme,” op.cit. pp.515-525.
47 See Alternative Cost-Effective Models for Pioneer Co-operation in Deep Sea-Bed Exploration, 
Technology Development, and Training, Joint Study by the International Ocean Institute (IOI) and the 
Asian-Affican Legal Consultative Committee (AALCC) 1989,op.cit.pp.566-567.
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developing states, having failed with the 1994 Agreement,48 African states, if they 
were to participate in deep seabed mining, would have to adopt a different strategy 
towards acquisition o f such technology. There would be a need to move from a rather 
laid back and passive approach of waiting for the transfer o f technology to a more 
proactive one o f acquisition of such technology through a more dynamic, integrated 
and forward-looking marine technology policy.49 Perhaps lessons could be learnt from 
the experience o f developing seabed mining states such as Korea, China and India. A 
common trend of these states is what appears to be a determined and forward-looking 
technology policy, towards the development and acquisition of deep seabed 
technology, leading not only to progress in that regard but also general technology 
capacity building in other marine areas, including fisheries, shipping and port 
development and near off-shore minerals exploitation.50 Such technology capacity 
building in these states can be traced to concrete governmental initiative, involving 
not only the establishment o f appropriate institutions to promote and encourage R&D 
into deep seabed technology,51 but also provision of government funding to bring this 
to reality. For instance in India, with the return of Indira Gandhi to power in 1980, the 
Department of Ocean Development (DOD) was established in 1982, having as one of 
its mandates the duty to promote the development of marine technology, including 
deep seabed technology.52 While it appears to be a paradox that a state like India, 
when dealing with social issues like mass poverty and deprivation, would have 
embarked on acquiring deep seabed technology, there is no doubt that with its 
registration as the first pioneer investor and its general development of marine 
technology, it has the international prestige of being regarded as part of the elite
53possessors o f high technology.
48 See section 3.2.1 o f  chapter 3 o f  this thesis.
49 Levy, J, “Towards an Integrated Marine Policy in Developing Countries,” (1988) 12(4) Marine 
Policy, p.326 at 336-337. See also the Interim Report o f the Task Force on Science, Technology and 
Innovation, op.cit.pp.50-52 which contends that technology transfer is an outmoded concept and 
suggests that technology should be “acquired, retained, diffused and improved” upon through “complex 
interactions between nations” involving not only governments but also NGOs and corporations.
50 Seoung-Yong, Hong, “Marine Policy in the Republic o f  Korea,” op.cit. ; Wang Zhixiong, “China and 
the Exploitation o f  Deep Seabed Polymetallic Nodules,” op.cit. ; Shyam, “Deep Seabed Mining: An 
Indian Perspective,” op.cit.; Yates, J, and Roonwal, G.S., “Marine Science and Technology in India: 
Current Status,” op.cit. and Ford, G., “Indian Marine Technology Policy,” op.cit.
51 For Korea there is the Korea Ocean Research and Development Institute (KORDI) and for China, the 
China Ocean Mineral Resources Research and Development Association (COMRA).
52 Levy J, “Towards an Integrated Marine Policy in Developing Countries,” op.cit.pp.332-334 and 
Ford, ibid.
53 Ford, ibid. and Kumar, C.K, “Commonwealth View o f Deep Sea Mining”, (1982) 6(3) Marine 
Policy, pp.239-241.
292
If Africa is to have any meaningful role in the regime of the Area, which it played an 
active role in formulating, in the eventuality of exploitation in the distant future, it 
needs to start to take steps towards acquiring and understanding the dynamics of deep 
seabed technology through a well-articulated, diverse but integrated marine policy 
oriented towards marine technology development and improvement, establishing an 
appropriate institutional framework, and providing adequate funding and 
governmental support towards promoting R&D in this area.54 This is not in any way 
to suggest that there are no institutions dedicated to developing marine technology in 
African states,55 but rather to point out that as a result of the lack of political will and 
commitment on the part o f these states to these institutions,56 unlike their counterparts 
Korea, China and India, they have not been able to accomplish any feats in marine 
technology, including deep seabed mining technology. This lack of political will and 
commitment on the part o f African states towards the development of marine 
technology generally, and that for deep seabed mining in particular, can perhaps be 
discerned in the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (AEC), which,
• C 7while making provisions on the promotion of science and technology, appears to 
focus more on the application o f science and technology to the development of 
agriculture, transport and communications, industry, health and hygiene, energy, 
education and manpower and the conservation of the environment, without 
specifically mentioning the need to use such science and technology for the 
development o f marine resources.58 While the areas mentioned are no doubt pressing 
areas in need o f technology application in the African continent, the failure to 
specifically mention marine resources appears to be symptomatic o f the short­
sightedness o f African states towards marine technology development. Although,
54 See, however, Watt, D.C, “An Integrated Marine Policy: A Meaningful Concept?” (1990) 14(4) 
Marine Policy, pp.299-304, where it was pointed out that there is no ideal organisational structure for 
the co-ordination o f  marine policy-making and that the priority to be given to the various aspects o f this 
policy was ultimately a matter o f  political choice.
55 This includes government bodies, university organisations and even NGOs such as Institut des 
Sciences de la Mer et de l ’Amenagement du littoral (Algeria); Institut National des Sciences et 
Technologies de la Mer (Tunisia); Nigerian Institute for Oceanography and Marine Research (Nigeria); 
The Marine Geoscience Unit (located at the University o f  Natal, Durban, South Africa) and Western 
Indian Ocean Marine Science Association {WIOMSA}(an NGO based in Zanzibar, Tanzania, 
dedicated to developing educational, scientific and technological development o f all aspects o f marine 
sciences in the Western Indian Ocean region consisting o f Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, 
South Africa, Comoros, Madagascar, Seychelles, Mauritius and Reunion).
56 Snoussi and Awosika, op.cit, p.214.
57 The OAU Heads o f  States signed the AEC Treaty in June 1991 at Abuja and the AEC has been in 
operation since May 1994. 30 ILM 1241 (1991). See Arts.51-53.
5 Art.51 (1) (b).
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there have been occasions where certain African states have indicated a desire to 
acquire deep seabed mining technology, it does not appear that significant steps have 
been taken by these states to actually acquire such technology. For instance, prior to 
the AEC treaty, at the First Meeting of the Group of Experts on the Law of the Sea of 
the States Members o f the Zone of Peace and Co-operation of the South Atlantic in 
Brazzaville, Congo in June 1990, attended by experts from 17 African states, the 
development o f the expertise and technology needed to exploit marine resources 
including seabed resources beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, was canvassed 
as one o f the priority areas for African states.59 More recently, the Nigerian 
representative to the 64th plenary meeting of the General Assembly appealed for 
assistance to developing states to acquire the necessary marine technology, including 
that which would enable them participate in activities in the Area.60 It is doubtful, in 
view of the deferment o f commercial exploitation of the Area, that the development of 
expertise and technology for exploitation in this regard is generally regarded by 
African states as a priority.
While it is easy to brush aside the need for African states to be involved in deep 
seabed mining in view of its capital and high technology intensive nature, the 
deferment of commercial exploitation and the pressing problems presently faced by 
the African continent, it is suggested from the experience of developing states like 
China, India and Korea, that some level of participation in this industry along with the 
R&D involved would be useful in promoting marine expertise and technology. It is 
proffered that such participation of African states in deep seabed mining activities 
would be best undertaken through strategic alliances and co-operative efforts.
6.3. Strategic Alliances and Co-operative Efforts.
As a result o f the phenomenal amount of capital and the expertise required not only 
for R&D towards acquiring the requisite technology, but also the actual participation 
in surveying, exploration and other deep seabed activities, any participation of
59 See the Report o f  the First Meeting o f the Group o f  Experts on the Law o f the Sea o f the States 
Members o f  the Zone o f  Peace and Co-operation o f  the South Atlantic, Brazzaville, Congo, 12-15 June 
1990, Op.cit.pl72.
60 General Assembly, Fifty-eighth session, Official Records, A/58/PV.64 o f 24 November, 2003, p.27.
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African states in deep seabed mining can only be practical and feasible through 
strategic alliances and co-operative efforts.61
Strategic alliances and co-operative efforts are within the contemplation of the LOSC, 
which has extensive provisions encouraging international co-operation in respect of 
marine issues generally62 and deep seabed mining in particular.63 The 1994 
Agreement also encourages co-operation by providing that “as a general rule, States 
Parties shall promote international technical and scientific co-operation with regard to 
activities in the Area either between the parties concerned or by developing training, 
technical assistance and scientific co-operation programmes in marine science and 
technology and the protection and preservation of the marine environment.”64 
However the declaration by the Agreement, that the mandatory transfer of technology 
provisions of the LOSC shall not apply, implies that any such co-operation is intended 
to be merely voluntary and non-obligatory.
Such alliances and co-operative efforts can range from African states just sharing with 
other entities engaged in seabed mining activities experiences, information and 
facilities, including research facilities and equipped ships, as well as human and 
financial resources, to a more formalised co-operation by way of partnership or a 
consortium. An example of the latter can be seen in Interoceanmetal Joint 
Organisation(IOM), a multinational entity controlled by Russia, Poland, Bulgaria, 
Slovakia, Czech Republic and the developing state of Cuba, which has been registered 
by the ISA as one o f the pioneer investors.65
61 For example in the case o f  biopolicy agenda Dr.Calestous Juma, a former executive secretary o f the 
United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, advocated strategic alliances in respect o f  
biodiversity by African states in his paper “Science, Technology and Economic Growth: Africa’s 
Biopolicy Agenda in the 21st Century” (edited by Baidu-Forson), delivered at UNU/INRA Annual 
Lectures 1999 at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in November 1999. See 
http://www.unu.edu/inra/pub/iuma/AL99.html [Accessed February 20 2004].
62 See, for example, LOSC, Art. 100 (co-operation to repress piracy on the high seas); Art. 118 (co­
operation in the conservation and management o f living resources o f the high seas); Arts. 197-201 (co­
operation on protection and preservation o f  the environment); Arts.242-244(co-operation on marine 
scientific research); Arts.270-274(co-operation on development and transfer o f technology).
63 See, for example, LOSC, Art. 143 (3) (co-operation in marine scientific research in the Area); Art. 144 
(2) (co-operation in promoting transfer o f  technology and scientific research relating to activities in the 
Area); Art. 150 (co-operation to ensure over-all development o f all countries, especially developing 
States, in carrying out activities in the Area).
64 Section 5(1) (c) o f  the Annex to the Agreement.
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This section seeks to examine possible strategic alliances and co-operative efforts, 
which African states may embark upon to ensure some measure of direct participation 
in deep seabed mining activities. In so doing the section seeks to pinpoint certain pros 
and cons of such alliances and co-operative efforts.
6.3.1. Intra-African Co-operation.
Attempts at co-operative action amongst African states are nothing new. With the 
attaining of independence by most African states in the 1960s, the establishment of 
the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) provided an avenue to encourage intra- 
African co-operation in different fields, including the scientific and technical 
domain.66 The OAU, as has been pointed out earlier in this thesis,67 played a 
significant role in mobilising African states to adopt a relatively united stand in 
respect of the law of the sea issues arising in UNCLOS III, including those touching 
on the Area.68 While the OAU played a significant role towards the evolution of the 
regime of the Area, it does not appear that it played any significant role towards 
ensuring the actual participation in deep seabed mining activities of African states. As 
a result, while all other geo-political regions, including the Latin American and 
Caribbean region (though this representation is only minimal through Cuba’s 
involvement in Interoceanmetal consortium), are represented in the pioneer investor 
scheme, Africa is not represented. 69 This is not to suggest that there was a lack of 
opportunity for this as the OAU had entered into a co-operation agreement on 4 
March 1992 with the the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee (AALCC) 
(now known as the African-Asian Legal Consultative Organisation-AALCO), a body 
that had done extensive work on cost effective ways to participate in deep seabed
■ • • • • 70mining activities.
65 See International Seabed Authority, Selected Decisions and Documents o f  the Fourth Session, 
ISA/99/01.E, (Jamaica, International Seabed Authority, 1999), pp.28-33.
66 2 ILM 766 (1963). See Art. II o f  the OAU Charter.
67 See section 2.1.4.1 o f  chapter 2 o f  this thesis.
68 See O.A.U Resolution on Problems o f  the Sea-Bed, Document CM/Res.238 (XVI), 1971 and Para.I 
of the 1974 Declaration o f  the Organisation o f  African Unity on the Issues o f the Law o f the Sea, Docu. 
A/CONF.62/33, UNCLOS III, Official Records, Vol.III, pp.63-65.
69 See section 5.2.3 o f  chapter 5 o f  this thesis.
70 See Alternative Cost-Effective Models for Pioneer Co-operation in Deep Sea-Bed Exploration, 
Technology Development, and Training, Joint Study by the International Ocean Institute (IOI) and the 
Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee (AALCC) 1989, op.cit. and Kwiatkowska, Ocean Affairs 
and the Law o f  the Sea in Africa,op.cit.p.29
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The OAU has since given way to the African Union (AU) .The treaty establishing the 
African Economic Community (AEC) and the constitutive Act of the African Union 
(AU) still provide a treaty basis for intra-African co-operation.71 The latter treaty 
enjoins the AU, as one o f its objectives, to promote research in all fields, especially 
science and technology, in order to advance the development of the Continent.72 The 
treaty establishing the AEC provides even more detailed provisions encouraging co­
operation among African states not only in the development of science and 
technology but also in respect o f mineral resources development.73 The treaty 
provisions, which are wide enough to cover co-operation in respect of natural 
resources in the Area, require member States to “co-ordinate and harmonize their 
policies and programmes in the fie ld  o f  energy and natural resources”.74 Furthermore 
there is the Convention o f the African Energy Commission (AFREC) adopted on 11 
July 2001 at Lusaka, Zambia, under the auspices of the then OAU and now the AU. 
This Convention establishes the AFREC75 to co-ordinate, amongst other things, the 
actions of African States in developing energy resources. The term “energy ” is 
defined under this treaty as “new and renewable or non-renewable resources o f  
energy in the natural state or processed, harnessed by humankind.”11 This definition 
is wide enough to cover methane (gas) hydrates, a resource located in the Area, which 
is believed to be an important energy source for the future.78 In addition, the AFREC 
Convention confers on the AFREC the function of assisting in “the development and
59 79utilization o f  new and renewable sources o f  energy,” therefore it is competent to
71 See 30 ILM 1241(1991) and http://w w w .african-union.org/homeAVelcome.htm [Accessed on 20 
May 2005] respectively.
72 Art.3 (m) o f the AEC Constitutive Act.
73 Arts.51-57. Under the AEC treaty certain specialised Committees including the Committee on 
Industry, Science and Technology, Energy, Natural Resources and the Environment are established to 
prepare, co-ordinate and harmonise, within their fields o f  competence, projects and programmes. See 
Art.7 (1) (g) and Art.25 (1) (d) and Art.26. See also Art.14 (1) (d) o f the African Union Constitutive 
Treaty.
74 Art.54 (1).
75 Art.2.
76 Art.4.
77 S .l o f the Convention o f  the African Energy Commission, http://www.africa- 
union.org/Official documents/Treaties %20Conventions %20Protocols/CONVENTIQN%20- 
%20AFREC.pdf r Accessed on 31 March 2004]. As at 30 July 2003 only 15 member States have 
signed, with Rwanda being the 15th signatory, and only two have ratified, Libya and Algeria.
http://www.africa-union.org/News-Events/Press Releases/Rwanda Julv%2030.htm [Accessed on 31
March 2004].
78 Borgese, E.M., “Caird Medal Address”, (2001) 25 Marine Policy, p.391 at 394 and Dr. William 
Dillion, “U.S. Geological Survey, Gas (Methane) Hydrates- A New Frontier,” 
http://marine.usga.gov/fact-sheets/gas-hvdrates/title.html [Accessed 25 August 2004].
79 Art.4 (m).
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engage in research in methane(gas) hydrates, a potential source of energy, for which a 
call has been made for the ISA to give its attention to.80
Steps have at various times been taken to encourage intra-African co-operation in 
respect of the development and utilisation of mineral resources, though the focus 
appears to be more related to mineral resources within the African Continent.81 Such 
initiatives include the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) 
sponsored Regional Conferences o f African Ministers Responsible for the 
Development and Utilisation o f Mineral and Energy Resources in Africa. These 
Conferences, which initially took off as an intergovernmental forum to promote only 
mineral development and utilisation, held in Arusha (1981), Lusaka (1985), Kampala 
(1988)82, Zaire [now Democratic Republic of Congo] (1990),83 were expanded to 
include energy resources and culminated in the Conference in Accra (1995) and the 
last session in Durban (1997).84 Thereafter a Committee on Natural Resources and 
Science and Technology (CNRST), established in April 1996, took over the functions 
of the Conference o f African Ministers Responsible for the Development and 
Utilisation of Mineral Resources and Energy. The CNRST, which meets on a biennial 
basis, is composed o f high level experts from a broad sector including government, 
academia, R&D institutions, private sector and NGOs and serves as a forum for the 
promotion of co-operation amongst African states in natural resources development
85 •and utilisation as well as science and technology. Beyond this attempt at continental
80 ISA, Press Release, SB/6/21 o f  5 July 2000. See section 1.3 o f chapter 1 o f this thesis.
81 See Traore, P. A., “The Challenge o f  Building an Effective Co-operation for the Sustainable 
Development o f  Natural Resources in Africa,” a presentation at the Alliance for Earth Sciences, 
Engineering and Development in Africa (AESEDA), Penn State University Symposium on 
Georesources Management: Human Capacity Development and Sustainable Livelihoods, October 13- 
14, 2003.
■http://www.africaalliance.psu.edu/svmposium/2 PLENARY PRESENTATIONS/KEYNOTE SESSI 
ON/Adama Traore.pdf [Accessed on 5 April 2004].
82 The prospect o f  such intra-African co-operation was broached at the Third Regional Minerals 
Conference at Kampala which encouraged the formation o f an African deep seabed-mining 
corporation. However, nothing came o f  this as no such corporation was ever formed. See 
Kwiatkowska, “Ocean Affairs and the Law o f  the Sea in Africa,” op.cit.p.29.
83 See Kwiatkowska, ibid. p .28.
84 See Traore, “The Challenge o f  Building an Effective Co-operation for the Sustainable Development 
of Natural Resources in Africa,” op.cit. and the Report o f  the Second Regional Conference o f African 
Ministers Responsible for the Development and Utilisation o f Mineral and Energy Resources, Durban, 
South Africa, 21-22 November 1997.
http://www.uneca.org/eca resources/Publications/RCID/old/97 Conf ministers mineral.htm 
[Accessed on 5 April 2004].
85 See http://www.uneca.org/cnrst/cnrst main.htm [Accessed on 5 April 2004]. The first and second 
CNRST were held in Addis Ababa in 1999 and 2001 respectively.
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co-operation in mineral resources development, there have also been sub-regional 
initiatives. In the 1970s and 1980s two subregional centres (in the South Eastern and 
Central part o f Africa) were established to encourage sub-regional co-operation in 
Africa in terms o f mineral resources development - the Southern and Eastern African 
Mineral Centre (SEAMIC) in 1977 and the Central African Mineral Resources 
Development Centre (CAMRDC) in 1981. The latter has since become defunct, 
though the former is still in operation.86 Sub-regional organisations such as the 
Economic Community o f West African States (ECOWAS), 87 the Common Market
DO
for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the South African Development 
Community (SADC)89 provide forums for the sub-regional member states to 
deliberate and co-operate on issues of science and technology, energy and natural 
resources development.
An obvious advantage o f such co-operative action by African states in a capital- 
intensive industry as deep seabed mining is the advantage of economies of scale 
arising from a pooling together o f resources, including finance and manpower.90 This 
would in turn diminish the pressure on scarce resources of individual states. Whether 
such co-operation is feasible can perhaps be determined, by way of analogy, through 
examining certain co-operative arrangements by African states in respect of offshore 
mining within national jurisdiction. Despite the various treaty provisions and forums 
providing a basis for such co-operation, there is, to the knowledge of the writer, no 
actual tangible multilateral co-operation by African states with regard to the 
exploitation o f natural resources in the seabed even within national jurisdiction. There 
is certainly no evidence of actual co-operation amongst African states in respect of 
participation in deep seabed mining. Several reasons have been suggested for the 
absence of effective co-operation in the African continent.91 Pierre Adama Traore, in 
examining the challenge o f building an effective co-operation for the sustainable
86 See http://www.seamic.org/ [Accessed on 5 April 2004]. See Traore, “The Challenge o f  Building an 
Effective Co-operation for the Sustainable Development o f  Natural Resources in Africa,” op.cit. pp.3-5
87 See Arts.27, 28 and 31 o f  the ECOWAS Treaty.http://www.ecowas.int./ [Accessed on 22 June 2004]
88 See Arts. 106-109 and 122 o f  the COMESA Treaty. 33 ILM (1994) 1067
89 Art.21 o f the SADC Treaty. 32 ILM (1993) 116
90 See the OAU Lagos Plan o f  Action for the Economic Development o f Africa, 1980-2000, paragraphs 
76-80 dealing with strategies for natural resources development,
http://'www.uneca.org/itca/ariportal/docs.htm [Accessed on 31 March 2004].
91 Traore, op.cit. and Mistry, P.S., “Africa’s Record o f Regional Co-operation and Integration”, (2000) 
99 African Affairs, p.553 at 556 -570.
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development of natural resources in Africa, identified a significant hindrance to such 
co-operation as the “political non-existence o f common goa ls”92 This hindrance can, 
perhaps, be attributable to African states’ failure to perceive an immediate common 
and mutual benefit for such multilateral co-operation. However, in a situation where 
there is such perception o f immediate and mutual benefit, as in the case of 
exploitation o f a mineral rich overlapping seabed within national jurisdiction, there 
are examples o f African states engaging in tangible bilateral and joint co-operation 
efforts, although it must be pointed out that such co-operation to some extent was 
forced on the parties concerned because of the inability to arrive at agreed boundary 
delimitation.93 An example o f such bilateral co-operation, in line with Article 83(3) 
of the LOSC, can be discerned in the treaty between the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
and the Democratic Republic o f Sao Tome and Principe on the Joint Development of 
Petroleum and other Resources, in respect of Areas of the Exclusive Economic Zone 
of the two states [hereafter called the Joint Development Treaty].94
Therefore for intra-African co-operation to be effective in the case of deep seabed 
mining there must be a perception by African states that there is some kind of 
immediate and common benefit in embarking on such co-operation. Presently, with 
the indefinite postponement o f commercial mining of the Area there appears to be 
generally apathy by African states to the whole issue of deep seabed mining. 
However, as has been argued elsewhere in this chapter that while there is no 
immediate benefit from actual seabed mining there can be certain beneficial common 
interests that can be fall outs from embarking on research and development in respect 
of the deep seabed.95
6.3.2. Africa-ISA Co-operation.
Under the original provisions o f the Convention the Enterprise, the mining organ of 
the ISA,96 was at liberty to enter into joint venture arrangements with eligible and
97willing entities in respect o f the reserved areas. In considering such joint ventures it 
was obliged to offer developing states and their nationals the opportunity for effective
92 Traore, op.cit.p.8.
93 Art.83 (1) and (3) o f  LOSC.
94 Entered into force on 21 February 2001. See DOALOS, Law o f  the Sea Bulletin, N o.50, pp.42-64.
95 See sections 6.1.2 and 6.2.2 above.
96 Art. 170 (1) and Art.l o f  Annex IV o f  LOSC.
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• 98participation. In the same vein the Convention encouraged joint arrangements in 
respect o f even non-reserved areas between contractors, the Enterprise and developing 
states or their nationals by making room in the rules, regulations and procedures on 
financial terms o f the contract for the contractors to receive some financial benefits 
for such joint undertakings." These attempts to encourage developing states’ 
participation, coupled with the extensive favourable terms in the original provisions in 
favour o f the Enterprise as regards compulsory transfer of technology,100 along with 
preferential financial terms, including contributions and debt guarantees from states 
parties, and interest free loans,101 would have provided a good chance for the effective 
participation by African states through such joint venture arrangements with the 
Enterprise. However, with the 1994 Agreement downgrading the Enterprise to an 
appendage of the Secretariat102 and removing certain provisions favourable to the
i mEnterprise as regards compulsory transfer of technology and favourable 
financing,104 the feasibility o f such co-operative action between African states and the 
Enterprise, especially as regards initial deep seabed mining operations, has become 
impractical. In order for the Enterprise to function independently, it must satisfy the 
Council that its joint venture operations accord with “sound commercial 
principles,”105 a requirement that appears to lessen the incentive for the Enterprise to 
embark on joint ventures with entities, including African states, with no deep seabed 
mining experience and technology. Further, in respect of reserved areas the 
Agreement gives the contributing contractor the right of first refusal to enter into a 
joint-venture arrangement with the Enterprise for exploration and exploitation of that 
area.106 The Agreement has substantially weakened the position of the Enterprise to 
embark on co-operative efforts on its own towards deep seabed mining with 
developing states, including African states. However, the Agreement has left 
untouched the provisions o f the LOSC that rules, regulations and procedures 
concerning financial terms o f contracts should take into consideration the need to
97 Art.9 (1) o f Annex III o f  LOSC.
98 Art.9 (2) o f  Annex III o f  LOSC.
99 Arts. 11 and 13(1) (d) o f  Annex III o f  LOSC.
100 Art.5 o f Annex III o f  LOSC.
101 Art. 11 o f Annex IV o f  LOSC.
102 Section 2 o f  the Annex to the Agreement. See section 4.1.3.1(IV) o f Chapter 4 o f the thesis.
103 Section 5(2) o f  the Annex to the Agreement.
104 Section 2, para.3 o f  the Annex to the Agreement.
105 Section 2, paras. 1 and 2 o f  the Annex to the Agreement.
106 Section 2 para. 5 o f  the Annex to the Agreement.
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provide uniform and non-discriminatory financial incentives to encourage contractors 
to undertake joint arrangements not only with the Enterprise, but with developing
I
states or their nationals. It is suggested that the ISA should put in place certain 
financial incentives that will encourage contractors to enter into joint arrangements 
with entities from states, including African states that presently lack the capability to
1 AO
participate in deep seabed mining activities.
It must also be pointed out that the LOSC requires the ISA and states parties to co­
operate in promoting the transfer o f technology and scientific knowledge relating to 
activities in the Area so that the Enterprise and all states parties may benefit.109 In 
particular the ISA is required to initiate and promote programmes for the transfer of 
technology to the Enterprise and developing states, including African states, on fair 
and reasonable terms and conditions. Also it is to take measures towards the 
advancement o f the technology o f the Enterprise and the domestic technology of 
developing states through providing opportunities for personnel of the Enterprise and 
developing states to be trained in marine science and technology to enable them 
participate fully in activities in the A rea.110 The Agreement, however, makes it clear 
that in the case o f transfer o f technology the obligation o f states parties to co-operate 
is limited. First, it must be shown that the Enterprise and such developing states are 
unable to obtain the technology on fair and reasonable commercial terms and 
conditions on the open market or through joint-venture arrangements. Second, such 
acquisition must be consistent with the effective protection of intellectual property 
rights.111 It is therefore doubtful if  developing states, including African states, would 
receive any tangible benefits from such co-operation since it leaves a lot of room for 
the owners of such technology to insist on the transfer being on a purely commercial 
basis only.
107 Art. 13 (1) (d) o f  Annex III to LOSC and Section 8, para.2 o f the Annex to the Agreement.
108 See Art. 160 (2) (k) o f  the LOSC that gives the Assembly the powers to consider problems o f a 
general nature militating against developing states’ participation in activities in the Area.
The ISA, which is presently engaged in considering the environmental implications o f deep seabed 
mining, is encouraging States to collaborate on research to consider the environmental implications on 
biodiversity in the Area. This collaboration is envisioned to occur through the Kaplan Fund Project. 
See Report o f the Secretary-General o f  the International Seabed Authority under article 166, paragraph 
4 o f the United Nations Convention on the Law o f  the Sea, ISBA/10/A/3 o f 31 March 2004 at pp.41- 
44.
110 Art. 144 o f  LOSC and Reg.27 o f  the Mining Code.
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6.3.3. Africa-Developing Seabed Mining States (South-South) Co-operation.
The possibility o f south-south collaborative initiatives between African states and 
developing seabed mining states has considerable potential as a result of such forums 
as the Group o f 77, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Asian African Legal
Consultative Organisation (AALCO) where they regularly interact and adopt common
112 •fronts on diverse issues. Shyam, while advocating collaboration between India and 
other developing countries as a feasible option in respect of Indian seabed mining
i i o
activities, suggests the following as a hindrance:
"... winning the confidence o f  decision-makers to accept the idea o f  a 
South-South collaborative venture. North-South collaborative ventures in 
which the developing countries provide the land and the low-cost labor 
have become so much a part o f  the landscape that it requires considerable 
adjustment to think o f  other possibilities. ”
He, however, rightly identifies the key to the workability of such co-operation as "... 
a political willingness to explore opportunities fo r  South-South collaboration and to 
exploit economic complementarity... ” 114
The desire for such south-south co-operation has been expressed, at least on paper, in 
various forums.115 However, there is still a tremendous “gap between the set
111 Section 5(1) (a) and (b) o f  the Annex to the Agreement.
112 Non-Aligned Movement (NAM ) consists o f  131 states, including several African states and India, a 
deep seabed mining. China, another deep seabed mining state, is an observer state in the NAM. 
http://www.nam.gov.za/ . Group o f  77, the largest third world coalition in the United Nations, consists 
o f 132 states, including African states and China as well as India, http://www.g77.org/ While the 
AALCO consists o f  47 states, including African states and China, India and South Korea. 
http://www.aalco.org/ [All websites were accessed on 22 April 2005].
113 Shyam, op.cit. pp.345-346.
114 Ibid.p.346
115 See, for example, the Tehran Consensus - South-South Co-operation: a common imperative adopted 
on 22 August 2001 at the Tenth Meeting o f  the Intergovernmental Follow-up and Co-ordination 
Committee on Economic Co-operation among Developing Countries o f  the G-77, attached to the Letter 
dated 7 September 2001 from the Ambassador o f  Iran to the United Nations and addressed to the 
Secretary-General, General Assem bly Doc. A/56/358 o f  14 September 2001 and Ministerial 
Declaration adopted at the Twenty-sixth Meeting o f  the Ministers for Foreign Affairs o f the G-77, held 
at the United Nations Headquarters in N ew  York on 19 September 2002 attached to the Letter dated 23 
September 2002 from the Permanent Representative o f  Venezuela to the United Nations addressed to 
the Secretary-General, General Assem bly Doc. A/57/444 o f  8 October 2002 and the G-77 Marrakech 
Declaration on South-South Co-operation 2003 http://www.g77.org/marrakech/Marrakech- 
Declaration.htm [Accessed on 6 April 2004]. See also Ohiorhenuan, J.F.E., and Rath A., “The History 
and Urgency o f South-South Co-operation in Science and Technology”; Hassan, M.H.A., “Challenges, 
Opportunities and Strategies: South-South Co-operation in Science and Technology in the 21st
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objectives and agreed actions and the actual implementation. ”116 The success of any 
co-operative efforts amongst states, including south-south co-operation would depend 
on the political will o f the states involved. Such political will would usually be 
stimulated, as a result o f the strong national interest content of international relations, 
when co-operative arrangements are not one-sided but rather of mutual benefit to the 
parties. It is opined that any co-operative arrangement between developing seabed 
mining states and African states could be strengthened through a quid pro quo 
arrangement. It is suggested that this can be achieved by the developing deep seabed 
mining states providing the training, access to requisite technology and the 
wherewithal for African states to actually participate in deep seabed mining activities, 
while the African states would in turn open up their domestic mining industry for 
participation by deep seabed mining developing states in the development and 
utilisation of the vast untapped natural resources available within the continent. The 
opening up o f African domestic mining industries to such developing deep seabed 
mining states would also serve as an avenue to create a more competitive environment 
in this industry, presently dominated by the industrialised states-based TNCs, thereby 
providing a basis for African states to wrest some concessions in respect of transfer of 
the necessary technology from the latter. The possibility of the developing deep 
seabed mining states entering into such co-operation with African states can be 
discerned in a recent situation whereby the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 
(NNPC), the Nigerian state oil corporation, has entered into a service contract 
agreement with China’s state oil firm (SINOPEC) for the development of two shallow 
water oil fields along with the Nigerian Petroleum Development Company (NPDC), a 
subsidiary company o f NNPC.117 This is in line with the Beijing Declaration and 
Programme for China-Africa Co-operation in Economic and Social Development 
issued at the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation, a Ministerial Conference held in 
Beijing, China from 10 to 12 October 2000 between ministers from China and 44 
African states.118 Paragraphs 12 and 13 o f the Beijing Programme for China-Africa 
Co-operation in Economic and Social Development call for co-operation in the
Century” and Parthasarathi, A., “India’s Experience with TCDC”, (2000) 1 Co-operation South 
Journal, pp.6-28, 29-42 and 108-112 respectively.
116 See Tehran Consensus, Ibid.
117 Oduniyi, M., “NNPC, Chinese Firm sign Contract on 2 Oil Blocs: Targets 80,000 bdp crude 
output,” This Day Newspaper (Nigerian Newspaper), April 14, 2004. 
http://www.thisdavonline.eom/news/20040414news06.html [Accessed on 14 April 2004].
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mining of natural resources and science and technology, which by interpretation could 
be inclusive o f deep seabed mining and the requisite technology. There is also 
indication o f this since COMRA, as a pioneer investor, under its obligation to train 
has actually trained personnel from two African states, Algeria and Sudan.119 Though 
this is a good start, more can still be done not only under its training obligation as a 
pioneer investor but also under the general China-Africa Co-operation.
In the case of South Korea, Dr. Jung-Keuk Kang of the Korea Ocean Research and 
Development Institute (KORDI), as far back as 1989, had advocated for Korea to co­
operate not only with states with much experience in deep seabed mining but also 
states with a poor experience having a keen interest in engaging in the deep seabed 
mining industry.120 However, there is no indication if  this is actually the official 
position of the South Korean government, neither is there a broad-based co-operative 
forum between South Korea and Africa similar to the China-Africa forum that could 
provide a framework for such co-operation in deep seabed mining.
An international organisational framework pointing to the possibility of such south- 
south co-operation in relation to deep seabed mining is the Organisation for Indian 
Ocean Marine Affairs Co-operation (IOMAC) established by a multilateral 
Agreement entered into at Arusha, the United Republic of Tanzania on 7 September 
1990.121 This intergovernmental regional organisation can be traced to the initiative of 
Sri Lanka at the 1981 22nd Session o f the Asian-African Consultative Committee 
(AALCC) held in Colombo, requesting the Committee to embark on a study of 
economic, scientific and technical co-operation in the use of the Indian Ocean. This 
initiative led to the convening o f the First Conference on Economic, Scientific and 
Technical Co-operation in the Indian Ocean in Marine Affairs (IOMAC-I) in July 
1985 at Colombo and a host o f other meetings, which culminated in the signing of the
118 http://www.chinese-embassv.org.za/eng/c4252.html [Accessed on 23 April 2004]. The Second 
China -  African Forum was held in Ethiopia from 15 to 16 December 2003.
119 Zou, K.., “China’s Efforts in Deep Sea-Bed Mining: Law and Practice”, (2003) 18(4) International 
Journal o f  Marine and Coastal Law , p.481 at 493.
120 See Dr. Jung-Keuk Kang statement at the symposium on Deep Ocean Mining, organised by 
KORDI, December 14 to 16,1989, quoted in “Alternative Cost-Effective Models for Pioneer Co­
operation in Deep Sea-Bed Exploration, Technology Development, and Training,” Joint Study by the 
International Ocean Institute (IOI) and the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee (AALCC)
1989,op.cit. p.565.
121 See http://sedac.ciesin.org/entri/texts/acrc/lndianO.txt.html [Accessed on 14 April 2004] and (1991) 
6(2), International Journal o f  Estuarine and Coastal Law, pp. 133-144.
305
treaty establishing IOMAC.122 This Organisation has its membership open to any 
coastal or hinterland state of the Indian Ocean.123 Membership includes certain 
East/South African landlocked and coastal states. 124 It is intended to provide a forum 
for a rather broad spectrum of co-operation not only amongst member states but also 
between them and other states, including, though not limited, to developing states, in 
various marine affairs in the Indian Ocean, including marine science, ocean services, 
marine technology and non-living resources.125 The non-living resources in the Indian 
Ocean include not only those within national jurisdiction, but also those located in the 
Area where India has been allocated a site as a pioneer investor. As far back as 1988 
at the First Meeting o f the IOMAC Technical Group on Offshore Prospecting for 
Mineral Resources in the Indian Ocean held in Karachi, Pakistan from 11-14 July 
1988, there was indication that the co-operative effort desired by IOMAC on the 
exploration o f non-living resources was not limited to national jurisdiction but 
extended also to the Area.126 India, the only pioneer investor with a mining site in the 
Indian Ocean, is not from the evidence available to the writer as at the time of writing 
this thesis, a member o f IOMAC. However, IOMAC member states, including certain 
Africa states, can seek co-operation with India on deep seabed mining since the 
IOMAC Agreement encourages co-operation between the members and non-member 
major maritime users (MMUs) such as India.127 In September 1990 at Arusha, 
Tanzania, the Second Conference on Economic, Scientific and Technical Co­
operation in the Indian Ocean in Marine Affairs (IOMAC II) Resolution, adopting the
122 For more on IOMAC see Indian Ocean Marine Affairs Co-operation Conference (IOMAC) in 
NILOS, International Organizations and the Law o f  the Sea, Documentary Yearbook Vol. 3,
1987,(London/Dordrecht/Boston, Graham &Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, 1989), pp.714-788 and 
Kwiatkowska,B., “Institutional Marine Affairs Co-operation in Developing State Regions, Part 2: The 
Indian Ocean and IOMAC”, (1990) 14(5) M arine Policy,pp.378-462.
123 Art.5 o f  the Agreement. This article in itself leaves room for membership o f  Australia, a developed 
state which is a coastal state o f  the Indian Ocean.
124 As at 1991 the IOMAC Agreement had been signed by nine states (Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Tanzania) and ratified by only five o f these 
states (Indonesia, Mauritius, Mozambique, Pakistan and Sri Lanka). See Low, L., “A Comparative 
Evaluation and Prognosis o f  Asia Pacific Bilateral and Regional Trade Arrangements,” (2004)18(1) 
Asian-Pacific Economic Literature,p.l at 3 and Jayewardene, H.W., “The Indian Ocean Marine Affairs 
Co-operation(IOMAC),” Report o f  Pacem in Maribus XIX held in Lisbon, Portugal on 18-20 
November 1991 http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uul5oe/uul5oe0n.htm [Accessed on 14 
April 2004].
12 See Arts. 3 and 4.
126 See Report o f the First Meeting o f  the IOMAC Technical Group on Offshore Prospecting for 
Mineral Resources in the Indian Ocean, Karachi, Pakistan, 11-14 July 1988 in NILOS, International 
Organizations and the Law o f  the Sea, Vol.4, 1988, (London/Dordrecht/Boston, Graham 
&Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, 1990), pp.625-636. At the meeting certain papers presented related to 
mining o f polymetallic nodules.
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constituent Agreement, emphasised that it was desirable for even non-member states 
active in the Indian Ocean, which are not coastal states and hinterland states of the 
Indian Ocean, to participate in the activities of the Organisation “fo r  the purposes o f  
ensuring the widest possible international co-operation. ” 128 India has since 
participated in the activities of IOMAC.129 Barbara Kwiatkowska, as far back as 
1990, was of the opinion that with India’s pioneer site being located in the Indian 
Ocean, the Indian Ocean states should look towards collaborative efforts with India in 
respect o f dissemination of knowledge and transfer of deep seabed mining
1 mtechnology. The limited number of member states of IOMAC, both African and 
Asian, a region consisting of about 38 coastal States and 12 landlocked States,131 
including the non-membership o f India, the only seabed mining State on the coast of 
the Indian Ocean, may be indicative o f a preference for an informal and non-legally 
binding framework o f co-operation that would encourage collaborative efforts in 
respect of developing the natural resources of the Indian Ocean, including those in the 
Area.
6.3.4. Africa-Developed Seabed Mining States (North-South) Co-operation.
With the bulk of the technology needed for deep seabed mining residing with the 
western industrialised states and their consortia, it could be profitable for African 
states to also explore the possibility o f co-operation with such states and their entities. 
The initial attempt spearheaded by developing states, including African states, to have 
a north-/south co-operation, based on the mandatory requirement of transfer of 
technology under the LOSC, was jettisoned by the 1994 Agreement, an Agreement at 
the behest of the developed industrial states. The present regime provides a voluntary 
basis for such co-operation. There is evidence of such co-operation between 
developing states, especially seabed mining states, and developed industrial states. 
For example, there are the co-operative efforts between India and Norwegian, as well 
as Finnish, companies in the development o f deep seabed mining technology.132 Also 
there is the ongoing joint collaborative effort between India and the Institut for
127 Art.3.
128 Jayewardene, H.W., “The Indian Ocean Marine Affairs Co-operation (IOMAC),” op.cit.
129 Ibid.
130 Kwiatkowska, “Institutional Marine Affairs Co-operation in Developing State Regions, Part 2: The 
Indian Ocean and IOMAC”, op.cit.p.410.
131 ibid.p.400.
307
Konstruktion (IKS), University of Siegen, Germany for the development of a mining 
system capable of operating at 6000 metres depth with a mining capacity of 25,000
1-3 0  ,
tonnes of nodules per year. This north-south co-operation on deep seabed mining is 
probably explicable on the grounds that it is mutually beneficial since India is a 
pioneer investor, actually involved in seabed mining activities. There is no evidence, 
to the knowledge of the writer, of such co-operation between non-seabed mining 
developing states, especially African states, and developed states. However, there 
exist some co-operative north/south frameworks, such as the African, Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) states and the European Community (EC) arrangement encompassing 
78 ACP states, including 48 African states.134 The earlier Lome IV Convention 
between ACP states and the EC appears to have provided a framework for such co­
operation since it covered exploitation of “all types o f  mineral resources in a way 
which ensures the profitability o f  mining operations in both export and local markets
,,135 .
while meeting environmental concerns. ’ However, m a subsequent provision of 
this Convention such co-operation appears to be limited to only onshore and 
continental shelf mining, and therefore seems to exclude deep seabed mining.136 The 
present Cotonou Agreement appears to diminish the emphasis on co-operation in 
respect o f mineral exploitation since, unlike some of the previous ACP-EEC 
Agreements, it does not devote a whole section to such co-operation. However in 
Article 23, dealing with economic development, it advocates co-operation to support 
sustainable policy, institutional reforms and investments including the “development 
o f  competitive industrial, mining and energy sectors, while encouraging private sector 
involvement and development. ”137 It is doubtful whether deep seabed mining would 
presently fall under the category o f “competitive mining”, since commercial 
exploitation is not likely in the near future. Therefore it is unlikely that African states
132 The Indian Department o f  Ocean Development Annual Report 2002-03, http://dod.nic.in/avr02- 
03/ami2002-03 .pdf [Accessed on 27 April 2004].
133 Ibid.
134 Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African 
Republic, Chad, the Comoros, Congo (Brazzaville), Cote d’ Ivoire, Democratic Republic o f  the Congo, 
Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Gabon, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, 
Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Madagascar, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, the Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia,
South Africa (not fully), Sudan, Swaziland,Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. See 
http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/rl2100.htm [Accessed on 14 May 2004]. There have been 7 
such Agreements including the present Cotonou Agreement.
135 Art.99. See 29 I.L.M.783 (1990).
136 Art. 101.
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can presently rely upon this Agreement to seek co-operative arrangements with EC 
states in respect o f deep seabed mining. Such co-operation between African states and 
developed seabed mining states, including EC states (France, Czech Republic, Poland 
and Slovakia presently are the only EC states that are involved in entities which are 
registered pioneer investors) may however be sought under the provisions of Part XI 
and the 1994 Agreement which encourage such co-operation.138
There are examples o f such north-south co-operation in other capital and technology 
intensive high-risk sectors, such as the peaceful uses of outer space. For example, 
there was co-operation between the Algerian Centre National des Techniques 
Spatiales (CNTS) and the Surrey Space Centre in the United Kingdom for the design 
and construction o f an enhanced microsatellite, AlSat-1, which was launched on 28 
November 2002.139 Similarly, there was collaboration between the Nigerian Centre of 
Satellite Technology and the same Surrey Space Centre to fabricate and launch 
Nigeria’s first orbital satellite, called NigeriaSat-1, which was launched on 27 
September 2003.140
6.4. Con elusion.
The limitations on African states’ ability to participate in deep seabed mining as a 
result o f a lack o f finance and technology are rather glaring. Understandably, there are 
other pressing social problems presently confronting the African continent, such as 
poverty alleviation, the fight against the AIDS pandemic and the provision of basic 
amenities. This, coupled with the fact that commercial exploitation of the deep seabed 
is not imminent, makes participation in deep seabed mining activities unattractive to 
African states. However, this chapter, while recognising and noting that the pressing 
social problems should and must be given priority attention by the governments of 
African states, makes a case for some level of participation in deep seabed mining 
activities. The chapter argues that though commercial exploitation is not imminent, it
137 Art.23 (f). See httD.7/europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/cotonou/agreement en.htm [Accessed 
on 14 May 2004].
138 See notes 62 and 63 above.
139 See United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, 
http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/natact/2002/algeria.html and also AlSat 1 
http://www.skvrocket.de/space/doc sdat/alsat-1 .htm [Accessed on 6 May 2004].
140 See Nigeriafirst-Official Website o f  the Office o f  Public Communications, the Presidency, State 
House Abuja http://www.nigeriafirst.org/article 1994.shtml and Surrey Space Centre Website 
http://www.ee.surrev.ac.Uk/ssc/G 1/PI/ [Accessed on 14 May 2004].
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would be prudent for African states to have some level of participation in such mining 
activities as a long-sighted policy for effective positioning in the eventuality of 
commercial exploitation. Also, since deep seabed technology cannot be developed in 
isolation from other marine technology, it is argued that such participation would help 
in acquiring the know-how of offshore mining technology, which would come in 
handy in a continent where several African coastal states, including those with an 
outer continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, have valuable offshore resources. It 
would also contribute in general to marine technology capacity building.
As a way to overcome the hindrances of a lack of technology and finance the chapter 
suggests co-operation o f African states amongst themselves, but also involving a 
reaching out to other states already engaged in deep seabed mining activities. In view 
of the capital- intensive nature o f deep seabed mining, it is advocated that African 
states should not embark upon this individually, but rather as a bloc, in alliance with 
entities with the capacity and technology for such mining activities. Further, the 
chapter suggests possible strategic alliances and co-operation that African states could 
embark upon to achieve some level o f participation in deep seabed mining activities, 
some of which appear to be more feasible than others. All in all, it does appear that 
the non-participation o f African states, despite the rather daunting requirements of 
finance and technology, should be attributed primarily to a lack of interest rather than 
strictly speaking a lack o f finance and technology. For as long as it was thought that 
commercial exploitation was imminent, African states appear to have shown interest 
in participating in seabed mining activities. However, with the indefinite 
postponement o f commercial exploitation to the distant future, such interest appears to 
have evaporated. This contention can be deduced from the fact that certain African 
states, namely Algeria and Nigeria, in strategic alliances, are already engaged in 
similar capital and technological intensive activity as the launching of satellites into 
space. The lack o f interest in deep seabed mining activities but positive interest in 
outer space activities can be attributed to the simple reason that these states believe 
that deep seabed mining has no immediate tangible benefits unlike space activities. 
Nigeria, in seeking to justify its national space policy, has this to say:141
141 See Nigeriafirst-Official Website o f  the Office o f  Public Communications, the Presidency, State 
House Abuja at note 125.
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“...Nigeria desired the technological know-how to become a space 
services provider and an active participant in space-related activities. 
This desire was borne out o f  the need to manage its landmass and the 
environmental challenges it poses to the country’s social and economic 
development. With an area that covers 924,000 square kilometers and a 
wide range o f  agro-ecological zones...the country is richly endowed and 
is classified as having abundant natural resources. At the same time, she 
increasingly faces the challenges o f  growing environmental degradation, 
desertification, soil erosion as well as loss o f  biodiversity. Nigeria 
therefore needed urgent geological information to face and surmount 
these challenges, enhance decision-making and grow its economy. Thus, 
acquiring space technology became a necessity, in order to master, 
develop and use its products to address the diverse socio-economic 
challenges. ”
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CHAPTER SEVEN.
GENERAL CONCLUSION
7.1. Summary o f Chapters.
The main objective of this thesis has been to examine the contribution African states have 
made to the evolution and development of the deep seabed regime. The thesis is divided 
into six substantive chapters. The first chapter discusses what part of the seabed 
constitutes the Area. The proper delimitation of the outer limit of the continental shelf is a 
sine qua non to a proper determination of what part of the seabed constitutes the Area. 
This chapter therefore examines the practice of African states in determining the outer 
limits of their continental shelf. It has been discovered that only a few of these states have 
deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations the charts and relevant 
information indicating the outer limits of the continental shelf as required by the LOSC. 
This scrutiny also reveals that some African states possess the potential of extending their 
continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. So far none of the broad-margin African 
states have made submissions to the CLCS, as required by the LOSC, though it must be 
pointed out that these states are still very much within the ten-year limit to make such 
submissions. However, it must also be pointed out that the complexity of the provisions 
of Article 76 on submission in respect of the extended continental shelf and the 
technology required to prepare such submissions, would make it difficult for African 
broad-margin states, most of which have a low technology capacity, to achieve 
compliance within the ten-year limit. Fortunately, certain support systems, including a 
voluntary trust fund intended to provide assistance towards the training of personnel from 
developing states, including African states, have been put in place. This, along with the 
provisions of the LOSC which give the CLCS the additional function of providing 
scientific and technical advice to coastal states, if they so request, should greatly assist 
such broad-margin African states in complying with the obligation to make submissions 
to the CLCS. There is already growing evidence that suggests that a few of the broad- 
margin African states, most of which are not due to make submissions before May 2009, 
are already taking steps to prepare their submissions. However, it remains to be seen 
whether these states will be able to meet the ten-year deadline for submissions. The
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chapter further examines certain domestic legislation of African states on the outer limit 
of the continental shelf and discovers some divergence between the laws of these states 
and the provisions of the LOSC. While a number are, to a large extent, in line with the 
LOSC provisions, a handful of African states, though parties to the LOSC, still retain 
legislation that apply the rather vague criteria of depth/exploitability in the 1958 
Continental Shelf Convention. Ultimately, for a clear demarcation of the Area to be 
achieved, African states along with other coastal states, would have to comply with the 
LOSC provisions on deposit of charts and relevant information of the outer limits of the 
continental shelf, with broad-margin states making such deposit in line with the 
recommendations of the CLCS. Equally, African states that are parties to LOSC and 
which have not yet adjusted their domestic legislation to reflect the Article 76 of LOSC 
definition of the continental shelf should be encouraged to do so.
The second chapter examines the historical evolution of this regime. Historically, the 
input of African states to this regime was considerable. They rallied behind the call by 
Arvid Pardo that the seabed beyond national jurisdiction (the Area) and the resources 
therein be declared as the common heritage of mankind. This can be attributed to a 
number of reasons, including, the fact that communal ownership of property is a familiar 
concept under African traditional property law. Moreover, the common colonial 
experience of African states arising out of the scramble and partition of the African 
continent by developed western powers raised a common determination by African states 
to oppose any such similar scramble and partition of the Area. Besides, the development 
of a new regime to govern the Area gave these states an opportunity to call for a 
comprehensive review of the traditional law of the sea that evolved without their input. 
The call for a regime for the Area evolved into the comprehensive and rather lengthy 
third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), where the vast 
majority of African states were for the first time able to be a part of the fashioning of a 
“modern law o f the sea ”, including the emergence of the regime of the Area. African 
states under the auspices of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), together with other 
developing states’ forums such as the Group of 77, were able to project a relatively united 
front on issues relating to the regime of the Area. This can be attributed to the fact that
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African states, most of which at that stage were (and are still) in a state of 
underdevelopment, erroneously assumed that there were immense natural resources in the 
Area that could provide immediate and alternative sources of income towards the 
continent’s development. Further, the whole issue raised by the regime, in the view of 
African states, provided another forum in which to address what were perceived as 
growing economic inequalities between industrialised western states and developing 
states. While initially this confrontation had a paramount economic aspect, when it was 
thought that the Area had immense natural resources and commercial seabed mining was 
imminent, it was also political, since African states, along with other developing states, 
wanted to exercise control over the regime and its institutions. African states, like other 
developing states, took the position that it was a fight for global equity in an international 
community made up of rules and regulations, which leaned more in favour of developed 
industrialised economies. Notwithstanding, certain concessions made to developed states 
under the package deal during the UNCLOS III, the regime of the Area carved out under 
the original Part XI of LOSC, appeared to lean, in many regards, in favour of developing 
states, including African states. This was primarily due to the strong input of developing 
states during the negotiation process. However, this was short-lived as certain 
industrialised developed states refused to ratify the LOSC due to concerns about the 
original Part XI provisions. As a result, the United Nations Secretary-General from 1990 
to 1994 embarked on consultations to address the concerns of these developed 
industrialised states, which culminated in the formulation of the 1994 New York 
Agreement. With the exception of the United States of America, virtually all the 
industrialised states that initially declined to ratify have since become parties to the 
LOSC and the Agreement. Despite the fundamental changes introduced by the 
Agreement to the regime under Part XI, an appreciable number of African states have 
become parties to the LOSC and the Agreement.
The third chapter examines the changes introduced to the regime of the Area by the 1994 
Agreement. Although the Agreement modified certain aspects of the Part XI regime, it 
still retained certain provisions of the LOSC championed by African states, including 
those dealing with the legal status of the Area as the common heritage of mankind. Yet,
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the practical effect of the changes introduced by the Agreement has been to water down 
the impact of the large part of the retained provisions vis-a-vis African states and other 
developing states. For example, the Agreement modified provisions championed by 
African states during UNCLOS III such as the mandatory transfer of technology, 
production limitation, compensation fund, a preferential role for the Enterprise and a 
more democratically based institutional framework. Yet as earlier stated, a number of 
African states have accepted these changes and become parties to the Agreement. The 
chapter then examines certain factors that could have influenced such acceptance, namely 
the lack of finance and technology on the part of these states to go it alone; the recent 
inclination by most African states to adopt domestically the free market principles, as 
opposed to a regulated type economy depicted in the original Part XI provisions, due to 
the strong influence of multilateral agencies such as the IMF and the World Bank; and 
also the collapse of the former USSR, which effectively eroded African states’ basis, 
arising from the Cold War, of achieving favourable concessions. The chapter argues that 
though most African states have accepted the Agreement, which is founded on free 
market principles, it is imperative that in its application special consideration be given to 
the peculiar disadvantaged position of African states in participating in deep seabed 
mining activities, since even in a typical free-market developed domestic economy, 
unequal parties cannot be treated alike. All free-market developed economies clearly 
recognise that certain disadvantaged members of society require special concessions, 
based on clear-cut guidelines, to enable them enjoy the benefits of a free market 
economy. There is no reason why similar concessions should not exist in the international 
society for African states in the deep seabed regime, as modified by the Agreement.
Chapter four examines the institutional framework of the regime vis-a-vis African states. 
While the original Part XI provisions, in some regards, sought to create a democratic 
institutional framework, it has been modified by the 1994 Agreement. For instance, the 
plenary body (the Assembly) where African states, along with other developing states, 
have numerical strength has had its powers diminished by the Agreement which requires 
it to act along with the Council. The composition and decision-making procedures of the 
non-plenary bodies have effectively strengthened the position of the developed
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industrialised states, which provide the bulk of the finance, thereby curtailing any move 
by developing states, including African states, to control these institutions as a result of 
their numerical strength. However, an examination of the composition of the institutions, 
except the Finance Committee, reveals that the African group vis-a-vis other regional 
groupings is relatively well represented, though current attendance at the meetings of the 
organs of the ISA by members from African states has not been very impressive. The 
reduced representation at these meetings has been attributed to the financial inability of 
these states to sponsor regular and consistent attendance. It has also been suggested that 
due to the indefinite postponement of commercial exploitation in the regime, there is 
currently no economic incentive for these states to attend ISA meetings.
Chapter five proceeds to examine mining of the Area in relation to African states. While, 
strictly speaking, the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles is not part of the regime 
of the Area, due to the special distributive role of the ISA in line with the principle of the 
common heritage of mankind under Article 82, this chapter still examines the system of 
mining in this part of the continental shelf. In light of the present experience, it is 
expected that broad-margin African states, in the eventuality of exploitation of this part of 
the continental shelf, would do so through TNCs working in tandem with these states 
through various contractual arrangements. In this situation the issue arises as to whether 
African states, not exempt from making the percentage payments or contributions with 
respect to production in the extended continental shelf, are to make such on the totality of 
the production or whether they can exclude the allocation going to the TNCs under the 
contractual arrangement as part of the “resources used in connection with exploitation. ” 
In the Area proper, where the compromise parallel system of exploitation applies, though 
in theory African states parties to LOSC have access to participate in mining activities, 
the reality on ground as a result of the twin requirements of sophisticated technology and 
substantial finance makes it difficult for African states to participate in deep seabed 
activities. A perusal of the list of registered pioneer investors reveals no iota of 
representation of the African regional grouping, despite the concessions to developing 
states under Resolution II of the Final Act of the UNCLOS III. The possibility of African 
states participating indirectly, through TNCs, is examined but discountenanced since the
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resources are located in “no man’s land”, the bulk of the commercially viable fields of 
which are located in the Pacific Ocean, a considerable distance from the African 
continent, as well as the general unstable economic and political conditions in the 
continent would not likely encourage such investments. The regulations dealing with 
polymetallic nodules that have been adopted, and those for polymetallic sulphides and 
cobalt crusts currently being formulated, as mere elaborating instruments of the LOSC 
and the Agreement, do not generally enhance the possibility of participation by African 
states but rather tend to confirm the remoteness of such participation. Chapter six, while 
looking at the limitations in terms of finance and technology to African states’ 
participation in deep seabed mining activities, however points out certain possible co­
operative framework that could enhance the ability of African states to participate in such 
activities. However, it is suggested that these co-operative frameworks, some of which 
are more feasible than others, would only be practical if there was an active interest in 
deep seabed mining on the part of African states, an interest that presently appears to be 
lacking because of the perception that such mining activities have no immediate 
economic benefit. This point is emphasised by fact that in another equally capital and 
technology intensive activity, the launching of satellites to space, certain African states 
have through co-operative efforts achieved some level of participation because of the 
perception that it would yield certain immediate benefits.
7.2. Appraisal
A study of the evolution and development of the regime of the Area reveals that African 
states contributed greatly to the emergence of the legal regime of the Area, including the 
central principle that the Area and the mineral resources therein are the common heritage 
of mankind. After the momentous speech of Arvid Pardo, African states, working closely 
with other developing states, rallied behind the declaration of the Area and its resources 
as the common heritage of mankind, mainly perhaps for the self-interested reason, acting 
on the erroneous perception of the imminence of commercial exploitation , that it would 
provide a source of “free” money for development, as a result of the distributive aspect of 
the principle that gave a preference to developing states, including African states. 
Further, the formulation of the regime in the UNCLOS III provided an avenue for
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African states to seek to put their “stamp o f influence” on the international law of the sea, 
by being part of the introduction of a regime that was not in existence under the 
traditional law of the sea that had evolved without their input. Largely, the position of 
African states on this regime could be said to be a “power-show” to confront the status 
quo and to seek to water down what appeared to be the overbearing domination of 
western industrialised states in the law of the sea.
In addition, it is suggested that the position of African states on certain issues in respect 
of the regime could be attributed to certain implicit cultural influences. For instance, as 
pointed out in chapter two of this thesis, the idea of the Area and its resources being the 
common heritage of mankind, with its rather communal inclination, has significant 
similarity to the communal ownership of property by a village, community or family 
under native law and custom in some African states’ domestic setting. This, it is further 
suggested, has led these states to impute not just joint management, but also joint 
ownership of the Area and its resources under the principle of the common heritage of 
mankind. Also, the original position of African states on the mandatory transfer of 
technology, as pointed out in chapter three of the thesis, arguably, could be said to be 
influenced by the traditional African outlook that any innovative work should not be 
credited to a single inventor, but rather the community as a whole. These African 
perceptions are antithetical to the western industrialised states’ position of a more 
individualistic ownership of land and technology. In some regards, it is suggested that the 
positions of African states and the western industrialised states in the UNCLOS III, 
leading to the Part XI provisions, and the informal consultations culminating in the 1994 
Agreement, represent a clash o f cultures: communal cultural outlook versus a more 
individualistic one. The 1994 Agreement, while retaining the common heritage of 
mankind, apparently endorsing a communal approach to the regime of the deep seabed, in 
having as its core principle the free market philosophy and endorsing the intellectual 
property rights of individual innovators over the community, appears to adopt a more 
individualised approach as compared to the original Part XI provisions.
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The role of African states at the UNCLOS III in respect of the regime reveals a high 
degree of influence, especially with an African, Bamela Engo, heading the First 
Committee that had the responsibility of looking into the issues on the deep seabed 
beyond national jurisdiction. The long negotiations of UNCLOS III disclosed a very 
active role on the part of African states, though in many regards they appeared to have 
wavered, obviously in the whole spirit of compromise, on their original position in 
respect of certain critical issues arising from this regime. For instance, though the original 
position of African states was for a much larger Area to be achieved by limiting the 
seabed within national jurisdiction to 200 nautical miles, their concession to the extension 
of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles greatly reduced the extent of the Area 
and also the volume of the resources subject to the common heritage of mankind 
principle. Although some broad-margin African states may benefit from this, it does not 
appear, compared to the total number of states in the continent, that this number is 
appreciable. Whilst Article 82 of the LOSC provides for distribution by the ISA, amongst 
states parties, of payments or contributions from commercial production in the extended 
continental shelf in line with the common heritage of mankind principle, as a compromise 
measure, the distributable percentage is very limited. The LOSC provides for payments 
or contributions from the sixth year of commercial production of 1 per cent of the value 
or volume of production at site (excluding resources used in connection with production), 
progressively increasing by an additional 1 per cent for each subsequent year until it 
stabilises at 7 per cent from the twelfth year. This, along with the possibility of 
exemption of developing states able to establish that they are net importers of the mineral 
produced in the extended continental shelf, would limit the distributable income 
available, unlike what would have been the case if  such part of the seabed, believed to be 
mineral rich, had remained as part of the Area. Also, from an original stance advocating 
that a strong international institution would have the exclusive right to exploit the Area, 
African states, especially in the light of the attractive possibility of access to marine 
technology and know-how, as well as finance for the Enterprise, the ISA’s seabed mining 
corporation, from industrialised states, conceded to a parallel system of exploitation. All 
these concessions, it is suggested, encouraged the trend of the gradual watering down of 
the principle of the common heritage of mankind in respect of the Area and its resources.
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This culminated in the 1994 Agreement that seriously modified the original regime as 
enunciated in Part XI, thereby further diminishing the whole concept of the common 
heritage of mankind. The whole process leading to the 1994 Agreement merely confirms 
the rather obvious truism that in spite of the numerical strength of developed states, 
including African states, the real centre of influence and control of the regime is vested in 
the industrialised developed states.
Despite the initial enthusiastic participation and contribution to the development of the 
regime by African states, their interest presently appears to have degenerated to apathy. 
This is evinced by the fact that African states are in no way represented in the list of 
pioneer investors, neither is there any evidence of any African state involvement in 
research, prospecting and exploratory activities in the Area. Also this apathy is reflected 
in poor attendance of African states at meetings of the Assembly and other organs of the 
ISA, as well as the non-payment of contributions to the budget of the ISA. This is 
explicable by the fact that commercial exploitation is not imminent. Further, the non­
participation in seabed mining activities is also attributable to the fact that virtually all 
African states, in the face of the scourge of poverty, lack the financial, as well as 
technological, wherewithal to engage in a high risk, capital and high technology activity 
such as deep seabed mining. However, this may not be the case for all African states, 
since a handful have embarked on the similarly capital and high-technology intensive 
venture of sending satellite to space. Perhaps for these states the main reason for non­
participation in deep seabed activities is more attributable to the lack of interest, as a 
result of the indefinite postponement of commercial exploitation. The thesis, while 
conceding that there are pressing priority issues confronting the African continent such as 
poverty, the AIDS pandemic and internal conflicts, contends that there should be some 
level of participation on the part of African states in deep seabed mining activities. 
Although commercial exploitation is not imminent, the thesis advocates that some level 
of participation by Africa states in research, prospecting and exploratory activities, would 
have an incidental effect of helping in marine technology capacity building that would
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come in useful in mining activities even within national jurisdiction. While conceding 
that it may not be feasible, in view of other priority areas, for African states to embark on 
deep seabed activities individually, in view of the enormous financial implications and 
technology required the thesis suggests various co-operative frameworks between 
African states as a bloc, under a framework such as African Union (AU), and other 
entities engaged in deep seabed activities and having the necessary wherewithal. 
However, there is a preference for co-operation under the south-south framework 
between African states as a bloc and developing seabed mining states (India, China and 
South Korea), since their common status as developing states would provide a vantage 
position of certain shared forums, such as the Group of 77 and the Non-Aligned 
Movement, and certain common experiences.
7.3. Recommendations.
The following recommendations are made concerning African states’ participation in 
deep seabed activities:
• An articulated Ocean and Coastal Policy, under the auspices of the African 
Union (AU), mapping out an African common policy on the law of the sea 
generally and the deep seabed regime in particular;
• An Institutional framework similar to India’s DOD, China’s COMRA and 
South Korea’s KORDI, but in this case a continent-based institution, again under 
the auspices of the AU, to provide an institutional framework for carrying out 
joint research and other activities on law of the sea issues, including those 
concerning the Area;
• A deliberate and articulated move with regard to pushing before the ISA, the 
SPLOS and the General Assembly an agenda towards looking afresh at the 
definition of “resources o f  the Area” under Article 1(1) of LOSC. This should be 
with a view to pushing for its amendment, in order to expand the definition to 
include other deep seabed activities that have more immediate prospects of 
exploitation and profitability, such as the exploration of genetic resources, thereby 
accelerating the prospects of benefits for less developed states, including African 
states, under the principle of common heritage of mankind;
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• A push during the impending review under Article 154 of LOSC, expected to 
be taken up at the Eleventh Session of the ISA, for the Assembly to adopt, or 
recommend to other organs to adopt, measures that would encourage the actual 
participation of African states in deep seabed mining activities, including research 
and actual exploration of the Area, in line with Article 148 of LOSC, which 
declares that “the effective participation o f developing states in activities in the 
Area shall be promoted. ”
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